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Intermunicipal cooperation (IMC) has become a fashionable topic often discussed 
by many experts in Central and Eastern Europe. A popular toolkit prepared by the 
Council of Europe, in cooperation with UNDP and Local Government and Public 
Service Reform Initiative, is just one of the prominent examples of this trend. In 
academic debates, IMC has been discussed for a long time as one of solutions for 
the improvement of metropolitan governance (Ostrom 1991; Barlow 1991; Norris, 
Phares, and Zimmerman 2007), but recently it has also been considered as part of a 
more comprehensive analysis of European practices (e.g., Hulst and Montfort 2007). 
This volume contributes to this debate, adding to the discussion the practical experi-
ences of countries in South Eastern and Central Europe (although the volume by 
Hulst and Montfort referred to all of Europe in its title, in fact it only focused on 
Western Europe). 
DEFINITION
Before going into the details of the presented studies, it is important to deﬁne the 
scope of our interest. What do we mean by intermunicipal cooperation? We are 
interested in:
  Joint delivery of services by two or more local governments in the country, 
which may involve diﬀerent functions, such as administrative services, water 
provision, public transport, but also joint activities among broader policies, such 
as the promotion of local economic development, which may be a single- or 
multi-purpose arrangement;
  Voluntary cooperation: we exclude from our scope of interest any forms which 
are strictly imposed by the law (although the law may sometimes strongly 
stimulate or even oblige local governments to look for cooperative solutions);
  Cooperation which is not incidental, but has a certain duration and most often 
is a permanent arrangement with an unspeciﬁed termination date;
  Diﬀerent legal forms of cooperation. In some cases this may include the creation 
of a new legal entity (for example, a co-ownership between involved local govern-
ments), while in others it may take on a more loose legal form;
  At the same time, and contrary to amalgamation, there is no deﬁnitive transfer 
of local tasks or competencies; municipal governments keep at least indirect 
control over the decisions and services that result from cooperation. 
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However, in this volume we do not discuss following the cases:
  National or regional associations representing local governments vis à vis, for 
instance, national government;
  Transborder cooperation between local governments;
  Selling services from one local government to another. 
WHY IMC?
Why such an interest in the topic? After the 1990 political transition in Central and 
Eastern Europe, there was widespread belief that decentralization could signiﬁcantly 
contribute to democratization and to a better delivery of services. But it soon became clear 
that in many cases individual local governments often had problems with an acceptable 
standard for the delivery of services. Obviously there are multiple reasons, including the 
gap between verbal support for decentralization and an actual reluctance to share power 
and resources with lower tiers of government. But one of the more important reasons is 
the often territorial fragmentation among municipal governments, which are too small 
to cope with several issues.1 At the same time, territorial reform is not feasible in many 
cases, and/or its implementation would lead to too many negative side-eﬀects.2 Some 
experts even suggest that the development of intermunicipal cooperation may be seen 
as a viable alternative for the territorial mergers of small jurisdictions (Hertzog 2010), 
although this conclusion might be seen as controversial. But even if local government 
systems are not territorially fragmented, local governments may beneﬁt from the joint 
delivery of services. 
So what are the major beneﬁts of IMC? Let’s recapitulate the most important argu-
ments discussed in academic and consultant reports. 
Economy of Scale
There is economy of scale in many local services. The marginal cost of service delivery 
is lower if the total amount of services produced is larger or—in other words—the 
unit cost of service delivery is lower if the scale of production is larger. If the service 
is provided jointly for two or more municipalities, the number of consumers is larger 
and the quantity of supply may be higher, which allows for a reduction in unit cost. 
Administrative services provided in local town halls provide an excellent example of 
this phenomenon. Spending per capita on local government administration is usually 
especially high in small local governments—this fact is well documented by empirical 
evidences from many countries (for evidence from the CEE region—see Swianiewicz 
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2002). This is especially important in countries with a lot of small local governments 
(for example, with less than 1,000 residents). In such tiny local jurisdictions, the cost of 
administration has to be a high burden for the local budget. In Hungary, already in the 
1990s some of such small local governments started to create “joint oﬃces” delivering 
administrative services for a couple or more municipalities. A similar solution has been 
applied a bit later also in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
The argument of economy of scale is especially important in countries with territori-
ally fragmented administrative systems, but for some services, it may also be important in 
countries in which municipal units are usually relatively large. Solid waste management 
provides a good example. It is a municipal function in most European countries, but it 
cannot be eﬀectively organized within the scale of a typical single municipality. Although 
estimates vary, in Poland experts agree that the minimal population size required for 
solid waste organization is around 70–100,000 customers. The average size of a Polish 
municipality is 16,000 and within rural areas this number goes down to approximately 
7,500 citizens. Cooperation between local governments seems to be the only logical 
solution if we want to apply modern technologies, including recycling systems, to build 
more than a primitive waste-dump, which would harm local natural environments. 
Catchment Areas are Wider than Administrative Boundaries
—‘Free Riders’ Consume Services 
Unless a service is charged to consumers according to the full cost-recovery model, 
consumers from other jurisdictions are subsidized by local taxes paid by residents living 
within the municipality where the service provider resides. A local government where 
the service originates is therefore responsible for services used by consumers who live 
outside of their jurisdiction in surrounding municipalities.
Public transportation systems in metropolitan areas provide the perfect example of 
such a situation. City buses, trams or underground systems usually serve not only the 
city center, but also surrounding suburban municipalities. If transport is delivered by 
the central city and if tickets do not cover 100 percent of incurred costs (which is often 
the case) then passengers from the suburbs are “free riders,” since they are indirectly 
subsidized by taxpayers from the city center. And even if the total cost is included in 
the ticket, there is still an accountability problem: transportation is delivered by a local 
government that these riders cannot inﬂuence. In practice, it often leads to poor ser-
vices in the suburbs, poor integration of metropolitan transportation systems, conﬂicts 
among municipalities about ﬁnancing the system, etc. An agreement allowing for the 
joint provision of the service for the whole area seems to be a logical solution. 
Public transportation in metropolitan areas is not the only example of this issue 
discussed in this section. Similar problems may occur with other services in which 
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the natural “catchment area” is wider than the administrative boundaries of the single 
jurisdiction. It concerns, for example, waste collection in metro areas or public trans-
portation in tourist regions covering more than one municipality (such as a ski-area 
with lifts starting in two or three neighboring municipalities). It often also concerns 
social services, such as secondary schools or healthcare institutions, that do not serve 
only the citizens of the local government unit responsible for the service, but citizens 
living outside their jurisdictions as well.
Joint Management of Indivisible Technical Infrastructure
Sometimes the infrastructure network, such as water provision, wastewater collection, or 
central heating systems, are constructed in an area covering more than one municipal-
ity. Physical environment may be the reason for such a set-up (for example one valley 
with a few municipalities in a mountainous area), or it may be the inheritance of an 
old administrative system. 
In Poland, prior to reform in 1990, local governments had no ownership of infra-
structure facilities like water networks. Facilities were owned and managed by the state 
and were often constructed across municipal borders. After 1990, when the ownership 
of property related to local infrastructure was being transferred to municipal govern-
ments, it was not clear who should take ownership and responsibility over such water 
provision or central heating systems. The creation of an intermunicipal association that 
would deal with management of the services was often a condition of communaliza-
tion of the property (the alternative would be the provision of the service by the state 
administration). In fact, most of the ﬁrst intermunicipal cooperation arrangements in 
Poland found themselves in such situations. Many of the local associations established 
between 1990–1991 still exist and are successfully delivering services. 
Joint Management of Functionally Integrated but Territorially 
Fragmented Areas
There are some areas in which the rationale for intermunicipal cooperation may be espe-
cially visible. These are areas that consist of several municipalities, but due to functional 
integration, many services cannot be eﬀectively provided by individual municipalities, 
which are isolated from one another. One variant of such a situation is related to the 
natural catchment area of the services delivered for a local population (as discussed 
above). But there are also situations in which there is no such “natural” incentive for 
integration. Nevertheless, the coordination of activities brings about positive impacts 
for all involved parties. 
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Let’s think about a metropolitan area within a centrally located city and several 
suburban municipalities that surround it, or about a tourist area which, for incoming 
guests, is a single region (with ski-lifts, historical castles, bicycle paths etc.), but for 
which the territory is divided among many local governments. Physical planning or 
economic strategies (technically) can be developed separately for each of the munici-
palities. But they may be much more eﬀective if local governments cooperate with 
each other and develop joint plans, or at least coordinate their individual ideas. In 
one case, the development of the international airport in a big Polish city was seri-
ously delayed because the new, planned runway was located on the border of two 
municipalities. Obtaining the permission to build required the creation of the zoning 
plan and then other necessary actions agreed upon between both local governments. 
A joint association responsible for bringing these municipalities together and for 
dealing with economic development could help to solve these kinds of problems in 
advance in order to accelerate a project’s implementation. 
Better Visibility
Sometimes municipalities decide to cooperate with each other to achieve better vis-
ibility. They realize that they are too small to undertake eﬀective tourist promotion or 
campaigns to attract new investors. Single local governments cannot aﬀord a promo-
tional campaign, which becomes aﬀordable if the cost is shared between two or more 
municipalities. Moreover, the attractiveness depends on location in a broader region. 
An individual castle or an individual cave (if we talk about tourist promotion) is not 
interesting enough, but what makes them attractive is a cluster in a territory of neighbor-
ing municipalities. The promotional campaign of a single municipality would not make 
much sense, but joint promotion is very eﬀective. Similar examples may be provided in 
the case of investment opportunity promotion. 
Access to External Funds
A very speciﬁc but important beneﬁt from IMC to many countries in Central, East-
ern, and South Eastern Europe is access to external project funding. Several programs 
supported by the EU or other international donors require either a minimal threshold 
for the project size (which is not available for individual, small local governments) or a 
direct mention of involvement by a group of municipalities. 
Individual gains from cooperation are interrelated and, in practice, there is rarely 
only one, single case made to establish a cooperation arrangement. For example, the 
case for joint tourist promotion, discussed above, may be presented as a project that 
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will increase visibility or economy of scale (therefore reducing costs for individual local 
governments). It is clear from the above discussion that there might be diﬀerent motives 
and various areas for the development of intermunicipal cooperation. 
A GOOD BUT RARE SOLUTION
If intermunicipal cooperation is such a good idea, why does it happen so rarely? Although 
innovative examples might be easily cited from nearly all of the European countries, if we 
look more carefully we discover more failures, or cases where IMC seems to be a natural 
solution, but where it is not utilized. The only examples of countries in which IMC is 
really widespread (such as France or Finland) are cases in which external incentives to 
cooperate are very powerful, sometimes to the extent where questions are raised about 
just how “voluntary” the cooperation is. Another important question is why, when an 
IMC is formed, does it not always function smoothly? These questions are the reasons 
behind the decision to undertake this study. We decided to research the issue to better 
understand typical IMC problems in individual countries and to discuss what might 
be done to minimize the barriers for eﬀective IMC. 
Also, it is important to note that we do not see IMC as an ideal solution for all 
the problems involved with decentralization and local government operation. The 
solution itself creates some new problems. That is why intermunicipal cooperation is 
not only praised, but also very critically analyzed by some authors (see, for example, 
Wollmann 2007, Borraz and Le Gales 2005). Some of the potential drawbacks are 
discussed brieﬂy below.
Slow Decision-making Process 
It very often happens that intermunicipal bodies are slow in making any decisions. 
Because they involve many municipalities, their delegates often have to consult with 
their “local home councils” when they are making crucial decisions. Although it takes 
time, sometimes a quick decision is necessary for the success of the project. Decision-
making is complicated by the involvement of more decision-makers, and there are no 
hierarchical provisions to get them out of deadlock situations.
Obviously the extent to which this issue is a problem depends on many factors, such 
as the legal form of the IMC institution or the internal regulation provisions agreed to 
by the involved municipalities. It is less of a problem if the IMC institution is a separate 
legal entity or if municipalities agree to form a separate company where they hold shares 
and which delivers services on their behalf. 
9D e m a n d e d  b u t  D i f f i c u l t :  I n t e r m u n i c i p a l  C o o p e r a t i o n  i n  C e n t r a l  a n d  E a s t e r n  E u r o p e
Duplication of Costs and Personnel
An IMC should in theory help to reduce costs (or to achieve more for the same cost). But 
in practice it turns out diﬀerently. For various reasons, including the inertia of bureaucratic 
structures, ambitions of local politicians who are not ready to give up their direct control or 
management posts, a municipality will spend more on personnel to handle issues that, in 
theory, have been transferred to IMC institutions. In such a case, IMC, instead of saving, 
incurs additional costs. Helmut Wollmann, in his 2007 critique, remarks on the situation 
in several French communautes, citing the overlap of functions between communes and 
intermunicipal communautes and the “chaotic system of partnership.” 
Democratic Deﬁcit
Mechanisms for social control over municipal governments, although far from being 
perfect, are known and well established. Meetings of the local council are open for the 
public and local media, and minutes from the meetings are also available (often on 
the internet). The mechanisms for decision-making are clearly described in national 
legislations and are known at least by the elites of local civic society. But the decision-
making procedures in IMC institutions are much less known and much less transparent. 
Are local councils—not to mention local civic society—informed (or: how are they 
informed?) about what goes on during the consultations between municipalities? Who 
controls, and how is the budget of intermunicipal institutions controlled? There is no 
doubt that the establishment of a proper system of controls is more challenging than 
the establishing of service delivery by a single local government. Some experts suggest 
that IMC institutions are especially vulnerable to corruption.
Political Costs of Cooperation
Entering intermunicipal cooperation means also sharing in the power and prestige en-
joyed by local political leaders. Sometimes they are reluctant to join the IMC structure 
because they are not ready to give up some of their responsibilities. But even after the 
decision has been made, the issue still remains. The ambitions of involved leaders, their 
pride and a weak ability to compromise may all lead to conﬂicts and hamper cooperation. 
It happens that local particularism, instead of being eradicated by the IMC arrangement, 
is showing up in a diﬀerent form. 
Another related issue is the phenomenon of “free-riders of cooperation”—munici-
palities who formally joined the IMC institution are willing to beneﬁt from it, but at 
the same time are inactive and unready to provide ﬁnancial and human resources. 
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All of the described situations may result in the deterioration rather than the accu-
mulation of trust among partners. And in the long-run, they endanger the sustainability 
of the IMC arrangement. 
The discussion of IMC’s negative features does not suggest that intermunicipal 
cooperation is a bad choice for the challenges faced with intermunicipal service deliv-
ery. Aside from the potential negative impacts, there are also positive eﬀects, such as 
the diﬀusion of innovations in management among participating local governments, 
the development of trust and a cooperative culture, etc. What we are suggesting is 
that one should not have naïve or oversimpliﬁed expectations with regard to inter-
municipal cooperation. Recommendations on legal stipulations and policies, which 
would help to mitigate these negative impacts, have also been a focus in the studies 
presented in this volume. 
ABOUT THIS VOLUME
The volume includes ﬁve country studies prepared during the period between 2008–
2009. The aims of the studies included:
 1. Diagnosis of current intermunicipal cooperation practices in participating coun-
tries. More speciﬁc questions included: What forms of cooperative arrangements 
are allowed by current legislation? How often are they used and what for (to 
perform which functions)? What have been the typical motives for establishing 
voluntary cooperation? How eﬀective are they usually? (For example: is there 
any evidence of economy of scale being achieved through cooperation?)
 2. Identifying barriers limiting scope and eﬀectiveness of existing arrangements. 
Barriers might be of diﬀerent nature: (i) legal/regulatory—for example, certain 
forms of cooperation are not allowed by the law, or ﬁnancial regulations provide 
disincentives rather than incentives for cooperation; (ii) political/cultural—such 
as the low level of trust among local politicians, poor civic control over policy-
making processes, etc. 
 3. Recommendations related to the legal framework and central as well as local 
government policies to be implemented in order to support IMC-type solutions. 
Recommendations concern both legal (regulatory) frameworks and capacity 
building at the local level. How can legal obstacles for cooperation be removed? 
What incentives might be provided to stimulate the most eﬀective solutions? 
How can transparency and accountability be increased during the decision 
making process in cooperative arrangements?
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The structure of individual chapters is similar but not identical. There are diﬀerences 
related to local environment—meaning both speciﬁc country characteristics observed 
during practice, and access to various data sources (ﬁnancial reports, national inven-
tory of intermunicipal institutions etc.). But there are common elements that may be 
identiﬁed in each of the chapters. They include:
  Analysis of the legal framework for intermunicipal cooperation;
  Description of the “state of art”—an attempt to draw a general picture of the 
current situation in the country. It includes data collection on a number of 
relevant arrangements, areas of local government functions, and the most often 
mentioned problems and successes;
  A few case studies with a more in-depth analysis of the history and results of 
selected IMC examples. 
Additionally, methods of empirical research are not identical, but there are signiﬁcant 
similarities among the chapters. Both qualitative and quantitative methods are used. 
Authors of all chapters analyze available documents (legal regulations, reports, and of-
ﬁcial policy documents) and statistical data concerning local government ﬁnances and 
other aspects of intermunicipal cooperation. All reports also feature in-depth interviews 
with bureaucrats and politicians involved with the analyzed institutions. Some of the 
chapters also refer to quantitative data from surveys of the involved local governments. 
There are ﬁve studies of ﬁve countries presented in the volume. Presented coun-
try cases are diﬀerent on several levels, including the existing experience in building 
institutions of intermunicipal countries. Two of the countries are currently members 
of the European Union (Czech Republic since 2004, Romania since 2007), while the 
remaining three are in various stages of advancement toward integration with the EU 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia). 
As discussed above, territorial organization (the size of the local governments) is espe-
cially important for intermunicipal cooperation. Table 1 demonstrates that our selection 
of cases is diverse based on this criterion. The Czech Republic belongs among the most 
territorially fragmented countries in the region, with far over half of its municipalities 
having less than 1,000 residents. Macedonia is the most territorially consolidated of 
the analyzed systems—with an average (median) population size of over 10,000 and 
no local government unit having less than 1,000 residents. It is worth emphasizing 
that such a territorial organization results from relatively recent (2004) consolidation 
reforms reducing the number of Macedonian municipalities from well over 100 to 84.3 
The remaining three countries: Romania, Albania and Bosnia, from this point of view, 
vary in size among the local governments of the Czech Republic at one extreme and 
Macedonia at the other. Our chapter on Bosnia and Herzegovina discusses both situa-
tions in Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The level of 
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territorial fragmentation is slightly diﬀerent in both parts of the country. In the former 
case (Republika Srpska) the territorial organization is especially peculiar—on the one 
hand the median size of municipalities is relatively large (more than 10,000 people), 
but when looking at individual cases the size varies greatly: four out of more than 60 
municipalities have less than 1,000 citizens. Such a variation certainly inﬂuences the 
demand for and capacity to cooperate with other local governments.
Table 1.
Territorial Fragmentation in Selected Countries of Central and Eastern Europe
Percent of municipal governments with population below 1,000
0 Up to 5% 5–50% Over 50%
Median 
population 
size of 
municipal 
government
<1,000 Czech Rep.
Hungary
Slovakia
1–5,000 Romania
Croatia
Moldova
Estonia
5–10,000 Albania
Poland
Macedonia—
before the 
reform
Over 10,000 Macedonia—
after 2004 
reform
Bulgaria
Lithuania
Serbia
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina
Note: Countries covered in this volume are marked with bold.
Finally, our countries diﬀer in their experience of building intermunicipal institu-
tions. The Czech Republic has considerable experience in cooperation, and for the last 
few years a speciﬁc form of cooperation (microregions) has been promoted by national 
policies. On the other hand in countries like Albania or Bosnia, the tradition of coop-
erative solutions is less frequent, and our chapters describe their ﬁrst attempts at such 
experiments. 
In general, the selection of countries provides a wide spectrum of conditions for 
IMC and the conclusions from the presented studies may be interesting from the point 
of view of other countries in the region. 
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COMMON OBSERVATIONS
The cases presented are diﬀerent in many respects and the lessons learned from each 
are often country speciﬁc. However, there are still some common observations that are 
worth emphasizing in this introductory chapter. 
Monitoring and Data Availability
In all of the analyzed countries, data availability on existing IMCs and their operation 
is a problem. Obviously, the scope of this problem is diﬀerent. In some cases, even the 
basic inventory of existing practices is not an easy task, and our authors had to make 
an enormous eﬀort to collect information from various sources (and they could never 
be sure that their data was complete). But even in countries with more advanced data 
collection systems (like the Czech Republic or Romania), there are problems with un-
derstanding the IMC operation. For example, the ﬁnancial reports are not suﬃciently 
clear on detail. Needless to say, that lack of suﬃcient information puts into question 
the possibility of fully transparent (and accountable) IMC arrangements. It all suggests 
that a special eﬀort is needed in order to collect and provide the data necessary for 
monitoring and which would allow formulation of further recommendations. It is a 
task for the national associations of local governments, but more immediately for state 
controlled institutions (such as statistical oﬃces or organizations responsible for the 
ﬁnancial supervision of local governments). 
Various Level of Development
As was expected, the IMC arrangements in analyzed countries are spread out to diﬀerent 
degrees. Due to limited data availability, it is very diﬃcult to provide accurate data, but 
the best possible estimation is provided in Table 2. 
It is not surprising that the phenomenon of IMC is the most common in the 
Czech Republic. The extreme territorial fragmentation pushes small Czech obce (local 
governments) into cooperation arrangements. Relatively high levels of local autonomy 
strengthen the trend, since autonomous units have to ﬁnd their own way in coping 
with the wide range of services they are responsible for.4 
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Table 2.
“Incidents” of IMC Arrangements 
Number of IMC arrangements/number 
of municipal-tier governments
Proportion of municipal 
governments involved
Albania 16/373 About 15%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 17/142 About 50%
Czech Republic 800/6,273 Close to 90%
Macedonia Over 60 Over 80%
Romania Over 200/3,180 About 40%
IMC arrangements are also relatively common in Bosnia, Macedonia and Romania, 
where more than half the municipalities are engaged in one or more agreements. In 
Romania there are more than 200 interesting cases. On average, one IMC arrange-
ment involves 7.7 local governments, but some of them are involved with more than 
one intermunicipal institution. In Bosnia there are at least 17 cases of intermunicipal 
cooperation. In Macedonia ﬁre protection is the most common among cooperation 
arrangements (involving half of all municipalities), but it is also semi-compulsory, 
required by national legislation. The Macedonian chapter provides a full list of IMC 
arrangements in the three most popular areas: local economic development and plan-
ning (in addition to ﬁre protection). Seventy of 84 Macedonian local governments are 
involved in cooperation in one of these three areas. 
Albania seems to be on the opposite extreme when compared to the Czech Re-
public. The inventory is not necessarily complete, but the author of the chapter on 
Albania was able to identify only 16 cases of existing cooperation among the close to 
400 municipalities. Only a small fraction of local governments have any experience 
in existing IMC institutions, and cooperation among local governments may still be 
considered a relatively rare innovation. But as is clear from the chapter, the situation is 
dynamic (some of the factors inﬂuencing the change are discussed later in this chapter).
Economy of Scale or Economy of Scope?
The typical argument in favor of IMC arrangements is to try to lower the unit cost of 
service deliveries. However, completed studies steer our attention to the fact that in 
Central and Eastern Europe the cooperation of small local governments makes possible 
the provision of services which would remain undelivered otherwise, even if they are on 
a list of mandated local government services. Cristina Stanus in her chapter on Romania 
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calls this phenomenon “economy of scope” and notices that the beneﬁts from it are even 
more important than when considered in the “classic discussions” of economy of scale. 
Areas of IMC
The scope of activities provided by intermunicipal institutions is very much diversiﬁed, 
but it seems that in analyzed countries two areas are dominant:
  Services related to environmental protection—mostly solid waste management 
and water/sewage services. In that area both economy of scope and economy of 
scale play an important role;
  General and often more loose cooperation related to land-use and economic 
planning, promotion of local economic growth, and tourist promotion. 
Obviously, there are also incidents of cooperation in other areas (for example, tax 
collection and ﬁre protection in Macedonia) but the two mentioned above seem to be 
the most typical.
IMC Does Not Happen ‘Automatically’ Nor Is Success Guaranteed
In none of the ﬁve countries was the development of IMC a massive, spontaneous 
result of bottom-up initiatives. If more numerous cases of IMC are observed, there is 
usually an incentive program somewhere behind it. Czech (but also Slovak or Hungar-
ian—not described in this volume) government policy to stimulate microregions is 
just one example of this trend. Moreover, it is not suﬃcient to initiate IMC with the 
assumption that beneﬁts would be evident and success might be taken for granted. In 
every country we ﬁnd examples of failures, sometimes due to opaque legal rules, and 
more often due to the inability of local politicians to give up their individual ambi-
tions in order to do something together with their neighbors. Unfortunately, some 
of our fellows were reluctant to include stories of failure in their chapters, suggesting 
instead that cases of success would be more interesting and revealing to the reader, 
or because they feared negative reactions from the “heroes” of the failed attempts. 
We respect their choices, although we believe that negative experiences may be as 
revealing as positive ones. 
16
W O R K I N G  T O G E T H E R :  I N T E R M U N I C I PA L  C O O P E R A T I O N  I N  F I V E  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E A N  C O U N T R I E S
The Role of the International Community
In each of the described countries there are examples of the role international programs 
played in the stimulation of intermunicipal cooperation. In Romania and the Czech 
Republic it was often the European Union who did a lot for the broad growth of coop-
erative practices. The stimulation was not always direct. But several local governments 
realized (or were told by their advisors) that they could not access EU Structural Funds 
by working alone. Their projects, they were told, were too small to pass the evaluation 
threshold, or they were simply incapable of submitting an acceptable proposal. Therefore 
working together with neighboring municipalities was the only option for those who 
wanted to beneﬁt from EU funds for regional policies. In the remaining countries (espe-
cially Albania and Bosnia) there were international donor programs (both multilateral, 
like UNDP or the World Bank, and bilateral, like the German GTZ) that played an 
important role in building in these countries the ﬁrst examples of IMC arrangements. 
It seems that international institutions can do more to build a record of “demonstration 
cases” which might be followed by others.
Incentives Streaming from Central Level Policies are Underused
The Czech Republic is perhaps the only exception to this case, with its central govern-
ment promoting microregions, but even in that case the incentive policies are not fully 
convincing. Following Hulst and Montfort (2007) we may distinguish three major 
types of possible incentives:
  Financial—in which, most typically, IMC is supported by various kinds of 
grants.
  Functional—in which certain functions may be delegated to local governments 
under the condition that they create an IMC institution.
  Setting obligatory standards or formulating statutory obligations to cooperate 
(leaving, however, local discretion as to the details related to the area, practical 
arrangements and the details of cooperation). 
The last example would be perhaps the least useful in Central and Eastern European 
environments. Setting too many unrealistic rules and standards is a common problem 
in the region anyway. These regulations are often not followed (because following all 
of them would exceed the capacity of local governments) and at the same time they 
seriously damage local autonomy. So producing more rules in order to stimulate IMC 
would most likely be both ineﬀective and harmful to the entire system of local govern-
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ments. The two remaining types of incentives, however, could be more eﬀectively used 
by central governments. 
 
Geographical Leadership
Although this discussion focuses on voluntary, horizontal cooperation between local 
governments, the successful cases presented in individual chapters suggest that there is 
often one municipality that clearly takes a lead in a joint project or activity. Frequently 
it is the largest local government (for example, a centrally located city cooperating 
with surrounding rural units), whose leadership seems natural for the other members 
of the joint institution. But sometimes the leadership may arise from the activity or 
charisma of a local political leader, not necessarily from the “natural features” of the 
local government unit. In any case, such leadership, if based not on power domina-
tion but rather on negotiation skills which are accepted by other players, is often an 
important factor of success. 
Legal Regulations Are Important but Not Sufﬁcient
Discussions about the improvement of local government systems often focus on legal 
regulations. The same approach may be noticed in the case of the many discussions about 
the promotion of intermunicipal cooperation. The law is of course very important. It 
provides (or does not provide—in a pessimist scenario) a foundation for any actions. 
But it is only a small part of a successful story. Similarly, it is not enough to provide 
training for local politicians explaining to them the potential beneﬁts of horizontal 
cooperation arrangements. There are important barriers in addition to these factors 
and they may be of a diﬀerent nature. In the Bosnian chapter (and to a smaller extent 
in some other chapters in this volume), there is a discussion of the problems associated 
with the cooperation of municipalities governed by diﬀerent political parties or inhab-
ited by diﬀerent ethnic groups. More generally speaking, the culture of cooperation and 
trust among involved actors is a crucial factor, which can only partially be changed by 
legal reforms or training on potential gains from an IMC. Policy recommendations to 
help IMC arrangements should therefore include not only legal changes and content 
training for local leaders, but also wider policies related to building civil society and 
to stimulating the growth of social capital in local communities. Such actions may be 
useful in the long-term. 
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NOTES
1 More about territorial fragmentation after 1990: Swianiewicz 2002.
2 The issue of territorial reform has recently been widely discussed in another LGI publication 
(Swianiewicz 2010) and will not be discussed in detail in this volume.
3 Local government units were even larger in the period when Macedonia was a Yugoslav 
republic, so consolidation in 2004 was in fact a partial reverse of the fragmentation trend 
after 1990 (for details see: Kreci and Ymeri 2010).
4 A relatively high number of Voluntary Municipal Associations should be supplemented by 
an unknown number of cooperation arrangements through intermunicipal companies.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The ﬁrst conﬁrmation of the existence of political will to share power and set up local 
government units (LGUs) in Albania came with the passing of the Law on Functions and 
Organization of Local Governments (August 1992). Decentralization remains a priority on 
the country’s political agenda, adhering to principles of subsidiarity, local autonomy, efﬁcient 
use of resources, transparency, and accountability. Nevertheless, two major components 
of the decentralization reform—its legal frame and implementation—have advanced at 
different speeds. 
Substantial progress has been made with the preparation of a legal framework. The 
Constitution of the Republic of Albania, voted on through a popular referendum in October 
1998, established the principle of autonomy for LGUs. It spelled out that local government is 
founded upon the basis of the principle of decentralization of power and exercised according 
to the principle of local autonomy.1 This was followed by the ratiﬁcation of the European Char-
ter of Local Self-Government (1999) and approval of the National Decentralization Strategy 
for Local Authorities. This strategy has been widely accepted by stakeholders, although, to 
some extent, acceptance has been triggered by features of the strategy compilation process. 
Subsequent laws have been endorsed since then, handing over a wide array of functions to 
local units and providing some ﬁscal basis for implementing devolved functions.
In contrast, with respect to implementation of the decentralization process, ambitious 
deadlines are far from being met. The process of transferring the duties and responsibilities 
from central to local government authorities has proven to be slower than initially antici-
pated.2
In the early stages, services and functions from which the public could beneﬁt directly 
were handed over to local bodies, which, although politically autonomous, still lacked real 
administrative and ﬁscal autonomy.3 Since 2000, implementation of the decentralization 
strategy has been continuously granting new competencies to local governments and de-
manding new solutions from local authorities to handle service delivery. Local authorities 
must shoulder several new responsibilities that they have no previous experience with, nor 
staff with the adequate skills. Moreover, LGUs lack appropriate funding to deliver expected 
services to local communities. (Previously, local units relied on the central government to 
provide such services.) Presently, much of the required funding will be generated locally, 
particularly from service taxes, focusing LGU efforts on improving the efﬁciency and effec-
tiveness of their operations.
This paper serves the purpose of assisting LGUs to wield their decentralized power and 
explores inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) as one of the routes towards improved local 
service delivery and the implementation of decentralized functions. Albania is no exception 
among the CEE countries where IMC is embryonic compared with several Western European 
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countries where such arrangements are abundant and backed up by a strong culture of 
cooperation and tools to facilitate and encourage it.
The ﬁrst sections of this paper analyze the status quo of local government, including 
the implementation of newly decentralized functions, without trying to generalize features 
that vary among local units in the country. Despite analysis describing the overall situation 
at the national level, the relatively large urban centers are in a favorable position in terms 
of services offered and ﬁscal capacities.
This research has made maximum use of the extended network of FLAG (Foundation 
of Local Autonomy and Governance) in trying to identify and record, for the ﬁrst time in 
Albania, cooperation among LGUs. Nevertheless, it cannot claim that the inventory presents 
a full-ﬂedged, countrywide assessment of inter-municipal associations. 
Some of the IMC arrangements are described in detail to account for process and 
institutional arrangements that accompanied the setting up of cooperation in the scarce 
examples identiﬁed. Case studies also describe incentives and challenges while considering 
the joining of forces for improved service delivery. Perception transcripts in case studies are 
gathered through discussions with respective ofﬁcials of cooperating municipalities and IMC 
staff, where applicable. Noticeably, case studies are quite descriptive, and monitoring and 
evaluation focus just on provisions for them at the initial development stage.
Some lessons learned from case studies are explored in the ﬁnal chapter, which makes 
recommendations for improved delivery at the local level through IMC.
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1. MATCHING OBLIGATIONS WITH LOCAL CAPACITIES
 —OVERVIEW OF THE STATUS QUO 
The dynamics of decentralization (functional followed by ﬁscal) in Albania have been 
counteracted by continuous questioning of LGU capacities to handle new tasks. Nev-
ertheless, the ﬁnal outcome of the functional division testiﬁes to the strong political 
will to decentralize. 
Such a dilemma is unsurprising given a starting point (in 1992) during which 
politically autonomous local governments operated within a highly centralized envi-
ronment right up until 1998. Responsibilities and the resource base were not clearly 
deﬁned by law, and local councils, though elected, possessed no relevant discretionary 
power to establish local priorities, nor any signiﬁcant revenue autonomy. Practically 
all expenditure allocation decisions were inﬂuenced or taken directly by the central 
government. Most resources used locally were earmarked and local authorities were 
left with insigniﬁcant, uncertain local revenue sources. For the last of these, local 
governments had limited leeway, since they could not determine the basis nor set 
the rates of their taxes and fees, nor could they administer their own revenue col-
lection. Local policy-making and “housekeeping” functions were handled through 
de-concentrated agencies. 
Subsequent sections of this paper will try to analyze some dimensions of the national 
institutional context with particular emphasis on the position of local government 
within the state structure. Several aspects that speak to the necessity for and advantages 
of cooperation (Hulst, 2007) include: the structure and division of duties within ad-
ministrative boundaries and tiers, functional and ﬁscal autonomy, and the evolution of 
the size and quantity of local units. 
External factors, particularly EU ﬁnancing instruments, inﬂuencing performance 
and opportunities for LGUs, are not thoroughly analyzed here, but recognized in vari-
ous sections since their impact is often decisive when considering further horizontal 
and vertical cooperation developments in public authorities.
1.1 Tiers
Decentralized tasks at the local level are implemented through a two-tier local govern-
ment system. Basic LGUs and counties (qarks) are deﬁned by the country’s constitution. 
Any other local governments that might be set up are to be regulated by such laws. 
The basic units are the communes and municipalities,4 “legal entities that perform 
all duties of self-government, with the exception of those given by law to other local 
government units.” Presently, there are a total of 373 local units composed of 65 mu-
nicipalities and 308 communes, without substantial legal diﬀerences between them.
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Counties comprise the second tier of local government and are composed of several 
basic units with traditional, economic and social ties, and joint interests. Regional and 
national policy are synchronously designed and implemented at this level. Counties 
function very much like local government associations, with limited functions deﬁned 
by law, allowing for delegation of functions from basic units or from central government. 
Their budgets are limited, they have no directly elected oﬃcials, nor do they have the 
power to levy taxes and fees.
The eﬃciency of a system comprising regions as currently deﬁned was called into 
question early on, shortly after the regions had been formally set up. Subsequently, their 
anticipated role in coordinating regional development did not produce the expected 
beneﬁts (World Bank, 2004). Thus, the functions and deﬁnition of the regions are be-
ing revised, though the deadline for ﬁnalizing a respective law keeps being pushed back 
in the implementation agenda of Albania’s decentralization strategy. In the meantime, 
there are examples of regional structures being used to boost development and tackle 
disparities. Their functioning and set up mirrors IMC in terms of regional coverage 
and scope and they have been set up, by law, with an endowment that equips them 
with qualiﬁed staﬀ.
Regions (as administrative units or reformatted solely as statistical units) have a 
crucial role to play in the implementation of the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), 
management of the latest format of EU assistance, and in the preparations for handling 
Albania’s structural funds in the forthcoming candidate stage of EU accession.
There is unexplored potential for increasing local government eﬃciency with better- 
positioned counties. The following sections focus on the basic tiers of local government 
in Albania, acknowledging counties as instruments with evolving roles crafted through 
central government policies, the donor community and the qarks’ own initiatives.
1.2 Allocation of Functions 
1.2.1 Policy Environment
The allocation of a clear set of exclusive, shared and delegated functions was laid down 
in 2000 by the Law on “Organization and Functions of Local Government,” which 
marked the beginning of the decentralization strategy implementation at a time when 
autonomous local government spending5 accounted for only 0.34 percent of GDP 
(Schroeder 2004). 
A snapshot of functions and responsibilities exercised at the local level (as of 2008) 
is reported in Table 1.1, when autonomous LGU spending amounted to 2.7 percent of 
GDP (see Mid-term budget Program 2009–2011). Sharing of responsibilities between 
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the ﬁrst and second tiers of local government and de-concentrated central agencies 
depicts vertical cooperation potential between agencies that administratively cover the 
same territory. For the purposes of this paper, the list of exclusive local government func-
tions is of particular interest since LGUs have full discretion over organizing services, 
either individually or jointly with other LGUs.
Guiding strategies such as the National Integration and Development strategy 
(2007), Decentralization Strategy (revised in 2007), and the current government pro-
gram, outline the decentralization of responsibilities at the local level for improving 
eﬃciency, accountability and responsiveness. With the central government’s initiative, 
responsibilities for shared functions are now better deﬁned, though not necessarily decen-
tralized: e.g. in pre-university education, administrative competence for municipalities 
is reduced6 and the same can be said for the country’s health care system.7
Fiscal decentralization, apart from providing for predictable resources and meaning-
ful taxation power, is seen as a way to combat corruption and formalize an economy. 
Albania’s Decentralization Strategy recognizes the diﬃculty in handling new responsibili-
ties and points to an asymmetric assignment of functions and IMC as tools to explore 
for accomplishing decentralized functions.
1.2.2 Gaps in Shouldering Legal Responsibility and Exercising Functions
Legally, all LGUs in the country should have been exercising the functions reported in 
Table 1.2 since 2000, irrespective of size or resources. The timeframe for decentralizing 
and regulating implementation of newly assigned functions was included in the Organic 
Law (2000). However, the deadlines that were set expired, and the new timeframe es-
tablished in a revised Decentralization Strategy (2007) now needs updating.8
Several factors have brought about delays, including reluctance to relinquish central 
power, existence of scarce resources at the local level and lack of a regulatory framework. 
Sometimes run-down infrastructure or accumulated debts9 have created an unwillingness 
among LGUs to take on the role of service provision provider. Meanwhile, the speed of 
ﬁscal decentralization has not matched the assignment of functions at the local level: 
initiatives to allocate meaningful ﬁscal power and properties to municipalities were 
initiated only in 2002, with the introduction of a law on taxes and fees.
A large portion of units still need to arrange service delivery start-up. As of 2007, if 
just two functions are considered—building permits and solid waste management—the 
situation accounted for the following: 
  85 percent of municipalities had territory regulation councils set up to exercise 
their function of urban planning and issuing of building permits, in contrast 
to eleven percent of communes (rural LGUs), the majority of which delegated 
the function to the qark (county).
27
C o u n t r y  R e p o r t s :  A l b a n i a
Ta
bl
e 1
.1
 
As
sig
nm
en
t o
f R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
tie
s E
xe
rc
ise
d 
at
 th
e 
Lo
ca
l L
ev
el
Q
ar
ks
M
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s 
an
d
 C
o
m
m
u
n
es
D
e-
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 S
ta
te
 
fu
n
ct
io
n
Ex
cl
u
si
ve
D
el
eg
at
ed
Ex
cl
u
si
ve
Sh
ar
ed
D
el
eg
at
ed
Planning and Administrative Services
M
ili
ta
ry
 C
on
sc
rip
tio
n
C
iv
il 
re
gi
str
y 
Po
lic
e 
an
d 
Fi
re
 fi
gh
tin
g 
(p
re
fe
ct
ur
es
)
M
un
ic
ip
al
 P
ol
ic
e
Ta
x 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n
Tr
ea
su
ry
 S
ys
te
m
Fo
rm
ul
at
io
n 
an
d 
im
pl
e-
m
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 re
gi
on
al
 
po
lic
ie
s i
n 
ha
rm
on
y 
w
ith
 
na
tio
na
l 
po
lic
ie
s
Lo
ca
l E
co
no
m
ic
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t;
M
ar
ke
t p
la
ce
s a
nd
 lo
ca
l t
ra
de
 n
et
w
or
k;
Sm
al
l b
us
in
es
s d
ev
el
op
m
en
t
an
d 
pr
om
ot
io
n;
Lo
ca
l t
ax
 a
nd
 fe
e 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n.
D
ist
ric
t s
ta
tis
tic
s d
iv
isi
on
Social Sectors
Al
l s
ch
oo
ls 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
un
iv
er
sit
ie
s a
nd
 re
se
ar
ch
 
in
sti
tu
te
s, 
te
ch
ni
ca
l &
 
vo
ca
tio
na
l
Pr
im
ar
y 
an
d 
se
co
nd
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
(L
G
s 
ar
e 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r 
op
er
at
in
g 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 M
oE
 st
an
da
rd
s a
nd
 
m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 fa
ci
lit
ie
s)
Pu
bl
ic
 h
ea
lth
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n
Pr
im
ar
y 
he
al
th
 c
ar
e
H
os
pi
ta
ls
Pr
io
rit
y 
he
alt
h 
ca
re
 an
d 
pu
bl
ic
 h
ea
th
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
(m
in
or
 L
G
 re
gu
lat
or
y 
co
m
pe
te
nc
e)
W O R K I N G  T O G E T H E R :  I N T E R M U N I C I PA L  C O O P E R A T I O N  I N  F I V E  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E A N  C O U N T R I E S
28
Q
ar
ks
M
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s 
&
 C
o
m
m
u
n
es
D
e-
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
ed
 S
ta
te
 
fu
n
ct
io
n
Ex
cl
u
si
ve
D
el
eg
at
ed
Ex
cl
u
si
ve
Sh
ar
ed
D
el
eg
at
ed
Social Sectors
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 lo
ca
l c
ul
tu
ra
l a
nd
 h
ist
or
ic
al
va
lu
es
;
Re
cr
ea
tio
na
l a
ct
iv
iti
es
;
So
ci
al
 se
rv
ic
es
 (o
rp
ha
na
ge
s, 
da
y 
ca
re
, 
el
de
rly
 h
om
es
);
H
ou
sin
g.
So
ci
al
 a
ss
ist
an
ce
 
(fi
na
nc
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
ea
rm
ar
ke
d 
gr
an
ts:
 
LG
s a
pp
ro
ve
 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s a
nd
 
de
liv
er
 th
e 
su
pp
or
t)
Infrastructure and Public Utilities
H
ea
tin
g;
El
ec
tr
ic
ity
;
G
as
;
(c
on
tro
lle
d 
by
 c
en
tr
al
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t a
nd
 
pr
ef
ec
tu
re
s)
In
te
r-
ur
ba
n 
ro
ad
s;
Re
gi
on
al
 
an
d 
ur
ba
n 
pl
an
ni
ng
;
O
th
er
s a
s 
de
fin
ed
 b
y 
la
w.
U
rb
an
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 
de
le
ga
te
d 
by
 
ba
sic
 L
G
U
s 
(T
er
rit
or
y 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 
co
un
ci
l)
U
rb
an
 P
la
nn
in
g,
 la
nd
 m
an
ag
em
en
t; 
Lo
ca
l r
oa
ds
, p
av
em
en
ts 
an
d 
sq
ua
re
s;
W
at
er
 su
pp
ly
 a
nd
 se
w
ag
e;
St
re
et
 li
gh
tin
g 
an
d 
ci
ty
 d
ec
or
at
io
n;
Pa
rk
s a
nd
 p
ub
lic
 a
re
a 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
;
Ir
rig
at
io
n;
So
lid
 w
as
te
 m
an
ag
em
en
t.
Re
gi
on
al
 
pu
bl
ic
 
tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
se
rv
ic
es
Lo
ca
l t
ra
ns
it 
an
d 
pu
bl
ic
 tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
se
rv
ic
es
;
Tr
an
sp
or
t l
ic
en
sin
g.
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
(p
re
fe
ct
ur
es
)
Re
gi
on
al
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
iss
ue
s
C
em
et
er
y 
an
d 
fu
ne
ra
l s
er
vi
ce
s;
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 lo
ca
l f
or
es
ts,
 p
as
tu
re
s a
nd
 
na
tu
ra
l r
es
ou
rc
es
.
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n
Ta
bl
e 1
.1
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
29
C o u n t r y  R e p o r t s :  A l b a n i a
  97 percent of municipalities and 54 percent of communes (61 percent of all 
units) had revenues from a cleaning tariﬀ. 
After more than a decade since the transfer of services, the basic waste management 
function is still not exercised in several local units. Moreover, the above ﬁgures include 
LGUs that deliver a service only to a small part of their administrative territory—the 
majority of communes oﬀer only the collection of waste and only for the central village 
(out of a total of 2,820 villages, with an average of nine per commune). 
Urban, and relatively large local, units were forerunners in exploring the delivery of 
new functions, in several instances with international assistance. Weaker local units still 
need to ﬁnd ways to start fulﬁlling their legal and moral obligations to their communities 
and, at some point, also to consider bringing the service level up to acceptable standards.
1.3 Territorial and Population Size
1.3.1 Current Size and Appropriate Size
Currently, the 373 LGUs in Albania have some 4.3 million10 inhabitants, with an aver-
age population size of about 11,600 people per local unit. When trying to draw some 
conclusions regarding eﬀectiveness and the capacity of LGUs based on their size, use 
of the average as the sole indicator is inadequate and misleading. When the capital city 
(Tirana) is removed from the dataset, the mean value is still just above 10,000 but, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.1, this value is not representative of most LGUs: the median value 
is much lower, at 6,500 inhabitants, and the mode lies between 3,000 and 4,000. The 
mode value includes one quarter (24 percent) of the country’s LGUs. Thus, the popula-
tion sizes of the communes are skewed very much to the left (both median and mode are 
considerably lower than the mean), i.e. most communes have very small population sizes.
The adequate (and optimal) size of an LGU remains a debatable, inconclusive issue 
among academics and practitioners (see Swianiewic 2002), and Albania is no exception 
(World Bank 2008) in this regard. The population size will need to be accounted for by 
subsidiary and accountability principles of local governance, already endorsed by Albania. 
Therefore, size will also include considerations of surface area covered. Currently, LGUs 
with a population size less than 5,000 account for 45 percent of the country’s surface 
area but just nine percent of the total population.
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Figure 1.1
Frequency Distribution of LGUs According to Population Size
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Table 1.2 reports an overview of LGUs clustered by population size intervals for 
the years 2001 and 2009. 
Table 1.2
LGUs Clustered According to Population Size Intervals for 2009 and 2001*
Population 
range**
No. of LGUs Percent population Percent surface area
2001 2009 2001 2009 2001 2009
<2,000 18 27 1 1 6 8
2,001–3,000 30 42 2 2 8 14
3,001–5,000 78 73 8 6 23 23
5,001–10,000 165 131 30 22 48 34
>10,000 83 100 59 68 16 21
Total 374 373 100 100 100 100
Source: Author’s own calculations based on data from MoI, Annual Statistics of Instat, Almanac of Albanian 
municipalities and communes, UNOPS Municipal Proﬁles, AAM.
Notes: * Data might be subject to some inaccuracies but are from the civil registry oﬃces (2001) and 
the national register, which oﬃcially receives data from the same source.
  ** There is no speciﬁc reason for such division in population range apart from being able to 
compare the data with recommendations laid out by CoE in 2003, and with a government 
proposal at that time for reviewing the administrative territorial division. 
Demographic movements have increased the number of LGUs governing very small 
populations (reﬂected in an increase between 2001 and 2009 in the number of LGUs 
with a population size of less than 3,000; Table 1.2) and also the number of municipali-
ties with more than 10,000 inhabitants (Table 1.2), with a concurrent decrease in the 
number of LGUs with a population size between 3,001 and 10,000. Meanwhile, LGUs 
with a population size above 5,000 that retain around 90 percent of their population 
have seen their surface area decrease relatively by 14 percent; i.e. migration continues 
to trend toward the cities, particularly for the medium and larger sized communes. 
Despite diﬃculties with the statistical system in place to reﬂect the displacement 
of inhabitants in a timely manner, the trend of Albanians moving towards municipali-
ties is clear. As long as it lasts, such a dynamic situation rapidly makes estimates for an 
acceptable LGU size obsolete at any given moment.
Given the poor infrastructure that exists in Albania’s rural and remote areas, one 
could pass quick judgment on subsidiarity and the diﬃculty involved for inhabitants 
in remote areas to receive basic administrative services. While numbers and surface 
area covered by LGUs falling into the smaller than 2,000 inhabitants category grows 
(Table 1.2; 18–27 percent, and 6–8 percent, respectively) the population percentage 
remains the same (1 percent). For LGUs with a population size less than 3,000, the 
ﬁgures are remarkable: an increase in the number of LGUs from 48 to 69 (44 percent 
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increase) and an increase in surface area from 14 percent to 22 percent (57 percent 
increase), while the population percentage remains at three percent.
1.3.2 Who Should Draw the Map and Is It Doable?
Intentions and arguments in favor of increasing the eﬃciency of communes through 
territorial administrative reform by “consolidating the small communes” is spelled 
out in the current decentralization strategy.11 The reasons are explored further in that 
document, which emphasizes that in communes with less than 5,000 inhabitants, more 
than 70 percent of the staﬀ have not received a higher education, and yet 22 percent of 
communes spend more than 40 percent of their budget on administration. 
The discussion on optimal size continues and the reasoning remains the same, while 
Albania’s central government has several times initiated territorial administrative reform 
for the country’s local units. Such initiatives, undertaken since 2003, are politically risky 
and prompt disagreeable discussions, often leading to their rejection by local commu-
nities. Knock-on eﬀects, such as mixing or splitting up of politically committed areas, 
impact the results of elections, disfavouring territorial revision.
During 2005, a speciﬁc parliamentary commission was set up, with political con-
sensus, to guide territorial reform. It was expected that such a commission, based on 
criteria and modalities suggested by a team of CoE experts, would pass on necessary 
normative acts to parliament for decision, but the latter’s mandate ended without deci-
sions being taken (Dedja and Brahimi, 2006).
Since 2003, there has been only one merger between two communes. An analysis 
carried out by Hila and Sokoli (2007) concluded that the merging of Bushat and Barbul-
lush communes increased communal administrative eﬃciency there. This was indicated 
by an increase in quality, an overall higher share in investments, and a decrease in costs.
Meanwhile, the Albanian Association of Communes (AAC) has as one of its strategic 
objectives and selected lobbying issues, an analysis of the potential implications and 
beneﬁts of commune mergers.
Whichever way the process now goes it is not going to be popular. Albania’s local 
government associations are now, however, in a position to voice stronger opinions, 
which will make centralized solutions more diﬃcult to push through. Meanwhile, 
under the constitution,12 communities have the right to referenda, also mentioned in 
the organic law,13 as a means for eliciting communities’ opinions regarding any change 
to an administrative unit’s territorial boundaries.
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1.4 Financing Assigned Functions
1.4.1 Fiscal Autonomy
Since 2000, ﬁscal decentralization has tried to catch up with functional decentraliza-
tion. This section will focus on one aspect of this decentralization process, namely the 
evolution and potential of local discretionary revenues. Such revenues are a source for 
ﬁnancing the implementation of exclusive LG functions, organized either individually 
or through cooperation agreements, as decided by local units.
Between 2002 and 2007, several laws14 that increased LGU ﬁscal autonomy were 
enacted, providing for a higher share of discretionary revenues at the local level through 
the authority to undertake the following: 
  levy, and decide upon the levels of, taxes (+/–30% of the indicate rates deﬁned 
by law);
  decide on the level and base fees for any service assigned within an LGU’s 
exclusive function, aiming to cover service costs through locally-raised fees;
  manage capital assets transferred to local unts;
  decide on priorities funded through central government transfer, the uncondi-
tional part of which has substantially increased since 2002;
  borrow, given that certain legally binding conditions are met.
Figure 1.2
Evolution of Discretionary Revenues in % of Total Local Revenues 
(Cumulative for Country)
Source: Own calculations based on data from Ministry of Interior, ﬁscal bulletins of Ministry of Finance, 
WB Policy note 2008, LGDA Study on Borrowing.
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Figure 1.2 describes the change (increase) in discretionary budget size both before 
and after functional (2000) and ﬁscal (2002) decentralization, and describes the evolution 
of the contributions for various strains of discretionary revenue sources as a percentage 
of total LG revenue. 
Several trends reﬂecting the major reforms that took eﬀect in 2003 and 2007 are 
worth commenting on. Between 1998 and 2002, revenues from own taxes and fees 
remained negligible, reﬂecting the tax base at the time, even though functions had been 
assigned to local units by 2000. Introduction of the local ﬁscal package in 2002 led to 
higher yields—almost 25 percent of all revenues and 43 percent of discretionary income 
by 2007. Introduction of the unconditional grant in 2001, the full share of property 
taxes for local government by 2003, and an unconditional grant formula, which included 
several ministries’ former infrastructure portfolios, increased discretionary revenues to 58 
percent in 2007. Meanwhile, local budget spending as a percentage of the state budget 
also increased, along with autonomous spending of LGUs as a percentage of GDP (0.34 
percent in 2000, 2.5 percent in 2006, 2.2 percent in 2007, 2.7 percent in 2008 and 3.1 
percent in 200915). Nevertheless, increasing the amount spent to fund local budgets has 
not been debated, except within the context of making central funding more predictable. 
1.4.2 Fiscal Authority and Capacity Are Far from Yield
Prominent taxes, with potentially high returns, are assigned to local units. These include 
property taxes and small business taxes. Meanwhile, improving the eﬃciency of the tax 
administration locally is an issue that has received some, but not nearly suﬃcient, atten-
tion. Most (95 percent of ) municipalities16 apply property taxes but, in the absence of 
a consolidated tax base and at such a low level, it is almost worthless to spend revenues 
on improving their administrations. Meanwhile, small business taxes are collected with 
the same inertia inherited from the central administration. 
Nevertheless, the average for the country, with more than 20 percent of local budgets 
generated from local taxes, appears encouraging. The reality, however, is that the country‘s 
cumulative perspective is deceptive when one tries to understand the real ﬁscal situation 
of most LGUs. Disparities are illustrated for 2007 with about 71 percent of local revenues 
collected in the municipalities, which comprise 17 percent of LGUs, with only 26.3 percent 
collected in the communes (83 percent of LGUs) and 2.7 percent from the counties (qarks, 
or regions). 42 percent of a 26 percent share of local revenues collected in communes is 
generated in four (one percent of ) communes located within the same county.
The two major taxes—property tax and small business tax—are used above to il-
lustrate how minimally local unit potential resources are being exploited with regard 
to ﬁscal capacity, without accounting for the service fees that are set and collected, but 
which do not cover even half of the service costs (yielding 5 percent out of a total of 43 
percent of discretionary revenues from taxes and fees).
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The present framework for generating revenues from local taxes and fees could be 
promising if it were adequate. It would then enable local units to perform their func-
tions according to some acceptable standards. Setting up a proper tax administration 
in communes with very scarce resources and little economic activity takes them beyond 
their capacities, but joining eﬀorts to providing such administrative services could prove 
worthwhile, and this is where IMC could be very beneﬁcial.
1.5 Citizens’ Perception
Despite the delay recorded in assigning and exercising functions at the local level, the 
perception of Albania’s citizens is quite close to the legal expectations. Citizen surveys 
carried out annually between 2004 and 2008 concluded that most communities expect 
from their local government services that are actually exclusive to them. 
Assessing the quality of services delivered within the assigned functions but without 
standards and performance measurement mechanisms leaves only perceptions as a means 
for evaluation. Figure 1.3 presents a summary of the perceptions of the citizens on four 
exclusive local government functions: cleaning, road maintenance, street lighting and 
water supply. Perceptions for 2005 are compared with the results for 2008.
Interestingly, the level of satisfaction with three of the public services surveyed 
has fallen, though it has increased with respect to street lighting (in 2009 there was 
54 percent satisfaction compared to 33 percent in 2005). Whether the overall drop in 
satisfaction is due to deteriorating performance or infrastructure or higher expectations 
is uncertain. Nevertheless, the ﬁgures give a clear indication that performance requires 
much improvement before it meets citizens’ expectations. In the following sections some 
ways to improve service delivery will be discussed.
Figure 1.3
Citizen’s Satisfaction on Service Quality by LGUs (Comparison 2005–2008)
Source: Data from surveys conducted on local government services in 2005 and 2008.
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2. IMPROVING DELIVERY AND EFFICIENCY—IMC AS A SOLUTION
Previous sections have touched upon the fragmentation of the size and resources of local 
units. They have also mentioned that the decentralization of functions has not always 
led to satisfactory execution. At present ﬁscal authority of local units needs further 
exploration to collect the resources necessary for delivering services eﬃciently and with 
the level of satisfaction required. The challenges enumerated above are grounded in the 
context of how and where local units operate—which is with a wide array of their own 
responsibilities and within a decentralized environment that abides by the principles 
of LGU subsidiary and autonomy.
Improving the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of fragmented local units, or achieving 
an eﬀect of economy of scale when delivering public services, or adjusting to service 
catchment areas that have natural borders, are the challenges that remain. The following 
options present potential strategies to cope with a fragmented territory and resources, 
some of which are also outlined in Albania’s guiding strategic documents:
  Asymmetric assignment of functions throughout local units based on capacity, 
potentials and resources, including regionalization here, based upon functions 
that would ﬁt the given scale of an administrative territory.
  Amalgamation (CoE, 2003)17 of units to increase capacities and reduce service 
costs.
  Inter-municipal cooperation, corresponding to scale of economy and catch-
ment size.
 
These potential strategies are not exclusive. On the contrary, they could be beneﬁcial 
to each other if well thought out and synchronized. A particular solution would be to ﬁt 
strategies to a given set of speciﬁc circumstances, but it would have to be locally steered 
and not centrally imposed. 
Table 1.3 reports an analysis of policy options from a perspective that values local 
autonomy, subsidiarity and democracy. It analyzes four diﬀerent strategies for improv-
ing service delivery: i) territorial mergers, ii) asymmetric assignment of responsibilities, 
iii) intermunicipal cooperation, and iv) regionalization (consolidation of upper self-
governance tier), against several criteria. 
Each criterion is composed of several indicators. No particular weight is assigned 
to any of the criteria, but political feasibility has proven to drive several reforms in the 
country, and seems to be the case in most European countries. 
The present document then goes on to further explore IMC since this arrangement 
can be initiated within the existing structure in Albania by local units themselves for 
functions exclusive to them. It could also provide meaningful grounds for potential 
future voluntary mergers and initiatives, and it oﬀers ﬂexibility when responding to 
the re-designation of regions. 
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3. CAN IMC BE INSTRUMENTAL? 
3.1 Trend and Fashion in IMC
Inter-municipal cooperation in Europe is a strategy that has been recognized as a way for 
local governments to deal with market pressures and public demand for better and more 
qualitative service delivery. Cooperation between municipalities seems to be almost as 
old as the municipalities themselves (Hulst 2007). In France, the ﬁrst councils established 
by local government to administer communal services date from the end of the nineteenth 
century (Maurel 1993); in the Netherlands, the 1851 Municipal Act already contained a 
provision for cooperation between municipalities “in communal aﬀairs, interests, installations 
and works” (Hulst 2000). And now, in the twenty-ﬁrst century, local governments are 
cooperating with each other on an increasing scale, particularly in the era of European 
integration (Hulst 2007). 
New trends, technology development and people’s increased mobility have evolved 
the complexity, scope and direction of IMC in Europe, forever adapting it to new cir-
cumstances and markets. It is worth pointing out here that apart from the demands of 
both the markets and citizens it is evident that national legislator initiatives have deﬁned 
opportunities and constraints on various forms of IMC (Hulst, 2007).
A snapshot of existing cooperations, their institutional arrangements, frequency, 
scope and tasks assigned was taken in 2007 by the Committee on Local and Regional 
Democracy. The Committee analyzed the situation in twenty-three countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hun-
gary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Thirty-ﬁve 
percent of the countries attempted to give some overall ﬁgures for some categories of 
IMC, with the rest having no consolidated recording system in place for all types of 
IMC, while still other respondents did not understand the question or the subject (see 
IMC questionnaires ﬁlled in by member states for CLDR). 
The Committee for Local and Regional Democracy study reported a full menu of 
IMCs, both single and multi-purpose, either fully public or in partnership with the 
private sector, dealing with service delivery and coordination. It highlighted that the 
democratic aspect appeared deﬁcient overall, since there was no direct representation or 
means in place to ensure eﬀective community participation (Deﬃgier 2007). 
Results of a comprehensive research study of IMC in western European countries18 
have been presented by Hulst and van Montford (e.g., in 2007, 2008) in several recent 
publications. These authors concluded that IMC is a widespread phenomenon in Western 
European countries, with an elaborated menu to choose from in terms of composition, 
tasks, scope, institutionalization and decision-making powers.
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Their analysis showed that the present tendency in countries with a tradition of IMC 
focuses on improving eﬃciency of the cooperative institutions and making provisions 
for increased accountability and representation. Vertical cooperation, building on the 
competitive advantages of several government tiers, including, in this case, skills and 
resources, seems to be gaining ground (in Spain, France, the UK, and Belgium). It is 
also interesting to note that, when considering cooperative arrangements with a mixed 
public-private character, there are no standing organizations under public law where 
municipalities and commercial private companies jointly provide services to the public 
on a regular basis (Hulst 2007).
Consolidation of the European market opened the potential for IMC on the one 
hand but on the other, it also raised questions about the fairness of procedures according 
to EU regulations. The latest example of IMC getting into diﬃculties is a court case 
initiated by the Commission of European Communities. The Commission “denounces” 
the direct contractual arrangement between several local units and Hamburg (cleansing 
department) without following procurement rules for service provision. The Court of 
Justice decided that a public authority must be allowed to perform the public interest 
tasks granted to it by using its own resources without being obliged to call on outside 
entities, and it may do so in cooperation with other public authorities as long as no 
private entities are involved. 
The court concluded that Community law does not require public authorities to use 
any particular legal form to jointly carry out their public service tasks. Such cooperation 
between public authorities does not undermine the principal objective of the Commu-
nity rules on public procurement. This is not an isolated case questioning the fairness 
of IMC workings and could be related to the trends concerning European membership. 
Naturally, questions and doubts will be raised over IMC operations, just as they 
are for local government operations kept under public and private sector scrutiny. Nev-
ertheless, local governments in Europe have been making use of IMC for more than 
a century, continuously adapting it to respond to evolving needs. IMC seems to oﬀer 
local units ﬂexibility in the way they organize themselves for optimal service delivery, 
beyond territorial-administrative borders.
3.2 Institutional Context—Legal Stipulations and Incentives
National environment plays a decisive role in the shifts and patterns of IMC (Hulst 
2007). The rest of this section will look into the strategic and national legal environ-
ment for IMC. Cooperative and administrative culture will not be discussed in detail, 
despite its strong inﬂuence in cooperation arrangements.  
Albania is a signatory to the CoE, which has embarked on an initiative to document 
the extent of, and to encourage, inter-municipal cooperation. This initiative follows the 
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second round of a report on the implementation of the European Charter of Local Self 
Government in signatory countries. The “second generation” report, in line with the 
proposal of the Institutional Committee (of CLRAE), will have as its theme the “insti-
tutional framework of inter-municipal cooperation.” Sharing knowledge, promoting 
intermunicipal cooperation and enabling an environment for such cooperation is the 
recommendation [nr: 221 (2007)] of CLRAE. 
While IMC is encouraged at the European level, national strategic documents also 
recognize its important role. Albania’s decentralization strategy outlines that IMC is 
crucial for implementing well-run service projects and public services. The strategy 
document also mentions that encouraging IMC ﬁnancial incentives will be instrumental 
for various sectors or projects paid out through competitive grants.
3.2.1 Legal Frame
The Albanian Law on Local Self-government is quite liberal with respect to inter-
communal cooperation. Interpretation of the law19 suggests that any function delegated 
to a local government for which it should provide a service can also be done jointly by 
multiple local governments to obtain the desired result. Such cooperation provides ease 
of association but also some additional responsibilities. The law is based on the European 
Charter of Local Self Government, which was ratiﬁed by the Albanian Parliament in 
November 1999, therefore emphasizing the right of local government units to associate.20
Any given exclusive function of municipalities and communes can be potentially 
organized through IMC based on three scenarios of intermunicipal cooperation as 
detailed below.
3.2.2 Institutional Arrangement Possibilities 
(Illustrated for Waste Management Function)
Scenario 1: Identiﬁcation of one municipality to carry out the operation (e.g. joint 
waste management) 
Participating municipalities delegate the function to a selected municipality. The identi-
ﬁed municipality will have to expand, or even create, a section within a given department 
to undertake such an operation. The selected consortium of municipalities will have 
to decide how, for example, service delivery, will be organized, whether through the 
municipal staﬀ and municipal enterprise or through the contracting out to a third party. 
The staﬀ managing the system will be the municipal staﬀ of the selected municipality.
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1
2
3 4
5
Considerations:
  Fewer administrative procedures are necessary to set up the structure within the 
selected municipality.
  The municipal structure will be more ﬂexible to respond to immediate needs.
  The administration costs could be lower compared to other scenarios, and also 
the salary structure will have to be based on the one applied for municipal staﬀ.
  Decisions are concentrated in the hands of one municipality with citizens of other 
municipalities—although paying for the service—not inﬂuencing decision-making. 
  The present level of municipal administration is not capable of coping with the 
undertaking when the initiative is much bigger than ordinary ones.
  New structures (that might need setting up) without strong management skills, 
can slow down the procedures for the acceptance of new members into the IMC 
arrangement.
  A controlling and monitoring system will have to be very well-developed—
outside of the usual municipal routine.
  The salary scales used (to date) for the municipal staﬀ are not competitive enough 
to attract well qualiﬁed personnel.
  Staﬀ will be more susceptible to the political interests of the Mayor or Council 
of the given municipality.
Scenario 2: Delegation of the function to the Regional Council 
All participating municipalities will delegate their waste management tasks to the 
Regional Council. Representation of the members has already been assured for this sce-
nario, since all the participating municipalities and potentially participating communes 
are represented at the Regional Council, in proportion to the number of inhabitants. 
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However, the Regional Council will have to set up a department with the appropriate 
executive staﬀ in order to operate a common waste management system.
Regional 
2
3 4
5
1
Considerations:
  A role would be given to the regional council that strengthens the latter.
  Information ﬂow for the new potential members could be facilitated.
  Regional policies could be coordinated more easily with the national policies 
on waste management.
  There is a lack of experience of the Regional Council since it is a new local 
government tier in Albania, set up in 2000.
  The Regional Council is also composed of municipal authorities that are not 
using the system, therefore complicating the decision-making process.
  Municipalities are reluctant to delegate their own functions to a level that is not 
closer to the citizens (subsidiary).
  Administrative capacities of the Regional Council are very limited and their 
function has never before dealt with service delivery to the citizens.
  There is a lack of a track record of good cooperation between the ﬁrst level 
LGUs and regional councils (second tier).
  New structures, without strong management skills, can slow down the proce-
dures for accepting new members.
  A controlling and monitoring system for the management of the common system 
will have to be very well elaborated, outside of the council’s usual routine.
  The salary scales of the regional administrations are not competitive enough to 
attract well qualiﬁed personnel.
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  Staﬀ will be more susceptible to political interests of the Regional Council and 
its Chair.
  A stronger basis for accountability of the Regional Council would be required, 
since the chair and council are not elected (unlike those of ﬁrst tier LGUs).
Scenario 3: Setting up of an Intermunicipal Association
The cooperating municipalities set up a separate legal entity—“the subject of common 
competences”—to be held responsible for the operation of the system. The municipalities, 
in this case, exercise their own function through the legal entity, which carries out the 
assigned duties through its own executive staﬀ. The general assembly and board, com-
posed of member municipalities represented through council members whose number 
is proportional to the size of the population using the waste management system, will 
govern the entity. Such an entity can take several public or private legal forms.
Municipal 
Association2
3 4
5
1
 Considerations:
  This provides for a more democratic decision-making process steered by a 
municipal leadership elected by citizens who receive the service.
  Activities of the association are based on economic analysis, and therefore strong 
analytical skills will have to be applied.
  The association will strongly abide by all of the ﬁscal rules of the private sector, 
and therefore should provide a strong basis for sustainability.
  Similar examples are good-functioning, worldwide models.
  The service delivery model best applies the principle of subsidiary.
  Users of the system make decisions about the functioning of the system.
  Mayors (interviewed) express a strong political will on behalf of their municipali-
ties to perform their own waste management function, given to them by law.
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  If the private sector is involved, all of the private companies operating in the 
territory covered by the association will be encouraged to participate.
  Salaries can be more attractive than the municipal salaries, attracting strong 
managers and well-qualiﬁed staﬀ.
  There are new, unfamiliar grounds for the Albanian municipalities.
  There are high administrative eﬀort and costs for setting up a separate legal entity.
  View of the potential tasks for the entity is currently limited (reluctance to 
delegate). 
  The objectives of the association will need clear deﬁnition as will the roles of 
the entity and cost recovery measures.
Since there is no limitation for IMC, any available form under public or private 
law can be considered an option.
An analysis of Not-for-Proﬁt Organizations, Anonymous Associations and State 
Enterprises follows, with consideration given to the advantages and disadvantages of 
each alternative. LGUs have several options to choose from, based on their needs and 
visions. However some advantages and disadvantages are mentioned for each legal form.
3.2.3 Potential Legal Form of an Intermunicipal Association
3.2.3.1 Not-for-Proﬁt Organization21 
Procedure 22 
LGUs draw an agreement to jointly exercise a function, for example, the collection, 
removal and treatment of waste. With this agreement participating LGUs decide on the 
establishment of a legal person, separate from the participant parties, to whom they give 
the authority and responsibilities to exercise the function(s). This legal person—subject 
to common responsibilities in this case—is an NPO.
Considerations 
The association can apply to donors operating in the ﬁeld, thus accessing funding for 
NPOs. Nevertheless, consideration should be given to how to exploit this advantage in the 
present case, and how many potential donors operate in any given area at the given time.
Direct clients of the association will be its founding municipalities and, indirectly, 
the citizens of these municipalities. If the association considers the oﬀering of services 
for a higher than cost price to a private business or outside LGU, the IMC will not be 
able to legally justify a proﬁt. The term “proﬁt” used in various applicable laws creates 
confusion,23 which could be a disadvantage for the IMC.
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The NPO law does not give non-proﬁtable associations the right to obtain loans24 
from banks. Loans are considered as good and functional means when further invest-
ments are required, for example during times of ﬁnancial diﬃculty that may come up 
during the exercising of an association’s activities. Also a quick survey among the loan 
departments of several private banks did not look positively upon the lending of funds 
to an NPO, a policy that might change. Moreover, an NPO cannot attract private 
shareholders. If any of the founding members of the NPO decides to leave the associa-
tion in order to accomplish the function separately and independently, it cannot share 
any of the IMC properties.25 
The NPO cannot be transformed into another kind of legal person, e.g. a com-
mercial association, without ﬁrst being liquidated, and later these municipalities can 
decide how they will accomplish these legal functions diﬀerently.
3.2.3.2 Private Law Companies—Anonymous Association26
Procedure27 
The municipalities set an agreement to jointly exercise the function of, for example, the 
collection, removal and treatment of waste. In the agreement, participating municipali-
ties decide on the creation of a legal person separate from the participating parties, to 
which they give authority and responsibilities to exercise the above-mentioned func-
tions. This legal person—the “subject of common responsibilities”—is established as 
the Anonymous Association. 
Considerations
The Anonymous Association has the possibility to apply for and receive loans from 
various private banks, to attract private investors in its activity when necessary, and to 
operate in the stock market by selling shares. 
This association can provide services for private businesses or non-member munici-
palities and can use its proﬁts to increase service performance. 
If a founding municipality decides to leave the Association in order to exercise 
functions on its own, that municipality has the right to claim its part of the investment 
until the moment of its departure by selling its shares on the market. 
AA will be considered a proﬁt-making28 legal person. As such, it will be subject to 
all provisions of the law on AA and will be bound to pay all ﬁscal obligations as deter-
mined by the law. 
3.2.3.3 State Enterprise
Procedure 29 
Participating municipalities agree in an accord to exercise a speciﬁc function, for ex-
ample the collection, removal and treatment of waste. In this accord, the participating 
municipalities decide on the creation of a legal person separate from the participant 
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parties, to which they give authority and responsibilities in order to exercise the above-
mentioned functions. This legal person—the “subject of common responsibilities”—is 
established as a State Enterprise. 
Considerations
A State Enterprise has many characteristics in common with an AA. Therefore, it would 
be useful to highlight the diﬀerences that exist between them.
A State Enterprise is the property of the State, or property of the municipalities, and 
therefore cannot operate in the share market and obtain private capital.30
Secondly, a State Enterprise can be transformed into an Anonymous Association 
while the latter cannot be transformed into a State Enterprise. Recently a large number 
of State Enterprises have been transformed into AAs.
The Head Council of a State Enterprise cannot include leaders of local government 
authorities,31 while such participation is not forbidden as far as the AA is concerned.
4. FIRST ATTEMPT AT A COUNTRYWIDE INVENTORY
The IMC inventory reported in Table 1.4 cannot claim to present a countrywide, 
fully-ﬂedged assessment of intermunicipal cooperation. The information was gathered 
through interviews with stakeholders of LG interests at the national level and also 
through the extensive network of FLAG32 with local units. It nevertheless remains the ﬁrst 
attempt at beginning to document local government (voluntary) cooperation in Albania.
Several cooperation arrangements triggered through central government decisions, 
such as water companies, are considered to be a successful form of intermunicipal coop-
eration. More information on such intermunicipal arrangements is included as Annex 1.
There are sixteen voluntary cooperation arrangements listed in Table 1.4, organized 
according to the exclusive functions of local governments. 
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Interestingly, although unsurprisingly (see CoE report on IMC questionnaire re-
sults from member states), there is no occurrence of cooperation for carrying out any 
of the social services assigned to local governments. All of the identiﬁed IMCs belong 
to the categories of “Planning and Administrative Services” and “Infrastructure and 
Public Utilities.” Even within these categories, there are a few favorite functions for 
IMCs, including solid waste management and planning, and the joining of capacities 
for economic development. These two functional areas are also the ones that bring to-
gether the biggest communities. It is therefore not surprising that waste management, 
wherever tackled, requires that municipalities and communes join forces. It is expensive 
and diﬃcult to carry out properly and therefore calls for greater scales of operation to 
be undertaken eﬃciently.
External funding in many of the identiﬁed IMCs suggests that cooperation has 
been donor driven. However, this has not discouraged local mayors from acting; on the 
contrary, it has encouraged them to think further about the possibilities for cooperation. 
Zadrima IMC was set up to mirror Italian IMC experiences, but without any initial 
purpose assigned to it. Presently the member units can see a broader scope than they 
had previously for the association’s involvement, even lobbying to join the recent IMC 
initiative of a common landﬁll in the neighborhood (Bushat, Shkodër). 
In all of the regions where considerably sized IMCs have been set up (Dibër, Korça, 
Lezhë) with donor support, other smaller size cooperations have germinated, building 
upon the trust developed.
Two out of the sixteen (Table 1.4) IMCs inventoried operate under non-formal 
agreements, and several other mayors share communal staﬀ and/or see the beneﬁt in 
joining for enforcement. These cases have been diﬃcult to identify due to incomplete 
information for some of the areas discussed. In most cases, agreements have ﬁlled in 
gaps where there is a lack of professional staﬀ (e.g., the sharing of lawyers between com-
munes) and equipment (the sharing of garbage trucks).
The mayors interviewed raised several issues where they consider it beneﬁcial to join 
forces over demanding issues, such as forest management, since forests were transfered 
into communal property.
4.1 In Search of a ‘Good Practice’
Initially, the present search was for a case study aimed at identifying one of the most 
advanced and consolidated IMC institutions that can be used as an organizational 
model for any relevant initiatives in the country. Information was gathered through 
interviews with national central government institutions supporting local government, 
local civil servants and mayors. However, ﬁnding a good model resembled the search 
for the philosopher‘s stone. Various perspectives give importance to diﬀerent particular 
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aspects. Any example identiﬁed was just sprouting its eﬀorts, and municipalities felt they 
were standing on unstable ground and that ﬁnancial incentives to resolve long standing 
needs became directly or indirectly associated with an IMC.
Four IMC examples have been scrutinized here: Peshkopi tendering (PE-T), 
Shkodër-Bushat Landﬁll (ShB-L), Korça solid waste management (K-SWM), and 
Berat-Kuçova Water and Sewage (BK-WS). These selected cases comprise those that 
have taken initial steps towards articulating mechanisms of cooperation. More details 
on the needs addressed, the setting up of eﬀorts and the challenges faced for each case 
study are included in Annex 2. Some general considerations on tasks, actors, ﬁnancing 
and monitoring are given below.
 
4.1.1 Range of Tasks Delivered
The four case studies concern joint delivery of a public service, with one describing an 
initiative to join eﬀorts for administrative functioning. All cases involve single purpose 
cooperation, with K-SWM and BK-WS covering several functionally integrated service 
areas. Table 1.5 summarizes the four case studies, describing the functional area, articu-
lated needs to tackle the function, discussions on extending the scope or coverage of 
IMC and the steps taken to deﬁne the optimal scale for IMC delivery.
Table 1.5
Tasks and Reasons for Assigning IMC (Summary of Four Case Studies)
Tasks assigned Articulated need for joint 
delivery
Potential for extending 
scope
Assessing optimal 
service size
PE-T
 Joint (delegated) 
tendering process 
for supervision of 
construction works
 Limited time and 
capacities (to arrange for 
works supervision)
 Limited number of 
qualified supervisory 
companies in region
 Repetitive workload and 
bureaucracy for LGUs 
to submit to Public 
Procurement Agency
 Small values of individual 
contracts not attractive to 
qualified providers
 Still under 
trial period/no 
confirmation that 
the arrangement has 
worked
 Synchronizing 
need for tendering 
of multiple LGUs 
gaining from same 
grant scheme
 Target group 
limited to LGUs 
successful in fund-
raising from Trust 
Fund
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Tasks assigned Articulated need for joint 
delivery
Potential for extending 
scope
Assessing optimal 
service size
ShB-L
 Joint investment to 
set up landfill
 Joint management of 
solid waste disposal
 Solving waste disposal 
issue
 Limited financial 
resources to build landfill
 Limited area available to 
find adequate landfill site
 2 LGUs initiated, 
opened up for other 
local units in the 
region
 Feasibility study 
carried out to 
suggest optimal size 
of service operation 
K-SWM
 Joint waste 
management, with 
IMC exercising 
service, administrative 
and investment 
competence on behalf 
of participating 
LGUs for collection, 
transportation, 
administration and 
disposal of urban, 
industrial, hospital, 
construction, 
demolition, remains 
from water treatment, 
agricultural, livestock, 
and bulky waste
 Improvement of situation 
of waste collection and 
disposal
 Implementing of proper 
principles and techniques 
for protection of 
environment
 Prevent further pollution 
of watersheds of Ohrid 
and Prespa lakes 
 Stop endangering water 
quality of aquifers that 
supply population with 
drinking water
 Scope of the IMC 
is extended over the 
years that objectives 
of IMC have been 
discussed. Joint 
landfill investment 
and operation was the 
initial aim that later 
was extended to all the 
functions integrated 
within the waste 
management chain
 IMC carried out 
awareness campaigns, 
calculated service 
tariffs, offers expertise 
to members
 Feasibility 
study carried 
out suggesting 
delivering service 
for 80 percent of 
region’s population
 Affordability of 
LGUs decisive in 
participating in 
arrangement
BK-WS
 Joint management 
and provision of 
drinking water and 
sewage collection 
and treatment
 Common water sources
 Lack of continuous 
drinking water supply 
 Inheritance of inefficient 
distribution system for 
water and sewage
 Vicious circle of not being 
able to provide good 
quality service and citizens 
not paying water fees
 Acquire investment 
funding
 Potential to join with 
local units of Polican, 
Skrapar and Ura 
Vajgurore considered 
and assessed, aiming 
towards regional 
service coverage
 Awareness raising 
activities to deal with 
non-payment of water 
bills considered part 
of company‘s activities
 Feasibility study 
and central-
level strategy in 
regionalizing water 
and sewage
Table 1.5 (continued)
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All observed cases tackled underperformance of LGUs in delivering accept-
able service standards on an individual basis. Two cases dealing with urban waste 
disposal planned the introduction of disposal methods that meet EU standards, 
a novel practice for the country. Cooperation negotiations seem to move towards 
regional landﬁll coverage, which is favored as the way forward for the country‘s 
environmental strategy. 
Despite the tendency to extend service coverage in the whole of a region’s adminis-
trative territory (in three cases: ShB-L, K-SWM, BK-WS), the second local government 
tier is not involved in the coordination operations. Thus the LGUs have decided to 
manage this exclusive function through organizations of IMC set up and run by par-
ticipating LGUs.
Three cases (PE-T, ShB-L, K-SWM) are trying to make use of economies of scale either 
to make service cost aﬀordable or to attract good quality private service providers. In the 
case of PE-T, the tendering process coincided with the introduction of new electronic 
procedures with which several participating small local units still had to become familiar.
Indivisible infrastructure (a common drinking water source) seems to be one of the 
main reasons for the creation of BK-WS. Also, the local units engaged in the K-SWM 
cooperation share two of the biggest water bodies in the country. Preventing the pollu-
tion of these lakes (which border Macedonia and Greece) has already been tackled by 
several programs, including major investments in the water and sewage sector. 
The present stage of development for IMCs is not yet ripe enough to yield results 
impacting the quality of services delivered to citizens. Nevertheless, all cases report suc-
cessful fundraising, while important feasibility studies have been carried out for BK-WS, 
K-SWM and ShB-L. These feasibility studies recommended eﬃcient service coverage 
in each case, facilitated decisions in IMC membership and provided projections for 
the costs involved. 
4.1.2 Forms of Cooperation and Actors Involved
The case studies identiﬁed here present an interesting mixture of various stages of insti-
tutionalizing cooperation. However, ﬁrst tier local units remain the only participants 
throughout the selection of IMC case studies (see Table 1.6).
Apart from PE-T, the three other cases are aiming towards a consolidated separate 
institution (K-SWM, BK-WS already registered such institutions). It is worth drawing 
attention to the time span required to formalize agreement in all cases, including PE-T, 
which is a formalized way of cooperation but which requires a lot less eﬀort than the 
three other cases, which try to set up a separate institution. Even PE-T took almost 
half a year to formalize agreements, and they are still waiting to see if the members 
will accept the outcome of the tendering process; i.e. there is still uncertainty about 
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it working. Among the three other cases the K-SWM company is the most consoli-
dated in terms of properly developed decision-making mechanisms and institutions, 
though it took seven years to institutionalize the cooperation. Even BK-WS, which 
had the central government intimately involved in the merging process, and a major 
loan awaiting disbursement, took three years to crystallize. Institutionalization has 
certainly proved to be one of the biggest diﬃculties in setting up IMCs. 
Table 1.6
Legal Form, Decision-making, and Membership (Summary of Case Studies)
Legal form and decision-making bodies Participating and potential members
PE-T
 Formal agreement
 Decision making follows structures and 
procedures implemented by Peshkopi 
municipality, to whom the tendering 
function was delegated
 First tier local government units
 Second tier of local government (regional council) 
facilitated the initiative
 Grants that LGUs were tendering 
delivered through Trust Fund project managed by 
regional council
ShB-L
 To be decided—arguments and interests 
support “communal enterprise” and 
”shareholders company”
 Communal enterprise strongly advocated in 
this case by LGU hosting the landfill
 Interests of various participating members will 
need to be ironed out before defining LGUs to be 
directly involved in deciding and managing joint 
landfill
 Private sector involvement within the IMC has 
not been discussed, though present discussions are 
inclined to have IMC with only LGU member-
ship and tendering out various waste activities to 
private providers
K-SWM
 Shareholders company
 Highest decision-making body is 
shareholders assembly composed of all 
shareholder local units, with voting power 
proportional to number of shares possessed
 Assembly proposes and elects a Supervisory 
Council, which oversees activity of executive
 Represented by General Administrator who 
covers administrative and financial sector
 LGUs presently the only shareholders of company
 Considerations given towards participation of 
private sector as shareholders and provisions in 
statute to sell and buy shares
 Regional council not participating, but has had 
some role as databank for various waste-related 
registers
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Legal form and decision-making bodies Participating and potential members
BK-WS
 Shareholders company, merger between 
two companies covering adjacent territory 
within same region
 Shareholders assembly is highest decision-
making body, composed of members LGUs 
with number of shares proportional to 
population size
 Representatives of shareholder local units 
participate in assembly meeting with an 
opinion approved in respective municipal 
council for items on agenda
 Supervisory council, with members nomi-
nated by Shareholders Assembly based on 
criteria defined by central government
 Director appointed by Supervisory Council 
 LGUs presently the only shareholders of 
company
 Merging process joined two companies each 
owned by a set of local units
 In each case majority of shares (>50 percent) 
were owned by the main municipality in the 
arrangement
Other cases, in which the second tier local government has been delegated the 
responsibility—an institution already set up with staﬀ engorged by bureaucracy (e.g. 
Peshkopi trust fund)—started to yield cooperation almost instantly. Staﬀ with relevant 
skills that the regional council inherits from previous district councils is missing in 
institutions coming out of voluntary municipal arrangements.
Each of the cases described above is associated with an initiator, usually the mayor 
of the largest municipality and probably the most active member of the initiators’ group. 
Negotiation skills, coupled with the possibility of subsidizing some initial steps in the 
setting up process (and despite the political composition of mayors in the negotiating 
group), in most cases enabled the initiative to move forward. 
4.1.3 Financing Mechanisms and Incentives
The ﬁnancing patterns of all case studies are almost the same: see Table 1.7, which re-
ports ﬁnancial incentives for triggering a particular IMC and also sustainability plans 
for the future of the cooperation.
Financial incentives, mainly externally funded, are present in all of the analyzed 
cases. This situation is quite representative for the country, and certainly cooperation 
arrangements that have some formal status are encouraged by ﬁnancial incentives. In 
all cases, feasibility studies are externally ﬁnanced even before the institutionalization 
of cooperation, while a substantial part of the ﬁnancial incentive is used for upgrading 
service infrastructure.
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In the previous section, the diﬃculty in setting up consolidated IMC institutions 
was elaborated upon. Financial incentives described in Table 1.7 are probably the main 
inﬂuencing factor that brought LGUs together into agreeing to formalize cooperation. 
It is natural that the IMC activities described here (apart from PE-T) would be 
ﬁnanced through service tariﬀs since areas of these activities cover public utilities. In 
any case, the participating members have agreed to an increasing service fee scale that 
corresponds with the increase in service quality expected through IMC, which is also 
in charge of conducting public awareness activities, giving out information on plans to 
improve the service and collecting payment fees.
PE-T is a case in which saving on administration costs is easily calculated, since 
the cooperation agreement avoids a ten-fold repetition of tendering procedures in each 
LGU. In other cases, improvement of service and setting up of new institutions has 
created additional administrative costs, and certainly start up costs, mainly absorbed 
by the bigger municipality. 
Table 1.7
 Legal Form and Decision-Making of Case Studies
Initial ﬁnancial incentives Membership ﬁnancing mechanisms
PE-T
 Funding of various infrastructure projects, 
though not a direct financial incentive for this 
arrangement, was the basis for municipalities 
to cooperate
 Peshkopi municipality (and indirectly its 
citizens) bore the complete costs of carrying out 
the function on behalf of all participating units
 Could also be interpreted as a solidarity 
principle connecting units in the region
ShB-L
 Feasibility study carried out through an 
externally financed project
 Part of 4,165 mln euro construction cost for 
landfill paid by Albanian government
 Cleaning tariffs applied across all participating 
municipalities and communes
 Tipping fee applied at landfill
K-SWM
 Three consecutive projects, totaling 
approximately 3 mln euro, has supported the 
process of establishing an IMC on top of a 
loan covering landfill construction, including 
sorting and recycling activities
 Activities of IMC supported by following 
revenue streams: cleaning fees and other 
revenues consisting of fees for services or taxes 
related to waste administration
 Other contributions made by participating 
local units
BK-WS
 6,646,795 euro spent to successfully upgrade 
water and sewage system with purification, 
and proper drainage was acquired
 Water fees: according to business plan, 
company will work on self-financing and 
cost-recovery principle
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4.1.4 Provisions for Representation and Accountability
It is a diﬃcult task to prejudge arrangements for accountability and representation 
merely by statute articles. Since there are no IMC legal forms that are tailor-made for 
publicly (or quasi publicly) owned companies, the present institutions are set up based 
on private law statutes for private companies, leaving representation and accountability 
arrangements up to each municipality. 
To date there is no record in any of the cases presented here of municipal council 
members being involved in the decision-making of the General Assembly of companies, 
where applicable. It is up to the assigned municipal representatives and the municipal 
council to streamline procedures for keeping the latter informed about activities carried 
out by the IMC. Such a routine procedure still has to be designed from scratch, taking 
into account that city councils have delegated managerial authority for the assigned 
function (without regulatory experience) to the institutions discussed here.
The PE-T case is quite a diﬀerent arrangement and is a spin oﬀ of larger-scale IMC 
that involved second tier local government—the regional council. Decisions in this 
arrangement are taken by vote of the regional council, which is composed of council 
representatives from all local units within the region’s boundaries, in numbers propor-
tional to their respective LGU population size.
5. BOTTLENECKS AND OPPORTUNITIES
IMC in Albania, although at an emerging stage and still working to prove its contribution 
to improving the life of its citizenry, can nevertheless celebrate its small achievements to 
date. It is already i) tackling crucial service areas associated with local unit underperfor-
mance, ii) making use of greater production scale in order to aﬀord the price of better 
services, iii) implementing a holistic approach to managing shared indivisible resources, 
iv) making space for the use of private sector potential, v) making some use of skilled 
staﬀ in the upper tiers of local government, vi) attracting investment to improve infra-
structure and ﬁnancing feasibility studies, vii) implementing the cost recovery principle 
into local government operations and viii) saving on administration costs. 
Obviously, several local units are pursuing IMC with clear objectives and there is 
ample evidence that it has delivered in other European countries. Why then is it not 
happening on a larger scale? Each of the studies reported here had its own speciﬁc 
bottlenecks but several challenges are shared among almost all cases, providing some 
insight into impediments for greater scale IMCs. 
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5.1 Barriers Hampering Cooperation
Resistance to changing existing procedures and the way of doing things in the munici-
palities is a stumbling block for several functions. IMC requires decision-making at the 
political level and also qualiﬁed and courageous advice at the expert level. Meanwhile, 
the organization and administrative culture of LGUs does not encourage innovation. 
IMC is certainly a new ground to explore for most of the municipalities given that their 
administrations are used to working with very strict guidelines and procedures. Coopera-
tion arrangements also require relinquishing power from involved politicians and also 
respective departmental staﬀ, demonstrated through a clear reluctance to cooperate by 
potential IMC members.
Start-up costs to institutionalize IMC arrangements are quite considerable for mu-
nicipalities to bear. Among the four cases studied, K-SWM took seven years of eﬀorts 
to crystallize as a standing organization. Reviewing existing administrative structures in 
municipalities has proven to be a challenging initiative, so the eﬀort of setting up a new 
organization is immense and there are no cases demonstrating that such an initiative 
has taken place without outside intervention. Presently, cooperations are still supported 
by donors and there are no concrete examples of IMCs continuing to operate with 
their own with resources after donors withdraw. Even though it remains for IMCs to 
prove sustainable after pull out of support there is hope that they will transform into 
permanent cooperation structure. 
In the case of the Trust Fund (see IMC inventory), where an existing entity is used 
to coordinate eﬀorts of member LGUs, results can be observed within a couple of years 
of negotiations. Obviously, in cases where municipalities have arranged to share staﬀ or 
equipment (using agreements or memoranda of understanding), without setting up a 
standing entity, cooperation requires less start-up eﬀorts. 
Interviewees involved in all case studied highlighted the lack of IMC examples and 
templates to refer to when setting up cooperation arrangements, particularly in the case 
of setting up stand alone institutions. Each IMC case began its course in a vacuum when 
it came to preparing statutes, a foundation act, mid- and short-term programme, as well 
as with regard to municipal council decisions about participating in IMC and whether 
to delegate authority to IMC. The preparation of such documents for public authority 
cooperation is quite novel, and the expertise required to prepare such documentation 
is lacking. 
The comprehensive IMCs observed here carried out feasibility studies that analyzed 
and recommended several parameters of cooperation. Preparation of such detailed studies 
exposed a lack of technical capacity to carry out interventions that would have introduced 
new dimensions into municipal service delivery. Clearly, IMCs are susceptible to the 
same deﬁciencies as individual LGUs.
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Relinquishing power to enter into IMC is a painful undertaking, particularly in 
a politicized society. Not only will mayors have to give up their authority to manage 
important functions but also a party‘s power and presence in the localities involved 
might be reduced. Carefully thought out mechanisms will have to be put in place to 
ensure that all members are heard and that the smaller municipalities are not overruled. 
Fair participation that somehow ensures gains for every party involved might increase 
interest in surrendering some power for better results. 
Cooperation for delivering public services and utilities is the most common arrange-
ment identiﬁed, and a need to considerably increase the service fees was observed in 
all IMCs aiming towards future sustainability with such an undertaking. Although an 
increase in cost for providing better services was anticipated by local politicians, most 
mayors and city council members were taken aback by the magnitude of the increase 
required. The payment of service fees requires a fundamental change in the mentality 
of Albanian society, as well politicians’ mentalities must also change when it comes to 
making decisions that involve an adequate increase in service fees. Yet, it is the local 
politicians that get voted in or voted out while improvements in service quality usually 
take longer than one mandate to harvest. 
5.2 Recommendations to Encourage IMC
In sum, the situation in Albania is ripe for encouraging IMC for improved service deliv-
ery at the local level. Local government is relatively new but enjoys a broad spectrum of 
functions, autonomy and discretion over the biggest part of its budget in most LGUs. 
National government, pursuing the route to European integration, is already committed 
to encouraging IMC in several roadmap documents.
Several stakeholders with major roles and interests are also part of the scene. Sus-
tained eﬀort with a thoroughly thought-out strategy could encourage the voluntary 
association of local units. Given the analysis of obstacles and bottlenecks identiﬁed here, 
and also the experience of other European countries, three entry points to encourage 
IMC are identiﬁed: i) central government, ii) donor community, and iii) local units 
and their associations.
Entry point 1: 
Central government introduces (a) legal instrument and template documents, 
(b) ﬁnancial incentive scheme supporting start-up costs and feasibility studies, and 
(c) minimal service delivery standards 
Lawmaker Interventions have given shape to IMC and its patterns in every country. 
It is suggested here that the central government prepare a solid legal foundation for 
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IMC, which would reassure municipalities and their actions during the establishing of 
cooperative arrangements. The law, if it is to be a law, should try to facilitate and not 
dictate cooperation so that avoidance strategies are not encouraged. Auxiliary docu-
ments, the lack of which has impeded observed cases to move forward, could be part 
of the regulatory framework. 
Facilitating a regulatory framework will not scale IMC up without an incentive 
scheme and observance plan ensuring minimal service standards implementation in the 
LGUs. Observance of standards will encourage local units to use all available instruments 
to meet their legal obligations. The obligation to meet standards will go hand in hand 
with incentives to set up cooperative arrangements among LGUs. Such incentives could 
cover start up costs for the IMC institutions, pay for investment grants that will upgrade 
the run down utilities systems handed down to LGUs, or fund feasibility studies for 
systematically analyzing and advising on various IMC parameters.
This entry point might start working even without introducing minimal service 
standards, relying on the strength of ﬁnancial incentives and facilitated by the regula-
tory framework for cooperation. In all cases studied, the ﬁnancial incentives have been 
one of the main reasons for initiating cooperation; it should nevertheless not obscure 
the fact that the main purpose for getting into IMCs is at least the minimal service 
standard oﬀered to the citizenry. 
Entry point 2: 
Local authorities and Local Government Associations (a) maintain examples 
database of IMCs, (b) expose LGUs to European experience through IMC, and 
(c) maintain a pool of skilled professionals that can facilitate IMC processes and 
documents.
Local authorities and national LGAs can act as a platform of information and provide 
services to municipalities that will then decide independently whether or not to enter 
into cooperative arrangements. This entry point gives the upper hand to local units at 
every stage. Leaving the municipalities to decide whether to cooperate with their own free 
will has been an approach taken at some point in history in the Netherlands, Finland, 
UK, Belgium, Italy, France, Germany and Spain, yet all the countries mentioned took 
the route of actively promoting IMC (Hulst 2007) at a subsequent stage. 
Maintaining a national IMC database and exposing municipalities to international 
experiences serves as a step forward in raising IMC awareness among LGUs. Systematic 
proof of improved service delivery through IMC can serve as encouragement for local 
stakeholders, although it seems that even other eastern European countries that have en-
couraged IMC for more than a decade have yet to prove the eﬃciency of the arrangement.
It will take a considerable amount of time to develop patterns of IMC solely from the 
encouragement of LGAs and to then share those experiences with other local authorities. 
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This process still relies on local units encouraging innovative practices and creativity in 
their everyday work environments, and raising awareness about the usefulness of joining 
forces with others to entities that have no track record of looking outside their borders.
Cooperation encouraged through this means will still face ﬁnancial and administra-
tive burdens which can be stumbling blocks, while interested municipalities will have 
to pay the costs of IMC professionals, since it is a tailored service for a select pool of 
members. It is diﬃcult to imagine the start up of IMCs without a ﬁnancial incentive 
at this stage. Cases observed in the country have all had ﬁnancial incentives as their 
starting point. 
Entry point 3: 
Donor community (a) encourage ﬁnancing of IMC initiatives for managing in-
divisible resources (b) prepare the foundation for eﬃciency scale cooperation in 
preparedness for EU funds absorption
Despite the isolating of this point as a separate support strategy, it is worth mentioning 
that ﬁnancial support is increasingly channeled through national routes that might feed 
into the two previous entry points.
On the other hand, presently there are several donor initiatives to support regional 
scale projects that target an area similar to the NUTS nomenclature that will be used 
later on to channel EU funds. Such regional projects have components that support local 
initiatives and IMC is worth exploring as an intervention since it creates a cooperative 
culture that is quite useful in the area after donors withdraw. It also helps the second 
local level tier, the Qark, to position itself as a facilitator of cooperation initiatives, gain 
experience and build expertise within respective regions; and it sets good examples for 
jointly managing forest and water basins that are valuable, inseparable natural resources.
Each entry point described above can be introduced partially, and jointly, with 
others. Despite the variety of stakeholders involved, several mechanisms described are 
compatible with each other since all have the same end product, increased IMC initia-
tives for improved service delivery.
If we were to identify one entry point that will yield results sooner than the others, 
and on a national scale, Entry 1 stands out. Even so, central government surely is not 
meant to introduce one-sided initiatives. Nowadays there is a culture of consulting 
local units and their associations on any issue concerning local government, therefore 
central government initiatives should have the support of LGUs when embarking on 
strategies to encourage IMCs.
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ANNEX: ELABORATED IMC CASE STUDIES
1. IMC Case Study: Joint Tendering Procedure
Name of the Municipalities Involved
(With number of inhabitants as reported by the municipalities/communes):
1. Peshkopi Municipality 19,611
2. Bulqiza Municipality 17,836
3. Melan Commune 6,250
4. Muhur Commune 4,677
5. Fushë–Çidhen Commune 4,631
6. Arras Commune 5,828
7. Maqellarë Commune 14,019
8. Zall-Dardhë Commune 3,778
9. Kastriot Commune 9,817
10. Zerqan Commune 6,625
Service Area
  Joint (delegated) tendering process for supervision of construction works.
1.1 Description of the Problem/Need for IMC
Cooperation to jointly tender and contract monitoring and supervision of infrastruc-
ture works, is a spin oﬀ the “Trust Fund Initiative”33 that articulated cooperation 
between all municipalities and communes in the Dibër Region. Through the Trust 
Fund Initiative, ﬁrst level local units obtain funding for accomplishing projects 
within their local development plans and strategies as well as receive assistance to 
increase their capacities in several policy areas. The Regional Council manages the 
Trust Fund on behalf of the municipalities and communes,34 is continuously assisted 
by The Netherlands Development Organization (SNV) and is ﬁnancially supported 
by the Dutch Embassy.
The rounds of applications and ﬁnancing have enabled ﬁrst tier local units in the 
region to begin implementing priority infrastructure projects. Despite the assistance 
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provided within the program to aid in project monitoring and evaluation, the technical 
monitoring of the projects has to be carried out by the municipalities. 
The requisite time and capacity necessary to arrange for works supervision was 
limited, given: the set timeframe for contracting the works and reporting back to the 
Trust Fund; the limited number of potentially qualiﬁed supervisory companies in the 
region; local units workload for those that had to individually compile ten times the 
same amount of documentation to submit to the central Public Procurement Agency; 
the bureaucracy associated with contracting and collating the supervisory company’s 
reports, which had to be repeated in each individual local unit, and the small contractual 
fee for the works supervision that might not attract qualiﬁed supervisors if local units 
applied individually. 
Impeding factors listed above led to low quality and unsatisfactory supervision of 
construction projects. Furthermore, the Regional Council as the ﬁnancer lacked the 
necessary data detailing the investment projects’ progress. When projects were not 
progressing as planned, there was no trigger to encourage action from the contractor. 
Considering the fact that most Communes lacked the capacity to select a good super-
visor and to solve some of the needs and challenges mentioned above, the communes 
and municipalities in the arrangement designated the Municipality of Peshkopi as 
the leader of the “Central Purchasing Body” on their behalf. Despite the delegation 
of supervisory services procurement and purchases to the Peshkopi municipality, 
each local unit, through its oﬃce of public service, works in close cooperation with 
the supervisor. 
Municipalities and communes, through this joint arrangement, try to decrease the 
administration costs for processing procurement and contracting documents, and also 
try to increase their chances of securing a well-qualiﬁed supervising ﬁrm by tapping 
into service providers across the region.
1.2 Description of Case Study
The arrangement between the ten municipalities and communes provided a delegation to 
the Peshkopi municipality to conduct the tendering process for works supervision and to 
contract out the joint supervision for construction works in all participating local units.
The communes and municipalities that decided to get together for joint procure-
ment were already members of a bigger scale cooperation that involved all local units in 
the region (Trust Fund Project). Within the bigger scale IMC initiative, participating 
members had obtained ﬁnancing and also developed trust and mechanisms to cooper-
ate with each other.
This particular IMC, dealing with supervisory works, included a total of ten infra-
structure projects, funded thought the Trust Fund facility (each project was ﬁnanced 
by the Regional Council through the Dutch Embassy funds, by each local unit, and 
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with the central government covering the VAT share of each infrastructure project). 
Direct beneﬁciaries included 9 villages and 2 cities in the Dibër region, with a respective 
beneﬁciary population of 15,457 inhabitants, while the total population of local units 
involved in the arrangement amounted to around 93,000 inhabitants.
Legal delegation of the purchasing authority to Peshkopi municipality was done 
through a joint agreement signed by the Mayors of each unit. Municipalities jointly 
decided on the ﬁnal version of the Terms of References for the supervisory company, 
while Peshkopi municipality prepared necessary documentation and organized the ten-
dering process. In eﬀect, the Peshkopi staﬀ, in close cooperation and with the assistance 
of the Regional Council, carried out a process that would have otherwise involved 20 
staﬀ members from the administrations of participating local units.
An equivalent of 15,000 euros (1,787,000 ALL) was the total amount tendered for 
the supervision work of ten projects located in participating communes/municipalities.
This is a “one oﬀ” arrangement and not a permanent agreement between participat-
ing local units. Nevertheless, at least within the Trust Fund initiative implementation, 
when construction projects are implemented simultaneously (based on the opening calls 
for proposals), within the same region, and ﬁnanced by the same source, a precedent is 
set for similar future cooperation.
1.3 Establishment of the IMC
Several steps were taken to make this cooperation work. Initially the idea was discussed 
with members of the monitoring groups from the Regional Council. These groups were 
set up within the Trust Fund project to monitor progress of successful project applica-
tions in several communes and municipalities in the region. Monitoring groups also 
needed the data on the technical accomplishments of works ﬁnanced. They therefore 
suggested having municipalities/communes apply jointly for a supervisory ﬁrm that 
ensured quality supervision.
The proposal was discussed and approved by the Steering Committee of the Trust 
Fund program, composed by Dibër Regional Council, Dutch Embassy and SNV.
Several consultation meetings were organized and also supported by SNV and the 
Regional Council, the two actors jointly implementing the Trust Fund program. 
The opportunity was presented to the communes/municipalities, explaining the 
potential advantages. Suggestions were legally based on the procurement legislation 
(article 11, Law No. 9643). 
Based on the legal grounding and on the fact that most communes lack the capacitiy 
to contract good quality supervisors for works, it was agreed upon to proceed with this 
IMC activity.
All steps carried out to set up the IMC were supported by the Training Unit within 
Dibër Regional administration. The training unit was introduced by the Trust Fund 
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program to assist municipalities with advice and trainings. In this case, it facilitated the 
process of introducing potential IMC to participating communes and municipalities, 
preparing the terms of agreement between participating local units, raising awareness 
on beneﬁts and guiding consultations until reaching a common agreement.
Peshkopi Municipality took on the task of “Main Purchasing Body” regarding the 
conduct of the procurement procedure. It drafted the terms of reference-related services 
for the supervision of the technical works and it communicated with the National Pro-
curement Agency to streamline procedures. According to the Law, the municipality, 
as the responsible procurement body, began by forming the procurement committee, 
preparing tendering documents, and publishing an oﬃcial announcement at the Public 
Procurement Agency.
Upon completion of the tendering process and the announcement of the winner, 
Peshkopi Municipality will inform all participating municipalities/communes. After the 
supervisor is selected from the contracting body (Peshkopi Municipality), each LGU 
will independently sign contracts with the service provider.
Main Success Factors Are: 
  Good will of the leaders of the local government units to cooperate and come 
up with a joint solution.
  Good local knowledge of the legal frame (rules and procedures) for tendering 
procedures.
  Fund availability and simultaneous launching of the winning projects (comple-
tion of application round), therefore all projects being implemented at almost 
at the same time.
  All the LGUs implement the given projects as part of the same program, there-
fore rules and requirements are uniﬁed.
  Very good initiating phase, where all the steps were carefully considered 
(awareness of the municipalities, good feeling regarding the advantages of 
the IMC). 
1.4 Beneﬁts and Shortcomings
Reduced administrative costs for most of the participating local units apart from Peshkopi 
municipality, which carried out the procedure for all units concerned.
New knowledge obtained on mechanisms to be used when jointly initiating coop-
eration initiatives. Agreements and terms of reference that can be used as templates if 
the experience is to be repeated, were prepared.
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Increased monetary value of the total sum procured attracted companies with higher 
capacities and experience in works supervision.
The training unit, which is attached to the Regional Council to oﬀer assistance to 
municipalities/communes in the region, acquired new skills in negotiation and prepar-
ing documents that facilitate intermunicipal cooperation.
Willingness of communes/municipalities to professionally perform works supervision 
for Trust Fund projects increased their credibility with the funding agency (Dutch Embassy).
The only observation that could be mentioned as a shortcoming is that Peshkopi 
municipality (and indirectly its citizens) bore the complete cost for carrying out the 
function on behalf of all participating units. This could also be interpreted as a solidarity 
principle connecting the units in the region.
1.5 Future Plans for the Development of the IMC
This is a “one oﬀ” arrangement and not a permanent agreement between participating 
local units. Nevertheless, at least within the Trust Fund initiative implementation, when 
construction projects are implemented simultaneously (based on the opening bids for 
proposals) within the same region, and ﬁnanced by the same source, they set a precedent 
for similar future cooperation.
1.6 Main Lessons Learned on How to Establish IMC and Make it a Success
  Reach common understanding and agreement between all actors involved by 
fully exploring opportunities
  When talking about IMC, one should base the IMC on the legal framework 
and national legislation; therefore national legal frame should allow for it
  Good planning and coordination of timelines proved very important in this 
initiative
  Previous cooperating experience between municipalities, with the Trust Fund 
project, created trust between participating units
  The area of cooperation was relevant since it proved to be cumbersome to carry 
out for smaller communes with limited capacities
1.7 Readiness to Support Other Municipalities to Establish IMC
Training unit of regional council administration can and is willing to disseminate the 
experience.
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2. IMC Case Study: Shkodra—Bushat Regional Solid Waste Landﬁll
Name of the Local Government Units Involved 
(With number of inhabitants according to National Civil register, launched in Febru-
ary 2009): 
1. Shkodra Municipality 113,794
2. Bushat Commune 22,767
3. Lezha Municipality 26,759
4. Vau Dejës Municipality 14,774
5. Velipoja Commune 8,648
6. Hajmel Commune 9,164
7. Gur i Zi Commune 11,168
8. Vig–Mnelë Commune 3,347
9. Dajç Commune 6,818
10. Blinisht Commune 5,537
11. Balldren Commune 10,507 
The ﬁrst three local units are part of the formal agreement while the others are in a 
negotiation process to become part of the IMC.
Service Areas of the IMC
  Joint investment to set up landﬁll
  Joint management of solid waste disposal 
2.1 Description of the Problem/Need for IMC
Shkodra Municipality, the biggest in the region, with a reported population of around 
114,000 inhabitants, has for several years faced problems when dealing with the dump-
ing of urban solid waste. The current location where urban waste is disposed does not 
respect established minimum standards and causes signiﬁcant pollution to the surround-
ing environment. The dumpsite is located in the vicinity of Kir river, part of the biggest 
watershed in the country’s Northwest. 
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Pollution from the dumpsite has caused ecological problems and risks to the popula-
tion of the north-south part of the city for several years. During heavy rain, the increase of 
the river‘s water ﬂow poses a high risk of pollution for the Shkodra Lake and Buna River. 
Solving the waste disposal issue has been one of the top priorities of the Shkodra 
Municipality. Construction of a new landﬁll required several steps and due to limited 
ﬁnancial resources the Municipality was unable to solve this critical and emergent issue 
on its own. Furthermore, proper landﬁll investments needed to target an adequately 
large population to make use of economies of scale for such strategic investments. It 
was also impossible to locate a proper landﬁll site within the municipality’s administra-
tive territory.
The proposal to construct a new landﬁll for the city is part of the Strategic Plan for Eco-
nomic Development 2005–2015 of the City of Shkodra (the code project G4:O6:PG1:p1: 
Construction of a landﬁll for urban solid waste disposal). It has also been a priority of the 
Regional Development Plan for Shkodra and Lezha (two adjoining regions).
Joint investment for a joint landﬁll, Shkodra-Bushat, solves a top priority issue for 
the Shkodra municipality and the Bushat commune. Present negotiations are consid-
ering solutions for more local government units in the regions of Shkodër and Lezha. 
The anticipated landﬁll will provide a solution to the problem of waste disposal for the 
next 20 years, in line with national and EU standards, for a projected population of 
235,000 inhabitants. The outcome is also the result of an excellent cooperation with the 
Region of Toscana and UCODEP, supported by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs. 
Apart from the construction of a landﬁll site, the cooperation will also deal with 
managing waste fractions. 
2.2 Description of the IMC
The Memorandum of Understanding describes that local units will jointly carry out the 
design and construction of the landﬁll and potentially jointly manage solid waste disposal.
This service covers a surface area of about 2,385 km2 (this surface area covers all 
11 municipalities and communes as part of the agreement and the negotiation) with 
about 235,000 inhabitants.
Memorandum of Understanding among local government units is the ﬁrst step 
that has been carried out to date while it is in the process establishing a legal body with 
the participation of all local government units in the area. A joint working committee, 
appointed by concerned local units, is streamlining the institutional arrangements (see 
section 3 for detailed information).
Presently, it is anticipated that an assembly and board, composed of representatives 
from participating municipalities, will be set up to steer the IMC. The legal form to 
register the company as remains under discussion.
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2.3 Establishing IMC 
Acquiring a Solution for the Municipality
Shkodra municipality tried to tackle the urban waste disposal issue beginning in 1999, 
through the LIFE program (ﬁnanced by EC). An attempt to set up the designed landﬁll 
at this point failed due to a lack of timely funding to implement the project, and to the 
site’s occupation by informal construction projects.
[In the framework of SEENET—Local Governments Engine of Development—re-
construction of the bridges of dialogue in South Eastern Europe, funded by the Italian 
government, ﬁnancial support for priority initiatives of each partner municipality was 
envisioned] The preparation of a feasibility study and the designing of a technical project 
(a landﬁll for urban solid waste disposal) was one of priorities presented in 2005 by 
Shkodra municipality. This priority received ﬁnancing in the amount of 42,700 euros to 
cover the costs of preparing the feasibility study and technical proposal for the landﬁll.
A technical working group was set up with the following tasks:
  Prepare the feasibility study and all technical and administrative documents 
according to Albanian and European legislation.
  Make sure through information activities and an awareness campaign to inform 
all the citizens, the interested community, and beneﬁciaries, about the landﬁll 
project. 
  Raise funds to help make the construction of the landﬁll possible.
Increasing Catchment Areas and Membership
In order to make use of economies of scale and to increase the chances of ﬁnancing for 
the investments, it was agreed that the new landﬁll would be constructed in a place 
that also fulﬁls two criteria: includes those inhabitants who live outside of the admin-
istrative territory of the city of Shkodra, and includes all the local governments in the 
corridor between Shkodra and Lezha. Considerations for expanding the catchment 
areas of landﬁll were followed by a meeting with representatives of the municipalities 
of Shkodra and Lezha and the commune of Bushat. In this meeting the possibility to 
construct a regional landﬁll for urban solid waste disposal and to collaborate among the 
local government units comprising both regions of Shkodra and Lezha was discussed.
The decisions taken in this meeting were as follows:
  A Memorandum of Understanding among all interested local government units 
was signed to formalize cooperation for setting up a regional landﬁll.
  The feasibility study and the technical project of the landﬁll, it was decided, 
would be based on and respond to the range of needs from the local govern-
ments units of Shkodra, Lezha and of Bushat and Shëngjin. Possibilities would 
W O R K I N G  T O G E T H E R :  I N T E R M U N I C I PA L  C O O P E R A T I O N  I N  F I V E  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E A N  C O U N T R I E S
76
also be assessed to include other local government units from both Regions of 
Shkodra and Lezha within this cooperative initiative.
  The SEENET Project oﬃce was given the responsibility of preparing within a 
short period of time, the feasibility study and the technical project of the landﬁll.
On 23 June 2005, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the 
mayors of the municipalities of Shkodra and Lezha and of the commune of Bushat to 
partner and collaborate together in order to facilitate the planning, construction and 
future common management of a regional landﬁll for the urban solid waste of their 
cities and their neighboring local governments. Cooperating local units undertook the 
following responsibilities:
  Agreed on the selection of ﬁnal landﬁll site, currently identiﬁed within the 
administrative territory of Bushat Commune; 
  Facilitate all necessary administrative procedures in order to obtain the required 
authorizations from the competent local and national authorities (e.g. NCTR35 
etc.);
  Liaise and inform all relevant authorities (e.g., Qark) which may be involved 
in this regional initiative;
  Assist and partner with the SEEnet Program during the preparation of the 
necessary technical studies related to the construction of the selected landﬁll.
Jointly Contributing Towards Implementation
The Commune of Bushat approved the construction of the regional landﬁll in its terri-
tory with decision no.1, on 23 December 2005, based on a project designed according 
to European standards and relevant national legislation. The ﬁnalized feasibility study 
and technical project looks into a regional landﬁll that will:
  Serve for approximately 20 years;
  Cover an area housing about 235,000 inhabitants;
  Have a construction cost of EUR 4.165 million divided into three phases: EUR 
1 million; EUR 2,05 million; EUR 1.115 million.
The regional landﬁll study and technical proposal was presented for all local gov-
ernment beneﬁciaries, respective civil society members, and environmental NGO 
representatives.
The municipality of Shkodra followed all legal procedures according to the Albanian 
legal framework for receiving the environmental permission to construct the landﬁll 
(by MEFWA,36 October 4, 2006), approvals to construct the landﬁll by the Territory 
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Regulation Council of Shkodra Region (November 15, 2006) and the National Council 
of Territory Regulation (May 22, 2007).
Following the necessary oﬃcial approvals Shkodra municipality and Bushat Com-
mune, with international facilitation, organized a fundraising event attended by the 
central government and various potential donors. In 2008, the Albanian government 
allocated funds of around EUR 800,000 to implement the ﬁrst phase of the project. 
Construction is planned to be completed by the end of April 2009.
Extending Scope and Deﬁning Institutional Arrangements
Since July 2007 Bushat and Shkodra local authorities have begun eﬀorts to negotiate the 
institutional set up of the cooperation (IMC) that will oversee construction of a landﬁll 
and examine additional services and facilities necessary to ensure the development of 
an integrated waste management system. Some of the issues tackled concerning the 
institutional set up of IMC are:
  Representation by member municipalities regarding how they will manage the site;
  Research of investment opportunities in recycling activities;
  Foreign investment opportunities via the Clean Development Mechanism.
Negotiations to-date have agreed on the following key steps regarding Regional 
Solid Waste Management:
  Creation of an advisory body (Working Committee) appointed by the municipali-
ties to implement solid waste programs in the region. This would consider the 
entire range of collection/transport/separation-and-recycling/disposal issues. The 
Working Committee would also appoint one (Director) or two people to ensure 
eﬀective overall management of the landﬁll project. Relevant central government 
ministries (e.g., Public Works, Environment) should be invited to participate as 
observers in the regional organization in an ex oﬃcio, non-voting capacity.
  Development of an eﬀective community awareness/involvement program. 
This component would focus initially on public awareness/education: what is 
happening; what are the beneﬁts and costs of a regional solid waste strategy, and 
how will a cleaner city/region beneﬁt local citizens and businesses (especially in 
the tourism industry). The community program would also consider the deﬁni-
tion of performance standards and monitoring procedures, and be involved in 
the discussion and establishment of household charges/rates: i.e., the amounts 
they would pay directly through household user fees and the amounts to be 
paid indirectly through the local commune or municipal budget.
  Lay down ﬁnal organization of the IMC arrangement by negotiating between 
the set up of a shared company and owning the landﬁll, with representatives 
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from all participating local government units on the Board tendering, or having 
a company owned by the commune where the landﬁll is located.
External International Assistance was Needed and Utilized for:
  recommending the technical solution for the landﬁll design project;
  providing information and contemporary technologies for urban solid waste 
disposal;
  preparing necessary detailed engineering and economic analysis;
  complying with European directive 1999/31/CE;
  providing coordination and technical supervision (through Confederazione 
Italiana Servizi publici degli Enti locali, Tuscany);
  Financing the cost of the feasibility study and technical project of the landﬁll 
(by SEENET Program);
  Facilitating the discussion between the various local units involved concerning 
the institutional set up of the IMC;
  Providing for various cooperation scenarios that institutionalize the joint opera-
tion of landﬁll and waste disposal.
Challenges Faced
There is no IMC track record or templates to refer to when setting up such cooperation 
initiatives. Inter-municipal cooperation is quite a new experience for the Region of Shkodra, 
indeed for almost the whole of Albania. In the Region of Shkodra local government units 
through their structures and enterprises provided all public services for their administra-
tive territory only. This was the ﬁrst time the Region of Shkodra had the experience of 
providing public services with the participation of numerous local government units.
During preparation of the feasibility study and designing of the technical project it 
was evident that technical and engineering staﬀ were lacking locally. As this project was 
quite a new experience, even at the national level, only a few technicians and engineers 
were competent enough to design even some components of this project. Also, with 
regard to the selection of the landﬁll site, following the existing legal framework in place 
in Albania, a total of ten sites were taken into consideration. Three were shortlisted and 
one of these three was evaluated according to given legal criteria. Such legal procedures 
were very demanding and diﬃcult to abide by, given that the existing options within 
the region were limited.
Local residents have long held negative perceptions of the existing service standards 
since those standards have never abided by broader standards or criteria. The actual 
dumpsite for solid waste management in Shkodra was rejected by local residents. Con-
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versely, the construction of a regional landﬁll built for many local government units 
to dump their garbage there seemed to worsen the perceptions of the Bushat citizenry. 
The working group developed and implemented a very careful program on eﬀective 
community awareness for the population of Bushat. It was explained in detail that the 
technical project and the contemporary technology being used to construct the landﬁll 
were safe. The importance of the landﬁll, and the beneﬁts it would provide for the whole 
region—including each local government unit, local citizens and businesses (especially 
tourism)—had to be carefully explained.
Fundraising to initiate landﬁll construction was diﬃcult and required a multi-year 
eﬀort. Since the cost was relatively high, the municipality’s ﬁnancial limitations and 
even those of the Albanian national government made this critical issue almost impos-
sible to resolve for many years. 
Open Challenges and Questions that Remain: 
  Ownership and management structure. This is perhaps the most important and 
most urgent issue to resolve;
  Financial sustainability. A review of the cost of operating the facility and the 
status of the budget for moving forward;
  Fees. Deﬁne fee structure suﬃcient enough to meet the operational needs 
(operations, ﬁnancial costs, maintenance, and expansion) for the service;
  Deﬁne a responsible structure for setting fees—both for tipping fees at the 
facility and for local collection of garbage from citizens.
Main Success Factors Are: 
  Planning process to solve the critical issue. The municipality of Shkodra has been 
intent for some time on constructing a landﬁll for the city and prepared docu-
ments included in the Strategic Plan for Economic Development 2005–2015 
of the City of Shkodra and in the Regional Plan of Shkodra and Lezha;
  Involving all the interested actors in the process and coordinating goals and 
objectives with the programs and plans of the involved municipalities;
  Public campaigning to transparently explain the project, the process of imple-
mentation and the beneﬁts of the project. 
2.4 Beneﬁts and Shortcomings
Through partnerships with other local governments, the per capita cost was lowered, 
including operating costs, and there were gains in eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness. It is a 
great prospect for each municipality to have, in time, a landﬁll that not only serves its 
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region, but also respects environmental protection rules and standards. Currently, it 
is very diﬃcult just to ﬁnd a suitable site to construct a landﬁll. The cost is still high, 
particularly for small municipalities and communes. 
The main challenge is to ﬁnd and agree on the type of legal body needed to manage 
the ownership and operation of the landﬁll.
2.5 Future Plans for the Development of IMC
The overall goal of the Regional landﬁll project is to serve all the local communities 
along the main regional corridor between Shkodra and Lezha. Therefore, all local units 
located in this area are considered potential members in the IMC initiative. 
The service cost, reﬂected directly in the tariﬀs per unit (lek/ton) will diminish 
with further expansion of the service coverage area. When more local government 
units participate in this cooperative scheme, according to the calculations carried out, 
an aﬀordable tariﬀ level will meet the operational needs (including capital investment 
maintenance and expansion costs for the second and third phases of the project).
Last but not least, by not including adjacent local government units in the IMC 
system and enabling them to use the landﬁll, illegal dumping might result in high 
environmental pollution for the local government units that are part of the landﬁll 
managed through the IMC. Inviting and convincing adjacent local units to participate 
is an important consideration in further negotiations.
2.6 Main Lessons Learned for How to Establish IMC and Make It Successful
  Programming, designing, and managing a regional landﬁll requires a holistic 
and integrated strategic approach, and a clear vision in order to reach it;
  Raise public awareness and gain the support of local communities from the 
beginning: the preparation of the feasibility study and the technical projects is 
a crucial element to the process and needs community buy-in;
  It is essential to build an eﬀective partnership in order to achieve the desired 
goals and objectives of all the partners;
  It is important to work at diﬀerent levels simultaneously (central, local and 
community);
  Take advantage of all the opportunities encountered during the process; use 
what’s given and coordinate what’s needed;
  A long term investment analysis is needed.
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2.7 Readiness to Support Other Municipalities to Establish IMC
The practice can be replicated to resolve dumping issues and to set up proper waste 
management programs in local governments that cannot presently aﬀord to provide 
the service themselves. Several sets of documents and analysis produced during the 
implementation of this IMC initiative can be made available to other local units to 
facilitate the negotiation processes. There is also substantial technical knowledge accu-
mulated during the implementation of the initiative, which can also be made available 
as a template for interested local units.
Municipalities can share their experience regarding organizing eﬀorts, streamlining 
procedures and technical solutions considered during the set up of the IMC.
3. IMC CASE STUDY: SHA UJËSJËLLËS KANALIZIME 
 BERAT-KUÇOVA (WATER AND SEWAGE SHAREHOLDER 
 COMPANY, BERAT-KUÇOVA)
Name of the Municipalities Involved 
(Number of inhabitants as reported by municipalities):
Berat Municipality 63,835 before IMC sharing water and sewage enterprise with:
Vertop Commune 7,211
Otllak Commune 13,322
Kuçova Municipality 43,000 before IMC sharing water and sewage enterprise with:
Perondi Commune 8,098
Kozarë Commune 10,633
Service Areas
  Joint management and provision of drinking water and sewage collection and 
treatment;
  Information on the Good Practice.
3.1 Description of the Problem/Need for IMC
Water supply and wastewater collection and treatment are functions that were legally 
assigned to local government units in 2000 with the passing of the Law on the Func-
tioning and Organization of Local Government in Albania. 
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Nevertheless, the transfer process has been and remains a complicated issue that 
includes: the central government formally handing over ownership of systems to 
local units; deﬁning the local unit/s owner for each supply network; deﬁning and 
appointing local representation to the steering bodies of water and sewage companies; 
providing ﬁnancing for debts that ex-state owned companies owe to the electricity 
provider (KESH); providing for major refurbishing of run down water supply systems 
throughout the network.
In Kuçova and Berat, as throughout the country, there is a lack of a continuous 
drinking water supply, and municipalities inherit an ineﬃcient distribution system for 
water and sewage treatment. Water fees do not cover even the present operating costs, 
not to mention coverage for the investment needed to upgrade existing networks. Mu-
nicipalities need to get out of the vicious circle of not being able to provide good quality 
service and citizens not paying water fees. In order to deliver the service as expected 
(continuous provision of drinking water within acceptable standards) investment is 
needed to upgrade the system, including in this case, water meters and proper arrange-
ments for dealing with sewage and surface waters.
The IMC that joined the water and sewage enterprises of Berat and Kuçova addressed 
the need to increase service quality and eﬃciency. It succeeded in obtaining investment 
funding to upgrade the water distribution and sewage systems in both municipalities 
participating in the IMC, through a project funded by KFW. Cooperation attempted 
to meet the following detailed needs: 
Provide the drinking water supply for the city of Kuçova from the “Bogova” spring, 
for the period during which the water supply from the source is adequate for both Berat 
and Kuçova.
Avoid supplying water through mechanical pumping for Kuçova city at least during 
the period when the spring is providing an adequate supply of water.
Deliver expert advice and implement a program to reduce present water losses.
Acquire investment funding to: replace two km of pipes (φ 400) between pump-
ing station Uznove to Reservoir Nr. 4; install 100 water meters for families; replace the 
big water meter (φ 80–φ 600) at the source and reservoirs in Berat city; replace water 
pumps, and install the large water meter to precisely measure the yield in Kuçova City. 
3.2 Description of the IMC
The merging of the two enterprises is considered a pioneering experience for a country 
that is trying to “regionalize water supply systems.” It extends the service coverage area 
to improve standards, attract investments, and reduce service costs, subsequently reduc-
ing the service fee for consumers. 
Each of the enterprises that were merged had their municipalities as main share-
holder (Berat had 75.6 percent of the shares in the Berat Enterprise and Kuçova had 
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61.8 percent of the shares in the Kuçova Enterprise) and two communes each holding 
the rest of the shares.
The joint water and sewage enterprises of Berat and Kuçova (SH.A.) cover water 
supply as well as sewage and surface water collection, and treatment and discharge for 
a total of around 146,000 inhabitants in both municipalities and surrounding partici-
pating communes. 
The community of Berat has been involved in a project for the improvement of the 
water supply and management of sewage, funded by the German Bank KFW, accord-
ing to the agreement between the governments of Albania and Germany, a project that 
provided assistance for IMC set up.
The IMC provides services for the city of Berat, which is currently supplied by the 
Bogova spring, located under the mountain of Tomori, around 36 km east of the city. 
The IMC now also provides services for the municipality of Kuçova. A capacity of 600 
liter/sec spring’s yield will be managed by the enterprise to also supply the city of Kuçova 
for 8 months, during the period when there is maximum spring yield. The number of 
consumers supplied with potable water are broken down in the following way:
Berat Kuçova
1. Family consumers 14,013 7,184
2. Public sector consumers 42 16
3. Private sector consumers 1,162 398
The councils of each municipality approved this IMC arrangement and the process 
has been supported by the central government. The new enterprise has its own share-
holders assembly and supervisory council, with the representatives from both Berat and 
Kuçova and the surrounding communes of Otllak, Vertop, Perondi and Kozarë. The 
representatives of shareholder local units participate in the assembly meeting and their 
opinions are approved during individual municipal council meetings as agenda items. 
The members of the Supervising Council are nominated by the Shareholders Assembly 
according to the criteria and qualiﬁcations deﬁned in the Guidelines (nr. 965 date 
11.12.2007) put out by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy. Five members and 
an appointed director compose the Supervisory Council of the Enterprises for Water 
Supply and Sewages Berat and Kuçova.
The Enterprise is organized based on the specialists’ recommendations, with a central 
oﬃce in Berat and two sector oﬃces, the Berat sector and the Kuçova Sector. The total 
number of employees is 271, out of which 178 are employed for the Berat sector and 
93 for the Kuçova sector.
Presently, the IMC is carrying out: the feasibility study for both cities; the expert 
services for implementation of the program to reduce water losses and which has an 
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investment of EUR 12,000 for Berat and EUR 33,000 for Kuçova, and investments 
to upgrade water and sewage systems with a total value of EUR 1,000,000 (ﬁnalized 
in June 2008). The cooperation succeeded in attracting the investment and upgrading 
the system to a standard that saves 30 liters/second of water, previously accounted as a 
loss due to illegal connections and water misuse.
The Enterprise is working with self-ﬁnancing and cost-recovery principles, and 
based on these principles a business plan has been formulated for the period between 
2008–2012. How municipalities will ﬁnance enterprise activities in the future remains 
to be discussed and ﬁnalized.
Part of the IMC‘s responsibility is also to provide information to the public and host 
awareness campaigns through the local media to explain problems that the enterprise 
faces and the actions undertaken to eliminate water misuse, and to raise awareness about 
the payment of water bills. 
The municipalities participating in the enterprise periodically receive information 
pertaining to economic and technical issues and other relevant statistical information. 
3.3 Establishment of the IMC
The Mayors of Berat and Kuçova municipalities were the ones that took the ﬁrst step 
to initiate the cooperation, and were also supported by the Ministry of Public Works, 
Transportation and Telecommunication and representatives of the German Bank for 
Development (KfW). 
The mayors’ initiatives were conﬁrmed with the municipal councils’ approval of 
the “Memorandum of Cooperation” for the joining of the two enterprises. Based on 
the memorandum an agreement was drafted where both parties agreed to establish this 
joint structure, to merge their ﬁnancial tools in order to increase performance, and to 
advance the investments from both foreign and local investors in the sector. External 
legal expertise was acquired for the drafting of the terms of the agreement. 
This initiative was supported and encouraged by KFW. The merging of the two 
enterprises was set as a condition to obtain a total loan of EUR 6,646,795, the amount 
required to successfully upgrade the system. 
The IMC practice has initiated operation and there had been no obstacles to report 
in the cooperation until now. The obstacle encountered is quite recent and therefore it 
might be too early to assess failures. 
Apart from upgrading the water supply system, both municipalities were interested 
and through this cooperation succeeded in raising funding for the reconstruction of the 
sewage system, including the water treatment plant. Sewage water that mixed in with sur-
face water drains caused immense pollution to the river system running through the cities.
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The main success factors are: 
  The cooperative climate between the municipalities of Berat and Kuçova has 
been good, and has therefore supported the IMC association for joint enterprise 
on water supply and sewage.
  Expertise from the specialists provided through KfW helped this process since 
it began.
  Support from respective municipal councils in both cities, which approved this 
joint cooperation.
  Support from the central government’s legal bodies.
  Financial incentives that provided the opportunity for municipalities to improve 
service to their citizens and reduce pollutant discharges into the environment.
3.4 Beneﬁts and Shortcomings
Major investment (1 mln euros) was attracted to acquire investment funding for: re-
placing two km of pipes (φ 400) between pumping station Uznove to Reservoir Nr. 4, 
installing 100 water meters for families, replacing the big water meter (φ 80–φ 600) 
at the source and reservoirs in Berat city, replacing water pumps, and installing a large 
water meter to precisely measure the yield in Kuçova City. 
The cooperation succeeded in attracting investment and upgrading the system to 
a standard that saves 30 liters/second of water, previously accounted as a loss due to 
illegal connections and water misuse.
Hours increased during which the drinking water supply was available for both 
Berat and Kuçova. 
  Reduced drinking water provision costs for Kuçova municipality due to a new 
water supply system design that used free ﬂow rather than mechanical ﬂow.
  Improved drinking water quality for the citizens of Kuçova, due to connection 
with one of the purest water springs in the county (Bogova spring) and the 
upgrading of the distribution system.
  The acquisition of a total investment of EUR 6,646,795 used to successfully 
upgrade the water and sewage system with puriﬁcation and proper drainage 
structures. 
  Reduction of pollution discharge into the main river system ﬂowing through 
the cities is expected, due to treatment of discharge waters.
  Cooperation is still too recent to identify its weak points.
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3.5 Future Plans for the Development of the IMC 
  The present enterprise is undertaking activities to further improve the situation 
in the cities. These activities include: 
  – Further investment and implementation of the feasibility study to guarantee 
continuous water supply for all consumers. 
  – Reconstruction of sewage pipes, and overall system, presently 80 percent 
damaged.
  The potential to join with the local units of Polican, Skrapar and Ura Vajgurore 
will be considered and assessed. 
  The successful cooperation for water provision triggered present considerations 
to expand the IMC experiences into waste management. The municipalities 
and communes looking into such a cooperation are Kuçova, Ura Vajgurore and 
Otllak. The potential IMC for waste management will seek to beneﬁt from a 
project regarding the purchase of joint equipment for waste management and 
the regional management plans for waste and landﬁll.
3.6 Main Lessons Learned for How to Establish IMC and Make it a Success
There is a potential to have similar cooperation initiatives in other cities. The central 
government can help with both legal and ﬁnancial expertise to improve IMC practices 
among cities and communes. Also, roundtables and seminars can provide municipalities 
with forums to discuss successful practices and share experiences. 
The Albanian Association of Municipalities can provide the necessary information 
regarding possible donor/funding programs that support IMC projects for the munici-
palities and Communes. The municipality and communes associations can distribute 
information regarding donors’ requisites for funding qualiﬁcation. 
3.7 Willingness to Support Other Municipalities Establishing IMC
Municipalities involved in IMC are willing to support other municipalities through 
the sharing of experiences gained in the process, and by providing information and 
documentation that other municipalities might need for establishing a successful IMC.
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4. IMC CASE STUDY: KORÇA REGIONAL WASTE MANAGEMENT, 
 SHAREHOLDERS COMPANY (KRWM SH.A.) 
Name of the Local Government Units Involved 
(Population numbers based on INSTAT census 2001):
1. Barmash 949 15. Maliq 2,498
2. Bilisht 8,188 16. Miras 11,148
3. Buçimas 12,788 17. Mollaj 7,017
4. Bulgarec 12,866 18. Mollas 4,189
5. Çerravë 9,126 19. Pirg 9,788
6. Dardhas 3,675 20. Pogradec 37,134
7. Drenovë 10,394 21. Pojan 17,270
8. Ersekë 10,003 22. Progër 6,260
9. Gore 4,164 23. Qendër Bilisht 9,255
10. Hoçisht 7,493 24. Qendër Ersekë 5,675
11. Hudenisht 5,811 25. Vithkuq 3,746
12. Korçë 82,998 26. Voskop 6,355
13. Libonik 14,102 27. Voskopojë 3,193
14. Liqenas 4,460 28. Vreshtas 11,093
Service Area
  Joint waste management, where the IMC will exercise service, administrative 
and investment competence on behalf of participating local government units 
for the collection, transportation, administration and disposal of the following 
waste categories: urban, industrial, hospital, construction/demolition, remains 
from water treatment, agricultural, livestock and bulky waste.
4.1 Description of the Problem/Need for IMC
Waste management, based on EU standards and waste directives, is quite a new approach 
in Albania. It was introduced in the Korça region as a necessary means to improve the 
situation of waste collection and disposal and provide the proper principles and tech-
niques for the protection of the environment. First tier local units are fully responsible 
for collection, transportation and disposal of waste since the enactment of organic Law 
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on Local Government in 2000. Despite this legal obligation and an increasing demand 
by communities for proper waste management, several local units remain unable to oﬀer 
quality service, or fully cover their respective administrative territory, or even introduce 
the service (particularly in deep rural areas). On the other hand, dumping in the region 
has polluted the watersheds of Ohrid and Prespa lakes and endangered water quality of 
aquifers that supply the population with drinking water.
Proper waste disposal systems remain diﬃcult to establish due to increased service 
costs (which directly aﬀect consumer fee levels), and also due the diﬃculty in ﬁnding 
adequate landﬁll sites and acquiring the necessary investment funding. 
KRWM seeks to establish an eﬀective regional system that will handle the process 
of waste management (collection, transport, treatment and disposal), oﬀer quality 
service to the citizens of 28 municipalities and communes37 and ensure environmen-
tally friendly practices. Through this cooperation, communes and municipalities 
in the Korça Region are seeking to fulﬁll their legal and moral obligations to their 
communities. Local units see the IMC as the best means to increase eﬃciency and 
eﬀectiveness in waste management and to protect the ground and surface water re-
sources in the region.
4.2 Description of the IMC
This IMC is focused in delivering the waste management service and includes also 
facilitation to set up a fee system applying the principle of cost recovery. Member local 
units have delegated to the KRWM authority38 to fulﬁll the function of solid waste 
management. However, regulatory competence for this function remains with founding 
members, while the IMC exercises administrative, service and investment competence. 
KRWM is also expected to provide training and advice for local unit administrations 
as well as develop standards for various waste management activities, such as for waste 
reduction, treatment and disposal.
KRWM serves a total of approximately 320,000 inhabitants in the region living 
in 28 local government units (5 municipalities and 23 communes). Participating units 
agreed to establish the joint-stock company “Korça Region Waste Management” to pro-
vide waste management services and help build the structures needed to perform such 
services. Participating local units are all shareholders of the Company, sharing the rights 
and duties according to the number of their shares, which are deﬁned in proportion to 
the population served (based on oﬃcial population ﬁgures published by the National 
Institute of Statistics, INSTAT).
The Shareholders’ Assembly is the highest decision-making organ and is composed 
of all Shareholder local units, with voting power proportional to the number of shares 
they possess. Shareholders assembly is the authority that has the right to change the 
Statute. The assembly proposes and elects the Supervisory Council, presently composed 
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of six members. The supervisory council oversees the KRWM executive’s activity during 
the periods between the Assembly meetings.
The company is represented by a General Administrator who covers the administra-
tive and ﬁnancial sectors. Overall, KRWM has four employees, including the ones that 
are presently being hired.
Partnering local units ﬁnance the activities of the IMC from the following revenue 
streams:
  cleaning fees; 
  other revenues consisting of fees for service or taxes that are related with waste 
administration; 
  other contributions made by participating local units. 
Members may also assist the company with administrative support or other services 
as deemed appropriate. KRWM can receive and administer loans, while assets needed 
for its activities remain the property of local units and are used by the company. 
Presently, through a loan from KfW,39 the company is planning to start up the 
construction of a joint sanitary landﬁll. Future projections consist of a scenario that 
has service fees as the main basis for ﬁnancing the activity of KRWM. The fee policy 
remains a decision of communal/municipal councils, with future projections to cover 
service cost, although such a cost recovery principle for services rendered was introduced 
by law in 2000. 
The company’s present activity is in its initial phase, wherein only the feasibility 
study has been completed and the IMC legally established with operational staﬀ and 
headquarters.
Regular reporting mechanisms to the Shareholders Assembly and Supervisory Coun-
cil are included in the legal documentation of KRWM. It is through the representation 
at the Assembly of Shareholders and the Supervisory Council that participating local 
units monitor and control the activities of the Company. 
4.3 Establishment of the IMC
Initiating Cooperation
The process, from expression of municipalities’ willingness to cooperate to the present 
establishment and operation of KRWM company, was a long-term exercise involving 
a seven year time-span (2001–2008). 
Mayors of the ﬁve municipalities in the Korça region, namely the Mayors of Korça, 
Pogradec, Erseka, Maliq and Bilisht, carried out the initial cooperation steps in 2001. The 
initiative, apart from resolving the issue of waste management in the given municipalities, 
also aimed at making further use of the good cooperation and investment opportunities 
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oﬀered by KfW. The latter had a very good track record of investment projects in Korça 
municipality, particularly with the set up of the water company that provided 24 hours 
drinking water to Korça city.40 Investment in waste management for the region would 
also help the success and sustainability for two already ongoing interventions ﬁnanced 
by KfW, i.e., the protection and preservation of Ohrid Lake watershed, in which several 
municipalities and communes have located dump sites, and the set up of a drinking 
water system from an aquifer that was exposed to high pollution levels with the illegal 
dump site on the top crust layer. 
The ﬁve municipal mayors signed an oﬃcial agreement expressing intent and will-
ingness to cooperate in setting up a joint waste management system. The agreement 
stipulated that member municipalities are willing to: use the system immediately and in 
the future; accordingly arrange existing contractual arrangements and collection systems; 
apply adequate uniﬁed and standardized collection and transportation of waste to a com-
mon landﬁll; ensure equality for all participating members; use a common landﬁll for all 
members; be open to include other local units in the region that would want to share the 
system and are prepared to bear their share of the cost for running it. 
Carrying out the Feasibility Study
The initiators carried out successful negotiations with KfW which, in 2003, ﬁnanced 
the feasibility and a site selection study for a regional landﬁll. The studies were carried 
out under the auspices of Korça Municipality, which was leading the process on behalf 
of the initiators group. The results of the feasibility study, which aimed to improve en-
vironmental conditions, minimize health risks and contribute to sustainable economic 
and social development by means of a modern waste management system, were:
  A compilation of all the necessary information and planning documents of the 
investment project covering all technical, organizational, economic, ﬁnancial, 
environmental and social aspects.
  Provide foundation for decision-making on the part of the Albanian and the 
German authority (KfW) with regard to the completion of the project and its 
ﬁnancing scheme.
Having generated a very thorough analysis of the waste management situation in the 
region of Korça, the feasibility study was successfully carried out. It analyzed all of the 
aspects of waste management in the region, including: a description of the present situ-
ation in the project area, geographical, hydrological and climatic data, population data, 
and demographic development. It also included socio-economic analyses of environmental 
awareness, up-to-date solid waste management systems in the project area, up-to-date waste 
management services analysis, the design basis of the waste management system, and an 
assessment and comparison of conceptual alternatives for treatment of all waste categories.
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The partners implementing the feasibility study conducted also obtained relevant 
approvals from the National Territory Regulation Council for the selected site and design, 
and a draft statute and program for the selected legal form of the Waste Management 
Association. They succeeded in extending the service area, including communes, bring-
ing population coverage up to 80 percent of those inhabiting the region.
The outcome of the feasibility study also included recommendations for provisional 
measures to prepare the community to actively take part in a new waste management 
system, introduce systems for recycling and reuse, and refurbish existing dumpsites so 
that they reach an acceptable standard. 
Undertaking Intermediate Measures
Supported ﬁnancially by SIDA and grounded in the recommendations of the feasibility 
study, the initiators carried out suggested intermediate measures which targeted both 
local government tiers in Korça region. 
At the second tier local level, activities were carried out to support regional authori-
ties in: 
  Coordinating and supporting municipalities;
  Establishing a system for distribution of regulations, registration, monitoring, 
and education;
  Launching public awareness campaigns for waste reduction, recycling and 
similarly related issues;
  Establishing a Regional Funding Facility for projects carried out in the munici-
palities and communes; 
  Carrying out a study of demolition waste and formulating local rules and regu-
lations.
At the ﬁrst tier local level, activities were carried out to: 
  Undertake a recycling project involving the Roma; 
  Start up source separation of recyclables from households in a pilot area;
  Establish a source separation system for waste like garden waste and organic waste; 
  Construct a pilot composting plant; 
  Improve selected existing dumps taking into consideration that most of them 
will still be in operation for a number of years;
  Encourage and start up waste collection in villages;
  Support awareness campaigns for the separation of hazardous waste, recycling 
and waste reduction; 
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  Assist municipalities and communes in their preparation of Local Solid Waste Plans;
  Draft a structure for a municipal fee system aiming at covering all costs related 
to waste collection and treatment including customer registration. 
IMC Legally Set Up
The Association was legally established in June 2008, at the ﬁrst meeting of the Share-
holders Assembly. The bridging phase project, supported by KfW, started with assistance 
in 2008 to institutionally strengthen the waste management association and provide 
resources for the staﬀ to acquire knowledge and skills to properly run the KRWA. 
Support for the bridging phase was a continuation of KfW’s commitment since the 
preparation of the feasibility study, carried out between 2003 and 2005. KRWM also 
beneﬁted from the SIDA-funded project a donation of oﬃce equipment and a vehicle, 
and from expertise that was provided by KfW.
Challenges Faced
  Lack of capacity and experience. Given the standards required for waste 
management, technical knowledge in Albania is scarce. The knowledge gap 
was ﬁlled by providing international expertise on landﬁll engineering design 
and waste management techniques, and economic analysis for various waste 
treatment scenarios including the ability of the population to bear the cost, 
waste composition analysis and future projections. Lack of experience was 
also matched with external expertise for institutional issues and to build the 
structural architecture of KRWM.
  Increased costs when compared with the current level of ﬁnancing for waste 
management by partner municipalities. The commitment to set up a sustain-
able waste management association with improved service performance was 
directly related to increased costs. Since waste treatment and disposal are to 
be introduced for the ﬁrst time in the waste management chain, overall costs 
are increased. Several communes/municipalities have diﬃculties proposing the 
necessary increase in cleaning fees, particularly when the fee increase must ﬁrst 
be applied before the service standard is visibly improved.
  Reluctance to cooperate. Anticipated members of KRWM had to be convinced, 
mainly through analysis and observations of the feasibility study, that the joint 
landﬁll is the optimal available solution.
  Distance involved and lack of infrastructure. Joint waste management is diﬃcult 
in the mountainous Korça region because of its terrain and also due to poor 
infrastructure. Several technical solutions (including transfer stations) are oﬀered 
by experts. Transfer stations are envisioned to facilitate waste transportation and 
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compensate for the diﬀerence in distance to the landﬁll for various local units. 
However the poor road infrastructure remains a challenge. 
Main Success Factors Are: 
  Expected increase of service quality. A better waste management service 
through this regional enterprise is expected by member municipalities and 
the community;
  Collaboration and common sense among central, local government and commu-
nity actors has accompanied the process;
  Continuous support by KfW and expertise provided;
  External assistance has been and remains crucial for the set up of an operational 
and sustainable IMC. Several experts have contributed in the following areas: law, 
ﬁnance, engineering and institutional relations. Without the external ﬁnancing 
and expertise thus far provided, the enterprise might not have succeeded;
  Strong leadership by the mayors who began the initiative and strongly supported 
and guided all steps carried out so far.
4.4 Beneﬁts and Shortcomings
  The partner municipalities beneﬁt from a well-organized and eﬃcient structure 
to handle the waste management services in the region, carry out considerable 
investments and negotiate and manage donations, and implement environmen-
tally-friendly practices. In several communes, the service will be introduced for 
the ﬁrst time, while in others citizens residing on the periphery of the territory 
will be included in the waste management chain.
  Expected service standards to be provided by the KRWM will prevent the 
pollution of aquifers that supply drinking water and the two major watersheds 
of Ohrid and Prespa.
  The inhabitants will beneﬁt from a cleaner environment and better services, 
directly improving the quality of life and attractiveness of the region for tourists 
and investors.
  Increased service area might increase interest of private sector, oﬀering attractive 
opportunities for experienced and well equipped waste companies.
Presently there are no shortcomings to highlight. 
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4.5 Future Plans for the Development of the IMC 
Plans for the future include expanding the cooperation to include other communes in 
the region, since it is envisioned that KRWM will be a regional enterprise covering the 
entire regional territory.
4.6 Main Lessons Learned on How to Establish IMC and Make It a Success
  Good will and availability to fulﬁll the conditions of the cooperation through 
careful negotiations and a willingness to reach a compromise that will satisfy 
all partners in the undertaking.
  Municipalities that initiated the cooperation have strongly supported and negoti-
ated each step forward, providing leadership for participating local units. Korça 
municipality expressed a willingness to support smaller units, and carried out 
the administrative burden in various stages of the process by providing expertise, 
lobbying and oversight of several issues until the KRWM was oﬃcially set up 
and employed by an executive branch.
  There was a clear articulation of the need to keep the same pace for all partici-
pating members when it came to fulﬁlling obligations for getting involved in 
the association‘s issues, including in this case, respective ﬁnancial contributions.
  A thorough analysis of the waste situation in each local unit was carried out. 
All members had a clear picture of scenarios that local units had to employ to 
come up with common standards and this encouraged members to have a full 
understanding of the eﬀorts each local unit had to make. 
  Exchange of experience with international consultants has been crucial to 
broadening understanding and staying updated about contemporary waste 
management trends and techniques.
4.7 Readiness to Support Other Municipalities in the Establishing of IMC
Participating members and KRWM staﬀ believe that this IMC practice can be success-
fully replicated in other regions of Albania. In order to increase the chances of successful 
replication, the central government should work on public awareness campaigns and 
facilitate the procedures required for the creation of similar IMCs. 
The Association of Municipalities can support the replication of their good practices 
by publicizing and amplifying the beneﬁts and its positive outcomes.
If other municipalities undertake an IMC in the waste management ﬁeld, KRWM 
would be willing to share experience with them and provide advice, suggestions and 
ideas to help them achieve their goals.
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NOTES
1 Albanian Constitution, Article No. 108.
2 Human Development Report, Albania 2002, United Nations Development Program, 2003.
3 For more information on local government in Albania see Artan Rroji and Jim Budds, 
Organization and structure of local government in Albania, 2001.
4 Municipalities govern mainly urban areas, and communes mainly rural areas.
5 Spending ﬁnanced by revenues other than earmarked grants.
6 Until 2008, local units were distributing salaries to local professional staﬀ.
7 CoM decision on Decentralisation policies reviewed the health care system nationally and 
did not transfer any competence to local units.
8 Such as the Law on Local Financing, update of the Law on Civil Service, clear deﬁnition of 
role of region and deﬁnition of minimal standards on service delivery.
9 In the case of water companies accumulated debts amounted to 85 mln euros.
10 Own calculation based on data from the national register of civil registry launched on 
February 2009.
11 Approved in 2007.
12 Article No. 108 of the constitution on inhabitants’ opinion for changing administrative 
boundaries.
13 Article 67, on Law No. 8656 on local referenda for changing boundaries.
14 Law 8744, dated 22.02.2001, “On transfer of immovable properties to local governments”; 
Law 8979, dated 12.12.2002, “On the local small business tax”; Law 8982, dated 12.12.2002, 
“On the system of local taxes”; Law 9632, dated 30.10.2006, “On the system of local taxes”; 
Law 9936, dated 26.06.2008, “On the management of budgetary system in the Republic 
of Albania”.
15 Figures do not include spending done in localities for education and health care which does 
not go through LGs, which might also make it diﬃcult when generalized and compared 
with other countries.
16 Not accounting here for the communes (small/rural).
17 CoE ﬁnal remarks on amalgamation, Working Paper 2003: Experts are not entirely 
convinced that amalgamation is the most eﬃcient way to resolve the present problems of 
local government in Albania. Territorial fragmentation is not extreme, and merging may 
lead to positive results but it may also produce conﬂicts, generate misinterpretation (or 
even mistrust) of the central government intentions by many local leaders and ﬁnally prove 
to be less eﬀective than expected. In addition, they are still not sure that all the relevant 
statistical data are available. 
18 Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom.
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19 July 2001; article 8/V of law Nr. 8652, on the organization and functioning of local govern-
ment. The above mentioned law, in article 14.1, spells out: “Every unit of local govern-
ment can exercise the right of inter-communal collaboration … using one of the following 
modalities: an agreement to accomplish together one or more functions; contraction with 
another unit of local government to exercise one or more functions; contraction from the 
interested local government units with a third party to exercise one or more functions.”
20 Article No. 10.
21 Includes the Membership Association, Center or Foundation.
22 Legal basis for the foundation of an NPO is The European Charter of Local Self-
Government, article 10, “the right for local municipalities association.” Paragraph 1 states: 
“The local municipalities have the right to collaborate while exercising their competen-
cies and, according to the law, can be joined with other local municipalities in order to 
accomplish the duties of common interest.” The law for organization and functioning of 
local government, no. 8652 article 8/V “the right to collaborate” option “c” says: “they 
have the right to be organized in associations according to the respective legislation for 
associations.” The civil law of the Republic of Albania article 39 states: “the association 
is a legal person that is created by the free will of 5 or more persons or not less than two 
legal persons, which have a deﬁned legal aim in the interest of the public and the associa-
tion’s members. Law “On Not for Proﬁt Organizations” deﬁnes the rules for the founding, 
registration, functioning, organization and activity. 
  It is important that articles 6 and 7 Law number 8788 date 07.05.2001 “On 
Non-Proﬁtable Organizations” be applied in the statute of the association. Article 6, “the 
principle of independence from the power” states: “Non-proﬁtable organizations exercise 
their activities independently from the central authorities and interests. Article 7 states: 
“Central authorities do not intervene in the activity of the non-proﬁtable organizations.”
23 Article 39/1 of the Civil Law states: “It is not allowed that the association accomplishes 
proﬁtable activities.” Does the “sale of the service with a higher value than its cost” mean 
proﬁtable activity? The Civil Code and the law “for non-proﬁtable organizations” does not 
determine what kind of activity will be considered proﬁtable. Furthermore, article 36 of 
this law states “if the non-proﬁtable organization, will make proﬁt through its economic 
activity, this proﬁt should be used to fulﬁll the aims deﬁned in the statue and the founding 
act”, thus creating confusion between the two above-mentioned articles. It is this confusion 
which represents a disadvantage of the non-proﬁtable associations.
24 Law No. 8788 dt. 07/05/2001 “for non-proﬁtable organizations” article 35 titled “sources 
and usage of income” states: “non-proﬁtable organizations obtain income from the sources 
acknowledged by this law.” It also states that “the income sources of the non-proﬁtable 
associations are the income from membership fees, where such exist, funds, grants and 
donations given by national or foreigner private or public subjects and income from the 
economic activity and properties owned by the non-proﬁtable association.”
25 Article 50 paragraph one of the Civil Law, changed with the law number 8781, date 
03.05.2001 states “The member that leaves or is expelled from the association is responsible 
for its obligations towards the third parties up till the moment of its leaving and has no 
rights over the moveable property and real estate of the association.”
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26 As a reference for several private law companies such as: Sole Proprietorship, Unlimited 
Partnership, Limited Partnership, Limited Liability Company. Anonymous Association, or 
Joint Stock company is presently used in service providers that used to be state enterprises.
27 Legal basis: Law no. 7638 date 19/11/1992 “On Commercial Association.” If the subject 
of common competencies will be an Anonymous Association, each municipality will be a 
partner in the founded association. The founding capital of the association will be consti-
tuted by the contributes given by each partner, in our case by the 5 municipalities, in the 
percentage deﬁned by them. The manner of the organization of this association will respect 
the above-mentioned law “On Commercial Associations.”
28 This does not mean that this is a legal condition for the association to result in proﬁt.
29 Legal Basis: The law “On State Enterprise,” article 5, states that the enterprises are classiﬁed 
as a) national enterprises and b) local enterprises. Article 7 of the same law states: “local 
enterprises are created, united, split, merged or divided by decision of the local authority.” 
Considering what is stated above the subject of common competencies may be a State 
Enterprise.
30 The law on the State Enterprises, article 1, states: “the State Enterprise, that will further be 
called Enterprise, is property of the State.”
31 Article 43 of the law on State Enterprises’ states: “The members of the Head Council are 
chosen once in two years having the right to renew the mandate. The members of the 
Head Council of the Enterprise can be persons that have no legal work relations with the 
Enterprise, excluding the members of the Government, the heads of local government, the 
general bank managers, the judges, the investigators, the arbitrators, the notaries and the 
heads of the directories of the municipal councils. The head of the Enterprise is a member 
of the Head Council.”
32 Foundation of Local Autonomy and Governance.
33 Municipalities and communes are both ﬁrst tier of local government in Albania, exercising 
the same set of functions and responsibilities, with the diﬀerence that municipalities are 
mainly urban while communes mainly rural.
34 Municipalities and communes are both ﬁrst tier of local government in Albania, exercising 
the same set of functions and responsibilities, with the diﬀerence that municipalities are 
mainly urban while communes mainly rural.
35 National Council of Territory Regulation.
36 Ministry of Environment, Forests and Water Administration.
37 Municipalities and communes are both ﬁrst tier local governments in Albania, exercising 
the same set of functions and responsibilities, with the diﬀerence that municipalities are 
mainly urban while communes are mainly rural.
38 The transfer of authority is accomplished through an agreement between participating local 
units, approved by respective local councils.
39 KfW stands for Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau/The German Bank for Development.
40 Korça was the ﬁrst city in the country to provide 24-hour drinking water to the inhabitants, 
through ﬁnancing and cooperation with KfW.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study tries to examine the situation related to intermunicipal cooperation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in order to provide enough evidence and ﬁndings for the improvement 
of the intermunicipal cooperation arrangements. The main hypothesis was accepted after 
careful analysis: that the effective exercise of the right to cooperate depends not as much 
on legislative corrections as it does on political afﬁliation and the existence of (economic) 
incentives for intermunicipal cooperation. 
The current territorial organization, in which more than 30 municipalities1 are not in the 
position to provide all necessary services to their citizens due to their limitations (human, 
technical, ﬁnancial), needs to be coupled with the intermunicipal cooperation arrangement 
for the provision of services. Although intermunicipal cooperation is deﬁned broadly within 
current local government laws, the intermunicipal practices reveal only several cases that 
were initiated by local government units. 
The culture of cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is at the lowest level in Europe 
(Salaj 2008) because of tradition, ethnic relationships and the recent war (1992–1995). 
Since improved efﬁciency or reduced costs are not a public option for citizens, the culture 
of cooperation manifests politically and in the lack of mutual cooperation between munici-
palities. The upper levels of government provide the framework for cooperation between 
municipalities but they do not provide any economic incentives for the joint provision of 
services. 
The recently announced minimal territorial changes within Republika Srpska will require 
more focus in the area of intermunicipal cooperation. At the same time, the current IMC 
arrangement needs to be institutionalized in order to prevent clashes in ﬁnancing and 
decision-making. Studies have shown that there is a tendency for bigger municipalities to try 
to dominate smaller ones if there is no unanimity in decision-making or respect for minority 
rights. Up until now, citizens have not been involved with the intermunicipal cooperation 
arrangement but there is a desire for their involvement. The accountability and transpar-
ency within IMC is still hazy due to the fact that most IMCs were mostly externally ﬁnanced. 
This paper is divided into four parts. The ﬁrst part deals with an institutional overview 
and the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second part is focused on the legal frame-
work, economic incentives and the cultural aspects that emerge in political life. The third 
part deals with the current IMC arrangement within the country, jointly with two in-depth 
covered practices—the establishment of the public enterprise DEP-OT and the Association 
of Municipalities of Eastern Herzegovina. Finally, some policy recommendations are given 
with respect to current and future policies that could have an effect on the improvement 
of intermunicipal cooperation arrangements. 
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VOLUNTARY INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION—A BRIDGING 
FRAMEWORK 
The improvement of voluntary intermunicipal cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is necessary to overcome territorial organization problems and to introduce economies 
of scale in producing goods and services. The joint provision of public services is a way 
to overcome production-related obstacles and meet the rising expectations of citizens 
(Hulst et al. 2007). 
The investigation of the context for intermunicipal cooperation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina that will be presented in this study reveals that municipal mergers in the 
last 50 years were disturbed by the consequences of the war (1992–1995). The war and 
inter-ethnic division along administrative lines deeply rooted the level of distrust among 
ethnic/religious groups. The current territorial division, with respect to local govern-
ment units, has had even more consequences for the level of social capital within the 
country. The establishment of new municipalities within inter-entity lines has created 
local governments that are not capable of fulﬁlling basic entrusted responsibilities, but 
there is no intention to include them in cooperation with others. 
Later ﬁndings will demonstrate that there were no economic incentives from upper-
level government tiers that introduced intermunicipal cooperation for the provision of 
goods and services because upper-level politics is biased toward politicizing intermu-
nicipal relationships and exerting control over local level authorities. When it comes 
to responsibilities and ﬁnances, the local governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
still opting for vertical rather than horizontal cooperation. Traditionally, the political 
system in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been constructed in the manner of a strict and 
thorough centralization, so the centralist tendencies of today can partly be recognized 
in this historically acquired predisposition. 
There are many, mostly donor driven, projects that were identiﬁed in this study as 
having the intention to boost intermunicipal cooperation by gathering municipalities 
and solving some jointly deﬁned problems. However, there are no IMC databases in the 
country that summarize all IMC arrangements. The special consideration within this 
study is given to the social capital aspects, revealing that Putnam’s “bonding without 
bridging” argument for Bosnia and Herzegovina had aﬀected intermunicipal cooperation 
as well. The cooperation among diﬀerent units and institutions depends on the dimension 
of social embeddedness, while distinguishing between the repeated exchanges between 
the partners (temporal embeddedness), relations with third parties such as donors 
(network embeddedness) and social institutions that allow for credible agreements and 
commitments (institutional embeddedness). These arguments are taken from previous 
analysis within the business sector (Rooks et al. 2000). The more stable, inter-entity 
cooperation requires a certain level of social institutions that allow for cooperation. 
W O R K I N G  T O G E T H E R :  I N T E R M U N I C I PA L  C O O P E R A T I O N  I N  F I V E  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E A N  C O U N T R I E S
104
Municipal leadership, that is, directly elected municipal mayors and/or an elected 
legislative body (local councilors) are considered one of most the important driving 
forces in the struggle for local government reform and decentralization (EDA 2006). 
The role of leadership is also crucial for creating voluntary intermunicipal coopera-
tion. However, since improved eﬃciency or reduced costs are not among the public’s 
choices at the local level in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mayors and local councilors usu-
ally tend toward representing the interests of parties or interest groups rather than the 
citizens and their needs. The speciﬁcity of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the domination 
of mayors over local councilors and citizens when looking at the decision-making 
process (Zlokapa et al. 2009).2 
In the initial focus was an analysis of the legal framework for intermunicipal coop-
eration via desk research. It is an overview of the legal framework and available reports 
and studies, and the context is local government systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska) and current 
trends within intermunicipal cooperation arrangements in the country. The desk 
research was complemented by interviews with relevant representatives from local self-
governing ministries and from municipalities (mayors and councilors). The interviews 
were based on the desk research of available data and surveys done in more than half of 
the municipalities. Finally, two examples of intermunicipal cooperation arrangements 
were analyzed thoroughly—voluntary municipal alliances and contractual relationships 
with speciﬁc tasks. 
Notably, intermunicipal cooperation is not a typical issue within local government 
aﬀairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with many other topics that are common for 
countries within modern Europe. The previous political system, previous war (1992–
1995), current administrative framework and politicians are the main points that have 
to be taken into consideration with every public policy decision. The speciﬁc problems 
that are deeply rooted within Bosnia and Herzegovina society such as distrust, dishonesty 
and ethnic/religious diﬀerences and polarization are present in nearly every aspect of life 
and public policy within the country. This study was generated by respecting the current 
context while also trying to oﬀer policy recommendations related to intermunicipal 
cooperation that will be useful for bridging the diﬀerences. 
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1. INTRODUCTION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS 
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
1.1 Two Local Government Systems
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a complex state made up of two entities, the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, with Brcko district acting as a special 
territorial unit within the country. With its area of 51,209 km2, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is one of the smallest countries in the region. The entities share the territory at a ratio 
of 51 percent : 49 percent with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina having the 
larger portion.
The territorial division within the country can be seen in the picture below, where 
the darker color represents the territorial structure of the Republika Srpska and the 
lighter color represents the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Figure 2.1
Territorial Organization of Republika Srpska and the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
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Bosnia and Herzegovina has two local government systems, one in the Republika 
Srpska (RS) and one in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB&H). The Repub-
lika Srpska is a centralized entity with 63 local government units while the Federation 
is a decentralized entity with 10 cantons and 80 local government units. Cantons are 
not another level of local government but rather political and territorial units with 
pronounced state-like features. 
The diﬀerences between the municipalities in Republika Srpska are immense, 
just as are the diﬀerences between the municipalities in the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Zlokapa et al., 2008). Municipalities diﬀer in terms of territorial size, 
population, development, employment rate, number of large and proﬁtable companies, 
number of pupils, students and citizens with university degrees, etc. 
Table 2.1
Municipalities in the Republika Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Area 
Municipalities with territory size Republika Srpska Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
up to 200 km2 20 27
up to 100 km2 10 13
from 100 to 200 km2 10 14
from 200 to 500 km2 21 36
200 to 300 km2 9 17
from 300 to 400 km2 7 15
400 to 500 km2 5 4
exceeding 500 km2 21 15
from 500 to 600 km2 5 6
from 600 to 700 km2 6 0
from 700 to 800 km2 3 3
from 800 to 900 km2 4 0
from 900 to 1,000 km2 0 3
exceeding 1,000 km2 3 3
Source: Republika Srpska Statistical Oﬃce and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Statistical Oﬃce.
107
C o u n t r y  R e p o r t s :  B o s n i a  a n d  H e r z e g o v i n a
Table 2.2
Municipalities in Republika Srpska and the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by Population
Municipalities with population size Republika Srpska Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
up to 1,000 inhabitants 4 1
from 1,000 to 5,000 inhabitants 12 10
from 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants 7 5
from 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants 23 31
from 25,000 to 50,000 inhabitants 10 19
from 50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants 4 9
exceeding 100,000 inhabitants 2 4
Source: Republika Srpska Statistical Oﬃce and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Statistical Oﬃce.
When considered spatially and demographically, the current territorial organization 
of local government units demonstrates a signiﬁcant discrepancy between geographic 
and demographic size (Bijelic et al. 2008). Primarily, this imbalance is the consequence 
of the war (1992–1995) and established inter-entity lines that have created 30 new 
municipalities (18 of them in the Republika Srpska and 12 in the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina). According to data from 2007, the diﬀerence between the largest and 
smallest municipality in the Republika Srpska is 49 times taking into consideration ter-
ritory and 6,343 times taking into consideration population. The diﬀerence between 
the biggest and smallest municipality in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
116 times taking into consideration territory and 203 times taking into consideration 
population. In all cases, the diﬀerences are between municipalities that existed before 
1992 and newly established municipalities. Municipalities next to inter-entity borders 
are characterized by small territorial and demographic size, and a low level of socio-
economic development. Out of 18 newly established municipalities in the Republika 
Srpska, 16 of them fall into categories of underdeveloped and extremely underdeveloped 
municipalities according to the classiﬁcation in 2008.3 The same situation exists in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
However, all municipalities within the Republika Srpska and within the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina have the same responsibilities (Zlokapa 2008). Local self-
government legislation4 does not distinguish among municipalities in terms of their 
abilities, regardless of the size and economic power of the municipality, the degree of 
urbanization, or any other important feature. Entity laws on local government make a 
distinction between municipalities and cities, but still accord them the same responsi-
bilities. All local government unit responsibilities can be divided into two categories:5 
regulatory and service provision duties. The tables below show local government duties 
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established by laws on local self-government units in the Republika Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Table 2.3
Regulatory Competences in Republika Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Regulatory competences Republika Srpska Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Entity 
level
Local 
government
Cantonal 
level
Local 
government
Adopting local government budget, 
development program, spatial, urban and 
regulation plan, as well as other policies 
related to municipal tasks and in 
accordance with the law
— x — x
Establishment of municipal bodies, 
organization of services and their 
coordination
— x — x
Collection, collection control and 
enforcement when collecting the munici-
pality’s original revenue 
— x — x
Adopting regulations on taxes, fees, duties 
and tariff s under the duties of the local 
government unit
— x — x
Establishing and carrying out inspections, 
surveying the implementation of 
regulations under the responsibilities of 
the local government unit
— x — x
Determining policies for managing 
natural resources in the local government 
unit and distributing the income from 
their use
x x — x
Determining the policies and fees for the 
use of public goods
— x — x
Devising and implementing policies 
of disposal, use and management of 
construction sites
— x — x
Organizing the communal police — x — x
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Table 2.4
Service Provision Responsibilities in Republika Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Service provision competences Republika Srpska Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Entity 
level
Local 
government
Cantonal 
level
Local 
government
Education—preschool x x x x
Education—primary and secondary x x x —
Education—higher x — x —
Public administration x x x x
Police x — x —
Civil protection — x — x
Firefighting x x — x
Civic affairs registry x x — —
Healthcare centers x x x x
Centers for social work — x x x
Geriatric centers — x — x
Theaters and galleries x x x x
Sport and culture halls — x x x
Water supply — x — x
Gas supply x x x x
Heating — x — x
Sanitation — x — x
Waste disposal — x — x
Local and uncategorised roads and streets — x — x
Cemeteries — x — x
Protection of environment — x x x
Public transportation (local) — x — x
Trade and tourism x x x x
Crafts — x — x
Water management x — x —
Employment x x x x
Local media (newspaper, radio, TV) x x x x
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As can be seen from the previous tables, laws entrust local government units with 
many and quite important authorization abilities. Laws also allow local governments to 
deal with other issues of local importance that are not excluded from their jurisdiction 
and are not entrusted to another level of government. This is completely in line with 
the European Charter on Local Self-Government, since the laws are formulated in line 
with this European document, which was ratiﬁed by Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2002.
The Laws on Local Self-Government in the Republika Srpska and the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina explain some municipal capacities in detail, while for others it 
merely invokes other laws pertaining to their ﬁelds and determines municipal abilities. 
Almost 100 laws in the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
regulate the work of the municipal administration (Miovcic 2008). 
The duality of local government systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, coupled with 
problems of territorial division among both entities, are partly the consequence of the 
capacity of local government policy makers. The central policymaking body in the 
Republika Srpska is the Republika Srpska Ministry for Administration and Local Self-
government and has generally weak capabilities for coping with vast problems related 
to local self-governance.6 The situation is even more problematic in the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina where there is no formal structure within the administration 
responsible for local government issues and policies. Within this entity, local govern-
ment framework policies are given responsibility under the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s Ministry of Justice, with every canton having one or two people within 
their administrative structure responsible for local government (cantonal ministries of 
justice and/or general administration). 
1.2 Weak Economic Position Concerning the Scope of Local Duties
The territorial organization and consequential distribution of state and society func-
tions have a major inﬂuence on the economic position of a particular level of authority 
(Draganic et al. 2008). Since Bosnia and Herzegovina has four levels of authority (state, 
entity, cantonal—in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—and local), the position 
of local self-government units in this context is not surprising at all. According to the 
data set forth in the next table, it is evident that the allocation of public expenditures 
for local government are signiﬁcantly lower in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
than in Republika Srpska (2.27 percent as compared to 7.28 percent of the respective 
entity’s gross domestic product in 2006 and 7.64 percent to 4.33 percent in 2007). At 
the same time, the allocations for the middle level of authority (entity and cantonal 
level in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and entity level in Republika Srpska) 
are lower in Republika Srpska than in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Table 2.5
Distribution of Public Expenditures in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2006 and 2007
 In percent GDP B&H In percent GDP RS In percent GDP FB&H
2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007
Municipalities in FBiH 1.56 2.72 — — 2.27 4.33
Municipalities in RS 2.73 2.65 7.28 7.64 — —
Total municipalities in BiH 4.29 5.37 — — — —
Cantons in FBiH 8.49 8.57 — — 12.34 13.64
Entity FBiH 5.45 7.70 — — 7.92 12.26
Funds FBiH 9.64 9.02 — — 14.00 14.37
Entity RS 6,31 6,75 16.83 19.50 — —
Funds RS 4.92 3.62 13.12 10.47 — —
BiH level 4.84 4.92 — — — —
Brčko District 0.98 1.25  — — — —
Total 45.00 47.19 39.84 37.61 36.53 44.60
Source: Data on public spending in 2006 and 2007 for all levels of authority (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Central Bank, Directorate for Economic Planning, Ministries of Finance, Macroeconomic Analysis 
Unit).
The share of local government unit expenditures as part of gross domestic product 
(GDP) of Bosnia and Herzegovina (4.29 percent in 2006 and 5.36 percent in 2007) is 
extremely low compared to other countries in Europe (see Table 2.6).7 
Table 2.6 
Local Government Expenditures in Percent of GDP in 2006
Euro 25 Euro 15 Denmark Czech Rep France Germany
Percent of GDP 11.5 11.5 33 11.9 11.1 7.2
Source: Eurostat statistics.
The revenues structure of local government units in the Republika Srpska is such 
that approximately two-thirds of local government unit revenues come from taxes 
(particularly signiﬁcant is the component of indirect taxes) whereas one-third comes 
from non-taxation revenues (including grants).8 According to the Law on Budgetary 
System of Republika Srpska,9 local government units receive: 24 percent of revenues 
from indirect taxes that are attributed to the Republika Srpska, 25 percent of income 
tax, 70 percent of fees charged for re-categorization of agricultural land, 70 percent 
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of fees charged for utilization of minerals, 30 percent of repossessed property and 
resources from sales within the capacities of the republic’s market inspectorate, as 
well as other revenues from donations and other business activities according to 
relevant regulation. 
The revenue structure for local government units in the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is such that approximately half of all local government unit revenues come 
from taxes (particularly signiﬁcant is the component of indirect taxes) whereas the other 
half comes from non-taxation revenues (including grants and other revenues).10 Ac-
cording to the Law on the Origin of Public Revenues,11 local government units receive 
8.42 percent of revenues from indirect taxes that are attributed to the Federation, at 
least 28.5 percent from income taxes, 100 percent of fees for construction, and other 
fees according to relevant regulation. 
The current ﬁnancial position of local government units is generally weak, especially 
in municipalities with a small number of inhabitants where all local government rev-
enues in the form of local taxes (consumption taxes, property and income taxes), and 
various administrative and utility levies are just suﬃcient to cover current administra-
tive costs (employees’ wages and material costs). In these municipalities, the provision 
of communal services is completely neglected—an extension of the poor condition in 
communal infrastructure. In the economic literature, it is diversely claimed that the 
number of inhabitants is the decisive criterion for determining the optimal size of a 
local administrative body (Steiner 2003). However, this is not the case in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where numerous duties require that even small municipalities provide 
the conditions for various services. The investments and maintenance of infrastructure 
depends primarily on larger grants for the improvement of conditions in this ﬁeld. It is 
very diﬃcult to quantify how many municipalities adhere strictly to the law in fulﬁlling 
their duties, but the general impression is that most municipalities adapt their opera-
tions to the means at their disposal and the situation “in the ﬁeld.” Thus, it happens that 
even the richest and most developed municipalities fail to meet all the legal standards in 
providing certain services, while the poorest and most underdeveloped fail to provide 
these services entirely.12
1.3 The Shadow of Centralization Hovers above Local Communities
One of the most noticeable characteristics of the local government system in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is the considerable tendency of local units to orient themselves toward 
mid-level state organization: the entity authorities in Republika Srpska, and the can-
tons in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Zlokapa 2007). In centralized political 
systems, the state has a monopoly over a lot of information and activities, which links 
all the parts of the system to the state center and makes them dependent on this center. 
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Traditionally, for centuries now, the political system in Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
been constructed in the manner of a strict and thorough centralization, so the central-
ist tendencies of today can partly be traced to this historically acquired predisposition. 
Although the system was radically decentralized by the Dayton Agreement,13 central-
ism remained rooted in key areas of the system. Local communities greatly depend on 
the assistance of upper levels, which is why they subordinate all other relationships 
to their relationship with the state. The municipality ﬁnds it simplest to maximize its 
relations with the state by reinforcing its position within the centralized system. Under 
such circumstances, intermunicipal cooperation is the exception, not the rule. Previous 
studies on the priorities of the municipal mayor (Zlokapa et al. 2007) have shown that 
after maintaining good relations with upper levels, mayors feel the need to devote their 
energy to local inter-party and intra-party struggles for power and prestige. Eﬀorts to 
strengthen the capacities of the municipality as a whole and improve the quality of 
services for citizens are third or fourth on most mayors’ lists of priorities.
1.4 Intermunicipal Cooperation Prior to the 1990s
There are still examples of functional linking that testify to the fact that cooperation 
can occur when there is a concrete interest for it even in the previous communal model 
of local government organization. IMC was often established for the purposes of water 
supply since some municipalities in the Bosnia and Herzegovina did not have their own 
water systems, so they latched onto the water systems of neighboring municipalities 
that had better water sources, better distribution and higher ﬂow rates in their water 
system. Unfortunately, these were only sporadic cases, since most municipalities insisted 
on constructing a local water supply system (Zlokapa 2007).
The reasons for such municipal behavior were seen in the communal model of 
local governments in former Yugoslavia, where frequent territorial merging led to the 
attempt to create an optimally sized municipality that would provide all communal 
services (Draganic 2008). The prototypical local government unit14 structuring was 
justiﬁed with the argument of economies of scale (provision of cheaper services with 
given investments) for all services provided by the local government. This meant that 
eﬀorts had been made to ﬁnd an adequate territorial organization and the distribution of 
responsibilities that would improve all the activities entrusted to the local government. 
Development of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s local government territorial organization 
during the period between 1952–2007 is shown in the Table below. 
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Table 2.7
Development of Territorial Organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1952
Year Area (km2) Population Number of 
municipalities 
Average area of 
municipality (km2)
Average population 
of municipality 
1952 51,221* 2,791,000** 418 122.54 6,677
1962 51,197 3,336,000** 122 419.65 27,344
1991 51,197 4,377,033 109 469.70 40,156
2007 51,197 3,873,000 142*** 360.54 27,275
Source: Correction or remodeling, EDA Banja Luka 2008. 
Notes: * Bosnia and Herzegovina area in 1953
  ** Population, midyear—estimate
  *** includes Brcko District
2. THE CULTURAL, LEGAL, AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF 
INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION
2.1 Why Is Intermunicipal Cooperation Important in Bosnia and
 Herzegovina?
Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly divided, not just administratively but also along eth-
nic and religious lines. Prior to the 1990s, almost every municipality had a dominant 
majority from one ethnic group in the speciﬁc territory (the so-called leopard skin pat-
tern of territorial organization within Bosnia and Herzegovina15). The territorial split 
that occurred during the war corresponded with the separation of “minorities” from 
majorities, with few exceptions. The war that ended in 1995 institutionalized these 
ethnic diﬀerences by administrative organization of the country, providing a Serbian 
majority to the Republika Srpska, while the Croatian and Bosniak majorities settled in 
a few cantons within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Currently, 80 percent 
of municipalities are dominated by one ethnic group. The picture below shows mu-
nicipalities with the data on ethnic majorities as it is today. The municipalities marked 
in red are areas where Serbs are in the majority, the green marked municipalities are 
areas where Bosnyaks are the majority and the yellow municipalities are areas where 
Croats are in the majority. Dashed areas (where there is more than one color) represent 
municipalities without an ethnic majority per se.16 
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Figure 2.2
Territorial Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The most important aspect within the ethnic division of the territory is that elected 
politicians, even at the local level, follow policies that do not endanger the current 
state of territorial majority. Thus, it is hard to see even incremental intermunicipal 
cooperation arrangements initiated by municipalities themselves17 that cross inter-
entity or even inter-ethnic boundaries (more on this in the later section). However, 
the situation must change, especially due to the fact that there is a need for tighter 
cooperation with regard to the provision of some services or the joint initiative to solve 
citizens’ problems. At least 30 municipalities, created after the war, required some 
changes in policy related to intermunicipal cooperation. The next table demonstrates 
territorial and demographic characteristics for the 10 smallest municipalities in the 
Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding territory 
that they cover. 
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Table 2.8 
Characteristics of the Ten Smallest Municipalities by Area
Republika Srpska Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
No. Municipality Area 
(km2)
Population No. Municipality Area 
(km2)
Population
1. Istocna Ilidza 23 16.665 1. Doboj-Jug 10 4.809
2. Istocno Novo Sarajevo 44 9.089 2. Teočak 28 7.045
3. Kupres 45 478 3. Doboj-Istok 34 10.623
4. Donji Zabar 49 2.894 4. Domaljevac-Šamac 44 5.008
5. Jezero 65 1.306 5. Usora 50 7.107
6. Istočni Drvar 84 60 6. Dobretići 59 3.243
7. Istočni Mostar 87 786 7. Sapna 121 14.370
8. Stari Grad 90 3.168 8. Bužim 130 18.300
9. Vukosavlje 94 5.420 9. Čelić 136 15.396
10. Osmaci 95 4.773 10. Ravno 331 1.854
 Total 676 44.639 Total 943 87.755
Source: Republika Srpska Statistical Oﬃce and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Statistical Oﬃce.
2.2 Trust and Social Capital As the Missing Building Blocks 
for Cooperation 
Robert Putnam, the most popular author on the social capital concept, once said: “Bond-
ing without bridging results in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” (Salaj 2008). By this, he wanted 
to point out that the bridging of social capital is missing, while bonding social capital 
is, on the other hand, very strong.18 The political reﬂection about an absence of bridg-
ing social capital was manifested in political life, particularly after the war. Generally, 
everyone from the same ethnic group has their own “national” political party and most 
municipal mayors and local government assembly representatives originate from these 
parties. This hardens cooperation between municipalities where diﬀerent political (and 
ethnic) priorities run local policies. The lack of cooperation is the consequence of cultural 
factors, and the lack of trust between people. Recent ﬁndings (Salaj 2008) on social 
trust in Bosnia and Herzegovina that question the above (Putnam’s hypothesis on the 
existence of bonding social capital) reveal low levels of trust among people. Generalized 
trust levels reveal that only 16 percent of the population within the country believes that 
most people can be trusted. At the same time, 74 percent of those surveyed believe that 
in a relationship with other people it is necessary to be careful. The slight diﬀerence can 
be found when we take into account the ethnic factor where Croats are most suspicious 
with only 10 percent believing that people can be trusted (see Table 2.9). 
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Table 2.9
Level of Trust among People within Ethnic Groups
Ethnicity Most people 
can be trusted
In a relationship with other people it 
is necessary to be careful
Don’t know/Not certain
Bosniak 17% 73% 10%
Croatian 10% 76% 14%
Serbian 18% 73% 9%
Source: Sozialer Zusammenhalt in Bosnien und Herzegowina, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Sarajevo, 2009.
The one unique response related to Bosnia and Herzegovina and trust is the trust 
citizens have in government institutions, as well as in social and political institutions 
(UNDP’s Early Warning System Report (quarterly), 2000–2008). General ﬁndings19 
reveal that the majority of people are not proud of institutions where they consider 
themselves the minority with respect to ethnicity, religion or status. This implies a great 
division within the society that prevents any improvement in cooperation among people. 
In the matrix below, some aspects of inter-ethnic relations can be seen. 
Table 2.10
General Attitudes Among the Main Ethnic Groups
Percent of full acceptance (March 2008)
Bosnyaks Croatian Serbian
To live in the same country with Bosnyaks 100 48 37.5
To live in the same country with Croatians 92 100 38.5
To live in the same country with Serbians 90 48 100
To live in the same neighborhood with Bosnyaks 100 46 36.5
To live in the same neighborhood with Croatians 92 100 36.5
To live in the same neighborhood with Serbians 91 43 100
To have a boss who is Bosnyak 100 40 26
To have a boss who is Croatian 90 100 27.5
To have a boss who is Serbian 88 41 100
To have Bosnyaks’ children that go to school with your children 100 44 36
To have Croatians’ children that go to school with your children 92 100 37
To have Serbians’ children that go to school with your children 90 43.5 100
To have member of the family who marries a Bosnyak 100 22 13
To have member of the family who marries a Croatian 28 100 17
To have member of the family who marries a Serbian 27 25 100
Source: EWS statistics, www.undp.ba. 
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The table above reveals that the level of distrust between diﬀerent ethnic groups 
is high. This hardens any formal cooperation arrangement since everybody (especially 
political representatives) has to be careful with their moves, particularly in relation to 
other ethnic groups. The level of ostracism is high if particular accepted norms are 
broken. This implicitly moves policies forward that do not favor cooperation between 
diﬀerent ethnic groups, except in cases where the international community and donors 
are heavily involved. 
2.3 Legal Framework for Intermunicipal Cooperation
2.3.1 Entity Laws on Local Self-Government
There are no visible obstacles in the legal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the state, 
entity, cantonal, or municipal level that prohibits, forbids, diminishes, disables or in any 
way limits the right of municipalities to cooperate with one other through association, 
enrollment in joint projects, or jointly carrying out common interest tasks (OSCE 2009).
It should be reiterated that Bosnia and Herzegovina have ratiﬁed the European Char-
ter on Local Self-Government and that upon ratiﬁcation, the Charter has supremacy over 
all domestic legal acts. Article 10 of the convention deals with the issue of cooperation 
between municipalities and their right to association, and therefore permits the concept 
of intermunicipal learning and problem-solving and innovation.
Box 2.1
Article 10: Local Authorities’ Right to Associate
Article 10
1. Local authorities shall be entitled, in exercising their powers, to cooperate and, within 
the framework of the law, to form consortia with other local authorities in order to carry 
out common interest tasks.
2. The entitlement of local authorities to belong to an associa tion for the protection and 
promotion of their common interests, and to belong to an internation al association of 
local authorities, shall be recognized in each state. 
3. Local authorities shall be entitled, under conditions that may be provided for by the law, 
to cooperate with their counterparts in other States.
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Furthermore, laws on local government for the two Bosnian and Herzegovina enti-
ties establish the right of municipalities to cooperate with each other in greater detail. 
For example, the Law on local government in the Republika Srpska deals20 with this 
issue in chapter VII.
Box 2.2
Chapter VII.: Cooperation Between the Local Government Units
Article 93
In performing their duties the local government units shall be entitled to cooperate with one 
another for the purpose of performing the tasks of common interest. 
The local government units shall enter into agreements concerning the forms and 
methods of cooperation referred to in the paragraph 1 of this Article. 
Article 94
The local government units may conjoin to form the Association of Municipalities and Cities 
of the Republika Srpska to the effect of promoting and protecting their common interests. 
The Association of Municipalities and Cities of the Republika Srpska referred to in paragraph 
1 of this Article may become a member of international associations of local authorities and 
work together with the relevant associations of local authorities in the Federation of BiH and 
abroad as provided by law.
Article 95
The local government units may accede to national or international associations of local 
authorities and cooperate with relevant local government units from the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and abroad, as provided by law.
It is Article 93, Paragraph 2, which through its broad and open wording, leaves 
space for wide-ranging forms of cooperation between municipalities. In this instance, 
intermunicipal problem-solving and the provision of some services is the very minimum 
that they can engage in. As can be ascertained from the above cited article, any form 
and any method of cooperation is allowed. Furthermore, article 95 clearly allows for 
such cooperation to take place across entity lines. 
A similar situation can be found in the Law on the Local Government Principles 
of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,21 where Chapter XI deals with issues of 
cooperation. This chapter states: 
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Box 2.3
Chapter XI.: Cooperation of the Units of Local Self-Government
Article 50
In performing their duties, the local government units shall be entitled to cooperate 
with one another for the purpose of performing the tasks of common interest. 
The local government units shall enter into agreements concerning the forms and 
methods of co-operation referred to in the paragraph 1 of this Article. 
Article 51
To the effect of protecting their common interests and promoting and improving the local 
government, cities and municipalities may form association at the level of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The association at the level of the Federation shall be entitled to:
1. act as a legal representatives of its members before the authorities in the Federation,
2. prepare draft laws and amendments to the draft laws with the aim to improve the law 
and regulations regulating the work of the units of the local government,
3. provide its opinion and proposals in relation to the allocation of public revenues, in a 
part affecting ﬁnancing of the units of local government,
4. establish contacts and co-operation with similar organizations in the country and abroad, 
and become a member of international associations,
5. Perform other functions in accordance with the statute of the association. 
The rights referred to in this Article may be exercised only if the association at the level of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina gathers more than two thirds of cities and municipali-
ties in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
It is in Article 50 where, along with the corresponding law from Republika Srpska, 
suﬃcient space for the formation of any type of cooperation is created. The law does 
not explicitly mention the Republika Srpska local government units as the Republika 
Srpska law does with the ones from the Federation. Such formulation does not mean 
that cooperation is forbidden, but allowed. 
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2.3.2 Other Sectoral Legislation Mostly Hinders Intermunicipal Cooperation
As previously mentioned, more than 100 diﬀerent laws within the Republika Srpska 
as well as within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina oblige municipalities to 
use them to run everyday activities (Miovcic 2005). Most of them were taken from the 
previous system where the municipality was at the center of a communal model and 
where all services were provided individually, within every local government unit. Dur-
ing the research, some of those laws from the Republika Srpska were analyzed in order 
to discover whether or not they provide obstacles or encouragement to intermunicipal 
cooperation arrangements. 
The Law on Public Companies22
The law regulates the establishment and management of public enterprises for the Re-
publika Srpska. Article II within the law states that a public enterprise can be established 
by the Republika Srpska or by local government units in order to fulﬁll common inter-
est tasks. The focus is on the words “local government unit,” where it is explicitly not 
stated that several units can be founders of the public enterprise.23 Up until now, only 
one example of a functional public company (Public enterprise DEP-OT), organized 
by several local government units can be found within the Republika Srpska. 
The Law on Enterprises24
The law regulates the establishment and management of several forms of legal busi-
ness entities. Article II within the Law states that enterprises can be established by 
individuals or legal subjects for the purpose of conducting business operations and 
in order to acquire proﬁt. It does not exclude the possibility for a legal subject to be 
established by local government units, or their association. It will be seen later that 
the Association of municipalities of Eastern Herzegovina used this interpretation of 
the law in order to establish three companies (agencies) in the form of private com-
panies limited by shares (Ltd.). However, this example is unique and we will explain 
this more deeply later in the study. 
The Law on Fire Protection25
The law introduces the possibility to organize a joint-entity from two or more munici-
palities that will be responsible for ﬁre protection. Article 40 encourages intermunicipal 
cooperation since it states that two or more municipalities can be founders of a territorial 
ﬁre brigade by joint agreement. However, Article 41 creates ambiguity since it states that 
the head of ﬁre brigade is appointed by the municipal assembly where the ﬁre brigade 
resides. Also, the law does not specify any responsibilities for the participating munici-
palities (ﬁnance, management, etc.). This uncertainty related to the management and 
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ﬁnancing of the jointly-established body is probably one of main reasons why there is 
no registered cooperation in this ﬁeld.26 
The Law on Managing Waste27
This is the most comprehensive law related to intermunicipal cooperation due to the 
fact that the law creates a framework for municipalities introducing the principle of 
regionalism to the creation of facilities. The law on managing waste, introduced to the 
Republika Srpska in 2002, created many intermunicipal cooperation initiatives and the 
implementation of the law was backed by heavy support from the World Bank during the 
creation of a joint sanitation dump and the establishment of joint companies. However, 
even within the most successful example in this area (Public enterprise DEP-OT), some 
problems have occurred and this will be elaborated on in later sections. 
The list of regulations that have inﬂuenced intermunicipal cooperation does not stop 
here. There are a lot of laws and regulations that recognize only municipalities and no 
other forms of intermunicipal cooperation arrangements. It should be mentioned that 
the Law on Property Rights28 was adopted a few months ago. In the law, some aspects of 
joint ownership and decision-making are established for the ﬁrst time after the change 
in political system in the 1990s. It is to be expected that this will move in a favorable 
direction for future intermunicipal arrangements within the country. 
2.4 Economic Incentives from the Upper Level and Donors
Generally, upper levels of government do not promise economic incentives for the 
conduction of joint tasks and intermunicipal cooperation arrangements. Since the 
majority of services and infrastructure are tailored for an optimally sized municipal-
ity in the previous communal model, the ﬁndings are not surprising. As previously 
stated, the upper level (canton or entity) chooses a rather heavy investment in each 
municipality without analyzing possible regional problems related to services or 
infrastructure.29 
When examining the intermunicipal cooperation arrangement in countries that 
share the same legacy—ie, the history of a communal model in former Yugoslavia—
one can see that the territorial fragmentation that occurred in the 1990s was a good 
ally for the introduction of solutions related to intermunicipal cooperation. It was 
also a good argument for asking for/receiving ﬁnancial support from the upper level 
entity or for the joint provision of communal services. For example, the number of 
municipalities in Slovenia had more than tripled from 1990 until today (62 in 1990 
and 212 in 2007). 
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Box 2.4
IMC in Slovenia
Intermunicipal cooperation is developed on the basis of Law on local self-government. Most 
of it is the result of shared communal utility infrastructure built during the existence of 
earlier communities. After the dissolution of municipalities into several smaller ones, public 
enterprises, which usually manage public utilities, were divided among such municipalities 
pursuant to legislation on shared property. It thus became/remained a shared enterprise. Joint 
management is effected through cooperation among representatives of all the municipalities 
in supervisory bodies of such enterprises. The seat of the company usually stayed in the same 
municipality where the old seat was. Preservation of a shared management system over public 
utility infrastructure ensures efﬁciency and quality of services. Municipalities which decided 
to leave the shared management system (such as Dobje, Gornji Grad, Vitanje) now have 
problems securing existing utility services or developing new ones, as they do not have the 
necessary ﬁnancial or professional resources. A new form of cooperation has been developed 
over the past few years on the basis of voluntary decisions by municipalities to merge their 
administrations to provide better quality of service for the citizens, or to rationalize their 
operations. Thus, cooperation has been developed in the areas of inspections, urban plan-
ning, etc. The state provides ﬁnancial incentives for the establishment of joint intermunicipal 
administrative bodies, so that it covers one half of their operating costs. Such bodies may or 
may not have a legal personality. The state supports the establishment of joint intermunicipal 
administrative bodies for administrative and professional tasks, as it proved impossible for 
small municipalities to provide such services with so few employees. The state provides for 50 
percent of the total cost of such services, which is favorable and motivates the municipalities 
to opt for such arrangements.
Source: Block by Block, It’s Good to Build Well. Banja Luka: EDA.
The donor and international organization funds have been immense in the last 13 
years and they have kept their focus partly on local government issues.30 International or-
ganizations and donors have mostly been engaged in the reconstruction of homes, roads, 
water-supply systems, etc. to help with the disturbing consequences of the 1992–1995 
war. The other important aspect on which the international community was focused 
was the attempt to generate peaceful conﬂict resolutions with warring neighbors in all 
aspects of life (providing help to returnees and refugees, support for building multina-
tional communities, etc). There has been no international project focused on the local 
level in the last 10 years that hasn’t had at least one project component focused on the 
joint cooperation of participating municipalities and their representatives. However, 
there are only a few examples of concrete cooperation, besides handshakes between 
municipal representatives or signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). Many do-
nors, such as the World Bank’s Community Development Project,31 gave more weight 
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to intermunicipal cooperation projects compared with interventions/projects in just one 
municipality (in terms of providing possible funding or grants). However, there were 
no examples of joint projects for the building of local roads or communal infrastructure 
initiated by two neighboring municipalities with their own initiative. The success of the 
World Bank’s promotion of intermunicipal cooperation is more visible in the ﬁeld of 
waste disposal. The reasons for success are seen in the accepted mechanism of ﬁnancing 
where funds were available only when the joint company was formed by participat-
ing municipalities with additional proof tied to the fulﬁllment of the regionalism and 
sustainability principle (through the feasibility study). 
3. CURRENT INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION ARRANGEMENTS 
3.1 Handshakes and Lax Contracts
Many intermunicipal cooperation arrangements can exist if all forms of cooperation 
(occasional coordination and exchange of information, regular consultations, joint 
projects and the joint provision of service/s) are considered. However, these cases 
cannot be found in one place, such as a database or a registry.32 The research done 
within this study has shown that intermunicipal cooperation is based mostly on in-
formal agreements or lax contracts and that decision-making is based on occasional 
consultations between involved local governments. Only a few examples of IMC, 
such as the public enterprise DEP-OT or the Association of municipalities in Eastern 
Herzegovina, established a legal form with formal decision-making mechanisms. The 
municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are still relying more on upper-level sup-
port for the provision of services and not considering cooperation as alternative for 
the provision of some services. 
The size of intermunicipal cooperation arrangement diﬀers, from bilateral agree-
ments to multi-stakeholder arrangements, particularly within the international 
projects. However, size obviously creates problems with decision-making, especially 
when multiple stakeholders want decisions to be made on non-unanimous items. Real-
ity puts smaller and weaker municipalities under the pressure of bigger and stronger 
municipalities. This will be later conﬁrmed in both case studies. Stronger cooperation 
generally exists between municipalities where there is no dominant player within the 
arrangement. Although several IMC practices were registered between groups of en-
tities/cantons, stronger voluntary cooperation exists within the same administrative 
framework (entity/cantons). 
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Box 2.5
How to Capture the Logic
Initially, to the plan was to use regression analysis in order to identify whether there are 
some patterns which can be interpreted with econometric modeling (based on the sample 
of 32 municipalities that provided the data). The logit/probit model was used to check the 
incidence of cooperation with respect to size, budget, existence of communal infrastructure, 
the year in which the municipality was established and the existence of economic incentives. 
The prevailing logic was that small municipalities (in terms of population) are more eager 
to go into some cooperation agreement with similar rather than bigger municipalities for 
the provision of services. Also those municipalities with smaller budgets, and no communal 
infrastructure, that were created after the war are more eager to be involved with cooperation. 
The existence of economic incentives would also have an effect on the incidence of coopera-
tion. This model was later expanded with respect to ethnic majority within a municipality. 
The results have shown ambiguous logic where only economic incentives hold 
within the model. Other aspects were not signiﬁcant according to deﬁned criteria 
and the sample used.
The rest of this section focuses on ﬁndings gathered during research.33 All practices 
were examined in terms of the number of municipalities involved, topic (scope) of co-
operation, source of ﬁnancing, decision-making, form of cooperation, the presence (or 
lack of ) inter-entity/regional cooperation, and description of the current status. More 
on examined practices can be seen in Appendix 1, but the summary of 17 analyzed 
practices throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina with approximately half of the munici-
palities involved can be found in Table 2.11. 
Table 2.11
Statistics of Analyzed IMC Arrangements
Characteristic Description of IMC Number of initiatives
Number of 
municipalities 
involved
2 municipalities 3
3 municipalities 3
4 municipalities 2
5 municipalities 4
Source: Research conducted during preparation of the study (Annex 1).
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Table 2.11 (continued)
Statistics of Analyzed IMC Arrangements
Characteristic Description of IMC Number of initiatives
Topic (scope) of 
co-operation
Joint project 10
Joint provision of single service 5
Joint provision of several services 1
Occasional coordination/Exchange of information 1
Source of financing
(more than one can 
be used)
Outside grant financing for establishment 4
Outside grant financing (for the project purpose) 10
Fees/charges for jointly provided services 5
Occasional contribution of involved local governments 5
Regular contribution of involved local governments 1
Decision making Decisions made on a regular basis by meeting of 
involved local governments with majority vote
6
Occasional consultations of involved local governments 9
Board/council of the “association,” the same number 
of representatives for each municipality
2
Form of cooperation Joint (Intermunicipal) Company 5
Contract among local governments 5
Informal agreement 6
Public Law Body (Legal entity)—multi purpose 1
Administrative 
framework
Inter-entity/regional cooperation 8
Within entity/regional cooperation 9
Description of 
current status
Ongoing 7
Problems in decision making 6
Problems in financing 2
Finishing 3
Source: Research conducted during preparation of the study (Annex 1).
Generally, the number of municipalities involved within intermunicipal coopera-
tion varies from two to three; when the cooperation represents a joint project of six or 
more, it is usually to provide single services (See Annex 1 for description). No permanent 
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institutions or cooperation forms are made between two or three municipalities for 
projects such as joint waste collection or water supply, although the previous analysis 
showed that more than 30 municipalities cooperated in fulﬁlling basic competences. 
Most analyzed intermunicipal cooperation arrangements are made in the form 
of joint-projects while the joint provision of a single service is characteristic in cases 
where donors introduce the regional concept. The regional approach is typical for waste 
disposal, which corresponds to the World Bank approach and regional clauses within 
laws on waste management in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Other services (water supply, 
sewage, tourism promotion, etc.) are usually the subject of the IMC arrangement in the 
form of a joint project. The joint provision of several services was seen in the creation 
of the Associations of municipalities of Eastern Herzegovina. One analyzed tourism 
and the development of the project was realized through occasional coordination and 
exchange of information. 
Most intermunicipal cooperation arrangements had outside ﬁnancing schemes, 
either for establishment or for support of regular activities. The previously mentioned 
lack of ﬁnances within local governments shows that most municipalities do not use 
their scarce resources for joint purposes or joint projects within IMC arrangements. 
Fees for services are generally introduced within the waste disposal regional initiatives, 
charging local communal enterprises some ﬁxed fee for waste disposal, while citizens 
pay for these services directly to local communal enterprises for waste collection and 
disposal within the same service. Also, there is the occasional ﬁnancial contribution 
from involved local governments in some intermunicipal cooperation arrangements, 
but usually these represent an agreed portion in order to get outside ﬁnancing. Only 
one practice, the Association of municipalities in Easter Herzegovina, shows a regular 
contribution of local governments to intermunicipal cooperation in the amount of three 
percent of their budgets. 
The majority of analyzed intermunicipal cooperation arrangements have decision-
making systems based on the occasional consultation of involved local governments. 
More permanent forms are seen within the regional waste disposal companies, organized 
through regular meetings of involved governments with majority votes. The most ad-
vanced form of decision-making is seen in the case of the Association of Municipalities 
of Eastern Herzegovina, in the form of the joint council with delegated members from 
involved local governments. 
When looking at the form of cooperation, the most prevalent arrangement is related 
to the informal agreement between participating municipalities. Usually, the signed 
MoU within certain donor projects represents it. Contracts between local governments 
are signed where the mutual obligations within joint projects (construction of roads or 
water supply system) need to be elaborated in depth. It can be noticed that contracts 
between local governments are more typical when local governments provide some ad-
ditional funds in realization of the joint project. The joint intermunicipal company is 
W O R K I N G  T O G E T H E R :  I N T E R M U N I C I PA L  C O O P E R A T I O N  I N  F I V E  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E A N  C O U N T R I E S
128
the approach used in regional waste disposal but it should be mentioned that only a few 
of them experience no problems in decision-making. Since associations of municipalities 
are usually founded with broader and more permanent purposes, they are registered as 
lawful public bodies, i.e., legal entities, with some independent competences agreed in 
their statute. Participating municipalities through the association’s council constantly 
monitor these bodies.
By examining intermunicipal cooperation cases, it appears that administrative 
boundaries do not create big problems related to intermunicipal cooperation. Eight 
out of seventeen analyzed cases represent intermunicipal cooperation that couples 
municipalities from diﬀerent entities (Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina) or diﬀerent regions. However, all of them are initiated and heavily 
ﬁnanced from outside, i.e., by a donor community. These arrangements are usually in 
the form of informal agreements or multilateral contracts with the precise deﬁnition of 
all responsibilities within deﬁned activities. The more permanent institutions between 
municipalities from diﬀerent entities or regions, such as joint companies in the area of 
waste disposal, show that problems occur even during the phase of their establishment. 
3.2 Public Enterprise DEP-OT
Intermunicipal cooperation in the form of a joint public company can be seen through 
the example of the public enterprise DEP-OT. Public enterprise DEP-OT was estab-
lished in March 2003 in order to reorganize and (re)build a regional sanitation dump 
in Ramici, Banja Luka, and had heavy initial support from the World Bank providing 
favorable loans for initial equipment and facilities. The government of Republika Srpska 
provided guarantees for the loan taken by DEP-OT.34 The enterprise is accountable for 
its work to founders (the city of Banja Luka and the municipalities of Gradiska, Prnja-
vor, Laktasi, Srbac, Kotor Varos, Celinac, and Knezevo) while it is governed through a 
shareholders’ assembly, supervisory board, and management. 
The prevailing reasons for the foundation of this enterprise was to reorganize and 
rebuild the regional sanitation dump in Ramici, based on accepted standards from 
the Law on Waste Management in Republika Srpska,35 as well as EU standards and 
regulations related to waste disposal. It was also established in order to improve the 
current situation in this ﬁeld by removing unprotected dumps, conducting public 
consciousness-raising and educational campaigns for citizens about the needs for 
waste selection, and to provide an infrastructure for separate waste disposal through 
the introduction of primary recycling (DEP-OT’s statute). As functions, waste collec-
tion and waste disposal were separated, with waste collection remaining the activity 
of municipal communal enterprises. 
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The collection and disposal of waste has been a municipal competence for decades in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.36 Prior to 2002, due to joint function wherein waste collection 
and disposal were not separate, every municipality had a local communal enterprise that 
collected and disposed of waste, among other things. The separation of waste collection 
from waste disposal was accomplished under the new legal framework and with heavy 
ﬁnancial support from the World Bank. Due to the fact that many municipalities did 
not have well-established places for waste disposal, which hindered progress toward the 
EU standards and requirements related to waste management, the Republika Srpska 
government produced the new law on waste management that has provided a basis for 
the regionalization of this function. 
Republika Srpska’s Law on Waste Management introduces the necessity for inter-
municipal cooperation via the principle of regionalism (Article 5). 
Box 2.6
Article 5—Law on Waste Management (Republika Srpska Oﬃcial Gazette 53/02)
Article 5
Principle of regionalism—it is required to construct equipment and buildings for waste treat-
ment and disposal in order to comprise regional needs and to provide the sustainability of 
these facilities.
The Law on Waste Management does not prescribe standards related to the region, 
nor force municipalities into undesired arrangements. The principle of regionalism 
simply gives direction to municipalities to organize themselves into rational regions 
for the establishment of waste disposal facilities. All details related to regionalization of 
waste disposal are a matter of decision-making among municipalities. 
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3.2.1 The Structure of the Public Enterprise
Figure 2.3
A Waste Management Public Enterprise in Banja Luka
The Assembly of Shareholders
The resolution on which DEP-OT was established is the joint contract on establish-
ment of the public enterprise, concluded between assemblies of the participating 
municipalities and the city of Banja Luka. All shareholders have paid their shares 
according to the contract on the establishment of enterprise. Initially, nobody held a 
majority (although Banja Luka had 50 percent of ownership) and decisions were won 
with majority vote. The shareholders assembly consists of representatives participating 
in local governmental units. However, after an increase in capital in 2007, Banja Luka 
became a major shareholder, with 60 percent of votes. This has created some problems 
that will be explained later. 
ASSEMBLY OF SHAREHOLDERS
– representatives from the City Banja Luka 
and 7 municipalities 
(appointed by municipal assembly)
ADVISORY BOARD
– Representatives from 3 major 
shareholders
– Manage the company
– Create and present 
annual report to 
municipal assemblies
Managing
Director
DEP-OT
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Table 2.12
Shareholders in DEP-OT
City/Municipality Ownership share in percent
(2003)*
Ownership share in percent
(2008)
City of Banja Luka   50 60
Gradiska 14 14
Prnjavor 10 10
Laktasi  8  8
Srbac  7  2
Kotor Varos  4  1
Celinac  4  4
Knezevo  3  1
Source: DEP-OT ﬁnancial reports 2008.
Note: * originally, the shares were dispersed according to percentage of population within the region.
The Advisory Board
The advisory board members are persons from the enterprise’s three biggest shareholders 
(Banja Luka, Gradiska and Prnjavor). They meet occasionally and develop business policy 
with DEP-OT’s executive director. Their role is also to monitor the implementation of 
joint decisions made by municipal assemblies and the executive director. However, dur-
ing the examination of this intermunicipal practice, interlocutors were not in a position 
to tell either why this function exists or their precise competences.37 
Executive Director
The enterprise’s executive director is appointed by DEP-OT’s shareholders’ assembly 
and he is in charge of business policy and everyday operations. The executive director 
does not have a mandate or represent the enterprise’s professional position. 
Employees
The enterprise has 37 employees. Out of that total, 34 represent full-time employees 
and are paid from the enterprise’s own sources. The three additional employees are the 
experts connected to the World Bank due to the fact that the enterprise was established 
with heavy ﬁnance from their side. It is not clear how these experts will exist within the 
company’s further development. 
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3.2.2 Financing of DEP-OT
The main sources of revenue (95 percent) are fees that are charged to legal entities that 
dispose of waste at the dump under DEP-OT management. The other sources of rev-
enue are related to individuals or businesses that bring waste to the dump. The initial 
funding of the company was secured from the World Bank through a credit line aimed 
at waste management improvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The public company 
DEP-OT received a 5 million USD loan under the IDA conditions for investment in 
equipment,38 facilities and machines where the Republika Srpska government provided 
guarantees for the loan. 
Box 2.7
Not in My Backyard
Aside from necessity, the prevailing reason to abide by new regulations and the Law on 
Waste Management is reﬂected in an answer from the DEP-OT director. When asked what 
motivated municipalities to participate in the enterprise, he answered, “Not in my backyard.” 
Waste disposal is a very controversial local government function. Citizens do not want to 
have waste dumps in their neighborhoods. Thus all founders were thrilled when DEP-OT 
was established and the regional waste disposal location was set in Ramici, near Banja Luka. 
The dump in Ramici was previously used only for the waste disposal needs of Banja Luka.
DEP-OT is not directly accountable to citizens nor can citizens inﬂuence the 
enterprise’s business policies (individually or through elected council members). The 
business policy is completely detached from the participation of citizens and even 
some municipal representatives due to the fact that the executive director commu-
nicates DEP-OT’s policies (including the price for its services) directly to municipal 
assemblies. The policy can be changed only by the city of Banja Luka, as a major 
shareholder. Citizens pay services to their local waste collection companies, calculated 
by their own operational eﬃciency, business policy and ﬁnancial needs. The prices set 
out by DEP-OT are universal and do not take into account the transportation cost 
of local communal garbage collection companies to the dump. This creates problems 
since citizens in diﬀerent municipalities pay diﬀerent prices for waste collection and 
disposal. Though there are no oﬃcial records of the attempt, some municipalities tried 
to change this practice. However, there is record that some local communal companies 
stopped disposing of their waste at the dump in Ramici.39
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3.2.3 The Basic Characteristics of the Region 
The territory of the region covered by DEP-OT services represents almost 19 percent of 
the total territory, containing 31 percent of the total population in the Republika Srpska. 
The areas covered are fully within the Republika Srpska and represent the country’s most 
developed region, with sound infrastructure and services. The joint municipal budgets 
amount in total to around 243 million KM, which represents 42 percent of total local 
government expenditure for the year 2007. The main source of revenue is indirect taxes, 
coupled with grants and loans from the Republika Srpska level. 
 
Table 2.13
Basic Characteristics of Municipalities Involved in DEP-OT
 Population Territory 
(km2)
Budget* 
(2007)
Waste disposal 
collected from local 
communal companies 
(in tons)
Paid fees
(KM)
Banja Luka 224,647 1,239 143,865,867 66,222 1,324,440
Gradiska 61,440 762 33,725,694 10,093 201,860
Prnjavor 49,821 630 12,335,285 7,630 152,600
Laktasi 40,311 388 26,162,646 5,097 101,940
Celinac 17,536 361.8 9,573,880 215 4,304
Kotor Varos 20,025 560 4,954,611 176 3,520
Knezevo 12,278 320 2,354,423 172 3,440
Srbac 24,739 453 10,362,837 247 4,940
Total 450,797 4,714 243,335,243 89,852 1,797,044
Source: Municipal budgets, DEP-OT ﬁnancial statements, Republika Srpska Institute for Statistics. 
Note: * in Convertible Marks (KM). 1 KM ≈ 0.51 EUR.
In 2007, DEP-OT collected the biggest amount of waste from the city of Banja 
Luka with KM 1.33 million charged for those services (almost 74 percent). Other 
municipalities participate at signiﬁcantly lower levels; some participate minimally if 
we consider the size of their territory and population. The latest development related 
to the ownership structure (wherein Banja Luka became the major shareholder) and 
the ﬁnancial situation in some municipalities created problems when local communal 
enterprises and municipalities stopped disposing of their garbage at DEP-OT’s prem-
ises. In order to maintain the same price for their services related to waste collection 
and disposal, some municipalities closed their eyes in reestablishment of new/old wild 
waste dumps in their territories.40
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Figure 2.4
Municipalities That Established DEP-OT (marked in red)
 
3.2.4 Main Challenges
Although initially seen as a good practice related to intermunicipal cooperation, the 
IMC arrangement of waste management needs considerable improvement. The legal 
framework on waste management in the Republika Srpska (and the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina) coupled with ﬁnancial incentives provided by the govern-
ment (with World Bank support) created a sound base for municipal cooperation 
in this ﬁeld. However problems occurred when DEP-OT detached itself from the 
regional aspect of the waste management problem and became an enterprise whose 
business policy is based on maximizing proﬁt. Although the aim of DEP-OT was 
to improve the waste management situation by removing wild dumps, its business 
policy does not fall in line with that intention.41 With this in mind, the next period 
of challenges concern:
  A change in the decision-making process via improvement related to the minority 
vote. Municipal mayors and representatives from municipal assemblies with 
whom the issue has been discussed are not requiring unanimity voting, but the 
possibility to inﬂuence business policy with respect to the problems of their 
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municipality. For example, some problems could be solved by introducing 
representatives from municipalities with a small portion of shares as members 
of the advisory board.
  The creation of a reloading station from which DEP-OT would accept part of 
the expenses related to transporting waste from that reloading station to the 
main dump in Ramici. However, it seems that this will be problematic since 
DEP-OT management does not expect such an investment and believes such 
costs should be charged to the municipalities. Since there is a problem with the 
majority vote, where Banja Luka has 60 percent of all shares, and where deci-
sions are brought about in respect to the majority, the current advisory board 
has no incentive to change their policy related to the reloading stations.
  The improvement of the triangle relationship within the local communal 
enterprise for waste collection, DEP-OT and the municipality, with special 
focus on improving accountability to citizens. The citizens require quality 
services at reasonable prices and due to the fact that this is a solely municipal 
competence, municipalities have to initiate improvement in their relation-
ship with local communal companies that are state-owned as well as with the 
public enterprise DEP-OT.
3.3 IMC in the Region of Eastern Herzegovina
The agreement on intermunicipal cooperation between the municipalities of Trebinje, 
Nevesinje, Gacko, Bileca, Ljubinje, Berkovici and Istocni Mostar in November 2005 
created an association of Eastern Herzegovinian municipalities. It is a voluntary asso-
ciation of local government units accepted by the municipal assemblies and signed by 
municipal mayors. 
The aim of the association agreed by its members is:
  Development, protection, promotion and improvement of local governments
  Cooperation and connection of municipalities in achievement of common goals
  Realization of mutual projects (development from regional projects, improve-
ment of road infrastructure, improvement of civil protection capacities, regional 
economic development)
  Improvement of public institutions and social groups (strengthening the 
institutional network in the area of culture, sports and media; environmental 
protection, and the establishment of common institutions and agencies).
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3.3.1 Structure of the Association of Municipalities
Figure 2.5
The Association of Municipalities in Eastern Herzegovina
The association assembly is called the council, comprised of municipal mayors, 
deputy mayors, presidents, and vice-presidents of the municipal assembly (for a total 
of 28 members). The president and vice-president of the council are chosen from the 
poll of municipal assembly presidents at six-month periods. Municipal mayors (seven 
of them) are members of the executive council. The executive council has its own presi-
dent and vice-president who are chosen at six-month periods, and the president of the 
executive council cannot be from the same municipality as president of the council. 
The executive director is chosen from the deputy mayors and the others represent her 
assistants. The executive director and the executive council supervise the work of three 
common agencies:
Agency for information, 
culture, sport and 
tourism
The Council
— 7 mayors
— 7 assembly presidents
— 7 deputy mayors
— 7 deputy assembly presidents
The Executive Council
— 7 mayors
The Executive Director
— 6 deputy mayors assistants
Agency for planning 
and engineering
Agency for 
development
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  Agency for development;
  Agency for planning and engineering;
  Agency for information, culture, sport and tourism.
The association council meets at least twice a year and it decides on: a work plan 
and program, the statute, acceptance of the annual report, a ﬁnancial plan, members of 
the executive council and the executive director, honoree members, etc. The decisions 
can be made if a majority is present, and with majority vote. 
The executive council is responsible for conducting determined tasks and achiev-
ing goals within the scope of an agreed aim. It decides on: a work plan and a ﬁnancial 
plan, programs and projects of common interest, priorities within programs and 
projects, modes of ﬁnancing, the executive director, proposals and initiatives to other 
institutions, and other bodies (commission, boards, etc.). The executive council has 
a joint secretariat for conducting administrative, professional, organizational and 
technical assignments relevant to its work. The decisions are made with unanimity 
of all members intact. 
The executive director is responsible for public representation and everyday operation 
within the boundaries determined by the executive council. She organizes the profes-
sional and technical support to the council and manages supervision of joint projects. 
She is responsible for regular reporting to the council and to the executive council. The 
mandate of the executive director is linked to the mandate of the executive council. 
The joint agreement between municipalities determines the minimum level of funds 
necessary for ﬁnancing programs and projects of common interest in the amount of 3 
percent of their municipal budgets. It is also determines that they will work jointly on 
attracting donor funds and grants from upper-level sources in order to realize jointly 
agreed projects. This joint agreement was breached on a few occasions in previous pe-
riods, not because municipalities didn’t have the funds but mostly because of political 
clashes within the associations. 
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Box 2.8 
Political Interference in IMC
The prevalent reason for establishment of the Association of Municipalities in Eastern 
Herzegovina was seen as a reaction to continuous neglect on the part of Republika Srpska. 
Although established with six municipalities (out of seven) where the majority of mayors 
were from the same political background as the upper level elected government ofﬁcials, the 
problems manifested as a notable lack of support due to mayors’ isolated positions in rela-
tion to the upper level. Eastern Herzegovina is almost 400 kilometers away from the capital 
of Republika Srpska and receives less support from the upper level in terms of the ﬁnancial 
development of municipalities. The municipalities thought their voices would travel farther 
if they shouted together, so to speak. In an interview with one mayor he repeated the old 
saying, “If you have one stick, it is easy to break it, but if you have seven adjoined it’s much 
harder.” At the time of the association’s establishment, the Republika Srpska government 
did not interfere, perhaps because of the fact that those six mayors were members of the 
same party as the upper level government. When the upper level government changed in 
2007, problems occurred in the form of a lack of ﬁnancial contribution from the municipality 
Trebinje, the most developed and biggest municipality within the association. The reason 
for Trebinje’s withholding of ﬁnancing was seen as the result of pressure from the upper 
government level upon the local mayor to prevent further development of the association 
and their agencies in the forthcoming local election year. This was not publicly announced, 
but mayors within the association suspected that this was the case.
3.3.2 The Basic Characteristics of Eastern Herzegovina
The territory of Eastern Herzegovina represents 16 percent of the total territory of the 
Republika Srpska, with only 5.5 percent of its population. The area is devastated due 
to continuous neglect from the upper level in terms of development.42 The former Yu-
goslavia had previously provided heavy support to this part of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
by creating business subjects and state institutions such as military facilities within this 
area. The breakdown of socialism and the new administrative framework that emerged 
after the war (1992–1995), left this area to cope with their problems alone and with 
limited funds for investment in the development of infrastructure. The joint municipal 
budgets amount in total to around 38 million KM, which represents 6.5 percent of total 
local government expenditures for 2007. Although the budget is almost proportional 
to the population, the huge territory and unfriendly terrain requires more funds for 
maintenance and the construction of basic infrastructure. The main sources of funding 
within municipal budgets are reimbursements for the use of natural resources, aside 
from the indirect taxes received from the upper level.43 Financing of the association 
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and its agencies is determined within the mutual agreement of municipalities and the 
association’s statute, in the amount of KM 1,135,520. 
Table 2.14
Basic Characteristics of Municipalities in the Association
Population Territory 
(km2)
Budget* 
(2007)
Financial contribution to the 
association (3 percent of budget) 
Berkovici 2,799 270 1,285,731 38,572
Bileca 12,282 633 6,201,956 186,059
Eastern Mostar 794 88 184,150 5,525
Gacko 10,300 736 8,561,867 256,856
Ljubinje 4,258 321 1,597,193 47,916
Nevesinje 18,955 1,040 4,647,382 139,421
Trebinje 31,299 858 15,372,373 461,171
Total 80,687 3,946 37,850,652 1,135,520
Source: Republika Srpska Institute for Statistics, Republika Srpska Ministry of Finance, Municipalities. 
Note: *in Convertible Marks (KM). 1 KM ≈ 0.51 EUR.
According to the research conducted, the majority of funds in previous periods were 
spent on the renovation of premises and the operational costs of the association and its 
agencies. The tangible results are also seen in the publishing of a joint newsletter and 
Internet portal where all relevant information for Eastern Herzegovina and its munici-
palities can be found. The newsletter is published under the auspices of the Agency for 
Information, Culture, Sport, and Tourism (KIST), in the town Nevesinje. Two other 
agencies are placed in the towns of Bileca, the Agency for Development (ARIH); and in 
the town Trebinje, the Agency for Planning and Engineering. A lot of eﬀort and ﬁnancial 
funds were spent in order to make the association and agencies visible to the public. The 
few projects pertaining to the promotion of potential tourism were launched through 
several initiatives (EU IPA, Republika Srpska Development program, etc.). However, 
it is evident that neither the upper level nor the donor community wants to support 
the association, only individual municipalities.44 
W O R K I N G  T O G E T H E R :  I N T E R M U N I C I PA L  C O O P E R A T I O N  I N  F I V E  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E A N  C O U N T R I E S
140
Figure 2.6
Municipalities in Eastern Herzegovina (marked in red) in Relation to Banja Luka, 
Capital of Republika Srpska (bold red square)
 
3.3.3 The Main Challenges
Enthusiasm for further development of the association’s role and intermunicipal coopera-
tion in Eastern Herzegovina still exists.45 This enthusiasm is based on the perception that 
joint projects in an area of infrastructure, transport, clean energy, culture and tourism can 
be launched in the future and bring new perspective to Eastern Herzegovina. However, 
problems that were present in the previous period such as the lack of support for joint 
projects or politicization are still very big. The main challenges related to maintaining 
and fulﬁlling the aim of joint cooperation can be seen in the following: 
  The ﬁnancial contribution scheme within the association needs to be changed 
in order to prevent possible clashes. The current scheme is endangered due 
to the fact that municipal budget size also depends on the proactive role and 
success of a mayor in search of upper level funds, donors and investors. Linking 
contributions to the regular revenues of municipalities, such as a proportion of 
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some tax could be more appropriate. By using a new scheme, the contribution 
will correspond more to the number of inhabitants and be more proportional 
to the particular municipality’s size. 
  Additional funds related to projects and programs of the association and its 
agency need to be collected from various sources. The ARIH was actively 
involved in a couple of events (fairs, cross-border projects with Croatia, 
etc.) that presented some potential for Eastern Herzegovina. These potential 
opportunities were presented as possible projects in the areas of tourism and 
energy but still lacked external support from upper level donors. The story of 
seven municipalities gathering in mutual provision of several services would 
be praised in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the current 
cooperation arrangement does not ﬁt into a “proclaimed” European region 
(as per the EURED project) that is heavily politicized and still questioning 
administrative boundaries within the country.
  Accountability to citizens has to improve. Since the association’s agencies have 
taken some competencies from the local level,49 their work needs to be more 
transparent and public. The association’s statute and other documents articu-
late this aspect that needs to be further elaborated through practical actions. 
It means that coordination between municipalities has to improve in order to 
adjust local government statutes and provide new mechanisms for participation. 
The most important reason for this can be seen in the fact that the association 
of cities and municipalities of Eastern Herzegovina was ranked near last in a 
list of institutions whom citizens trust.46 Also, the association of municipalities 
has to spend more time explaining to citizens the association and its agencies’ 
purposes and aims in order to maintain the initial support that helped establish 
the association. According to a survey conducted in 2006, 73.3 percent of 
citizens see establishment of the association as something positive in Eastern 
Herzegovina. At the same time, 12.8 percent of citizens were not familiar with 
the initiative.47
  The role of municipal council members within the association’s council will 
depend on the general position of local council members and local assemblies 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is perceived that more eﬀort must be shown 
from their side in order to create a better framework for cooperation in terms of 
accountability and transparency. However, the most important players are seen 
to be the municipal mayors with their role in supporting further development 
of the association. 48 
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4. IMPROVING THE IMC FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Minimal Territorial Changes with a “Reduction” of Competences
The start of this paper on IMC already conducted activities within the project, “Introduc-
tion of multi-type units of local government.”49 The main ﬁndings within the previous 
two publications50 are seen in the fact that the most favorable options consist of minimal 
territorial correction (known as the “keep and improve option”) in both Bosnia and 
Herzegovinian entities. Territorial fragmentation (creation of smaller municipalities in 
order to improve local democracy and bring local government closest to the citizens) 
and territorial amalgamation (with respect to reduction of unit costs, coherent local 
economic planning and simpliﬁcation of allocation of resources and grants)51 are not 
seen as favorable options from both sides, municipal leadership (mayors) and decision 
makers (the entity’s assembly representatives). 
Republika Srpska’s Spatial Plan until 2015 provides the elements for the “keep and 
improve” option. The application of criteria such as population size, population density, 
commercial potential, technical and social infrastructure, implies that the three present 
municipalities in Republika Srpska do not satisfy the minimum prerequisites. This op-
tion is conﬁrmed through the Republika Srpska Local self-government development 
strategy, accepted by the Republika Srpska National Assembly session on June 22, 2009. 
The application of the same criteria as in the Republika Srpska case (population size, 
population density, commercial potential, technical and social infrastructure—with 
modiﬁed values), for minimal territorial changes in the Federation of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, would lead to the abolishment of ﬁve municipalities that merge with larger 
neighboring municipalities (Bijelic 2008). However, there is currently no clear political 
will to go in the same direction as the Republika Srpska. 
The implementation of the territorial corrections would probably mean a reduction 
in the number of Bosnia and Herzegovina municipalities from 142 to 134; however 
more than 20 municipalities would probably still be in a state of urgency related to 
fulﬁlling basic competences. As previously mentioned, nowadays municipalities per-
form only those competencies for which they have suﬃcient resources and which their 
municipal leaders see as priorities. That is a stringent logic derived from the monotype 
categorization of municipalities in situations of chronic ﬁnancial deﬁciency. Neverthe-
less such behavior puts poor and undeveloped municipalities in at the mercy of the 
central authority that fully ﬁnances their budget and has discretionary powers in the 
allocation of resources intended for their very development and capital investments. 
Introduction of the multi-type model of local government would allow undeveloped 
and poor municipalities to have a reduced scope of original competencies, whereas other 
competences, those essential for normal life in those municipalities, would be directly 
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assumed by the state or through the intermunicipal cooperation. This solution does 
not imply transfering the competences to the upper level but it represents the incentive 
to create joint administrations to provide several services. The Republika Srpska Local 
Self-government Development Strategy implies changes in local government regulation 
that will be implemented beginning in 2011. 
4.2 Options for IMC Improvement 
The policy options related to improvement of voluntary cooperation arrangements are 
not numerous according to previous analysis. The ﬁrst option is related to the status 
quo, where processes within this area will be ad-hoc and under the inﬂuence of proj-
ects initiated outside, at the upper level or donor community, with some exceptions 
as can be seen in the case of the association of municipalities of Eastern Herzegovina. 
This is not a satisfactory option if we consider that almost 30 municipalities struggle 
with fulﬁlling their present competences and need more resources in order to pro-
vide funds for progressive development. However, this is the favored option within 
municipalities that think the upper level will provide them with enough money for 
individual development. 
The second option is related to changes in legislation (be it minimal change or the 
creation of a Law on IMC) that will, jointly with ad hoc economic incentives, create 
new impulse for the intermunicipal cooperation arrangement with respect to regional-
ism and sustainability.56 This is not a simple redrafting of the law but a changing of 
the logic previously accepted in the communal model of the former Yugoslavia where 
municipality was seen as a basic provider of all local communal services. The existence 
of institutions such as the law creates the possibility of sanctioning opportunistic be-
havior. Agreements and commitments can be made legally enforceable. Consequently, 
institutional integration makes agreements and commitments credible: transactions 
take place under the shadow of the law (Rooks et. al 2000).
Finally, the third option consists of radical moves from the upper level (among 
decision makers related to local government status) where legal changes will be coupled 
with economic incentives or even a portion of costs covered for the services provided 
through the IMC. The new standards, derived from sectoral laws, will force munici-
palities to jointly provide some services with respect to rationality and eﬃciency. This 
option, coupled with the current state of social trust within the country, could initiate 
further instability in the short run but it can also represent a new start for inter-ethnic 
relationships among local governments in the long run. The extensive interactions 
between diﬀerent municipalities, especially with diﬀerent ethnic majorities, within 
the proper legal framework can inﬂuence an increase in social capital. Here, the inten-
sity of mutual interactions through common interest (water supply, sewage systems, 
W O R K I N G  T O G E T H E R :  I N T E R M U N I C I PA L  C O O P E R A T I O N  I N  F I V E  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E A N  C O U N T R I E S
144
licence provision, etc.) will have a rather positive eﬀect on current reform processes 
and better understanding between ethnic groups. For more on viable policy options, 
see the next table. 
Table 2.15
Policy Options to Improve IMC
Policy options
Status quo Improving legal 
framework
Improving legal framework 
+ economic incentives
The effectiveness of the policy
 No. of municipalities involed
Ad hoc Slight increase in 
number
All municipalities
The effectiveness of the policy
 No. of services provided
Ad hoc Slight increase in 
number
All services with respect to 
joint interest
Influence on social capital
 The general level of trust 
among people
Ø Framework for 
bridging
+/– in the short 
run
Increase of the social capital 
due to intensity of mutual 
interactions (+++)
Influence on social capital
 The level of trust among 
different ethnic groups
Ø
Cost reduction
 Average cost per user of service
Ad hoc Slight improve-
ment
General improvement
Cost of the policy Ø Reduction of 
costs for service 
provision
Significant increase of 
transfers/funds from 
upper level 
Significant reduction of costs 
for service provision 
Current capacity for policy 
implementation
Ambiguous External support 
needed
New capacity (technical and 
financial) need to be created
Acceptability
 Citizens
Ø + ++
Acceptability
 General politics
+++ + +/–
Support to current reform 
processes
 No. of decentralised services
Low Low/moderate Moderate/high
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Deﬁned within the Republika Srpska government in their strategy agreement, the 
new course of the multi-type model of local government units represents a critical point 
for introduction and promotion of intermunicipal cooperation arrangements. Although 
legal solutions within the current Law on Local Self-Government do not present obstacles 
for intermunicipal cooperation, they should further explain the possibility of cooperation 
in fulﬁlling competences. Also some sectoral legislation needs to be updated in order to 
provide a more clariﬁed argument for intermunicipal cooperation. The preconditions 
are seen in the detailed study of how much every competence costs per capita.52 This 
could be a sound base on which to establish the allocation of resources and a transfer-
ring system in order to further promote intermunicipal cooperation. 
As previously seen, economic support from the upper level and donors provide 
strong incentives for municipalities to realize in providing services to citizens. The 
cultural obstacles to cooperation, which are reﬂected in political life, will not be easy 
to overcome in the short run. However, strong and persistent approaches coupled with 
the announced regionalization will probably increase the number and scope of inter-
municipal cooperations within the Republika Srpska, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.58
The situation is not so clear in relation to policy options in the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, since the Law on local-self government principles (2007) has not been 
implemented fully.53 The reasons are twofold—the favoring of for centralization in some 
locations as well as ethnic clashes between Bosnians and Croatians. The legal solutions 
that will further boost IMC would have ambiguous eﬀects since there are possibilities that 
initiative will be politicized. It can be said that the current institutional set-up provides 
enough space for intermunicipal cooperation, at least within the provinces. Thus, the 
more favorable policy option can be seen in the provision of heavy economic incentives 
for cooperation among municipalities (within province and between municipalities from 
diﬀerent regions and entities if initiatives occur). The Law on intermunicipal coopera-
tion can be introduced after solidifying strong practices in the form of either an update 
of the current Law on local government principles or via the creation of a new Law on 
intermunicipal cooperation. 
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Box 2.9 
IMC Already on the Republika Srpska Government Agenda
The government of Republika Srpska has accepted the Local Self-government Development 
Strategy 2009–2015, wherein special focus has been given to intermunicipal cooperation. 
Here are abstracts from the Focus and SWOT analysis within strategy. 
Vertical orientation of municipalities—towards government and entity institutions—is 
considerably stronger then horizontal—cooperation with municipalities they shared some 
problems with and could join resources for more effective resolution of problems. Municipal 
management, especially of weaker municipalities, almost totally relies on assistance from the 
Republika Srpska Government and the Republic’s institutions. Despite the fact that the law 
on local self-government prescribes intermunicipal cooperation for the purpose of performing 
competencies, intermunicipal cooperation is more an exception then a rule. There are sporadic 
cases of cooperation in the ﬁeld of water supply systems while it takes a lot of effort to establish 
methods of cooperation in formation of regional waste dumps even with strong international 
assistance. Cooperation in the ﬁeld of environmental protection is also far from satisfactory 
since most of the rivers serve as sewage collectors while municipalities are building their water 
production factories on the same rivers. One of the rare “self-initiated” projects of intermu-
nicipal cooperation is the Association of Municipalities of Eastern Herzegovina, which is still 
not operational at the envisioned level.
Strengths
 There are a number of Republika Srpska institutions which function according to 
regional principle.
 Conducted high-quality analysis of situation and possibility of regional (self) organiza-
tion.
 Municipalities are normatively enabled to connect with other municipalities, in order 
to better execute local competencies.
 Positive examples of intermunicipal projects, initiated by the municipalities and/or 
donors.
Weaknesses
 Insufﬁcient municipal interest for intermunicipal cooperation and regional (self) 
organization.
 Opportunism of the municipal management, which spends more time and energy 
in obtaining direct assistance from entity level and attitude of the entity level which 
supports such opportunism and dependence.
 Political differences are very often a reason for absence of inter-municipal cooperation.
 Undeveloped capacities for managing intermunicipal projects, which are normally 
complex, difﬁcult and expensive.
 Lack of ﬁnancial instruments for ﬁnancing intermunicipal cooperation.
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Opportunities
 International support to intermunicipal and cross-border cooperation.
 Council of Europe initiative for improvement of intermunicipal cooperation.
 Creating new economic motivation through the Republika Srpska Development Fund 
and Investment Development Bank, stimulating intermunicipal projects.
 More ﬂexible categorization of responsibilities (for example: competences that are 
carried out independently by each municipality, and intermunicipal responsibilities that 
could satisfy the wider region, while formally retaining the local character.
 Creating a “critical mass” of good intermunicipal examples and their promotion.
Threats
 Negative experiences with economic regionalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
promoted by European Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 Unwillingness of local and entity authorities to renounce a part of responsibility and 
resources.
 Strengthening dependency of local and Intermunicipal relations towards entity govern-
ment.
 Politicization of relationship between entity and local governance.
Source: Republika Srpska Local Self-government Development Strategy 2009–2015, 
adopted by Republika Srpska National Assembly, June 2009.
The main challenges within a new approach toward intermunicipal cooperation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, also seen cases of current intermunicipal cooperation arrange-
ments analysed in the previous chapter, are: 
  Creation of IMC databases.
  Strengthening arrangements in terms of legal power and binding mutual interest. 
  Provision of economic incentives for intermunicipal cooperation.
  Drafting ﬁnancial schemes for IMC ﬁnancing.
  Institutionalization of the decision-making process within complex IMC 
arrangements.
  Increase of accountability of IMC services to citizens.
  Improvement of skills and knowledge to manage complex relationships within 
intermunicipal cooperation.
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The cultural aspect that prevents cooperation among people is still one of great-
est obstacles for intermunicipal cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ethnic 
relationships, coupled with the low level of democratic values, will eﬀect politics (at all 
levels) in the next period. If properly introduced, IMC can be seen as a new window 
of opportunity towards bridging social capital. It should be kept in mind that the IMC 
has its opposition also: people fear job losses if services are combined or control is lost. 
Thus, the approach should be very cautious in order not to incite ethnic or political 
arguments that do not favor cooperation. The citizens’ roles are crucial but only after 
some period of time, when they start to consider the possibilities and beneﬁts of the 
intermunicipal cooperation arrangement in the provision of services. 
There are several players that could have supportive roles in the improvement of 
the country’s IMC arrangement. All relevant stakeholders within both entities can be 
seen in the following table. 
Table 2.16
Main Actors in the Improvement of IMC within Bosnia and Herzegovina
Role Responsibility
Mayors Leaders of IMC
arrangements 
Initiate (and negotiate) the IMC arrangements with other 
municipalities
Initiate joint studies on possibilities of IMC within 
different services
Bridge social capital over time
The entity/regional 
government 
Decision 
makers 
(Facilitators) 
Create supportive legal solutions (re-drafting the current 
laws, introduction of laws on the IMC) 
Provide economic incentives for intermunicipal 
cooperation arrangement
Institutionalize the social trust within the change of 
attitude in their policies
Associations of 
municipalities and 
cities
Advocate for 
change
Participate in the advocacy for improvement of IMC 
arrangements 
Keep records of all intermunicipal cooperation 
arrangements 
Organise best practice contests (Beacon scheme)
The current IMC 
entities
Best practice Show the viable possibilities of joint cooperation to solve 
common problems and provide joint service/s
Donors Supporters Support projects that create sustainable IMC 
Citizens through 
their representatives 
Benefactor and 
beneficiary 
Support “Best value for money” concept 
Active participation and advocacy for better services 
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The role of local mayors is seen as crucial for improvement of IMC. Although 
many countries within Europe consider local assemblies and local councils as IMC’s 
most important partners (Hertzog 2008), the role of municipal mayors is enormous 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to legitimacy received through direct elections and 
functions attached to local executives. However, the municipal assembly, particularly 
if not supportive of the mayor’s policies can create obstacles and prevent the execution 
of IMC. These clashes between directly elected mayors and directly elected assembly 
representatives are present in some cases where the holder of executive function diﬀers 
from the political options that have majority within the local assembly (CCI 2009). 
However, the research conducted in previous periods (Jevdjovic 2008) show that com-
munities that have strong mayors prosper faster than communities where the municipal 
leadership role is not observed. 
The role of the regional government is also essential to intermunicipal cooperation. 
The research conducted within this paper shows that regional government considers 
intermunicipal cooperation deﬁned within the current legal framework. However, the 
upper level still favors centralization over decentralization (Draganic 2008). Analysis 
shows that the legal and economic aspects need to be more deﬁned within the policies 
and laws related to local government. New legal solutions backed by economic incentives 
could promote a further cultural shift against the current lack of cooperation. However, 
one should keep in mind all of the political implications that can arise during this process. 
The regional association of municipalities and cities should take over the advocacy 
role related to IMC arrangement. However, up until now regional associations of cit-
ies and municipalities have had a weak role in advocating solutions to improve local 
government (Miovcic 2005). Although they’ve signed memoranda of understanding 
with regional governments, they are not seen as real partners in local government de-
velopment.54 The future roles of regional municipality and city associations are seen as 
a provision of support to the establishment of IMC, as well as the keeping of records of 
all established IMC units. At the same time, they could organize a best practice contest 
regarding intermunicipal cooperation within an already established Beacon scheme 
framework. 
Research on current IMC practices within the country show that most intermunicipal 
cooperation arrangements are funded from outside of the country. The role of donor 
and international organisations in promotion of IMC arrangements is immense. This 
support should continue in the future, especially when considering the use of EU funds. 
Citizens are generally the most important aspect of IMC arrangements. However, 
the previous analysis and general attitude show that the participation of citizens is still at 
a very low level (CCI 2009). Public hearings and local communities (Mjesna zajednica 
—MZs) are completely neglected. Although new performance management accepted 
through various projects at the local level was introduced, the insistence upon secur-
ing the best values for money is still at rock bottom. Better participation in decision 
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making and requests for eﬀective and eﬃcient local services force local governments 
to consider new ways to provide services, among which is intermunicipal cooperation 
(Jevdjevic 2008). Although theoretical discussion goes in the direction of more IMC 
accountability to citizens, analysis show that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
implies the necessity of raising awareness in order to involve citizens as benefactors and 
beneﬁciaries of the more eﬀective services. The eﬀective cooperation between diﬀer-
ent municipalities will increase the level of citizen satisfaction with local government 
services and will have a positive impact on the level of social capital with the country.
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 c
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t p
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 d
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 m
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 p
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. 
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 m
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 c
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D
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t p
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m
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l m
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at
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re
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ta
bl
ish
m
en
t. 
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 c
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 p
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 c
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 m
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 p
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t p
ro
je
ct
O
cc
as
io
na
l 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 
in
vo
lv
ed
 lo
ca
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
O
cc
as
io
na
l 
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
ns
 o
f 
in
vo
lv
ed
 lo
ca
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
C
on
tr
ac
t 
am
on
g 
lo
ca
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ts
Tw
o 
ne
ig
hb
or
in
g 
m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 so
lv
in
g 
pr
ob
le
m
s w
ith
 w
at
er
 
su
pp
ly
 o
n 
a 
co
nt
ra
c-
tu
al
 b
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 d
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r c
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m
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 p
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e p
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 p
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 p
os
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e c
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 d
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e c
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e s
tu
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. 
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l b
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s f
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-
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NOTES
1 According to certain criterion (population, level of urbanization, state of social services, 
etc.), there are 35 local governments that are classiﬁed as underdeveloped in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (source: Republika Srpska Ministry for Administration and Local 
Self-government and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Institute for Development 
Programming). 
2 Although legislators in Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the example of the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government, tried to emphasize the primacy of the legislative over 
the executive power, the past ten years demonstrates that it was an ineﬀective eﬀort. During 
the last decade, mayors became the masters of local politics, including the domination over 
local assemblies. This situation is mostly due to the changes in executive function, where 
the collective executive body was replaced directly by the elected mayor. This has disrupted 
the former balance of power at the local level. 
3 Ministry for Administration and Local Self-government of the Republic of Srpska (Decision 
on development of municipalities).
4 The Law on Local Self-government in the Republic of Srpska (2004) and the Law on Local 
Self-government Principles in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2006).
5 In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is one more group that can be called 
evaluation duties. Evaluation duties are those responsibilities for which the local units are 
explicitly authorized by this law to analyze and assess. This includes the work of certain 
cantonal and entity bodies, organizations and services. The law speciﬁcally points to the 
following cases: assessing the work of institutions and the quality of services in healthcare, 
social security, education, culture, and sports, as well as securing the ﬁnancial means for the 
improvement of their operation and the quality of services in accordance with the needs 
of the population and the capacities of the local self-government units; and analyzing the 
state of public law and order, personal and property security, and proposing measures to 
authorized bodies pertaining to these issues.
6 The data gathered through the analysis show that there are almost 5,000 employees in local 
government units in Republika Srpska while there are only four people within the Republika 
Srpska Ministry for Administration and Local Self-governance that is responsible for local 
government policies. 
7 The local government expenditures exclude social security funds, state and central government. 
8 Particularly noteworthy and signiﬁcant for future consideration of the local government 
units and source of funding for intermunicipal cooperation in Republika Srpska, is the 
coeﬃcient of determination of revenue types as compared to the number of inhabitants. 
According to the data for Republika Srpska, it was established that 93 percent of municipal 
revenues deriving from taxation sources are explained by the number of inhabitants, while 
the rest is attributed to other factors.
9 The Law on Budget System of Republika Srpska (Republika Srpska Oﬃcial Gazette Nos. 
96/03, 14/04, 67/05, 34/06, 128/06, 117/07, 54/08 and 126/08).
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10 According to the data for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was established that 
76.57% of municipal revenues deriving from taxation sources are explained by the number 
of inhabitants, while the rest is attributed to other factors.
11 The Law on the Origin of Public Revenues in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Oﬃcial Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 22/06). 
12 It is interesting that small municipalities which do not have capacity (human, technical, 
etc.) to provide some services by themselves would rather sign a contract with professionals 
from neighboring municipalities than initiate intermunicipal cooperation with municipali-
ties where this professional is employed.
13 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex IV—Dayton Peace Agreement), 1995.
14 The prototypical organization of local government units represents the organization where 
all local government units have the same competences, no matter the size, potential or possi-
bility to fulﬁll given functions. On the contrary, multi-type organization of local government 
represents the organization where there are some diﬀerences in competences related to the 
type of local government (urban/rural, city/town/municipality, etc.).
15 Leopard skin is an expression used for the regional distribution of ethnic groups in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Opacic et al. 2005).
16 Source: Author’s rough calculation on the ethnic distribution of population based on the 
local elections, prior census data, municipalities and entity institutes for statistics. 
17 In the later sections, it will be demonstrated that there is some intermunicipal cooperation 
accross inter-entity borders, but all of them represent donor projects. 
18 The concept of social capital was popularized in Putnam’s “Making Democracy Work: 
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy” (1993). Social capital is used to explain that the quality 
of social relationship, how they inﬂuence the success of individuals and entire societies 
related to democracy, economic development, education achievement, health, etc. Bonding 
social capital keeps people together who are similar in speciﬁc characteristics such as 
ethnicity, religion, social class, etc. Bridging social capital keeps together people who are 
not similar/don’t look alike. 
19 The Early Warning System (UNDP) represents a methodology that examines quarterly public 
opinion polls related to economic, political, social, ethnic, and institutional aspects of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. More can be found on www.undp.ba under the publication section. 
20 The Law on Local Self-Government in Republika Srpska (Republika Srpska, Oﬃcial Gazette 
Nos. 101/04, 42/05, 118/05).
21 The Law on the Local Government Principles of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Oﬃcial Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegonia, No. 49/06).
22 Republika Srpska Oﬃcial Gazette No. 75/04.
23 Interlocutors from the Republika Srpska Ministry for General Administration and Local 
Government state that the law does not prohibit establishment of public enterprise but still 
there is some ambiguity in the interpretation.
24 Republika Srpska Oﬃcial Gazette Nos. 24/98, 62/02, 66/02, 38/03, 97/04, 34/06.
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25 Republika Srpska Oﬃcial Gazette Nos. 16/95, 16/02, 2/05, 1/08. 
26 See later sections with results from research conducted jointly with the table in the Annex. 
27 Republika Srpska Oﬃcial Gazette No. 53/02, 65/08. 
28 Republika Srpska Oﬃcial Gazette Nos. 124/08, 58/09.
29 It is interesting that the Law on Local Self-government was created based on the dominant 
prototype model of local self-government organization with respect to the principle “one size 
ﬁts all.” An interlocutor from the Republika Srpska government who worked on the current 
law on local self-government has said that responsibilities are given with the respect to the 
biggest local government in the Republic of Srpska. Actually, responsibilities were given to 
the city of Banja Luka due to the fact that the president of the Banja Luka Assembly was 
also a member of the team that worked on the law. 
30 Bosnia and Herzegovina is a rare example in Eastern Europe, where centralization still 
prevails over decentralization (at least from an international organization’s perspective). This 
relates particularly to state functions that need to be transferred from entity/cantonal level. 
This creates a lot of controversy within a country where local self-government tries to ﬁnd 
its place within the administrative division of the country. 
31 The Community Development Project is the World Bank project that was launched ﬁve 
years ago with the intention to provide funds and grants to underdeveloped and extremely 
underdeveloped municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is conducted through two 
institutions (the Fund for Development and Employment in Republika Srpska and the 
Development Agency ODRAZ in the Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
32 There is no register of the current intermunicipal cooperation arrangements within Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. If an intermunicipal cooperation was established as a legal body, then 
there is some registered data within the local courts. For all other cases, the main source of 
data are local governments, which determined their approach toward collecting practices 
during this study. 
33 Data collection of intermunicipal cooperation cases was done within the UNDP’s Integrated 
local development planning (ILDP) project during the assessment phase of the project. All 
municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were asked about their current status on intermu-
nicipal cooperation where 70 municipalities have provided the data. 17 practices involving 
40 municipalities were identiﬁed from questionnaires. 
34 The World Bank approved the Solid Waste Management Project to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
on July 20, 2002. Jointly with the Second Solid Waste Project, more than USD 50 million 
was approved. The public enterprise DEP-OT received around 10 percent of that amount 
(approximately USD ﬁve million). 
35 Law on Managing Waste (Republika Srpska Oﬃcial Gazette 53/02).
36 According to practices and laws related to local government from 1952 onwards. 
37 Previous analyisis of the role of advisory boards in public enterprises in the Republic of 
Srpska show that this represents most highly politicized bodies wherein political parties 
install their strongest members (Divjak 2007). 
38 International Development Association. 
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39 Although called local communal companies (waste collection, water, sewerage, collective 
heating), they represent state own companies with management that is chosen by decision 
of the Republika Srpska government. They are obliged to provide services in coordination 
with local government, but problems sometimes occur when the local government majority 
and municipal mayors were from diﬀerent political background than the Republika Srpska 
elected representatives. This highly irresponsible behavior was always paid for by citizens 
(low quality of services, high prices, poor availability of services, etc.)
40 The year 2008 was characterized by the enormous rise of operating costs related to fuel and 
transport which make up a signiﬁcant part of garbage collection and disposal activities. The 
situation has worsened due to the fact that reloading stations (originally intended) were 
never established on the territory of participating municipalities. 
41 Interlocutors from participating municipalities see DEP-OT as the city of Banja Luka’s 
company without taking into consideration the regional aspect of the problem. This is due 
partly to the fact that there is no protection of the minority vote and business policy is based 
on domination by majority.
42 It should be mentioned that this part of the Republika Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
are characterized by many mountains that create obstacles for the creation of physical infra-
structure such as roads, water and sewage provision. 
43 At least 30 percent of municipal budgets represent the fee that is charged to upper level govern-
ment and the Republika Srpska Public Electricity Company due to the fact that two hydro 
and one thermoelectric power plants are located in this area. The power plants are charged 
according to regulations on environmental protection and ﬂooding of agricultural land. 
44 As previously mentioned, Republika Srpska is a centralized entity. Regional policy and instru-
ments are not developed although some functions are organized regionally such as employ-
ment oﬃces, statistics, public health institutions, and courts). The European Commission 
launched the EURED project in 2002, introducing economic regions within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The project brought controversy to the regional policy since some political 
parties from the Federation of B&H back this project that introduced regionalism without 
corresponding to entity boundaries. The fear within the political elite in the Republika 
Srpska is that the regionalization (even Eastern Herzegovina) weakens the position of the 
Republic of Srpska within the unsettled constitutional framework. Thus, the Republika 
Srpska government has extra reason for neglecting the eﬀort of municipalities related to 
intermunicipal cooperation. During this research, it was discovered that the politicians from 
the governmental upper level prevented the creation of an association of municipalities in the 
Birac region (region that covers six Republika Srpska municipalities in the northeastern part 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina) through support from “loyal” mayors. It should be mentioned 
that the ruling party at the entity level have mayors in 38 out of 62 municipalities after local 
elections in October 2008. 
45 In May 2009, during revisions of this paper, the association came up with the declaration 
stating the following: they want to be classiﬁed as an underdeveloped region, that the 
Republika Srpska government has to provide funds for projects as well as funds for agen-
cies’ operational costs, and that they are requesting money for the establishment of the 
Development Fund for Eastern Herzegovina. 
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46 The survey was conducted by the Agency for Information, Culture, Sport and Tourism 
(KIST) through the Internet portal Virtual Herzegovina (www.virtualnahercegovina.com). 
The better-ranked institutions are churches, NGOs and the municipal assembly. Only the 
police were ranked worse in terms of citizens’ trust. This situation is partly due to the weak 
presence of the association in public but also partly because citizens do not perceive them 
as trustworthy since the general level of trust toward public institutions is weak (see also 
the EWS reports, www.undp.ba). 
47 Survey conducted by the Agency for Information, Culture, Sport, and Tourism (KIST) 
through the internet portal Virtual Herzegovina (www.virtualnahercegovina.com).
48 Mayors, as elected leaders, are the masters of local politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They 
make almost all the decisions in local governments (Zlokapa et al. 2009). Although lawmakers 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina have predicted that the right and the ability of local authorities 
to regulate and manage a substantial share of public aﬀairs under their own responsibility 
and in the interests of the local population is exercised by councils or assemblies, the practice 
in the last ten years has placed mayors as leaders at the local level. 
49 The project was seen as a major precondition for ﬁscal decentralization within the Local 
self-government development strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2006). The immense 
diﬀerences in territory and population, and consequently in the ﬁnancial position of local 
government units were seen as a major obstacle to decentralization since the sustainability of 
decentralization rests on the potency of the weakest municipality to fulﬁll legal competences. 
50 Block by Block—It’s Good to Build Well (study of comparative practices) and Corrections 
or Remodeling—It’s Good to Build Well (policy study related to options for territorial and 
functional changes within local self-government units) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
51 P. Swianiewicz (2004) “Is Territorial Consolidation a Necessary Precondition for Further 
Decentralization? Territorial Organization in South Caucasus Countries.” Paper prepared 
for Fiscal Decentralization Initiative Workshop, Lithuania. 
52 The Strategy for Local Government Development in Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska 
government, 2009.
53 Every region has competences related to establishment of local governments. Regions are 
not local government units and they represent administrative units within the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that have constitutional competences over local government. The 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Law on Local Self-government principles is the basis 
for organization of local self-government within every province but they have exclusivity in 
the implementation of these principles. It corresponds to a situation in which there are ten 
local government systems within the same Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina framework. 
54 The reasons behind this rest in the fact that associations’ capacities (ﬁnancial and human) 
are very weak due to permanent neglecting of their possible role by all stakeholders (local 
government units, upper level, international donors, etc.). A particular problem within a 
country such as Bosnia and Herzegovina is the issue of ownership since eﬀective association 
could be competitive to various local government projects funded by internationals. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Municipal structure in the Czech Republic is extremely fragmented. Out of 6,249 mu-
nicipalities, 87 percent have less than the average number of inhabitants (1,675). Small 
municipalities are often less equipped with technical infrastructure and civic amenities; 
their citizens claim insufﬁcient provision of public transportation and the lack of cultural 
and social events, and expenditures on municipal councils and administration per capita 
are higher in small municipalities. Intermunicipal cooperation (IMC) is the most promising 
solution because it is very ﬂexible and it does not imperil a municipality’s self-governance.
Intermunicipal cooperation is widespread in the Czech Republic and only a minimum 
of municipalities are not involved in any such cooperation arrangement. The law on munici-
palities deﬁnes three forms of intermunicipal cooperation: contracts, mutual legal persons, 
and voluntary municipal association. Voluntary municipal association is a special legal form 
designed for intermunicipal cooperation. Municipalities are familiar with this form and use 
it frequently. Currently there are about 800 voluntary municipal associations in the Czech 
Republic.
Voluntary municipal associations are either microregions or non-microregions. Mi-
croregions usually have a general goal (such as the common development of the involved 
municipalities’ territories), while non-microregions are usually single-purpose. About 60 
percent of voluntary municipal associations are microregions.
Total expenditures of voluntary municipal associations amount to only about 1–2 percent 
of total municipal expenditures. Two thirds of their expenditures are capital expenditures. 
Most of the expenditures are in the area of sewer, sewage plants and water (71 percent), 
communal services, territorial development, waste treatment and road transport.
While the number of voluntary municipal associations has been stable over the last ﬁve 
years, the volume of expenditures has continued to decrease signiﬁcantly since 2006. About 
a quarter of voluntary municipal associations operate with such limited resources that no 
reasonable activity is possible. 
The Czech Republic’s central government does not have a single policy regarding inter-
municipal cooperation. This fact can be considered both a cause and a result of extremely 
fragmented responsibilities regarding various aspects of intermunicipal cooperation. Lack 
of exact and complete data on the magnitude and character of existing IMC initiatives hin-
ders formulation of intermunicipal cooperation policies and leads to instances of solitary 
interventions with limited impact. 
Intermunicipal cooperation today does not reduce the consequences of the existing frag-
mented municipal structure nor limit some of the problems with which small municipalities 
must deal with. In this paper, three possible options are disscussed: (1) the status quo, (2) the 
formation of a new forrm of intermunicipal cooperation such as the municipal community 
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which would participate in the tax sharing system, and (3) the formation of an IMC unit. 
As part of a central government agency, the IMC unit would have a clear purpose and 
responsibilities and would stop the duplication of activities. This unit would act: (1) as an 
information service for all relevant stakeholders (municipalities, intermunicipal arrange-
ments, regions, other central government agencies) regarding the formation and operation 
of intermunicipal cooperation arrangements; (2) as an information data bank responsible 
for the complex monitoring of intermunicipal cooperation activities and the evaluation of 
realized policies, and (3) as a policy research entity that would identify areas suitable for 
intermunicipal cooperation and design relevant support and incentives.
The IMC unit offers an efﬁcient, equal, and feasible solution to improving situations in 
small municipalities through information provision and design of targeted measures. These 
units enable equal treatment for all municipalities regardless of size, region, and distance, 
and do not depend on support from the new tax sharing system.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Municipal structures in the Czech Republic are extremely fragmented. Out of 6,249 
municipalities, 5,440, i.e., 87 percent, have less than the average number (1,675) of 
inhabitants. This high number of small and very small municipalities frequently raises 
a question: do all municipalities have the capacity suﬃcient to deliver public services 
at the expected level and, in general, ensure the necessary standard of living? Recent 
research shows that small municipalities lack both technical infrastructure (such as water, 
sewage, sewage plants, or gas) and civic amenities (such as schools, health services, post 
oﬃces, or police oﬃces), and that citizens claim insuﬃcient public transportation and 
a lack of cultural and social events (see Maříková 2004). On the other hand, municipal 
oﬃcials do not claim diﬃculties regarding local public administration in the area of their 
own responsibility, only in the area of delegated power (see Gavlasová et al. 2007b). At 
the same time a detailed analysis of municipal expenditures showed that expenditures 
on municipal councils and administration per capita are higher in small municipalities 
(see Tománek 2009).
Davey (2004:87) lists four alternative solutions for municipalities unable to fulﬁll 
their expected services, i.e., those municipalities unable to develop their territories or 
achieve eﬀective delivery of their assigned public services. These alternative solutions 
include: amalgamation, transfer of competencies to the intermediate government level, 
contracting out (to either the private sector or other local governments), and intermu-
nicipal cooperation. 
The former two approaches are not presently realistic in the Czech Republic. Direct 
forced amalgamation would certainly cause considerable resistance, as it would repeat 
a similar practice instituted between 1960 and 1989. Only 1.5 percent of mayors of 
small municipalities consider amalgamation with a bigger municipality (see Maříková 
2004). Also, indirect stimuli in the form of advantageous tax sharing formulas for bigger 
municipalities, applied since 2001, have not proven suﬃcient in covering costs associ-
ated with massive municipal merges. 
The transfer of competencies to the intermediate government level is also problem-
atic, especially when successful municipalities are asked to absorb the responsibilities of 
troubled ones. The constitution guarantees equal status and therefore equal responsibility 
to all municipalities (regardless of size) in regard to addressing their speciﬁc municipal 
issues. Therefore transfer of competencies is not desirable from the point of view of 
bigger municipalities, which have not encountered any diﬃculties in delivering their 
own public services or developing their particular territory. 
The latter two options are well suited for the Czech Republic and are used frequently. 
For example, detailed information on the methods of municipal public services delivery 
in the Czech Republic with special attention to contracting out can be found in Ochrana 
and Fantová (2007). 
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Intermunicipal cooperation (IMC) is the most promising solution because it is very 
ﬂexible and it does not lead to the disappearance of a municipality as a self-governing 
entity. The ﬂexibility of IMC is beneﬁcial for several reasons. There is no optimal 
municipality size for all the provided services, thus a municipality can choose to par-
ticipate in several IMC arrangements for diﬀerent services and IMC is available to all 
municipalities, regardless of their size. Even big municipalities may ﬁnd cooperation 
in one particular area convenient. If conditions change, the IMC arrangement can be 
adjusted or abolished quite easily in comparison to both amalgamation and the shift of 
competencies to the intermediate government level.
IMC is one of the attempts to improve the ability of municipalities to respond ef-
ﬁciently to the demands of their citizens and to inter-jurisdictional problems. The rise 
and existence of cooperations is associated with beneﬁts and costs that the participants 
assess continuously. Feiock (2007) makes a distinction between collective and selec-
tive beneﬁts and costs. Collective beneﬁts arise mostly from greater eﬃciency gained 
through economies of scale and the ability to capture cost and beneﬁt spillovers. The 
major collective costs are caused by lower local control, allocation ineﬃciencies and 
increased transaction costs. In the case that overlapping jurisdictions compete for the 
same resources, a common pool resource problem occurs. Selective beneﬁts are associ-
ated with the beneﬁts of municipal oﬃcials, who through a successful IMC can increase 
their “value” as managers or reap political beneﬁts such as re-election or promotion in 
their party hierarchy.
The objectives of this paper are to evaluate the current state of intermunicipal coop-
eration in the Czech Republic with special attention to voluntary municipal associations 
(VMA), to identify major problems, and to propose measures to increase the use and 
development of IMC potential.
First, local government in the Czech Republic and its ﬁnancing is characterized 
and the legislation pertaining to IMC is described. Next, the extent and area of activity 
of the IMC and various aspects of the VMA are explained. Then, elaborate case study 
ﬁndings are presented. Finally, the main ﬁndings are summarized and possible options 
for improvement of IMC in the Czech Republic are identiﬁed.
The paper is based on detailed analysis of four main data sources: 
  Recent research reports dealing with intermunicipal cooperation (Vajdová et al. 
2006 and Gavlasová et al. 2007a), voluntary municipal associations (Škrabal 
et al. 2006 and Pápol et al. 2006), local public administration (Gavlasová et al. 
2007b) and small municipalities (Maříková 2004).
  Legal framework, i.e., both the law, its interpretation and responses to related 
questions provided by the professional journal Moderní obec.
  Compilation of a database of existing voluntary municipal associations based 
on several publicly available databases. 
  The elaboration of eight case studies garnered from in-depth interviews and 
document analysis.
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2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
The purpose of this chapter is to brieﬂy introduce the local government system and 
its ﬁnancing in the Czech Republic. First the local government system’s structure and 
the responsibilities of regions and municipalities are set forth. Special attention is paid 
to explaining that municipalities simultaneously exercise both their inherent and del-
egated responsibilities. Then, the municipal size structure including its development 
is distinguished. Finally, local government ﬁnancial management is brieﬂy described 
together with the composition and volume of the budgets of municipalities, regions, 
and voluntary municipal associations.
2.1 Local Government Structure and Responsibilities
The Czech Republic is a unitary state. The 1993 Constitution establishes two levels of 
local government: regions and municipalities. The 14 regions were established in 1997. 
The ﬁrst regional representatives were elected in November 2000, and the regional 
governments have been at work since January 1, 2001. Regions care for the general 
development of their territory and the needs of their citizens, especially in the ﬁelds of 
social care, environmental protection, transportation, education, culture, and security. 
Until December 31, 2002, there also existed 76 districts. These districts were de-
concentrated branches of the central government. They oversaw implementation of 
state policies at the local level, supervised the legality of performance of local authori-
ties on delegated functions, coordinated intermunicipal aﬀairs and supported smaller 
municipalities in the discharge of their duties. The existence of districts came to an end 
as a part of the public administration reform.
Municipalities are basic territorial self-governing communities, i.e., public cor-
porations with their own property. There are currently about 6,250 municipalities. 
Municipalities exercise simultaneously both their own responsibilities, which are 
carried out by the municipality and its bodies on its own behalf, and their delegated 
responsibilities, which are performed on behalf of the state while the state assumes legal 
responsibility for the performance of the delegated power. 
The Law on Municipalities (128/2000 Coll.) recognizes three types of municipali-
ties regarding the scope of delegated power: municipalities with basic delegated powers 
(includes all municipalities, about 6,250 in total), municipalities with authorized mu-
nicipal oﬃces (second type municipalities, 388), and municipalities of extended scope 
(third type municipalities, 205). Municipalities belonging to the latter two groups are 
listed exhaustively in a special law (314/2002 Coll.). 
The execution of each municipality’s delegated power is ﬁnanced through a special 
grant. The volume of this grant is determined as part of the approved state budget ac-
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cording to the extent of the executed delegated power. Although there is a clear purpose 
to the grant it is not earmarked, as the municipality does not have to account for it 
separately. This practice implies that there is very limited space for the municipality’s 
independent decision-making regarding delegated power (e.g., the number or assign-
ment of employees dealing with the execution of delegated power). 
In the area of their own responsibility, municipalities are responsible for: the 
delivery and implementation of a civil registry and the enforcement of national 
regulations, pre-primary and elementary nine-year schools, recreational activities, 
sport and park facilities, secondary hospitals and primary healthcare, local library 
services, pensioner residential homes, orphanages, homes for the mentally handi-
capped, nursing homes for the elderly, local roads, local transport, local police, 
collection and treatment of solid waste, street cleaning, sewage treatment plants and 
operation, water treatment and supply, natural gas supply, heating, maintenance of 
public housing and buildings, city planning, local environmental issues and local 
tourism (see de Carmo Oliveira and Martinez-Vazquez 2001). Table 3.1 shows the 
major municipal spending categories. Regarding their own responsibilities all mu-
nicipalities are equal according to the law; of course in reality the level of provided 
services depends upon available ﬁnancial resources that vary among municipalities 
(see Vedral et al. 2008: 331).
Table 3.1 
Major Municipal Spending Categories 
(Share of Total Municipal Expenditures, 2008)
Current 
expenditures
Capital 
expenditures
Total
Local administration 18.1% 5.2% 14.3%
Pre-primary and primary education 9.8% 9.6% 9.7%
Road and rail transportation 7.7% 8.5% 7.9%
Social transfers 10.1% — 7.2%
Roads 5.3% 19.4% 9.4%
Communal services and territorial development 5.2% 11.1% 6.9%
Housing 3.7% 7.8% 4.9%
Waste water treatment 0.6% 11.4% 3.8%
Sports 2.2% 6.2% 3.4%
Waste treatment 4.3% 0.9% 3.3%
Source:  Grouping of spending categories as individual spending lines adopted from Tománek (2009), 
data from ARIS.
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2.2 Municipal Size 
The Czech Republic is characterized by a high number of settlements, which today form 
about 6,250 self-governing municipalities. Table 3.2 illustrates the results of compul-
sory amalgamation between 1960 and 1989, and a very fast and massive disintegration 
between 1990 and 1993. The law on municipalities did not set any size limitations for 
newly established municipalities at that time. However, since 1994 new municipalities 
have had to consist of at least 300 inhabitants and since 2001, 1,000 inhabitants.
T able 3.2 
Number of Municipalities Between 1921 and 2009
Year 1921 1930 1950 1961 1970 1980 1989 1991 1993 1995 2009
Number of 
municipalities
11,417 11,768 11,459 8,726 7,509 4,778 4,120 5,768 6,196 6,234 6,249
Source: Vajdová (2006:17) and Czech statistical oﬃce (http://www.czso.cz/csu/2009edicniplan.
nsf/p/1301-09, June 19, 2009).
Table 3.3 shows the size groups of municipalities in the Czech Republic. Small 
municipalities are usually considered municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants. 
Then, there are 5,594 small municipalities in the Czech Republic with 2.7 million in-
habitants, i.e., 26.4 percent of the entire population. A comparison with 19911 shows 
that the population of small municipalities grew by 70,000, i.e., 0.5 percent.
Tab le 3.3
Sizes of Municipalities (January 1, 2009)
 Number of municipalities Population
199 1,561 25.0% 193,328 1.8%
200–499 1,991 31.9% 651,689 6.2%
500–999 1,330 21.3% 935,658 8.9%
1,000–1,999 700 11.2% 972,484 9.3%
2,000–4,999 392 6.3% 1,184.204 11.3%
5,000–9,999 142 2.3% 964,895 9.2%
10,000–19,999 70 1.1% 981,219 9.4%
20,000–49,999 42 0.7% 1,243,739 11.9%
50,000–99,999 15 0.2% 1,058,196 10.1%
Over 100,000 6 0.1% 2,282,130 21.8%
Total 6,249 100.0% 10,467,542 100.0%
Source: Czech Statistical Oﬃce, http://www.czso.cz/csu/2009edicniplan.nsf/p/1301–09 (May 29, 2009).
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2.3 Local Government Financial Management
Local government ﬁnancial management is guided by two laws: (1) the Law on Budgetary 
Rules for Local Governments (250/2000 Coll.), which regulates the revenues, expendi-
tures, budget, budgetary process and property management of local governments, and 
the management of budget organizations established by local governments; and (2) the 
Law on Tax Assignment (243/2000 Coll.), which speciﬁes the tax sharing mechanism.
The share of local government expenditures in total public expenditures was about 
25 percent in 2008 and about 10 percent of the GDP. These shares have been quite 
stable over time. 
Although municipal ﬁscal autonomy is very low, it still remains much higher than 
regional ﬁscal autonomy. The majority of municipal tax revenues (95 percent) come 
from shared taxes; the remaining tax revenues come from property tax and local fees. 
Municipalities have some autonomy regarding the rate and base of both the property 
tax and local fees; however, this autonomy is quite limited and when considered in 
relation to the volume of revenues coming from these two sources it becomes almost 
insigniﬁcant. The regions also do not have any discretion regarding tax revenues.
Currently the revenues coming from income taxes (both personal income tax and 
corporate income tax) and the value added tax are shared among the three government 
levels. With some simpliﬁcation, municipalities receive 21.4 percent, regions 8.92 
percent, and the state 69.68 percent of the proceeds from these taxes. These revenues 
are distributed among the individual municipalities and regions based on a formula. 
For municipalities the formula includes these characteristics: number of inhabitants, 
size-group coeﬃcient, and land area. For the regions, the above-mentioned law ﬁxes 
the shares. For more information on the tax sharing system and its evolution see de 
Carmo Oliveira and Martinez-Vazquez (2001:31–33), Hemmings (2006:14–15) and 
Sedmihradská (2008). 
Figure 3.1 shows the volume and the structure of revenues and expenditures of mu-
nicipalities, regions and VMAs in 2008. The comparison of municipalities and regions 
shows clearly that the role of municipalities as a local government is much higher than 
that of the regions and that municipalities are more ﬁscally independent than the regions 
(most of the grants received by the regions only pass through their budgets to various 
organizations’ budgets, such as schools). The volume of regional capital expenditures 
is signiﬁcantly lower than that of municipalities. The VMA are shown for comparison 
only and their revenues and expenditures will be explored in more detail later. Here it is 
worth pointing out the fact that two-thirds of their expenditures are capital expenditures. 
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Figu re 3.1
 Volume and Structure of Revenues and Expenditures 
(2008, CZK Billions and Percentage of Total) 
Source: State budget proposal for 2009, Part F, estimates only. 
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3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION
A legal framework determines the way municipalities cooperate. While the ﬁrst part of 
this chapter deals with the legal framework for intermunicipal cooperation in general, 
the second part focuses on a special type of legal entity intended for intermunicipal 
cooperation: the voluntary municipal association (VMA).
3.1 Forms of Intermunicipal Cooperation and Their Regulation
Valid legislation oﬀers a range of legal arrangements for IMC. In case the cooperation 
includes subjects other than municipalities, diﬀerent structures are applied than in the 
case of solely municipalities as members. Cooperation of any kind is allowed only in 
the area of municipalilities’ own responsibilities.
Regarding IMC we can distinguish three periods: (1) between November 24, 1990, 
and August 20, 1992; (2) between August 21, 1992, and November 11, 2000; and 
(3) onward from November 12, 2000. In the ﬁrst period the Law on Municipalities 
(367/1990 Coll.) included only a very general paragraph (§17): municipalities can form 
associations, start partnerships, and cooperate with municipalities from other countries 
and participate in international associations of local governments. In the second period, 
based on the Amendment to the Law (410/1992 Coll.), Paragraph 17 was cancelled 
and the form of voluntary municipal association was introduced for the ﬁrst time (in 
§20a-d and §20e), making possible various forms of international cooperation. At the 
same time, based on the Law on Civil Associations it was prohibited for municipali-
ties to associate (83/1990 Coll.). However, there was no mention of cooperation in 
the form of the interest-based association of legal persons and so municipalities used 
this form frequently. At that time the legal diﬀerences between interested association 
of legal persons and a voluntary municipal association were very small as both of them 
were mostly regulated by the civil code. The diﬀerences appeared later with the new 
law on municipalities.
The third period started with a completely new law (128/2000 Coll.), which brought 
forth more detailed and restrictive legislation regarding IMC: it exhaustively listed the 
allowed forms of IMC, it prohibited the formation of interest-based associations of legal 
persons formed solely by municipalities, and it brought several changes to the VMA.
Cooperation of municipalities can now take the following three forms:
  Contracts signed for fulﬁllment of special tasks,
  Formation of a voluntary municipal association, and
  Formation of mutual-interest associations of legal persons based on the appro-
priate legislation.
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Regarding the cooperation in the framework of contracts signed for fulﬁllment of 
special tasks and formation of mutual legal entities, special laws based on the exact type 
of the contract or the established legal entity regulate the cooperation.
General requirements for the contracts are written form and approval of municipal 
councils of all involved municipalities before the signature of the contract. There is 
also speciﬁed compulsory content to each contract. Municipalities can jointly estab-
lish various types of legal entities based on the relevant legislation (Vedral et al. 2008: 
272–273), which lists these allowed types of legal entities: joint stock company, limited 
company, limited partnership, co-partnership, cooperative, not-for proﬁt organization, 
and foundation.
3.2 Special Legal Entities: Voluntary Municipal Associations
The voluntary municipal association (VMA) is a special type of a legal entity intended 
for intermunicipal cooperation. A VMA is not a local government; however, some local 
government regulations apply (e.g., the Law on Budgetary Rules of Local Governments, 
250/2000 Coll.). 
A VMA can be founded by two or more municipalities that need not be neighbors. 
One municipality can be a member of multiple VMAs. The VMA is established based 
on a contract that must be approved by the municipal councils of all participating 
municipalities. The VMA legally comes into being when the regional oﬃce registers it. 
The VMA ends its existence based on an agreement, lapse of the designated period, or 
fulﬁllment of the task deﬁned in the founding contract.
The activity of a VMA is guided by its status. The law on municipalities (128/2000 
Coll., §50:2) deﬁnes these obligatory parts of the status: name and seat of the VMA 
and all member municipalities; the VMA’s area of activity; bodies of the VMA in-
cluding their foundation, scope and decision-making process; property placed into 
the VMA’s care by the member municipalities; revenue resources; methods of proﬁt 
division and sharing of loss; conditions for entry or leaving of the VMA; and the 
content and scope of the control provided by member municipalities. As the VMA’s 
status can be changed, it is necessary to deﬁne the rules for approval of its amend-
ments (see Neumannová 2000). 
There are no rules regarding VMA executive structures, i.e., VMA bodies. The 
decision-making mechanism and ﬁnancing is regulated by the status of the VMA. 
Neumannová (2000) suggests utilizing a supreme authority, an executive body and a 
control body, i.e., to use a structure common in other types of legal entities as well.
VMAs have three main ﬁnancial sources: member contributions, non-tax revenues 
resulting from their own activity, and external resources such as grants (see Gavlasová 
et al. 2007a: 62). Member contributions (contributions from the member municipali-
ties) usually include annual and entrance fees. The annual fee is mostly given as a per 
capita amount, while the entrance fee is a lump sum per municipality. In case of the 
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realization of an investment project, contributions are often calculated based on the 
cost principle (see the elaborated case study of Sdružení obcí-Plynoﬁkace Pocidliní in 
section 10 of the Appendix to this chapter). In these cases citizens of the municipalities 
often pay, for example, a connection fee, which may be revenue either of the VMA or 
the municipality. Box 3.1 presents a typical example of the executive structure, decision-
making, and ﬁnancing of a VMA. 
Citizens of the member municipalities are allowed to participate in a general nature 
at the meetings of the VMA bodies, to look into the records, to submit proposals to the 
budget, and view the VMA’s ﬁnal account. 
Based on the current legislation VMAs can found their own legal entities with the 
exception of a budgetary organization. Mockovčiaková (2003) prefers the foundation of a 
legal entity by the individual municipalities as a joint legal entity instead of a legal entity 
founded by the VMA, since the latter option may limit transparency. Mockovčiaková 
(2003) suggests including prohibition of the foundation of a legal entity by the VMA 
in the very status of the VMA. 
The management of the VMA is regulated by the Law on Budgetary Rules of Local 
Governments (250/2000 Coll.), so the same regulation applies to municipalities, regions, 
and VMAs. This arrangement increases the transparency of VMA ﬁnancial management. 
A body of the VMA, which is assigned by its status declaration, prepares and approves its 
annual budget. The VMAs use the budget classiﬁcation and their management is subject 
to an annual audit. The law on accounting (563/1991 Coll.) also applies to VMAs.
There are two major problems in the current legislation regarding the VMA: (1) 
fragmentations of the regulation as all the issues not directly regulated by the law on 
municipalities (128/2000 coll.) are regulated by the Civil Code (40/1964 Coll.) (see 
Ministry of Interior 2005), and (2) a VMA is not a local government; however, some-
times the regulation of local governments applies and this creates ambiguity in the 
interpretation of the law for VMAs. 
Many ambiguities arose when interpreting the law on budgetary rules of local 
governments (205/2000 Coll.) as it applies to local governments and it was not clear 
which arrangements are applicable to VMAs as well. A recent amendment to this law 
(477/2008 Coll., eﬀective since April 1, 2009) should decrease this problem as it added 
the words “svazek obcí” to all the paragraphs that apply to VMAs.
One of the issues coming from the second legal problem is bankruptcy. Based 
on the law on bankruptcy (182/2006 Coll.) a local government cannot go bankrupt; 
however, a VMA can. If one VMA were to declare bankruptcy, it would probably cause 
a loss of trust in many other cases. Guarantees are another matter of concern. The law 
on municipalities severely limits the power of a municipality to issue a guarantee for 
a private subject. This regulation, however, does not apply to VMAs, and thus VMAs 
can issue guarantees without any legal limitations. Resulting problems have not been 
reported in practice so far. Existing uncertainty could lead to choice of another legal 
format or limit cooperations as a whole.
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Box 3.1 
Executive Structure , Decision-Making, and Financing—The Case of Ladův Kraj
Ladu˚v kraj is a VMA that associates 24 mostly small municipalities at the southeast border 
of the capital city, Prague, and is active in the area of tourism.
The VMA’s highest body is an assembly of mayors, wherein each member municipality has 
a representative and each representative has one vote. The assembly of mayors decides on 
changes in status or membership, sets the volume of entrance or annual contributions, 
elects the chairman of the association, approves the annual budget and ﬁnal account, and 
approves purchase or sale of property if its value exceeds CZK 40,000.
The chairman is the statutory body of the VMA and he calls together the assembly of mayors, 
directs the manager, acts on behalf of the VMA, ensures management of accounting and 
approves purchase or sale of property if its value exceeds CZK 10,000. In the case of absence, 
the chairman is substituted by the vice chairmen, who is also elected by the assembly of 
mayors.
The executive body of the VMA is a council with ﬁve members elected by the assembly of 
mayors. The council approves all activities of the VMA including the purchase or sale of 
property if its value exceeds CZK 10,001 but is less than CZK 40,000.
The association does not have any employees. The manager of the association works based 
on a contract. Accounting, preparation of the budget, and the ﬁnal account are done by 
the ﬁnancial department of the town Rˇícˇany, and is based on another contract. The seat 
of the association is in the information center of Rˇícˇany; the association does not pay rent, 
which is compensated through the voluntary work of the manager in the information center.
Each member municipality contributes CZK 25 ZK per person annually to the budget of the 
association. Refusal of payment of the contribution would lead, based on the contracted 
status, to exclusion of that municipality from the association. The entrance fee for a new 
municipality is CZK 3,000. The structure of revenues (in CZK thousands) is shown in the 
following table.
Table 3.4
Structure of Revenues in CZK Thousands
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Non-tax revenues 2 5 12 81 72 61 194
Member contributions 547 527 562 562 770 777 802
Transfers from the state budget 119 81
Transfers from EU funds 567
Transfers from the region 193 186 293 950
Total revenues 549 1,099 694 836 1,027 1,218 1,946
Source: Statutes of VMA Ladův kraj, ARIS.
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An interesting issue is the regulation of the property of a VMA, as the law prohibits 
transfer of property from a municipality to a VMA. VMAs can only act as managers 
of this property. Despite this regulation a VMA can have property. Based on Vedral 
(2001) we can distinguish two sources of VMA property: property gained through the 
VMA’s own activity regardless of the time of acquisition, and property received from 
its member municipalities before 2001.
The regulation of VMA property may also complicate its activity. Vedral et al. (2008: 
285) describe how the regulation of VMA property can limit the potential of the VMA. 
For example, one municipality places property in the care of a VMA; according to the 
law the municipality remains the owner of that particular property. Then if the VMA 
appreciates this property through an investment, the municipality freely collects this 
appreciation from the costs of other partnering municipalities.
The monitoring and evaluation of VMA activities suﬀers the same problems as 
the monitoring and evaluation of municipal activities. The legal requirements ensure 
procedural control (i.e., legal compliance); however, the outcome-based control is 
missing. Especially regarding the VMA there remains an important element of external 
monitoring and evaluation realized by the grant providers, who require fulﬁllment of 
the conditions associated with a particular grant.
4. WHY, HOW, AND HOW MUCH CZECH MUNICIPALITIES COOPERATE
The law on municipalities deﬁnes three forms of IMC: contracts, mutual legal entities, 
and VMAs. However beside VMAs, which constitute a special legal conﬁguration, we 
can observe the parallel existence of so-called microregions, which in contrast have no 
special legal form, although they mostly resemble VMAs. The deﬁnition of a microregion 
is very vague: a microregion is an association of municipalities with no speciﬁc legal form 
and its goal is the common development of the territory of involved municipalities (see 
Škrabal et al. 2006). Basically, a microregion is any municipal association that claims to 
be a microregion. Thus, this creates two overlapping groups of municipal associations.
IMC in the Czech Republic is very widespread and only a minimum of munici-
palities are not involved in any IMC. Previous research shows that only 1.3 percent of 
municipalities do not participate at all and that simultaneous participation in various 
IMC arrangements is common: 49 percent of municipalities have a contract signed 
for fulﬁllment of special tasks, 83 percent participate in a VMA, and 8 percent have 
established a joint legal entity (Šelešovský et al. 2004). Newer data shows that the in-
volvement of municipalities in microregion IMCs is even higher. Labounková (2008) 
indicates that 88 percent of municipalities are members of at least one microregion. 
The current magnitude of intermunicipal cooperation was inﬂuenced ﬁrst in the early 
1990s by the fact that newly established breakaway municipalities kept relations with 
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other municipalities with which they had recently been part of the same municipality. 
The quite general legal regulation valid in the 1990s enabled the formation of many 
IMC initiatives. Since the end of the 1990s, support from EU pre-accession instru-
ments and structural funds has grown gradually and it has became popular belief that 
bigger projects are more likely to be supported. This was an important impulse for the 
formation of many VMAs.
Gavlasová et al. (2007: 61) list these main reasons for intermunicipal cooperation: 
the sharing of experience, technical cooperation, and the matching of ﬁnancial resources 
and savings. In general, conducted interviews show that most IMC networks expected 
that they would be able to attract resources that single municipalities would never receive. 
This expectation was stronger in direct relation to how less speciﬁc (or more general) the 
IMC purpose was. Of course, in each case there are speciﬁc motives for cooperation (see 
section 6 and the Appendix to this chapter), which allow justiﬁcation of IMC formation.
The availability of aggregated, nationwide information diﬀers considerably among 
diﬀerent types of IMC networks. While we can easily get a full list of registered (both 
active and extinct) VMAs, to obtain a list of the remaining two types is impossible. In 
the instance of single municipalities, we can easily ﬁnd lists of municipal-owned trading 
companies (in the trade register); however, tracking down the co-owners is challenging 
work. Based on the trade register, municipalities (as owners) are involved in about 2,400 
trading companies. Obtaining information on these individual contracts would require 
direct communication with each individual municipality.
All the VMAs are registered and thus included in the ARES (Administrative Registry 
of Economic Subjects, provided by the Ministry of Finance, in cooperation with the 
Czech Statistical Oﬃce). Based on this registry, there were 811 active and 106 already 
dissolved VMAs, by November 22, 2008. The Ministry of Finance runs the ARIS (Au-
tomated Budget Information System) which records VMA ﬁnancial statements. The 
statements of 899 VMA are found in ARIS, including statements of some dissolved 
VMAs. Out of them, 707 include all relevant years. The ARIS also includes statements 
from 54 municipal associations with varying legal statuses; however, the number of 
these associations gradually decreases among the records.
The records of microregions are even more fragmented. The Institute of Spatial 
Development (which belongs to the Ministry of Regional Development) kept a registry 
of microregions between 2000 and 2005, when individual regions overtook the agenda. 
The Czech Statistical Oﬃce (its regional oﬃces) publishes information on microregions 
gained from individual regions. Based on this data, there were 533 microregions in 
January 2007, out of which about 60 had a legal structure other than a VMA. 
A random cross check of various easy explanations did not lead to any simple con-
clusion: The VMAs which are not microregions have been founded continuously since 
1993; they are active at least to the same extent as the microregions and some of them 
are not even single-purpose organizations.
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A consequent problem with exploration of VMAs comes from the fact that these 
associations are voluntary, so while they seem stable based on the number of VMAs, the 
contrary is true. Changes in the membership of VMAs are frequent and information 
from diﬀerent sources may diﬀer (see also Ryšavý 2006). The founding municipalities 
of a VMA are listed in its status; however, the Law on Municipalities does not require 
amendment of the status when and if membership changes.
All the information presented below is based on an inquiry of a sample of VMAs 
for which data was available regarding particular characteristics.
It is very diﬃcult to estimate IMC volume and especially the volume of expen-
ditures realized through IMC. Based on a detailed exploration of the data available 
from municipal statements, we can label IMC associated expenditures as transfers 
and loans to VMAs, other municipalities, and budget organizations established by 
other municipalities. The picture is distorted by the fact that it is not possible to get 
information on the volume of services contracted out and especially contracted out 
to joint companies. 
Table 3.5 shows the expenditures of municipalities and VMAs for six functional 
areas. The ﬁrst column shows total municipal expenditures. The second column shows 
transfers and loans to other municipalities. In total they account for three percent of 
municipal expenditures. Unfortunately from the data available we can only partly link 
these expenditures to their purpose: 628 million CZK were used as contributions on 
obligatory education for children frequenting school in another municipality (part of 
the services for inhabitants), 670 million of administration expenditures were loans, 
707 million went to non-speciﬁed ﬁnancial operations, and 997 million were spent on 
other non-speciﬁed activities. 
Data in the third and fourth column show the transfers and loans to VMAs and 
budget organizations established by other municipalities. The loans to both the VMAs 
and organizations are negligible. The current transfers to VMAs are directed mostly to 
public transport (CZK 55 million), communal services and spatial development (CZK 
55 million), local administration (CZK 45 million), drinking water (CZK 21 million), 
sewage (CZK 31 million) and tourism (CZK 11 million). Capital transfers are allotted 
for sewage (CZK 284 million), drinking water (CZK 107 million), communal services 
and spatial development (CZK 32 million), roads (CZK 20 million), and housing (CZK 
10 million). In the area of budget organizations the capital transfers concerned mostly 
roads (CZK 65 million) and hospitals (CZK 20 million), while the current transfers 
concerned healthcare (CZK 53 million), education (CZK 33 million), culture (CZK 
23 million), and sport (CZK 21 million). 
Data on expenditures of VMAs in the ﬁfth column are shown for comparison only 
and are analyzed in greater detail later.
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Table 3.5 
Expenditures of Municipalities and VMAs (2007, CZK Millions)
Municipality
(1)
Transfers/ 
loans to other 
municip.
(2)
Transfers/
loans 
to VMA
(3)
Transfers
 to org.
(4)
VMA
(5)
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 1,586 4 0 0 6
Industry 57,231 46 550 88 3,403
Services for inhabitants 98,327 740 132 171 533
Social affairs 28,052 5 3 16 13
Public safety 6,712 23 0 2 1
Administration 49,669 2,493 105 2 194
Total 112,763 3,312 791 279 4,151
Source: ARIS, author’s calculations.
Note: Column (1) total municipal expenditures, (2) transfers and loans to other municipalities, (3) 
transfers and loans to VMA, (4) transfers to budget organizations established by other munici-
palities, (5) total expenditures of VMA.
The data presented in Table 3.5 suggests that VMAs are used more for cooperation 
in the area of industry (i.e., physical infrastructure such as water, sewage, and transpor-
tation) and that other forms of IMC are used for cooperation in the ﬁeld of services for 
citizens (i.e., education or healthcare). Although the presented numbers do not give a 
complete picture of IMC, the data deﬁnitely shows the directions and also the methods 
of cooperation in the diﬀerent ﬁelds. 
5. VOLUNTARY MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATIONS: 
 A TOOL ESPECIALLY FOR INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION
As the voluntary municipal associations are a special type of legal entity, related data 
can be quite easily obtained from various databases, as mentioned in part 4. This allows 
us to analyze the number of VMAs, the volume and structure of their revenues and 
expenditures, as well as their development. The results of this analysis are presented in 
the ﬁrst part of this section. The second part focuses on individual VMA expenditures 
and compares the revenues and expenditures of microregions and non-microregions.
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5.1 Voluntary Municipal Associations and the Financial Resources 
 They Manage
The ﬁrst VMAs were founded in 1991 and after quick diﬀusion of this form of coop-
eration in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s we can observe only a modest growth until 1998. 
Between 1998 and 2002 the number of VMAs in the Czech Republic more than tripled. 
Since 2004 the number of VMAs has remained more or less stable (see Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2
Number of VMAs, Microregions, and Share of Microregions
(as of November 22, 2008)
Source: ARES, recognition of microregions based on Czech statistical oﬃce.
Despite a standstill in the growth of the number of VMAs, the volume of their 
budgets grew until 2006. 2006 was exceptional not only for VMAs but also regarding 
municipal management; unusually high capital revenues and capital expenditures were 
realized, probably partly due to municipal council elections. Furthermore, it coincided 
with the ﬁnal year of the previous programming period for EU structural funds. The 
total revenues were higher than in other years not only thanks to higher received trans-
fers from both the EU and national sources, but also due to increased capital revenues 
which came mostly from contributions from individuals for investments such as the 
development of sewer networks. Since that year a fast decline, or return to a more com-
mon state is notable. 
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Figure 3.3
Revenues and Expenditures of VMA (2000–2009, CZK billions)
Source: ARIS (2000–2008), State budget for 2009 (estimates only).
Figure 3.4 shows the volume and structure of the main revenue sources and the 
functions of expenditures.
The share of owned revenues (non-tax revenues and capital revenues) fell from 28 
percent in 2000 to 23 percent in 2007. Transfers are a dominant revenue source for the 
VMA. There are two main sources of transfers: internal, e.g., municipalities and owned 
funds, and external, which were quite balanced in the observed period.
The examination of expenditure development shows a fast growth (both nominal 
and relative) in the area of industry. On the contrary, expenditures for the services for 
inhabitants (mainly communal services and waste treatment) are nominally stable.
The expenditure structure does not conﬁrm the common claim that the role of single 
purpose VMAs is decreasing (see Ministry of Interior 2005). Table 3.5 shows the most 
important areas of expenditure (using a more detailed classiﬁcation than in Figure 3.4) 
together with the share of capital expenditures in total expenditures for the particular 
functional area in the whole period of 2000–2007. Capital expenditures were dominant 
in all areas with only two exceptions: road transport and local administration.
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Figure  3.4 
VMA Revenues and Expenditures (2000–2007, CZK Billions) 
Source: ARIS, author’s calculations.
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Table 3.6 
Areas of the Most Important VMA Expenditure 
(2000–2007, CZK million)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Cap. exp.
Sewage and 
sewage plants
110 203 402 782 705 1,403 2,625 2,064 88%
Drinking water 370 441 462 524 646 685 1,023 1,028 85%
Communal services 
and territorial 
development
434 676 905 748 553 300 410 265 81%
Waste treatment 48 29 56 46 56 81 155 164 61%
Road transport 32 43 96 62 68 102 74 62 14%
Local administration 15 28 41 43 62 90 105 76 21%
Healthcare 4 2 2 17 39 78 245 29 79%
Roads 12 4 18 30 41 58 82 137 73%
Source: ARIS, author’s calculations.
Note: Cap. exp. = share of capital expenditures in total expenditures for a particular functional area in 
the whole period from 2000–2007.
Comparison of the main sources of revenue and types of VMA expenditures per 
capita in diﬀerent regions showed surprisingly high diﬀerences. Based on detailed 
analysis of the individual VMAs in the Central Bohemia region and anticipation of a 
similar pattern in other regions, I assume that the main reason is the realization of a few 
sizable projects, while the majority of the VMAs are not exceptional. A more detailed 
exploration of the grant sources in diﬀerent regions showed that the major diﬀerences 
are caused by the diﬀerences in grants from the state and state funds. Although the 
diﬀerences in grants from the regional budgets are smaller and do not explain the dif-
ferences in total grants received, they do show that the regional policies regarding the 
VMA diﬀer quite signiﬁcantly.
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Figure 3.5
Comparison of per Capita Revenues and Expenditures in 13 Regions 
(CZK, 2007)
 
Source: ARIS, author’s calculation; number of inhabitants from Czech Statistical Oﬃce.
Note: The ﬁgure shows minimum, maximum, and 25th and 75th percentiles.
5.2 A More Detailed Financial Analysis
Figure 3.6 shows that the majority of VMAs operate with very limited resources. 
This is especially evident when analyzing expenditures per capita (the number of 
inhabitants can change frequently, so the presented numbers may be inaccurate to 
some extent; however, the conclusion remains the same). More than one-ﬁfth of 
VMAs operate with less than CZK 10 per inhabitant and about a quarter of VMAs 
operate with a total budget smaller than CZK 100,000.
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Figure 3.6 
Number of VMAs with Particular Expenditure Volume 
(In CZK Millions and in CZK Per Capita)
Source: ARIS, author’s calculation; number of inhabitants from Czech Statistical Oﬃce.
Despite the fact that the distinction between microregions and other VMAs (non-
microregions) may be vague in some cases, a separate ﬁnancial analysis of these two 
groups shows interesting diﬀerences.
Figure 3.7 shows that microregions operate with signiﬁcantly smaller resources than 
non-microregions. In 2008 the average revenues of a microregion were CZK 2.3 million 
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while non-microregions averaged CZK 7.2 million. At the same time, their revenue 
structures diﬀer: the microregions rely more on transfers, especially investment transfer. 
In the examined period transfers formed 86.9 percent of revenues in microregions and 
72.2 percent in non-microregions on average. Non-tax revenues, i.e., revenues from own 
inherent activity and incomes from rents, interest, and sale of small property, are more 
important in non-microregions, accounting for 9.5 percent of revenues in microregions 
and 19.7 percent in non-microregions on average during the examined period.
Figure 3.7 
 Revenues of microregions and non-microregions: volume and structure
Source:  ARIS, recognition of microregions based on Czech statistical oﬃce.
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Figure 3.8 shows similar comparison of expenditure volume and structure. The 
expenditures copy the revenues, thus the expenditures of non-microregions are higher 
than that of microregions. For the whole period, the share of capital expenditures was 
higher in non-microregions. The diﬀerence was between one and 16 percent.
Figure 3.8
E xpenditures of microregions and non-microregions: volume and structure
Source: ARIS, recognition of microregions based on Czech statistical oﬃce.
While mostly ﬁnancial, the provided analysis shows that: VMAs strongly rely on 
transfers both from internal and external sources; only about one-ﬁfth of VMAs are 
ﬁnancially self-suﬃcient, i.e. are able to ﬁnance their activities from user fees or rental 
incomes; about a quarter of VMAs do not operate with a budget which allows reasonable 
action; VMAs act mostly in the area of building infrastructure (water and sewer) and 
less in either provision of services or tourism; there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences among the 
grants received by VMAs in diﬀerent regions, and there are diﬀerences among microre-
gions and non-microregions regarding revenue and expenditure volume and structure. 
6. MAIN FINDINGS 
The practice of IMC in the Czech Republic is extremely patchy; therefore my selection 
of the examined cases was guided by the attempt to include this heterogeneity in my 
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sample. Eight cases were elaborated in total. Their brief summary is presented in the 
appendix. The interviews realized with the heads of the selected IMC units were ac-
companied by a detailed review of related documents.
Municipal cooperation in the case studies started because one of the mayors wanted 
to do something (build a landﬁll, manage the water pipes, start an information center, or 
provide gas service) and the mayor could not do it alone because of insuﬃcient ﬁnancial 
resources, limited territory, or an inherited and binding drinking water infrastructure. 
None of the interviewees mentioned inspiration by another similar and successful IMC, 
and (with some exception) they were not aware of the existence of similar cases. This 
observation supports the supposition that the rise of an IMC is the result of exploitation 
of an opportunity, either real or expected (in the case of Přemyslovské střední Čechy).
Municipalities know that they can cooperate and they know how. However most 
of the interviewees who were present in the early sages of the IMC recalled diﬃculties 
connected with speciﬁc steps such as the choice of the proper legal structure or com-
pilation of the status. Only two interviewees acknowledged some (limited) assistance 
by the district oﬃce (which existed only until 2001) during the process of formation 
of their IMC. The formation of an IMC is not supported (not even methodically) by 
either a government agency or the regions. However, regions do oﬀer some assistance 
regarding the available grant schemes for existing VMAs.
Despite the defects in the legal framework of the VMA described above, none of 
the interviewees made a direct claim in that regard. At the same time they were content 
with the strict regulation of budget related issues, which ensure that proper ﬁnancial 
management is exercised.
One interviewee (Veltrus Dominio) was aware of his strong personal role in the 
VMA and expressed doubts about continuation of the VMA if he is not re-elected next 
year. Dependence of the continuation of the IMC on one or a few persons (either one 
of the mayors or the manager) was quite strong in all multipurpose VMAs (Ladův kraj, 
Přemysovské střední Čechy, and Veltrus Dominio); on the other hand in the techni-
cally oriented IMC (water or waste management—Svazek obcí Boží voda, Vodárenská 
společnost Táborsko, and SOČ Černošín) this dependence did not exist. For example, 
both in Svazek obcí Boží voda and SOČ Čenošín, the management of the IMC has 
changed without any inﬂuence on its functioning.
Changes in membership are quite frequent: for example, Vajdová et al. 2006:53 
reports that 68 out of 150 surveyed VMAs observed changes in membership; in my 
sample four out of eight IMC networks observed changes in membership. Despite 
my expectation this was generally not considered a problem. The entrance of new 
municipalities was considered positive. Termination of cooperation was perceived as 
a signiﬁcant risk in case of the IMC providing waste management (SOČ Černošín), 
as their service area and thus revenues would decrease. However, in the multipurpose 
VMA either actual or potential exit of some municipalities was considered a logical step 
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for municipalities participating in more similar IMC units (e.g., Přemyslovské střední 
Čechy). On the other hand, participation in more IMC units with diﬀerent purposes 
is almost a rule and is evaluated positively.
The interest of both council members and the public in the activities of an IMC is 
low. For example, in Ladův kraj they decided to abolish a control commission because 
it required the involvement of additional persons next to those already involved in 
the council.
7. EXPLOITING THE POTENTIAL OF INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION
The present analysis shows that since 1991 to date in the Czech Republic, numerous 
IMC arrangements have been established and are operating. The vast majority of them 
have now taken the legal structure of a voluntary municipal association (VMA) and 
run their ﬁnancial management in accordance to the budgetary rules of local govern-
ments. This process was driven from the bottom-up. Municipalities have tried and still 
try to take advantage of cooperation despite minimal support from the central govern-
ment and with only recent interest from some regions. The reason for cooperation in 
the form of a VMA is attributed to its familiarity and public status. There is much less 
experience with cooperation of other legal forms such as limited companies, especially 
due to the lack of information and council members’ anxiety of over loss of municipal 
property and control. 
The lack of a central government policy regarding intermunicipal cooperation brings 
two main deﬁciencies to light on the municipal level: (1) needlessly high transaction costs 
for municipalities when starting a cooperation, and (2) limited or delayed cooperation 
in areas which proved convenient for cooperation elsewhere.
At the same time on the central government level, the eﬀorts of various agencies 
are overlapping (e.g., number of various registers of VMA or a recent compilation of a 
handbook for the formation of a school by a VMA, put out by the Ministry of Educa-
tion, see MŠMT 2009).
Experiences with IMC show that Czech municipalities are very ﬂexible and that 
they react sensitively to all sorts of ﬁnancial incentives. Spontaneous development and 
expectations of more signiﬁcant support, especially from the EU structural funds, have 
created microregions and non-microregions that exist side by side, and microregions are 
now often perceived as a more advanced form of cooperation. Unfortunately, most of 
the microregions were created as a tool to access or receive EU grants. This inﬂuences 
the common perception that “a good manager is able to sustain the microregion without 
contributions from the member municipalities” (quote comes from interview realized by 
Kasalová 2009), and they rarely overtake an activity previously exercised by individual 
municipalities (such as the operation of a water network or waste management). 
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At the same time not all grant schemes were designed to support cooperation. Some 
even seem to exploit the advantages of cooperations. For example, grants provided by 
the Královehradecký region to VMAs for the acquisition of equipment such as lawn 
mowers or small tractors, lacked clariﬁcation regarding ownership of the acquired 
equipment, which became the property of only one member municipality without an 
obligation to share it with the others (see Ryšavý 2007). Also, the provision of gas service 
in Sdružení obcí-Plynoﬁkace Pocidliní, despite the fact that the project was carried out 
by the association, remained in many aspects three independent projects in which each 
of the municipalities made its own technical documentation, hired a building ﬁrm, 
and realized work inspections (see Appendix to this chapter). Although municipalities 
are in favor of this situation they still hesitate to contribute signiﬁcantly because of the 
suspicion that someone else would proﬁt on their account.
7.1 Possible Next Steps
There are three general approaches of the central government in relation to intermu-
nicipal cooperation in the Czech Republic. Our focus here is centered upon the central 
government, because only it can change the approach to IMC on all levels. Of course, 
each of the options presented here involve other subjects as well.
1. Status Quo
 With no action from the central government the situation will not change much. 
We will observe the parallel existence of microregions and non-microregions. 
Professionalized microregions with a “self-sustaining” manager will continue their 
activities, while weaker microregions managed by one of the mayors may be adversely 
aﬀected by each municipal election. It is very unlikely that VMAs would overtake 
municipal responsibilities. It is also unlikely that they would signiﬁcantly contribute 
to overcoming problems related to the fragmentation of municipal structure and 
limited facilities of small municipalities. 
2. IMC Unit
 This second approach is that the central government formulates a clear statement 
regarding intermunicipal cooperation with special attention to VMA practice. 
A subsequent step would then be to create an integrated unit that would be in charge 
of all issues related to IMC (contrary to the current situation wherein intermunicipal 
cooperation is the partial responsibility of at least four ministries).
 The character of the IMC unit, i.e., the ministry that would create it and its orga-
nizational form, depends on the stated objectives. The responsible branch should 
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be either the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Regional Development. The 
IMC unit could be a department within either ministry or a part of its organization. 
Thus the relationship would be like that of the Institute for Local Administration 
within the Ministry of Interior, or the Institute of Spatial Development within the 
Ministry of Regional Development.
The IMC unit would act in these areas:
  Acting as an information service for municipalities, VMAs and regions regarding 
the formation and operation of particular intermunicipal cooperatives, provision 
of sample documents, collection of good practices, and other relevant issues.
  Monitoring and evaluation of current cooperatives, i.e., the continued moni-
toring of microregions as realized at the Institute of Spatial Development between 
2000 and 2005, as well as a widening of other forms of cooperation.
  Identiﬁcation of areas especially suited for IMC, the proposal of support forms 
for the creation of cooperation in the desired areas (this should be composed 
mostly of support from other central government agencies which deal with the 
particular areas, including close cooperation with the Ministry of Education 
and the IMC unit when preparing the above-mentioned handbook).
3. Společenství obcí (Municipal Community)
 A third approach would be the return to and ﬁnalization of the proposal prepared 
by the Ministry of Interior in 2005. This proposal suggested establishing a new 
form of IMC which would in comparison to the VMA be more strictly regulated 
by law, slightly limited regarding participation (participating municipalities must 
have less than 10,000 inhabitants and the total number of inhabitants in a municipal 
community should be between 15–20,000), and which would participate within 
the tax sharing mechanism. Each municipal community would have to act in at 
least two of the following areas: transportation, education, tourism, water manage-
ment, waste management, social and health services, and cultural development, and 
perform accounting for the member municipalities. In contrary to a VMA, a 
municipal community could act in the area of delegated power (see Ministry of 
Interior 2005). The government cancelled elaboration of this proposal in May 2005 
(Resolution No. 623/2005), and since the 2006 elections nobody has returned to it.
 Theoretically, there exists a fourth option wherein options two and three would 
be realized simultaneously; a new form of IMC would be proposed and codiﬁed 
together with establishing a supporting IMC unit. However, I consider this fourth 
option strictly theoretical due to the current social and (especially) political situa-
tion, and therefore it is not discussed further.
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7.2 Evaluation of the Proposed Options
In the Czech Republic there is not any integrated policy regarding IMC and thus we 
have to formulate our own tentative objectives in order to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of 
the proposed alternatives:
  The aim of IMC in the Czech Republic is to reduce the consequences of the 
existing fragmented municipal structure and to limit some of the problems 
small municipalities deal with, i.e., insuﬃcient technical infrastructure and 
civic amenities, limited public transportation and cultural and social events 
and higher administration costs. 
The evaluation of the three proposals’ individual aspects is provided in the outcome 
matrix (see Table 3.7).
Each of the three proposed alternatives can improve the ﬁrst four areas to some 
extent; however, only the IMC unit would be able to alter the current spontaneous 
and selective way to a more strategic, targeted approach based on the research of needs 
and available tools. A selective approach would mean fulﬁllment of some of the above-
mentioned objectives regarding IMC initiatives; however, these objectives would not be 
fulﬁlled on the national scale. A targeted approach means that through usage of speciﬁc 
tools particular objectives of IMC will be fulﬁlled nationwide, or that the progress in 
a particular area will be widespread, not isolated. An example of a selective result may 
be the creation of two joint elementary schools thanks in part to elaboration contained 
within the aforementioned handbook. An example of a targeted approach is the iden-
tiﬁcation of geographic areas where joint schools would be beneﬁcial, the supply of 
information, technical and legal assistance to these municipalities, and the provision of 
a start-up grant which would lead to the formation of joint schools in 30–50 percent 
of identiﬁed cases.
Improvement in the ﬁfth area (the lowering of administration costs) could, to a 
certain extent, ensure a well-functioning municipal community.
A comparison of associated costs and beneﬁts must take a variety of several types 
of costs and beneﬁts into account. Among these are central government costs related 
to the realization of chosen policy, central government costs related to the change of 
the tax sharing system, and the costs of municipalities and VMAs or municipal com-
munities. The volume of the costs in the ﬁrst group would be quite similar for both the 
IMC unit and municipal community, thanks to a staﬀ reduction and the number of 
units now dealing disinterestedly with IMC at diﬀerent agencies. Municipality related 
costs would very much depend on the way municipal communities are implemented 
and what kind of assistance would be provided. For the central government, beneﬁts 
are mostly associated with cost reduction as a result of new policies as opposed to 
the current state. The beneﬁts toward municipalities and IMC initiatives ﬂow ﬁrst 
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from varied transaction cost reductions and in the case of municipal communities, 
from tax sharing.
The change of the tax sharing mechanism, even when without regard to municipal 
communities, is the subject of heated discussion for which a consensus is not approach-
ing. I suppose that the time for changing the tax sharing mechanism has not yet arrived, 
and that the connection between improvement of intermunicipal cooperation and a 
change in the tax sharing mechanism hinders the feasibility of this proposal. If, in the 
future, the interest in municipal communities is heightened, it may be useful to modify 
the proposed method of ﬁnance: rather than the politically sensitive tax sharing method, 
provide unconditional grants calculated on a based formula.
Any arrangement should ensure equal opportunities for all municipalities regard-
less of location traits such as region, distance, and neighbors. Currently, each region 
argues its individual policy regarding VMA and signiﬁcant interregional diﬀerences are 
apparent. Municipal communities are designed for small and medium-size municipali-
ties. Thus, starting this type of cooperation limits municipalities neighboring bigger 
towns on one side and only small municipalities on the other. Comparison of the three 
deﬁned options shows that the creation of an IMC unit enables improvement in four 
out of ﬁve target areas, it is feasible from a cost standpoint as well as its ability to obtain 
necessary political support, and it ensures equal access to all Czech municipalities. The 
status quo option does not lead to signiﬁcant improvement in any of the targeted areas 
and based on the careful analysis of recent developments, the role of IMC initiatives is 
decreasing in many areas. Creation of municipal communities is unfortunately associ-
ated with the need to change the tax-sharing mechanism. Presently, this is an obstacle 
impossible to overcome. Depending on the exact design of the municipal communities 
and on possible assistance, municipal communities could contribute markedly to needed 
improvements as stated above. 
The municipal community’s lack of political feasibility and the status quo option’s 
substantial deﬁciencies are my reasons for choosing the creation of an IMC unit as the 
preferred policy option.
Table 3.7 
Outcome Matrix
Efﬁciency Status quo IMC unit Municipal community
Improvement of 
 Technical infrastructure
Selectively Selectively Selectively
 Civic amenities Selectively Targeted Selectively
 Public transportation Selectively Targeted Selectively—Targeted
 Cultural and social events Selectively Targeted Selectively—Targeted
Lowering administration costs Unlikely Unlikely Possible
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Table 3.7 (continued)
Outcome Matrix
Efﬁciency Status quo IMC unit Municipal community
Additional costs for 
central government or 
regions
None Formation and 
operation of the 
IMC unit
Finalization of the 
proposal;
Elaboration of methodical 
guidelines;
Decrease in the share of 
the state budget on shared 
taxes.
Costs for municipalities 
and VMA/municipal 
communities
High transaction 
costs when 
establishing new 
cooperation.
NA Depends on the extent of 
provided methodological 
guidelines: in case of low 
methodological assistance, 
very high transaction costs 
especially for the early birds.
Additional benefits for 
central government or 
regions
NA Reduction of 
duplicate activities 
and staff.
Lower costs of delegated 
power in the long run and 
thus lower grants from 
the central government 
budget.
Additional benefits 
for municipalities 
and VMA/municipal 
communities
NA Reduced costs 
thanks to extensive 
information service.
Participation in tax 
sharing.
Political feasibility NA Objection from 
effected units (their 
mother agencies or 
respective ministers), 
which will be 
replaced by the new 
units.
Change in the tax sharing 
system is extremely 
sensitive because there is 
no solution without losers, 
either state budget or big 
municipalities; reaching 
a consensus during the 
current term is not feasible.
Equity Small municipalities 
lag behind in above 
mentioned areas;
Any municipality, 
regardless of size can 
cooperate;
Some regional 
differences.
Targeted support to 
small municipalities 
is possible;
Any municipality, 
regardless of size can 
cooperate;
Limitation of 
regional differences.
Targeted at small 
municipalities; 
Big municipalities 
are excluded; possible 
impact on municipalities 
neighboring only big 
municipalities;
Regional differences may 
occur due to size structure 
of municipalities and 
division of coordination 
and assistance roles between 
central government and 
regions.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
The Czech Republic is a country with a high number of municipalities (6,249) out of 
which 89 percent have less than 2,000 inhabitants. Small municipalities are often less 
equipped with technical infrastructures and civic amenities, citizens lack frequent public 
transportation and cultural and social self-realization, and the costs of local administra-
tion are rather high. 
Since the early 1990s the law on municipalities allows municipalities to cooperate 
and the preferred form of cooperation is a special type of legal entity: the voluntary 
municipal association, which is in many aspects (especially regarding ﬁnancial manage-
ment) regulated in the same way as local governments. 
The central government does not have a single policy regarding intermunicipal 
cooperation, which can be both the cause and result of extremely fragmented respon-
sibilities regarding various aspects of intermunicipal cooperation. Lack of exact and 
complete data on the magnitude and character of existing IMC initiatives hinders 
formulation of such a policy and leads to the realization of solitary intervention with 
only limited impact. 
Interviews highlight the absence of a place to go to for advice. All the interviewed 
founders of intermunicipal cooperation units had to contract out for a lawyer who 
prepared the founders’ contract and the status. When IMCs took a legal structure other 
than voluntary municipal association, they dealt with the lack of information necessary 
to make an informed decision.
Formation of an integrated IMC unit as a part of a central government agency should 
have a clear purpose and responsibilities, and should stop the duplication of activities 
that now happens frequently. This unit would act: (1) as an information service for 
all relevant stakeholders (municipalities, intermunicipal arrangements, regions, other 
central government agencies) regarding the formation and operation of intermunicipal 
cooperation arrangements; (2) as an information data bank responsible for the complex 
monitoring of intermunicipal cooperation activities and evaluation of realized policy; 
and (3) as a conductor of policy research that would identify areas suitable for inter-
municipal cooperation and design of support and incentives.
It would remove the main shortcomings of the current system (insuﬃcient moni-
toring and minimal assistance to municipalities). At the same time, careful analysis of 
the existing intermunicipal cooperation and of municipalities—their management, 
provision of services, endowment, etc.—will help to identify areas especially suitable 
for intermunicipal cooperation together with the proper incentives.
IMC units oﬀer an eﬃcient, equal, and feasible solution as they can improve situa-
tions in small municipalities through information provision and the design of targeted 
measures; they also enable equal treatment for all municipalities regarding size, region, 
and distance, and they do not depend on the support of a new tax sharing system.
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APENDIX: REVIEW OF THE ELABORATED CASE STUDIES
Name of the IMC Přemyslovské střední Čechy
Type, number of municipalities involved VMA, 21 and Local action group, 79
Number of inhabitants VMA 22,811 and Local action group 66,761
Interviewee Jaroslav Huk, manager of the VMA and 
member of board of the Local action group.
Year of formation 2004
Area of activity Development of the region
The region northwest of Prague battles with its heritage: coal mining and iron processing, collective 
agriculture during socialism, and having the unfavorable position as a satellite of Prague without its own 
local center. The region is deprived in the sense that the environment and facilities in the municipalities 
are below average (e.g., water and sewer systems). Many of the inhabitants work in Prague and have 
little interest in their municipality’s development. The described IMC tries to deal with the resulting 
problems. Its purpose is very general: restore and develop the region. 
The initiators of the partnership believed that the principles of partnership supported in the local 
action group (LAG) and by the program, LEADER, are the right tool. So far they have done well. 
LEADER is an initiative financed by EU structural funds and is designed to help rural actors consider 
the long-term potential of their local region. It seeks that public subjects cooperate with non-profit 
subjects and entrepreneurs. The LAGs participating in LEADER obtain a block grant, which they further 
distribute to small-size projects proposed by subjects from the particular territory.
Although it is not an example of a joint provision of services or construction of infrastructure, there 
are clear and tangible benefits to the cooperation.
The following is an example of the most recent type of IMC in the Czech Republic. It shows how 
difficult it is to bring together such varied subjects.
The following table shows the main revenue sources and the expenditure structure in CZK thousands.
Source: ARIS.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenues from inherent activity 5 105 5 0 0
Member contributions 61 39 122 85 72
Current transfer from the region — 90 — — —
Investment grants from the state budget  — 4,188 450 — — 
Other investment grants  — 5,281 433 33 — 
Current expenditures 18 159 72 12 37
Capital expenditures  — 9,457 1,058  — — 
Balance 48 87 121 106 34
201
C o u n t r y  R e p o r t s :  C z e c h  R e p u b l i c
Name of the IMC Přemyslovské střední Čechy
Type, number of municipalities involved VMA, 21 and Local action group, 79
Number of inhabitants VMA 22,811 and Local action group 66,761
Interviewees Jaroslav Huk, manager of the VMA and 
member of board of the Local action group.
Year of formation 2004
Area of activity Development of the region
There was no gas service available in the municipalities; however, there was substantial interest 
from both municipal officials and citizens. Forming the cooperation was the only possible avenue 
toward reaching this goal as none of the individual municipalities were big enough to convince the 
gas company (Východodočeská plynárenská a.s, today RWE) to build high-pressure gas pipelines 
into the municipalities. Through cooperation, however, the municipalities ensured the gas company 
that there would be enough consumers to justify high-pressure pipelines. The gas company built 
the pipelines up to Žiželice (settlement Loukonosy), as well as establishing an adjustment (regula-
tion) station from high-pressure to intermediate pressure for the total value of CZK 11 million. 
The rest of the pipeline was built by the municipal association and financed mostly via the state 
environmental fund.
Although the association carried out the project, these were in many aspects three independent 
projects: each of the municipalities made its own technical documentation, hired a building firm, 
and realized work inspections. Thus, no economies of scale could be realized!
The following table shows the revenue and expenditure of the association during the lifetime of 
the project in CZK thousands. The capital revenues in 2002 and 2003 are contributions from the 
inhabitants who were connected to the network, while 2006 reflects revenues from the sale of the 
network. The investment transfers came from the state budget, state environmental fund, and the 
central Bohemia region. Current expenditures in 2007 are transfers of the proceeds from the sale 
of the network to the member municipalities. Capital expenditures are related to the construction 
of the network. Over its lifetime the association’s budget is balanced (the first three years of its 
existence are not presented).
Source: ARIS.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Capital revenues — 1,233 890  —  — 9,000 — —
Current transfers 1 1 —  — 12 5 — —
Investment transfers  — 15,961 11,352 651 401  — — —
Current expenditures 1 1 11 1 352 1 9,006 1
Capital expenditures  — 15,194 14,232 4,506 100  — — —
Budget balance 0 2,002 –2,000 –3,856 40– 9,005 –9,005 1–
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Name of the IMC Svazek obcí Ladův kraj
Type, number of municipalities involved VMA, 24
Number of inhabitants 33,601
Interviewee Dana Grossová, manager of the VMA.
Year of formation 2001
Area of activity Tourism
A group of mostly small municipalities located at the southeastern border of the capital city, Prague, 
wanted to promote themselves in respect to both their citizens (who mostly work in Prague and stay in 
their home municipalities only overnight) and to potential visitors. No first class sightseeing location 
is promoted within the region. Therefore 10 municipalities, today having grown in membership to 24 
municipalities, established an association that identifies itself as the region of Josef Lada, whose drawings 
immediately recall childhood to everyone. The association managed to build a handful of natural and 
cycling trails, some of them especially designed for families with children. These activities make the 
region attractive for its own citizens as well as others, who would hardly visit the region without the 
image of Ladův kraj and the new trails. Despite only being adopted eight years ago, the name Ladův 
kraj has now attained brand-status. The municipalities, resulting benefits are a higher number of visi-
tors which has enabled the survival and even the start-up of new restaurants and boarding houses. This 
success has also increased citizens’ patriotism, as they now tend to be proud of being from Ladův kraj 
instead of simply from southeast of Prague.
An example of a typical microregion with a good manager who applies for grants and runs projects 
with only little attention from the member municipalities and their officials.
The revenue structure of this association is described in Box 3.1, a vast majority of the expenditures are 
current expenditures and the budget over the lifetime of the association is in surplus of CZK 200,000.
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Name of the IMC Vodárenská společnost Táborsko, s.r.o.
Type, number of municipalities involved Limited company, 3
Number of inhabitants 46,525
Interviewee Bedřich Beneš, deputy of the company and 
mayor
Year of formation 2003
Area of activity Provision of drinking water, sewage and a 
sewage plant
Today, as a result of past development and geographical characteristics, these three municipalities 
form an agglomeration, i.e., one town is attached to another without a clear border. Thus the water 
system was always built as a single system. The first sewage plant from the 1970s was built as a joint 
investment. Therefore, in the 1990s when the former centralized water system was decentralized, the 
three municipalities had to run the system together. Until 2002 they cooperated in the framework 
of an interest association of legal persons when one member of the association was also the operator 
of the network (Vodovody a kanalizace Jižní Čechy, a.s.). This arrangement seamed unfavorable for 
the partnering towns as their position was not strong enough when negotiating with the operator, 
which was a member of the same association. Therefore, they decided to establish a limited company 
without direct involvement of the operator in 2003. The company is now subcontracting the operator. 
Impressively, despite the differences in the size of populations of the three towns and the initial capital 
they gave to the company, each of the mayors is acting as a deputy of the company and has one vote.
The annual revenue of the company in 2008 was CZK 53 million. The profit in the same year was 
18.8 CZK million.
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Name of the IMC SOČ Černošín
Type, number of municipalities involved VMA, 31
Number of inhabitants 38,910
Interviewee Pavel Filipčík, manager of the VMA and 
council member.
Year of formation 1993
Area of activity Waste management, landfill, education centre
Until the early 1990s the communal waste in the area was disposed of at a number of small, partly 
illegal landfills. Plans to build a bigger, modern landfill in Černošín trace back to the 1980s when 
suitable plots were identified. In 1991 the neighboring municipalities started to take steps to build the 
landfill; in 1993 they created a voluntary municipal association; and in 1994 they founded a limited 
company. The landfill started to operate in 1995. Today, the limited company provides complex waste 
management services for more than 25,000 inhabitants. Since 2008 an environmental education 
center has also operated there, financed by the state budget and the region (see the table below).
The company operates in a competitive environment and the member municipalities are not obliged 
to contract it out, so the biggest town (Tachov) contracted out a competitor. If more municipalities 
were do so the company and VMA would hardly survive.
The table below shows the revenue and expenditure structure in CZK thousands. The association 
finances its activities and the majority of its investments from its own resources. 
Source: ARIS.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenues from its 
own activity
6,157 1,678 2,620 2,794 3,036 17 1,255 —
Revenues from 
rent, interests 
and sale of small 
property
940 562 1,035 1,065 842 1,061 971 2,504
Capital revenues — — — — — — 1,067 33
Current grants 
from the region
— — — — — — 33,893 —
Current 
expenditures
2,567 1,237 6,797 3,609 3,188 1,107 960 1,319
Capital 
expenditures
5,940 1,484 — 149 930 3,654 39,981 667
Balance –1,410 –481 –3,141 100 –241 –3,684 –3,756 551
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Name of the IMC Svazek obcí Boží Voda
Type, number of municipalities involved VMA, 4
Number of inhabitants 1,686
Interviewee Josef Ulman, manager of the VMA and mayor.
Year of formation 1995
Area of activity Provision of drinking water
Between the years 1954 to 1965 a sizable drinking water network was built in central Bohemia. As 
there are rich sources of high quality underground water in Liběchov, water from the local sources 
flowed to this network. In this period all the households in Liběchov and the surrounding munici-
palities were connected to this network. After 1990 the prices of water rose rapidly (due to price 
liberalization and the abolishment of various types of subsidies) and consequently, consumption 
fell dramatically. Thus, water sources from Liběchov were not as necessary for the water supply in 
distant places as before. The water sources in Liběchov became important only for that area, while 
wider importance disappeared. 
In the framework of privatization and restitution, four municipalities created an association and 
requested the transfer of the group water supply (pipes) from the National property fund to the 
ownership of that association. This transfer was realized in 1995 and the association has continued 
to run the water supply since that time.
Due to the technical aspects of the water supply system it was not possible to divide it among the 
four municipalities; therefore they acted together.
The association collected revenue from operation of the water network and expenditures related 
to it. The average annual revenues in the period 2004–2008 were CZK 2 million; the association 
operated with a surplus of CZK 200,000 to 500,000.
The association collected revenue from operation of the water network and expenditures related 
to it. The average annual revenues in the period 2004–2008 were CZK 2 million; the association 
operated with a surplus of CZK 200,000 to 500,000.
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Name of the IMC Technické služby Benešov, s.r.o.
Type, number of municipalities involved Limited company, 2
Number of inhabitants 21,856
Interviewees Zděněk Březina, deputy of the company and 
mayor. Martin Kadrnožka, vice-mayor.
Year of formation 1997
Area of activity Waste management, cemetery management and 
maintenance, maintenance of public greens, 
repair and maintenance of local roads, town 
cleaning, and winter maintenance 
Týnec nad Sázavou provided all the communal services directly through its municipal office and its 
own 2–4 employees. This situation was not very satisfactory for a few reasons:
 They had to rely on one garbage pickup. Thus in case of any breakdown (frequent due to the 
age of the pickup) they had enormous difficulties collecting the garbage.
 They owned several other machines (small lorry, small digger, and other mostly single purpose 
machines) that were used only occasionally.
 The person responsible for the communal services was overloaded, as he was also responsible 
for housing and investment.
Týnec nad Sázavou wanted and needed to solve the described situation. Benešov transformed its 
communal services unit into a limited company (Technické služby s.r.o.) in 1994. By the time Týnec 
nad Sázavou’s problems cumulated in 1995–1996, Benešov’s company was already a well-functioning 
one. Due to the shared knowledge of the situation in this geographical area the two towns agreed 
that Týnec nad Sázavou should enter into the company as a second owner.
The main objective of Týnec nad Sázavou was to provide necessary services in an efficient manner, 
and especially, to capitalize upon the low usage of previously owned equipment.
The annual revenue of the company in 2008 was CZK 84 million, out of which about 60 percent 
was realized in the two partnering municipalities; the remainder was revenue from servicing other 
municipalities. The profit in the same year was CZK 153,000.
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Name of the IMC VeltrusDominio
Type, number of municipalities involved VMA, 8
Number of inhabitants 5,469
Interviewee Bronislav Havlín, manager of the VMA and 
mayor.
Year of formation 2007
Area of activity Development of the territory 
During the 2002 floods, the park next to the castle Veltrusy was severely damaged. The park is state 
property and the National monument institute manages it. Mayors of the surrounding municipali-
ties were not satisfied with progress in the park’s renovation and established the VMA as an interest 
group, which would have a stronger negotiating position regarding renovation of the park. They 
gradually also realized other (mostly) renovation projects in their territory.
Veltrusy is also a member of Přemysovské střední Čechy. Mr. Havlín did not consider the double 
membership a problem, as the interests of both VMAs are different according to him. However, 
based on two in-depth interviews, the declared purposes of both VMAs are very similar.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The concept of intermunicipal cooperation (IMC) is not unknown in the Republic of Mace-
donia. The decentralization process has commenced with the adoption of the Law on Local 
Self-government of 2002 and the Law on Financing of Units of Local Self-government of 
2004. Even though these laws transferred more functions and more sources of income to 
the municipalities, there are still areas of competence that cannot be performed in their 
entirety by the municipalities mostly because of scarce ﬁnancial and administrative resources. 
In order to tackle such deﬁciencies, and under the threat of withdrawing the functions 
back to the central level, several municipalities have discovered that IMC can provide them 
with the necessary critical mass of resources. These critical resources would enable them to 
perform all given functions in the initial stage, while later to develop and improve them by 
providing better and/or cheaper services to their citizenry. These solutions remain exceptional 
and are examples of spontaneous case-by-case resolutions of particular mayors that had 
the political goodwill to enter into cooperation. Overall, however, the country still lacks a 
well-designed and developed IMC policy system.
With the above issues in mind, the paper will discuss Macedonia’s overall situation in 
light of the decentralization functions and ﬁnancial resources allocated to municipalities, 
and will also present the sentiments of municipalities toward IMC and its potential.
The legal framework for local self-government in the country is mainly presented through 
the Law on Local Self-government. It is broad in allowing various forms of IMC when provid-
ing services to citizenry and enabling local economic development. This law does not impose 
any restrictions on the establishment of forms of cooperation, and by the same token, does 
not provide any clariﬁcation in the matter. Still, the law has proven sufﬁcient in allowing 
proactive mayors to pioneer IMC in practice and to trail blaze for other municipalities with 
similar needs which can also be resolved through certain forms of cooperation.
The lack of a systematic approach towards incitement, establishment, implementation, 
monitoring, and replication of the good practices of IMC has been targeted by a special Law 
on Intermunicipal Cooperation, adopted by Parliament during the creation of this paper. 
Prepared over the course of several years with the help of various experts, ministerial, local, 
and other concerned stakeholders, this Law on IMC has emerged in its ﬁnal state. Now only 
practice and time will show the effectiveness of the solutions provided therein.
In order to convey the efforts of international and domestic stakeholders to initiate 
IMC, this paper presents all of the available incentives that are provided for municipalities. 
Predominantly presented are the initiatives of international organizations such as the OSCE 
mission to Skopje and the UNDP project team, which is currently managing a multifaceted 
biannual project in the amount of EUR 900,000. The incentives section shall show that 
foreign organizations are leaders in promoting IMC while national institutions are more 
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dormant and need to become proactive. Areas of such needed activity include participation 
in the ﬁnancial incentives as well as in the capacities to inﬂuence the municipal political 
leadership and to render skills to municipal administrations for the successful implementa-
tion of IMC forms on the local level.
As a counterweight to the incentives, the research also presents obstacles that munici-
palities face in their efforts to implement cooperation. The most probable among these 
obstacles will be deﬁned in order to ﬁnd solutions by which to overcome them by creating 
policy proposals and implementation methods. 
Aside from research that addresses the overall faults and virtues of IMC in Macedonia, 
several speciﬁc examples are presented as good practices. These examples cover different 
forms of cooperation such as the selling of services in the ﬁeld of tax administration manage-
ment for Veles and Chashka; the creation of joint administration for collection of taxes, urban 
planning and inspectorate services for Bosilovo, Vasilevo, and Novo Selo; and the creation of 
a joint communal enterprise for water supply in the municipalities of Ilinden and Gazi Baba. 
The level of detail in the examples serves not only as description, but also as an inspiration 
for the replication of these examples throughout other municipalities in the country. 
At the end of the policy paper, proposals are made according to various aspects since a 
comprehensive policy is versatile by nature. However, different scenarios will not be offered 
as it is best for policymakers to write their own scenarios and decide which recommenda-
tions will be implemented according to political will and achievability. 
These policy proposals involve recommendations for:
 Correct implementation of the Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation.
 Extensive translation of the law to enable easier and more versatile IMC.
 Financial support through granting or loaning available from national and interna-
tional sources.
 Building of the administrative capacities of local and national IMC stakeholders.
 Adequate monitoring and evaluation of the IMC in order to remedy mistakes in short 
term and create improved policy in the long term.
 Stronger promotion of IMC beneﬁts and greater political will for cooperation.
It is important to mention that IMC in Macedonia has a special attribute that goes be-
yond the technical cooperation of two or more municipal administrations providing services 
or forming a public utility enterprise. Even though research shows that ethnic belonging is 
neither the key incentive for cooperation nor the key impediment for dismissal of coopera-
tion, IMC also needs to be viewed as a tool for building social capital among the diverse 
ethnic groups populating this small country. All opportunities should be taken to connect 
municipalities and form alliances among them since participation by different ethnicities 
represents added value to the effort of establishing IMC. 
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1. METHODOLOGY
The research methodology for this paper includes several methods ranging from desk 
research analyzing the national decentralization strategy and legal framework, in addition 
to local bylaws, manuals, and other written documents, and also includes interviews, 
questionnaires, and discussions with relevant stakeholders of the IMC topic in the 
country. 
The desk research was used to analyze the written legal documents that would allow 
for correctly positioning IMC within local self-government’s general legal system. The 
provisions from the Law on Local Self-government,1 the Law on Financing of Units of 
Local Self-government,2 and the Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation3 were analyzed 
in more detail. The speciﬁcs of these laws and their bylaws were scrutinized to view the 
course of IMC in Macedonia mostly through its allowed forms as well as the ﬁnancial 
regulation and sources for initiation of IMC.
Interviews conducted with mayors and council members included in the develop-
ment of functioning IMC practices are presented below in the paper. The questions were 
composed to clarify what reasons and identiﬁed needs determined IMC as a solution. 
They were also asked what political steps were necessary in order to reach the consensus 
to join funds and other local resources with other municipalities. March 2009’s local 
municipal elections, in which some mayors were replaced, presented the need to dis-
cuss future IMC development with newly elected mayors. On a more technical front, 
consultations were done with members of the municipal administration responsible for 
the actual implementation of IMC in the ﬁeld. They provided valuable information 
on how IMC functions in practice and helped in pinpointing speciﬁcs of IMC where 
their municipality is included. 
As a key institution, the Ministry of Local Self-government was consulted regarding 
the design and implementation of both the Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation as well 
as the policy for future development.
ZELS4 was consulted in the drafting of this paper as a potential partner to the mu-
nicipalities to alleviate the importance and the number of areas of IMC in the future.
The most relevant in-country international organizations that ﬁnancially support 
IMC were also consulted. Primarily this was the team of the UNDP project “Inter-
municipal cooperation for better service provision and EU accession,” but also the OSCE 
Mission in Skopje program for support of IMC. The responses of all the stakeholders 
are included in the parts that are connected to their scope of activities. 
Some of the ﬁndings related to the relation of the municipalities towards IMC used 
in this research are drawn from the six surveys made by a project ﬁnanced by the EU 
and managed by the European Agency for Reconstruction “Technical assistance for 
implementation and coordination of the process of decentralization (II),” together in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Local Self-government, for the purpose of assessing 
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the factual situation within the municipalities regarding the preparation of the Law 
on Intermunicipal Cooperation. These six surveys were conducted nationwide and 
questionnaires were sent to all of the municipalities. The questionnaire contained 
questions regarding established forms of IMC, areas of cooperation, obstacles to IMC, 
the level of human resources for IMC, future challenges and possible areas of future 
IMC, etc. However, not all municipalities replied to all questions so this leads to the 
conclusion that numbers of the replies may vary on a case-to-case basis. It is also pos-
sible that not all municipalities correctly understood the questions and their answers 
might not prove useful.5 The clearest answer that may be deduced from the surveys is 
that although they may show a general indicative direction there is no absolute clear 
assessment of the needs of the municipalities, nor is there a valid evaluation of their 
interest in IMC.
The methodology encompasses a comprehensive consultation of all relevant stake-
holders in IMC in order to secure all the diﬀerent perspectives of this matter, which is 
in the beginning of its serious development in the Republic of Macedonia. 
2. PROFILE OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN MACEDONIA 
2.1 Population and Territory 
According to the deﬁnitive 2002 census results announced by the State Bureau of 
Statistics,6 Macedonia has a population of 2,022,547. Broken down into ethic groups, 
the population consists of 64.18 percent or 1,297,981 Macedonians, 25.17 percent or 
509,083 Albanians, 3.85 percent Turks, 2.66 percent Roma, 1.78 percent Serbs, 0.84 
percent Bosniaks, 0.48 percent Vlachs, and 1.04 percent or 20,929 other ethnic groups. 
It should be mentioned that this ethnic versatility is relevant since the political par-
ties, although declaring themselves oriented to the left or right, are still predominantly 
composed along ethnic lines. The alignment of ethnic political parties with territorial 
organization are evident during local elections when the ethnic majority in the mu-
nicipalities always wins the mayoral seat. The political platform of mayoral candidates 
is often attacked on the basis of their ethnic origin. 
The territorial organization of the Republic of Macedonia has been altered twice since 
dissolution from the Yugoslav Federation in 1991. After the proclamation of indepen-
dence, the number of units of local self-government was 34, functioning continuously 
from the previous system but in a centralized environment with limited functions and 
little resources to manage the competencies awarded. 
In 1996, Macedonia’s territorial organization was redistributed by a Law for Ter-
ritorial Division that formed 123 new municipalities, among which several had only a 
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few hundred inhabitants. Several also lacked both ﬁnancial and staﬃng resources (often 
conditioned by central approval as allocated in 1995’s Law for Local Self-government) 
to implement their limited functions.
The Law on Territorial Organization in 2004 designed the current territorial orga-
nization of the Republic of Macedonia. With this Law, the formerly 123 municipalities 
were reorganized into 84, merging smaller local self-governments with larger ones. 
The intent was to form local centers capable of administering two main processes: that 
of transferring competencies awarded by the 2002 Law on Local Self-government; 
and the process of ﬁscal decentralization as per the 2004 Law on Financing of Units 
of Local Self-government. 
This new territorial arrangement was carried out during a tense atmosphere ac-
companied by an unsuccessful referendum against the proposed change. To succeed, 
the new local competencies stemming from the amended constitution in 2001 follow-
ing the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the 2002 Law on Local Self-government 
needed a new framework. It was necessary to alter the territorial organization in order 
to achieve a system of municipalities with the capacity to implement all their new 
functions. The experts that were included in the deﬁning of the optimal size of the 
municipalities suggested that the Republic of Macedonia should have 507 municipali-
ties produced through amalgamation of the existing 123. However, the creators of the 
new municipal map were inﬂuenced not only by easing the technical functions of the 
new municipalities but also by political pressure coming from the ethnic diversity of 
the country’s population. The units of local self-government with greater competencies 
and ﬁnancial resources were very tantalizing spoils for political parties from dominant 
Macedonian and Albanian ethnic blocks. The political discussions regarding municipal 
boundaries not only considered the successful implementation of functions but also 
their demographics. This consideration produced consequences in the areas of oﬃcial 
language,8 child education, and mayoral elections, based on the presumption that an 
ethnic population would elect a mayor from its own ethnicity. Therefore a majority 
ethnic Albanian municipality will always have an ethnic Albanian for mayor. 
Practice demonstrated and conﬁrmed this presumption when during the 2009 
local elections,9 when out of the 84 municipalities, 16 municipalities that have 
an ethnic Albanian majority elected ethnic Albanian mayors regardless of their 
political party. This ethnic election of mayors is even visible with smaller ethnic 
groups such as the Roma, who have the majority in one municipality (Shuto 
Orizari) and have a Roma mayor. Likewise ethnic Turks have the majority in the 
municipality of Centar Zhupa where an ethnic Turk was elected mayor. 
For the reasons listed above and after tough political negotiations, it was agreed to 
propose a total of 84 new municipalities. This was met with dissatisfaction from smaller 
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municipalities10 whose existence was terminated. They organized local referendums 
against the new organization; however, the referendum results were not taken into 
consideration since they had only an advisory, not an obligatory function. 
A nationwide referendum for keeping the old territorial organization was initiated 
by the gathering of 180,000 citizens’ signatures. However, conducted on November 7, 
2004, the referendum was unsuccessful since there was less than a 50 percent turnout 
of the total number of voters.11 This was due mainly to the fact that the governing coali-
tion, the ethnic Macedonian SDSM (Social Democrat Alliance of Macedonia) and the 
ethnic Albanian DUI (Democratic Union for Integration), boycotted the referendum. 
Therefore, the ﬁnal result was the present solution of 84 municipalities, out of which 
some were the collateral damage of ethnic political arrangements.
The approach of determining the municipal boundaries through amalgamation was 
not very eﬃcient since there were a number of municipalities that remained with quite a 
small number of inhabitants. These municipalities also remained unequipped to collect 
the taxes that were given to them, make urban and spatial planning, manage education, 
and provide eﬃcient water supply and sewage systems. At the same time, the smallest 
municipalities often could not resolve the issue of debts from previous years and found 
their bank accounts blocked by their creditors through the courts. 
These newly composed municipalities started their work without any skilled staﬀ 
or with only a small number of employees transferred from the local units of several 
ministries. These human resources were neither trained nor adequate for overtaking 
the new tasks of the local self-government. For example, even now, several years after 
the beginning of the decentralization process, there are a number of municipalities that 
do not have a unit for managing the education process even though this undertaking 
comprises almost half of the municipal budgets. Furthermore, a speciﬁc function such 
as urban planning is rarely executed in the smaller municipalities simply because there 
are no qualiﬁed personnel or adequate modern technical equipment for such a task. 
Another noticeable issue is in the area of conducting inspections of local competences 
where small municipalities do not have their own inspectors.12 
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Table 4.1
     Population Proﬁle of Municipalities   
Population proﬁle of municipalities
Below 5,000 16
5,000–10,000 16
10,000–20,000 21
20,000–40,000 14
40,000–60,000 8
60,000–80,000 5
80,000–100,000 3
Above 100,000 1
Table 4.2
Surface Area Proﬁle of Municipalities
Area proﬁle of municipalities
Less than 100 km2 15
100–200 km2 20
200–300 km2 16
300–400 km2 8
400–500 km2 13
500–800 km2 8
800–1,000 km2 3
Above 1,000 km2 1
As Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show, municipalities in Macedonia are not large in terms 
of population. With only one metropolitan city among them, they are not very large 
in area either. The territorial dispersion of municipalities consists predominantly of 
several small rural municipalities around one larger city, which is among other things 
an administrative, educational, and cultural center. The smaller municipalities gravi-
tate to the larger one for business and institutional needs. The larger municipalities 
always have more developed institutions that serve as a council for the smaller ones, 
establishing a speciﬁc dependent relationship between the two parties. This is quite 
visible in the area of IMC as well, since the cooperation is very often among the 
smaller and the larger municipality, even though there are examples of cooperation 
between small municipalities.13
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2.2 Competencies
Local self-government in Macedonia is regulated with several benchmark documents. 
The ﬁrst one is the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, adopted on November 
17, 1991, wherein Chapter V is dedicated to establishing a single tier system of local 
self-government. The Constitution determines the right of the people to organize in units 
of self-government in the form of municipalities and awards the discretion to organize 
even smaller neighborhood units in the form of mesna samouprava.14 This supreme legal 
document also distinguishes the capital of the country, the city of Skopje, as a separate 
unit of local self-government whose competencies are determined by special law. 
Since 1991, Macedonia has adopted two laws regulating local self-government. The 
ﬁrst one was adopted 1995 and came into use in 1996. This law regulated the competen-
cies and organization of municipalities but it also actually conﬁrmed their centralized 
functioning and central government oversight.
The later and still valid Law on Local Self-Government was adopted in 2002 follow-
ing the constitutional amendments of 2001. This law provided for an extensive list of 
original competencies awarded to the municipalities as well as the option for the central 
government to delegate functions to the municipalities, granted that the ﬁnancial means 
for their execution are also provided. The list of original competencies15 now includes:
 1. Urban and rural planning; 
 2. Protection of the environment and nature;
 3. Local economic development; 
 4. Communal (public) utilities;
 5. Culture;
 6. Sport and recreation;
 7. Social security and protection of children.
 8. Education;
 9. Health protection; 
 10. Conducting preparations and undertaking measures to protect and rescue citizens 
from war, natural and other emergencies, and their consequences;
 11. Fire protection;
 12. Oversight and control over the execution of competencies; 
 13. Other matters determined by law.
These enumerated competencies are only listed in the general (organic) Law of 
Local Self-government, while for each competence there are sectoral laws determining 
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detailed regulation of education, environment, culture, ﬁre protection, and other such 
matters. The long list of original competences adequately reﬂects the broad scope of 
possibilities for cooperation among municipalities in the process of executing their tasks 
in accordance with the provisions of sectoral laws. 
Each of these sectoral laws has a diﬀerent impact on IMC. Some lend themselves 
to intermunicipal cooperation while others simply order mandatory cooperation. For 
example, the Law on Fire Protection adopted a regional approach for resolving this 
matter, ordering groups of municipalities to cooperate in order to provide a service that 
is available to all of them at aﬀordable prices through the use of scale economies joint 
manpower and other joined resources. However, It would not be correct to categorize 
such laws within the IMC framework that is being presented here.
Other laws are interesting for IMC because they provide for a certain task to be 
executed by a speciﬁc number of qualiﬁed staﬀ that not every municipality has on 
hand.16 Without such staﬀ the municipality is in danger of losing or not being able to 
execute the functions that are transferred to them according to the process of decen-
tralization. This danger seems to be pushing smaller municipalities to ask for assistance 
and cooperation, most often from the bigger neighboring municipalities, to share skilled 
administration and assist them in performing these tasks. The examples can be found 
in the laws regulating the ﬁnancial management of the municipality as well as legal 
provisions regarding the municipal inspectorates.
The ﬁnal group consists of municipalities that are self-suﬃcient but have identiﬁed 
interest in providing better, broader, cheaper, closer services to their citizens. These 
municipalities voluntarily cooperate to achieve a higher level of municipal functioning. 
They use the sectoral laws to ﬁnd methods and models of cooperation that best suit 
them and employ such options for the beneﬁt of their citizens. These municipalities 
have formed joint communal enterprises17 or have created a local development strategy 
for the microregion they occupy. 
2.3 Finance
The Law on Financing Local Self-government Units was adopted by the Parliament of 
the Republic of Macedonia on September 6, 2004. The aim of the law was to put into 
practice (in a consistent manner) the constitutional provisions related to the indepen-
dence of the local self-government units. 
The law regulates the ﬁnancing of municipal functions and deﬁnes two types of rev-
enue sources: inherent revenue sources and other ﬁnancing sources. The law deﬁnes and 
separately details revenue sources, both inherent revenue sources and transfers provided 
from the general budget of the Republic of Macedonia, including loans.
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Inherent revenue sources should provide funds for implementing the functional 
and ﬁnancial independence of municipalities. 
Inherent revenue sources in compliance with the law are the following:
  local taxes (property taxes and other local taxes stipulated by law);
  local fees (communal fees, administrative fees and other fees stipulated by law);
  local charges (communal construction charge, communal service charges, spatial 
and urban plan charges and other local charges stipulated by law);
  property income (rent income, interest and property sales income that do not 
interfere with the public functions and competencies of the municipality);
  a portion of the personal income taxes collected in the current year (100 percent 
collection from natural persons performing crafts within the municipality terri-
tory in compliance with the Law on Crafts;
  a three percent collection of personal income tax from natural persons with 
permanent or temporary residence in the municipality concerned;
  income and in-kind contributions;
  income from ﬁnes stipulated by law;
  income from donations;
  other income stipulated by law.
By means of earmarked grants from the general budget of the Republic of Macedonia 
and from funds, the central government provides additional revenue for the smooth 
performance of legally stipulated competencies.
The Law on Financing Local Self-government Units deﬁnes the following transfers 
from the central budget and the funds:
  income from the value added tax (three percent from the overall income on 
the basis of VAT collected in the previous ﬁscal year; municipalities are given 
complete freedom regarding the use and purpose of these funds);
  earmarked grants (for speciﬁc activities, transferred from ministries);
  capital investment grants (strictly determined amounts for capital investments);
  block grants (ﬁnancing entire sectors for municipalities in the 2nd stage of ﬁscal 
decentralization);
  delegated competency grants (for speciﬁc delegated competencies).18
Fiscal decentralization in Macedonia, according to law, was planned to occur 
in two phases. The ﬁrst phase started in July 2005, and for municipalities that had 
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fulﬁlled the criteria for progression, the second phase began in September 2007. One 
of the criteria for progression in ﬁscal decentralization was the requirement that the 
municipality have adequate staﬀ for ﬁnancial management and tax administration, 
which was an inspiration for intermunicipal cooperation between less developed and 
more developed municipalities.
With healthy management, local authorities can increase revenue from their own 
inherent sources. Local taxes and fees can and should be the most important municipal 
revenue sources. Appropriate implementation of legislation enables expansion of tax 
basis, introduction of new types of fees and charges, as well as an immediate increase of 
income and improvement of budgeting and ﬁnancial planning, leading to an increase 
in indirect revenue.
An important option for municipalities to obtain ﬁnancial means outside their sources 
of revenue is local borrowing or the taking of loans or credits by the municipality for capital 
means and investments. The Law on Financing Units of Local Self-government allows 
the municipality to take loans only after consent from the government of the Republic 
of Macedonia based on the Ministry of Finance’s opinion. The Ministry of Finance must 
determine that two conditions have been fulﬁlled by the municipality, namely that in 24 
months prior to the application of the Law on Financing Units of Local Self-government, 
the municipality has regularly submitted positively evaluated ﬁnancial reports and in this 
period has no outstanding obligations to its service providers and business partners. The 
municipal council must adopt the taking of the loan after a public debate in the munici-
pality regarding the loan. The loan imposes a limitation on the annual return of the loan, 
citing that it be no greater than 15 percent of the operational budget of the municipality 
for the previous ﬁscal year. Local borrowing is a viable option to accumulate funds for 
initiating IMC, especially for projects of great ﬁnancial cost such as the construction of 
a system for drinking water, sewage, and waste management.
2.4 Ethnic Diversity and Language
The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia and the Law of Local Self-government 
stipulate that the oﬃcial language in all municipalities is Macedonian and the Cyrillic 
script. Since amendments to the Constitution in 2001, in municipalities where more 
than 20 percent of the population uses a language other than Macedonian and the 
Cyrillic script, that language and script are now also in use. If communities that make 
up less than 20 percent of the population populate a municipality, the municipality 
council can introduce another language into oﬃcial use by its own decision. At the mo-
ment in 32 Macedonian municipalities languages and scripts other than Macedonian 
and Cyrillic script are in use where their communities make up more than 20 percent 
of the population in the municipality:
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  In 28 municipalities, Albanian language and script are in use;
  In 4 municipalities, Turkish language and script are in use;
  In 1 municipality, Serbian language and script are in use;
  In 1 municipality, Romani language and script are in use;
  In 1 municipality, Vlach language and script are in use.
However, the real situation within the abovementioned ethnically mixed munici-
palities is not identical with the one presented. Namely, many municipalities do not 
actually implement bilingualism into their everyday work due to the lack of ﬁnancial 
and human resources. Research has shown that 14 out of the 32 municipalities do not 
provide for the oﬃcial use of minority languages, whereas in 15 out of the 32 there are 
problems with oﬀering services in Macedonian when the ethnic Macedonian popula-
tion is not in the majority.19
In surveys regarding relations among local governments, ethnicity and language 
have never been considered relevant factors toward intermunicipal cooperation or 
impediments against it. Bilingual municipalities cooperate in exactly the same areas 
as monolingual ones because they must all tackle the common problems of eﬀectively 
executing local tasks. Examples20 of municipalities with varied ethnic compositions 
are numerous throughout the country. Therefore the perception from all interviewed 
stakeholders that ethnic composition is neither a reason nor a barrier to cooperation 
is understandable, despite the fact that such ethnic composition must be taken into 
consideration as relevant factor towards or against IMC. 
In a country such as the Republic of Macedonia it is prudent to see this issue from 
the opposite perspective, in other words, rather than consider how the ethnic structure 
inﬂuences IMC, take into account how the practice of IMC relates to ethnic cohabita-
tion and cooperation. The important function of IMC as a problem-solving tool may 
prove of utmost importance in building social capital among multiethnic municipalities. 
Cooperation according to strictly technical issues can foster a tradition of cooperation 
and mutual trust for greater collaboration with the higher political importance necessary 
for the adequate functioning of all municipalities.
2.5 The Need for Intermunicipal Cooperation in the Republic of
 Macedonia’s Municipalities
The proﬁle of the Macedonian municipality presented above provides us with an 
idea of the array of local entities that vary in size, with populations that diﬀer both 
in number as well as in ethnic composition, and of municipal administrations that 
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vary in their number of employees and their capacity to execute local functions. 
Most municipalities have scarce budgetary resources stemming from their small line 
of income in the face of the large expenditure essential to municipal functioning and 
administrative services.
Regardless of the named diﬀerences, all of these municipalities share an equal number 
of competencies under the country’s single tier system of local self-government. Among 
other duties, each of the 84 municipalities is equally responsible for tax collection, 
education management, urban and spatial planning, and local economic development. 
Comprehensive execution of all delegated responsibilities allows the municipalities to 
exercise the beneﬁts of ﬁscal decentralization; this includes (but is not limited to) al-
leviating the managerial level of the municipality regarding local ﬁnancing, transferring 
of block donations, allowing the option for taking loans, and the collection of local 
taxes. Furthermore, each municipality must provide all delegated services in a quality 
manner to their citizens under the threat of surrendering the given competences to the 
central level and the related ministry.
Considering the country’s territorial established process for organizing and forming 
municipal territorial lines, it is obvious that a new territorial organizing method, one 
that creates bigger more sustainable municipalities by absorbing smaller neighboring 
municipalities, will be a very diﬃcult and dangerous task. The political price of this kind 
of reorganization will be much more costly than the beneﬁts that any such amalgamation 
could oﬀer if ever achieved. Political stakeholders shall always look beyond the technical 
practicalities of amalgamation when redesigning the municipal territorial map, which 
will only conﬁrm the prominence of this issue’s “bone of contention.” Consequently the 
option for regionalization and amalgamation seems much too dear a solution, which in 
the long term may provoke consequences beyond the theme of this research.
Discarding for a moment the possible political implications of territorial amal-
gamation, it is necessary to return to the aforementioned technical practicalities. 
Included among these technical practicalities are the provision of cheaper services to 
citizens by utilizing an economy of scale, provision of better services to the citizens 
for the same price, optimal usage of quality administration by the municipalities, ad-
ministering of large infrastructural systems, and other tasks which are greatly needed 
by Macedonian municipalities. 
The provision of services by the municipalities is often expensive since all of the 
municipalities must have the same institutional structure for providing the services. 
In this case the ﬁxed expenses are identical regardless of the number of citizens that 
are served (for example every municipality needs an education inspector regardless of 
whether the municipality has one or ten schools). The only other option would be 
that the municipality does not provide the expensive service, which would lead to the 
conclusion that the citizens of such a municipality are discriminated against in relation 
to other municipalities that did receive such service. 
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2.6 Intermunicipal Cooperation as a Solution 
Despite seeming like a large problem, the problems of the current local self government 
system can be tackled by political good will and the establishment of intermunicipal 
cooperation. IMC, deﬁned as “cooperation deliberately organized between two or several 
municipalities, for a certain duration or permanently, on matter(s) falling into the legal 
competences of the municipalities, with the aim of improving municipal functions and 
obtaining mutual beneﬁts,”21 actually provides for the joining of available resources to 
meet the municipalities’ identiﬁed needs. Questions regarding the form, duration, and 
the results of cooperation should remain deﬁned by the partners’ agreement, but IMC 
should be accepted as a plausible tool for overcoming some of the problems of local 
self-government in Macedonia. 
Indicative sources of information regarding the need of IMC are the several surveys 
conducted through the “Technical Assistance for implementation and Coordination of 
Decentralization Process (Phase 1 and 2),22” as well as from the Ministry of Local Self-
government. In April 2007 a very important question was: What was the main reason 
for establishing intermunicipal cooperation? 
The reasons that were collected from the replies of municipalities were the following 
(ranked from most to least important):
 1. Lack of ﬁnances and saving on expenditure (referring to the lack of ﬁnances for 
setting up municipal institutions and the savings produced when a function 
was performed through cooperation);
 2. Improvement of service delivery at same or lower cost (services provided either 
by the municipalities or the public enterprises founded by the municipalities); 
 3. Lack of specialized human resources (prompting the buying and selling of intel-
lectual services, mostly from a larger municipality with skilled staﬀ to a smaller, 
poorer municipality);
 4. Successful cooperation in one area triggered cooperation in another (social capital 
built in one area produced a tradition of cooperation among municipalities).
As mentioned in the introduction, IMC is not a new concept in the Republic of 
Macedonia. There have been several very successful cases that have produced positive 
results and helped promote the idea of cooperation through achieved beneﬁts, primarily 
through saving on expenditure, but also in providing quality services to citizens. Beyond 
ﬁnancial proﬁt, IMC has contributed to the development of a tradition for cooperation 
among municipalities. Because of their acquired conﬁdence as reliable partners those 
municipalities now seek to continue their relationship and tend to work together on 
activities not related to their original area of cooperation. Built in such a manner, this 
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social capital is important for a country like Macedonia where turmoil in the early 2000s 
drew deep lines, especially between the Macedonian and Albanian ethnic communities. 
This intermunicipal cooperation may serve as a valuable instrument to connect people 
on the local level, helping destroy nationwide stereotypes that hold the country hostage 
to interethnic tensions. 
The ﬁnal conclusion does not pertain to whether or not the practice of IMC is 
needed, but rather that a comprehensive and systematic approach to this issue is needed 
and desired. In fact, sometimes the correct approach appears to be the only solution.
3. LEGAL REGULATIONS ADDRESSING INTERMUNICIPAL
 COOPERATION 
The need of intermunicipal cooperation was presented to be more than evident both in 
the identiﬁcation of municipalities’ existing needs, the realization on their own behalf 
of the importance of IMC, as well as the role of IMC in building social capital among 
citizens and administrations of two or more municipalities especially if they are from 
diﬀerent ethnic backgrounds.
The following chapter presents the legal environment regarding the possibilities for 
municipalities to cooperate among themselves.
3.1 Law on Local Self-Government
The Law on Local Self-government, in Article 14 (Paragraphs 2 and 3), gives the op-
tion for intermunicipal cooperation for the purpose of fulﬁlling common interests 
and executing common services through the joining of funds, creation of joint public 
enterprises, and using joint administration:
(2) “For the purpose of fulﬁlling of common interests and conducting joint 
competences of the municipalities, they can join funds and create joint public services, 
in accordance to law.”
(3) “For the purpose of executing certain competencies, the municipalities can form 
joint administrative bodies in certain areas in accordance to the law.”
This article only sets up the options for cooperation without further regulating it, 
while other laws like the Law on Public Enterprises, the Law on Waste Management, and 
the Law on Urban and Spatial Planning act as lex specialis for more detailed codiﬁcation 
of the cooperative relationship. These laws rarely limit the options for cooperation and 
are very broadly designed to allow for the development of IMC. Apart from these speciﬁc 
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laws, there is an abundance of legislative acts that provide opportunity for cooperation. 
These laws cover environmental issues, sport, culture, regional development, tourism, 
ﬁre protection, social protection, and more.23 
Article 15 of the Law on Local Self-government also provides the option to create 
an association of local self-governments. In Macedonia such an association is ZELS, 
or the Association of Units of Local Self-government. Its role is to act as an organized 
body for cooperation among municipalities and a relevant stakeholder as well as legiti-
mate participant in negotiations and legislative drafting with the government and line 
ministries that concern the municipalities. 
The Ministry of Local Self-government, on the other hand, according to this law, 
has no responsibilities (such as issuance of permits or inspection of cooperative rela-
tions) in the area of municipal cooperation. The Ministry’s only task is to keep record 
of international inter-municipal cooperation. On the other hand this does not mean 
that it is forbidden for the Ministry to provide incentives for municipal cooperation in 
execution of the national governmental plan relating to local self-government. 
Article 61 of the Law on Local Self-government provides for the establishing and 
dismissal of joint administration among municipalities. These forms of joint administra-
tion are established and dismissed by a majority decision within each of the concerned 
municipalities’ municipal Ccouncils.
Based on the decisions of each of the councils, an agreement is concluded which 
establishes the joint administrative body, its seat, the object and manner of perform-
ing its activities, usage of the material equipment and other assets, and ﬁnally the 
control, oversight, and dissolution of the joint administrative body. This agreement is 
published speciﬁcally in the Oﬃcial Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, while other 
decisions and agreements of local self-government are published only in the munici-
palities’ oﬃcial gazettes.
In the complete text of the Law on Local Self-government there are no impediments 
to the establishment of any kind or form of IMC in the country. The municipality can 
freely choose the area, scope, methods of management, division of powers, account-
ability, and all other components for forming a functioning IMC. Actually the only 
limitations that are present arise from the laws that regulate the speciﬁc content of the 
matter arranged by sectoral laws.24
The absence of such kinds of limitations or exceptions to the freedom for coopera-
tion, together with the broad wording of the Law on Local Self-government, present 
plenty of opportunities for municipalities to join eﬀorts for ad hoc project management 
as well as building continuous long-term alliances. 
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3.2 Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation
The Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation was adopted and published on June 24, 2009. It 
represents a legislative instrument to institutionalize various forms of cooperation among 
municipalities and has the goal of “completing the legal regulations regarding speciﬁcally 
the legal forms or shapes of IMC as well as the forms of joint administrative bodies.”25
The need for such regulation was identiﬁed and is the reason that there is a single tier 
local self-government featuring a number of small municipalities with small ﬁnancial and 
human resources as well as a lesser degree of responsibilities resulting from the process 
of decentralization of power. The size of the municipalities however is not as small as 
the comparative perspective would show. For example, the Czech Republic has more 
than 6,000 municipalities, Georgia has 900, while Italy has 8,100 municipalities, out 
of which 75 percent have a population below 3,000 inhabitants.26 The representation 
of municipalities in the Republic of Macedonia as “small” mostly reﬂects their small 
capacity for execution of the functions given to all of the units of local self-government 
regardless of elements such as their size, population, administration, or infrastructure.
As Article 2 of the Law declares: 
“Intermunicipal cooperation as in this law is the cooperation established among two 
or more municipalities for more eﬃcient and more economic performance of the 
competences of the municipalities determined by law and fulﬁllment of their joint 
interests and goals.”
One of the main beneﬁts directly expected from this law is the more eﬃcient and 
economic execution of competencies by municipalities using available administrative 
capacities in conjunction with the principle of economy of scale. The law, however, 
does not instruct nor order any certain type of forced cooperation, but is based on the 
principle of relevant stakeholders’ voluntary discretion to choose the adequate form.
The initiative for establishing IMC can be started by the mayor of the municipality 
as well as members of the municipal council, and also by 10 percent of registered voters 
in the municipality (identical to any other citizen initiative).27 The possibility to initi-
ate IMC by the citizens represents a direct democratic option as a viable tool for local 
decision-making. In the future this option may be especially important for providing 
certain services like water supply or garbage collection to hamlets outside the center of 
the municipality. It may also be used for connection and cooperation among munici-
palities in the social and cultural sphere for common promotion of the socio-cultural 
characteristics of a region consisting of several municipalities. Leaders in the creation 
of IMC that stem from the citizens initiative can be of two types. The ﬁrst one is the 
NGO sector with organizations established in one or more municipalities, while the 
other key initiator may be the so-called mesna samouprava,28 which is a submunicipal 
form of organization without the status of a legal entity but historically signiﬁcant in 
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smaller habitats. These two stakeholders have the greatest chance to realize the letter 
of the mentioned provision. These possibilities need to be explored in the future, since 
there is no record of such citizen initiative in past IMC establishment. 
The initiative containing the goal, the relevant competence, and the form of the 
proposed IMC is submitted to the municipal council. The council must decide upon the 
proposal in 90 days upon its submission and inform the citizens of its decision. If the 
council approves the initiative for IMC, it prepares an oﬃcial proposal for establishing 
IMC and delivers it to the other potential partner municipalities. 
The municipal council/s to which the proposal for IMC is directed, must confer 
within 90 days from the day of receiving the proposal. The mayors of these municipali-
ties also give their opinion regarding the proposal.
If the councils accept the proposal for IMC, a joint commission consisting of an 
equal number of representatives from each municipality is formed for preparation of 
the draft document for establishing the IMC and all necessary documents prescribing 
the form of the IMC. 
The law provides for the following options for IMC29:
 a) Formation of bodies for IMC
   Joint working body and commission
   Joint administrative body
 b) Establishment of joint public services30
   Joint public enterprise
   Joint public institution
The draft version of the text of this law also contained the option to form a joint trade 
company, which allowed the IMC to include the private sector through creation of 
a trade company that would utilize the capital of the cooperating municipalities as 
well as a component of private capital. This would enable the poorer municipalities 
to form partnerships among themselves and a private investor in providing public 
services to the citizens. The deletion of this provision, however, does not impede this 
kind of public-private partnership because it is allowed by the Law on Public Private 
Partnerships and Concession (Oﬃcial Gazette No. 7/2008), as well as with the Law 
on Trade Companies (Oﬃcial Gazette Nos. 28/2004, 84/2005, 25/2007, 87/2008).
“Intermunicipal contracts” can be also made for:
  Joining of ﬁnancial and other means;
  Performing certain works by one municipality for one or more other munici-
palities.
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The law continues to elaborate on each of the forms of IMC, determining necessary 
provisions for straightforward operation of the selected manner of cooperation. The 
law determines the elements of each of the forms of IMC (although they are already 
provided in other laws and bylaws) thus bringing the provisions into a document that 
compiles previous regulations. 
The law also does not present obstacles through conditions for establishment, min-
isterial approval, or any other criteria by central (ministerial or other) bodies toward the 
choice for cooperation by the municipalities. 
The law provides for “instruments for inciting IMC” listing them as:
  Irreversible grants.
  Financing and co-ﬁnancing of preparation of analysis and studies pertaining to 
areas of broader importance and interest with the goal of conducting activities 
in such areas.
  Other instruments in accordance to law.
The instruments for inciting IMC are very weak since they do not provide any 
substantial assistance to the municipalities. Rather they are undeﬁned in their amount, 
method of allocation, and areas of activity, among other criteria. 
The municipalities need a ﬁnancial instrument to commence the initial phase 
of functional IMC. The needed resources for activities like renovation of premises, 
buying of furniture, vehicles, computers, wireless links, and others cost money which 
the municipalities are sometimes unable to aﬀord at the time, although one year of 
IMC-related expenditure savings would probably provide them enough money to 
repay these expenses. For this reason the municipalities need a well developed and 
approachable grant scheme that would allow them to secure a grant and make the 
investment. An alternative for the municipality is the loans that would allow repay-
ment in several years under a low interest rate. This solution is preferable to irreversible 
grants for the incitement of IMC units by municipalities, since such grants would 
be scarce if established at all, and would incite a political battle to determine which 
municipalities would be the beneﬁciaries. The ﬁnances used to “jump start” IMC 
surely pay oﬀ in the long-term perspective and this is one of the real incentives for 
mayors to support IMC.
The second instrument for incenting IMC is also not the most favorable. Financ-
ing studies is only one step in the initiation of IMC, no matter whether we call it a 
“feasibility study,” “project assessment,” “cost beneﬁt analysis,” or any other euphemism 
from the project terminology. Financing of the analysis does not incite IMC per se, but 
rather gives a theoretical perspective on possible solutions.
The third instrument is the use of general provisions in accordance to law, but since 
this is the lex specialis, it is unclear which law applies.
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All of these, especially the ﬁnancial incentives, are determined only as a possibility 
rather than an obligation by the government to provide budgetary means for IMC. 
Throughout the law the wording is that the government “may” plan ﬁnancial resources 
from the previous budget as a projection for the next year.
These kinds of “incentives” do not demonstrate a serious will for initiating new 
practices of IMC in the country.
The government is obliged to support and encourage IMC as well as secure ﬁ-
nancial means to enhance cooperation. The government is also obliged to prepare a 
special document specifying the criteria and complete procedure for allocation of funds 
earmarked for IMC.
The government is also obliged to create a commission31 for initiating and follow-
ing IMC with the mandate to track the established forms of IMC, initiate changes in 
IMC legislation, identify the best practices of IMC, and support initiatives for IMC. 
The versatile composition of this commission is as follows:
  two representatives from the Ministry of Local Self-government;
  one representative from the Ministry of Transport;
  one representative from the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning;
  one representative from the Ministry of Education and Science;
  one representative from the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy;
  one representative from the Ministry of Culture;
  one representative from the Ministry of Finance;
  Each of the eight “Plan Regions” through municipal mayoral elections within 
the region (from the Law of Equal Regional Development) appoints one repre-
sentative as a member of the commission;
  one representative from ZELS.32
The purpose of the commission is to be the key policymaker in the area of IMC and 
to be responsible for insertion of IMC into all programmatic and strategic documents 
regarding decentralization. This body will also be responsible for liaising with all relevant 
central and local governmental stakeholders as well as associations and representatives 
of interested donors. The commission should be used as a forum for coordination and 
policymaking on a wider level.
The intermunicipal cooperation is envisaged to be ﬁnanced from several sources:
  Municipal budgets
  Donations and grants
  Other sources.
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It is notable that there are no pledges from the national budget for support of IMC 
and the line “(from the) national budget” which existed in the draft law was erased in the 
adopted version. This may not be the optimal solution since it is sometimes necessary 
that initial IMC incentives (as well as the phase of IMC sustainability and replication) 
originate from the central level and up. With this solution the legislature decided for 
a diﬀerent approach (in comparison to the provision of the Law on Equal Regional 
Development): for a concrete amount of ﬁnancial support to be allocated from the 
central budget to the eight planned regions where the amount of annual subsidy was 
established at one percent of GDP. 
A special article in the law is dedicated towards the registering of the IMC which 
prescribes that all of the forms of IMC need to be documented in the Registry of IMC 
no later than 30 days after their establishment. However, the law does not impose an 
obligation for IMC units formed prior to the adoption of the law, leaving doubt whether 
the named registry will include all IMC units in the country and will settle the lack of 
any systematic inventory of forms of cooperation among municipalities. 
The law provides for dual “oversight” regarding IMC. Municipalities may establish 
an oversight coordinative body, while oversight over the implementation of the law lies 
in the hands of the ministry. Yet the law does not specify the methods of central control 
or if there are any at all regarding, for example, the preparation of an annual report by 
the ministry to the government about the progress of intermunicipal cooperation in 
the country.
A virtue of this law is that it has compiled forms of IMC and has identiﬁed the 
most relevant stakeholders as well as established a body that will initiate and follow 
IMC in Macedonia. The Registry of IMC is also an important tool which needs to be 
operated by the Ministry of Local Self-government and which can be used to analyze 
needs and trends so that an adequate policy for IMC development can be designed 
in the future.
The overall added value of the law is rather limited and it does not resolve any 
problems because there are no innovative solutions, nor does it provide for regular or 
guaranteed ﬁnancial incentives for establishing IMC. The law declares that IMC “may” 
be ﬁnanced by the central budget, which leaves tremendous discretionary power in 
government hands for decisions pertaining to purely municipal matters. Financial sup-
port should be present and independent from governmental and ministerial decision. 
The law as it stands will only reﬂect the value that it is given by proper and bona 
ﬁde implementation of its provisions. Its rules should never be understood in ways that 
are restrictive towards IMC.
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3.3 Law on Equal Regional Development 
The necessity of accumulating greater capacity for development and for providing equal 
treatment, impeded by the dispersed territorial organization of the municipalities, 
allowed for their regional organization. This new organization of municipalities was 
ordained by the Law on Equal Regional Development, adopted in May 2007 (Oﬃcial 
Gazette No. 63/2007). The term “ordained” is used because the municipalities did not 
voluntarily decide to form such an organizational structure, rather, the regions were 
determined by the NUTS-333 classiﬁcation and therefore cannot be considered voluntary 
intermunicipal cooperation units, which are the subject matter of this research. 
The bodies of governance of these regions do not have their own original competen-
cies or other capacities by which to be considered as a second tier of local self-government. 
They are established to enable more equal allocation of central budget funds directed 
toward implementing regional projects.
Equal regional development is achieved through the Strategy for Equal Regional 
Development, proposed by the government for a ten-year period and adopted by the 
National Assembly; as well as by the Program for Development of the Plan Region,34 
developed and adopted for a ﬁve-year period by the Council for Development of the 
Plan Region, and later implemented by annual action plans for implementation of the 
planning documents.
The policy creators for regional development are, apart from the government and 
Ministry of Local Self-government, the newly established Council for Equal Regional 
Development as well as the eight special Centers for Development of the Plan Region. 
The composition of the Council for Equal Regional Development is made of the vice 
premier, nine ministers from the government, all of the presidents of the Councils for 
Development of the Plan Regions, and the president of ZELS. The Councils for Develop-
ment of the Plan Regions are composed of mayors of municipalities included in the plan 
region out of which a president of the council is elected for a two-year renewable term. 
The planning regions do not follow the exact concept of IMC, which is researched 
in this paper. However, the importance of this kind of organization of municipalities 
must be identiﬁed especially as a forum for neighboring municipalities to convene and 
discuss their mutual problems as well as common interests. These would be implemented 
parallel to the organization of the planning region through forms provided in the Law 
on Intermunicipal Cooperation. 
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4. INVENTORY OF INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN THE
 REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
 
In order to direct the future development of IMC in Macedonia, it is necessary to de-
termine the stage of past and present forms of cooperation. This shall also demonstrate 
how hospitable an environment the previously explained legal provisions have actually 
provided. The correct arrangement of status for IMC in the municipalities’ current work 
should contribute in developing the working mechanism for upgrading the level and 
eﬀectiveness of joint administrations, joint enterprises, and other forms of cooperation. 
A comprehensive “inventory” of IMC would allow us to identify the areas where IMC 
is most present and where it is lacking, helping us to deduce positive conclusions from 
collective experiences.
In the Republic of Macedonia there is no comprehensive register of IMC that 
identiﬁes and presents patterns of IMC. Instead, numerous and sporadic pieces of 
information exist depending upon the implementer and organization connected to 
the IMC. 
The most relevant sources of information are the several surveys conducted through 
the “Technical Assistance for Implementation and Coordination of Decentralization 
Process (Phase 1 and 2),”35 as well as from the Ministry of Local Self-government. 
However, these results must be considered with great reserve. Even though they provide 
a general perspective, they do not reﬂect the complete situation. The surveys were sent 
to all municipalities but not all replied to all of the questionnaires. It is possible that a 
municipality answered several of the total of six questionnaires and this must be taken 
into consideration when drawing conclusions or drafting strategies. It appears also that 
the municipalities did not answer the questionnaires in a uniform way; for example, 
some municipalities that cooperate in the manner that an inspector from the larger 
municipality goes to the smaller municipality and renders services may have replied 
diﬀerently regarding the form of cooperation, since one might answer that they have 
joint administration and others that they are providing services.
Another important issue in need of mentioning here is the presence of “pro forma” 
IMC cases, in which the municipalities only formally agree to cooperate but in real-
ity the IMC does not exist. These are the cases when IMC is needed in order for the 
municipalities to enter the second phase of ﬁscal decentralization, or when there is an 
objective danger that some competencies might be revoked. In these cases the service 
or the competence is not delivered or executed, although on paper it appears that it is 
being performed through some type of IMC. This is also why it appears that there are 
many more cases of IMC in practice than there really are.
The ﬁnal conclusion is that there is no hard, reliable data especially regarding the 
number and form of the present practice of IMC. The need for such an inventory is real-
ized in the Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation where the minister is obliged to create 
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the registry as well as to maintain and update it with information regarding established 
IMC from the municipalities.
Although imperfect in their presentation of the IMC situation in the Republic of 
Macedonia, the surveys still present the most interesting competences for cooperation 
among the country’s municipalities. Conducted in 2008 the surveys show the frequent 
areas of intermunicipal cooperation.
Figure 4.1
Proportion of Municipalities Involved in IMC Related to Certain Areas in 2008
The survey shows that 49 percent of municipalities cooperate in the area of ﬁre pro-
tection, however this is the direct result of the Law on Fire Protection, which institutes 
a regional approach towards the execution of this function; therefore, it is incorrect to 
perceive this high percentage as voluntary cooperation for a ﬁeld emerged in identiﬁca-
tion of necessity and urgent actions.
In the following text, the most frequent areas of intermunicipal cooperation will 
be demonstrated according to the criteria of the employed forms of IMC and with the 
names of the municipalities that are involved and participating in such cooperation. 
Because cooperation in the area of ﬁreﬁghting, as mentioned above, is not a voluntary 
one, we shall proceed with the following three areas of cooperation, namely: Local Eco-
nomic Development, Primary and Secondary Education, and Urban/Rural planning. 
4.1 Local Economic Development 
Local economic development is a new competence of municipalities awarded by the 
law of 2002, which is complementary to other competences such as urban and rural 
planning, discretion of local taxes and fees, communal utilities, and other similar re-
sponsibilities. The approach of local economic development is to combine the listed 
competences in an eﬀort to attract investors, create beneﬁcial conditions for new 
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companies, promote local comparative economic advantages, as well as use the local 
workforce and increase employment. 
In order to achieve these goals, municipalities in Macedonia are cooperating in the 
production of multiyear local development strategies that mostly encompass a wider 
region of several municipalities. All of the municipalities join together into a task force or 
other kind of informal team composed mostly of representatives of the Local Economic 
Development Units within the municipal administrations. These teams, often assisted 
by external experts, design the local economic development strategies that are approved 
by all of the municipal councils after the production of the ﬁnal text. The strategies are 
composed of proﬁles of the involved municipalities, SWOT36 analysis, identiﬁcation 
of projects and their prioritization, as well as action plans and the ﬁnancial means for 
their implementation. After the adoption and publication of the strategy some of the 
teams that created it are dissolved, some continue to operate informally, and others are 
upgraded and become centers for local economic development (such as the cooperation 
between Strumica, Vasilevo, Bosilovo, and Novo Selo).
Table 4.3
Municipalities with IMC in LED
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Karbinci, Shtip, Sveti Nikole
Kriva Palanka, Rankovce, Kratovo, Makedonska Kamenica, Probishtip, Kochani, 
Cheshinovo-Obleshevo 
Pehchevo, Berovo, Delchevo, Vinica, Radovish
Radovish, Konche
Drugovo, Vraneshtica
Vinica, Kochani
Oslomej, Zajas 
Lipkovo, Arachinovo Kumanovo 
Novaci, Bitola, Mogila, Prilep, Resen, Krushevo, Krivogashtani, Demir Hisar
Novo Selo, Strumica, Bosilovo, Vasilevo 
Jegunovce, Tearce
Kavadarci, Rosoman, Demir Kapija
Ohrid, Resen, Struga, Prilep, Bitola
Zelenikovo, Kisela Voda, Sopishte
Struga, Ohrid, Kichevo, Debar, Debarca
The municipalities involved in local economic development cooperation do not 
follow the patterns of the territorial boundaries of municipalities (meaning within the 
plan region). Rather, they cooperate on the basis of practicality and the willingness 
among municipality mayors and administrations.
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4.2 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
The primary and secondary educational system is a very speciﬁc competence included 
in the process of decentralization. The municipalities control the widespread network 
of primary schools and need to provide safe and adequate working conditions, provide 
for the hiring process and payrolls of the teachers, and almost everything except the 
content of the teaching curricula. According to the Law on Primary Education, it is the 
municipal education inspector’s duty to oversee new education competencies. Since the 
smaller municipalities have only one or a few primary schools, they do not necessitate 
a full-time special municipal education inspector. Therefore, they very often arrange 
agreements for the contracting of services from the neighbor municipality.
Other forms of cooperation among municipalities occur in relation to second-
ary school networks. Since smaller municipalities do not have secondary educational 
institutions within their own territory pupils must travel to bigger municipalities. The 
municipalities cooperate for the purpose of transporting children to high schools so 
that they may proceed towards a quality education. 
The larger municipalities keep such relationships in mind when managing education. 
When designing their Local/Municipal Education Strategy they include the students from 
the neighboring municipalities in their prognosis and needs assessment, The use of data 
from smaller municipalities assists in providing quality education for all future pupils. 
Table 4.4
Municipalities with IMC in Education
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Gradsko, Negotino, Veles 
Berovo, Pehchevo
Radovish, Konche
Makedonska Kamenica, Delchevo 
Gevgelija, Bogdanci
Veles, Chashka, Lozovo
Tearce, Jegunovce, Tetovo
Bitola, Novaci, 
Bitola, Mogila
Mavrovo I Rostushe, Gostivar
Ohrid, Debarca
Rankovci, Kumanovo,
Debar, Centar Zhupa
 
It should be noted from the list of cooperating municipalities that cooperative units 
always consist of one larger municipality and one smaller neighboring municipality.
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4.3 Urban/Rural Planning
There are several reasons for widespread intermunicipal cooperation in the area of urban/
rural planning. The smaller municipalities rarely have the database, the equipment or the 
necessary staﬀ to execute all the relevant competencies. Thus cooperation is essential in 
order for the citizens of these small municipalities to obtain building permits, to receive 
property conﬁrmation, and perform other planning-related tasks. 
Table 4.5
Municipalities with IMC in Urban/Rural Planning
M
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s 
th
at
 h
av
e 
es
ta
b
lis
h
ed
 in
te
rm
u
n
ic
ip
al
 c
o
o
p
er
at
io
n
 
in
 t
h
e 
ar
ea
 o
f 
U
rb
an
/R
u
ra
l p
la
n
n
in
g
Brvenica Tetovo
Butel Chair, Shuto Orizari, Gazi Baba, Chucher Sandevo
Centar Zhupa, Mavrovo-Rostushe
Cheshinovo-Obleshevo, Zrnovci
City of Skopje with 10 Skopje municipalities
Debarca, Ohrid
Dojran Gevgelija
Karbinci, Shtip
Kavadarci, Rosoman
Konche, Radovish
Krivogashtani Krushevo
Mogila Bitola, Novaci
Novo Selo, Bosilovo, Vasilevo
Plasnica, Makedonski Brod
Probishtip, Kochani, Obleshevo, Makedonska Kamenica, Kratovo, Kriva Palanka
Staro Nagorichane, Rankovce
The listing of IMC shows that municipalities cooperating in multiple areas create a 
tradition of cooperation that is born of necessity, mostly on the side of smaller munici-
palities. This listing represents a good basis for the new registry envisioned as part of the 
Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation. This law will need to be renewed and shared in 
order to provide valuable perspective on the forms and functions of cooperation, as well 
as to allow further valuable research for promoting and supporting IMC in the country.
241
C o u n t r y  R e p o r t s :  M a c e d o n i a
5. OBSTACLES AND INCENTIVES FOR INTERMUNICIPAL
 COOPERATION
5.1 Obstacles to Intermunicipal Cooperation
It has to be noted that there are serious obstacles that impede the potential for these IMC 
processes. The obstacles can diﬀer in nature and range from political, ﬁnancial, strategic 
and other challenges. Replies from municipalities researched in the above-mentioned 
survey: are presented in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6
Obstacles to IMC
Obstacles to IMC (percentage of responding municipalities in survey of 2008)
Lack of financial resources (lack of capital for initial investment) 73% 
Municipalities have not understood the benefits of IMC 58%
Lack of strategies for long term development 53%
Lack of legal regulation of IMC 37%
Municipalities have not realized the need for cooperation 31%
Lack of human resources in municipalities 29%
It is very important to elaborate further on the answers given by these municipali-
ties. It is easy to see that the main obstacle in establishing IMC is the lack of ﬁnancial 
means although the same IMC unit’s greatest beneﬁt would be saving on expenditure 
and maintaining ﬁnancial resources. Closer analysis shows that municipalities lack the 
initial ﬁnancial means to establish IMC that would generate long-term savings. The 
municipalities need these initial funds to invest in database updates (taxpayer registration, 
urban plots, assessment of school conditions, buildings, etc.), to make feasibility studies, 
buy necessary equipment (computers, printers, software, vehicles) and other expenses 
needed to make the proposed IMC functional. Only after these ﬁnancial resources are 
secured and directed towards the IMC are mayors and other stakeholders more willing 
to further support and promote the idea of cooperation, which in one or several years 
would create a proﬁtable ﬁnancial arrangement for all the municipalities concerned.
Apart from the obvious lack of early ﬁnancial means to initiate the IMC, the other 
most relevant group of obstacles is that the beneﬁts of IMC have not been properly 
promoted to concerned municipalities. Mayors concentrate on resolving problems 
single-handedly and often do not have a clear strategy by which to employ IMC as a 
problem-solving instrument. This is also the product of political determination, which 
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deems the municipalities’ priorities, and consequently the direction of the municipal 
budgetary means. 
Another realistic obstacle is the weighing of political costs against the ﬁnancial 
beneﬁts of IMC. Establishing a joint administration can be a politically costly endeavor 
for any mayor, since actual power over the administration becomes divided. However, 
rather than concern themselves with how many people they employ and manage, mayors 
should recognize the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of IMC and should prioritize the opportunity to 
use such ﬁnances to implement development policies for their municipality.37 
In tandem with these factors, prior to the adoption of the Law on Intermunicipal 
Cooperation, there was an unclear legal framework that did not impede IMC but also 
did not regulate it in any detailed way. For the municipalities it represented a risky 
endeavor, an uncharted territory or “no man’s land” in which they did not feel comfort-
able including themselves. 
Although of lower urgency among identiﬁed obstacles to IMC, a very relevant issue 
is the lack of trained human resources with practical experience in municipal and central 
administrations. This obstacle is latent since it is obscured by the lack of ﬁnancial means 
and political inﬂuence; nevertheless it is one of the most important for the practical 
execution of cooperation. 
All these obstacles are not speciﬁc to Macedonia nor do they represent a barrier 
that cannot be overcome. Some of the obstacles are being tackled through the adoption 
of legislative provisions and bylaws, while others should be addressed through speciﬁc 
ﬁnancial mechanisms and the capacity building of local administrations. The greatest 
obstacle is the lack of interest or will to enter into cooperation even though a need has 
been identiﬁed and beneﬁts are attainable. The municipalities must perceive that the 
potential beneﬁts shall exceed costs (including political ones) and then obstacles can 
be overcome. 
5.2 Incentives for Intermunicipal Cooperation
The incentives for establishing intermunicipal cooperation are an important factor in the 
initial stage for this kind of collaboration among units of self-government with scarce 
ﬁnancial resources and a lack of developed capacities in its employees. As mentioned 
above, currently in Macedonia there are few (although signiﬁcant) incentives that 
stimulate this kind of cooperation. Though these incentives are primarily external and 
performed through international organizations, they are still relevant as a beginning 
point for such activities. These incentives also must be evaluated for their ability to ap-
peal beyond the aforementioned obstacles and how adequate they serve this purpose.
The government of the Republic of Macedonia in its Program for Implementation 
of the Decentralization Process 2008–201038 (pages 24–25) appointed the creation of 
243
C o u n t r y  R e p o r t s :  M a c e d o n i a
favorable conditions for eﬀective and eﬃcient intermunicipal cooperation as a strategic 
goal. Special annual Action Plans 2008 and 2009 were adopted for the program’s imple-
mentation. These plans demonstrated in detail all the necessary steps for implementing 
priority activities and measures for achieving the envisioned strategic goals. Measure 6.2.1: 
Introduction of legislation for governmental grants, consists of similar wording. Through 
amending the regulations for the methodologies for preparation and allocation of grants, 
this measure seeks to give advantage to municipalities involved in IMC for infrastructure 
development and improvement of the approach and quality of public services.
Even while recognizing the importance of the obligations undertaken by the gov-
ernment ministries, there are still only sporadic and ad hoc incentives being oﬀered by 
national institutions. There is no systematic institutional support specializing in the 
development of intermunicipal cooperation, although a special unit for IMC has been 
established in the systematization of the Ministry for Local Self-government. This unit 
should have ﬁve employees working on the problem, but currently there is only one 
position ﬁlled. The legislation and especially the bylaws specifying criteria for allocat-
ing ﬁnances to support IMC are being developed, but the process is being prolonged 
and even when adopted there will be no guarantees that money will be allocated. At 
present there is no ﬁnancial incentive in the form of direct ﬁnancial allocation; there 
is neither any grant earmarked for IMC, nor options for municipalities to receive low 
interest credit with a repayment grace period. Considering all this, it appears that IMC 
is not an immediate priority for the ministry; there is neither institutional capacity to 
tackle the challenges of initiating or supporting IMC, nor is there a ﬁnancial subsidy 
for interested municipalities. 
On the other hand, the international organizations’ missions are providing signiﬁcant 
incentives for the establishment and development of intermunicipal cooperation. These 
activities are done in direct cooperation with the municipalities or in liaison with the 
Ministry of Local Self-government, ZELS, and the municipalities.
The OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje (OSCE SMM to Skopje), based on 
the knowledge acquired through their annual decentralization surveys, have concluded 
that there is a need to support the establishment of IMC by several grants awarded to 
the applicant municipalities interested in IMC. 
The 2008 and 2009 grant scheme of the OSCE SMM to Skopje had the aim to 
provide incentive for initiation of IMC as a contribution to realize initiatives of mutual 
beneﬁt to the applicant municipalities. This granting scheme was initiated upon the ﬁnd-
ings from the annual decentralization surveys as well as from the perception that there 
was a lack of initiative and funds for establishing IMC. The total amount of the grant 
scheme was EUR 60,000 in 2008 and the same amount in 2009, while the maximum 
amount per IMC project was determined at EUR 20,000 in both years. The criteria for 
selection included that the intermunicipal cooperation should be intended to resolve 
needs of an administrative nature such as tax collection, tax administration, urban 
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planning, issuance of license and permits, joint inspection, and similar tasks.Also an 
important criteria (especially in 2009) was that “Participating municipalities are of mixed 
ethnic composition,” which coincides with the thesis that IMC also produces social capi-
tal among the population of the country. Although the amounts of the grants were not 
very signiﬁcant, they still assisted municipalities in raising their administrative capacity 
and opening the way for future activities in intermunicipal cooperation. In 2008 and 
2009 the municipalities supported were from all over the country and covering diﬀer-
ent areas of cooperation. The grants were awarded for development of rural tourism in 
municipalities of Ohrid and Debarca, a joint urbanism unit in Cheshinovo-Obleshevo 
and Zrnovci, as well as an IMC unit within the microregion of Delchevo, Pehchevo, 
Vinica, and Berovo. All of the projects were implemented primarily with the concerned 
municipalities and with limited coordination and assistance from the Ministry of Lo-
cal Self-government. However, even though the support of IMC has presented results, 
apparently it is not a high priority for the OSCE SMM to Skopje, since the granting 
scheme will not be continued in 2010. 
The United Nations Development Program has signiﬁcantly acted in building local 
capacities for undertaking intermunicipal cooperation activities. The UNDP has suc-
cessfully participated in IMC success stories through its initial project, “Intermunicipal 
partnership for improved public service quality,” assisting Bosilovo, Vasilevo, and Novo 
Selo in achieving results in intermunicipal cooperation (these examples will be explained 
later) in liaison with the Ministry of Local Self-government, the Civil Servant Agency, 
and ZELS. However it must be stressed that the carrier of the project is UNDP while the 
other bodies have a more cooperative role instead of having the status of equal partners. 
The Ministry for Local Self-government and ZELS are practically assisting the UNDP 
project team in the implementation of project activities. Based on the premier stage 
of this project there has been continuation of similar activities under “Intermunicipal 
partnership for improved public service quality—II,” aiding the municipalities of Veles 
and Chashka as well as Tetovo and Brvenica in the area of tax collection and administra-
tion. Under these programs a total of 12 municipalities have already received support 
in establishing IMC.
At the time of writing, the UNDP support of IMC in Macedonia continues with 
the capital project, “IMC for better service provision and EU accession,” worth EUR 
900,000 for the years 2009/2010.
“The overall strategy of the project is to provide a comprehensive and multi-faceted 
approach to promoting and supporting intermunicipal cooperation on a national 
scale, which would include activities aimed at: 
 1. Building a critical mass of knowledge and capacity for replication of existing 
IMC practices and implementation of new models of IMC in the areas of 
municipal competences; 
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 2. Establishing an eﬀective ﬁnancial mechanism to support municipalities’ iden-
tifying IMC opportunities, and to initiate and implement IMC activities; 
 3. Establishing an IMC knowledge management system that collects, system-
atizes and disseminates information on IMC as a means to raise awareness, 
knowledge and capacities on an ongoing basis and stimulate the replication 
of good practices;
 4. Facilitating an ongoing policy dialogue between central government, municipali-
ties, donor communities, ﬁnancial institutions and private sector for coordinated 
strategic approach and national policies in support of IMC”.39 
The UNDP approach is to build the capacities of national and local institutions for 
the opportunities for IMC through presentations and training for mayors, members 
of council, municipal administration, and civil servants employed in the Ministry of 
Local Self-government and other line ministries. These institutions should later be 
able to receive all the products that emerge from the project and maintain the sustain-
able progress of IMC in the country. In line with this project activity is the insertion 
of “Program for IMC” into the Ministry of Local Self-government’s working plan in 
order to develop the necessary bylaws (registry of IMC, criteria for ﬁnancial incentives 
for IMC, etc.) envisioned in the Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation. Together with 
these bylaws a set of templates of contracts, agreements and other documents are being 
produced which can help the municipalities to easier conclude forms of IMC. As a ﬁnal 
activity in the program is a grant scheme of EUR 100,000 (EUR 10,000–20,000 per 
award) designated for replication of current IMC forms (in tax and urbanism-related 
work, for example), and the development of innovative IMC practices (within sport, 
culture, social protection, and other areas).
It is notable that the incentives and assistance in establishing various forms of 
IMC are generally directed towards tackling the objectives which were identiﬁed 
in the previous pages through ﬁnancial support, promoting the concept of IMC, 
as well as providing universal documents, such as templates and trainings for con-
cerned administrations. However, it must be noted that IMC is predominantly 
supported by international organizations rather than from central or local sources. 
From a short-term perspective this “foreign donor support” process may be useful 
to establish the foundations for development of the cooperation; however, in order 
to secure sustainability and continuous progress of municipalities it is essential to 
employ national resources. It is essential to acknowledge that this support should not 
lead to the creation of “dependency.” To avoid such dependent relationships, a clear 
policy must be developed by the national actors to use all the external support up to 
the point of self-sustainability and future development of IMC. Through this policy 
the broad scope of present incentives should lead to more speciﬁc incentives. These 
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more speciﬁc incentives should fall in line with central and local government strate-
gies for advancement in certain competence areas that would attain their optimum 
performance through IMC. It is important for local and national stakeholders to show 
greater enthusiasm and willingness to promote and develop IMC, since the foreign 
donor programs are only as valuable as the capability of the Macedonian institutions 
to employ them. Of course, this value is furthered by an institution’s ability to sustain 
results after the donor community is no longer present. 
6. EXAMPLES FROM VOLUNTARY MUNICIPAL COOPERATION 
 IN MACEDONIA
The good practices section of the research presents several successful cases of IMC dif-
ferent in their nature. The objective of the presentation of these cases is not only to 
demonstrate but also to inspire replication of these cases in sizes and manners appropri-
ate to other municipalities’ local speciﬁcs. The examples present solutions of diﬀerent 
municipalities by size, population, level of development, and other indicators; however, 
their common denominator is the shared vision that IMC may aid them in achieving 
certain goals that they could not achieve alone. The examples will also show that it is 
not often the ﬁnancial and commercial interests that are predominant, but rather the 
investment in assisting a neighbor municipality and building long-term strategic alliances. 
The three examples presented include the “rendering of services” by the municipal-
ity of Veles to the municipality of Chashka; the establishment of joint administration 
among the three municipalities Bosilovo, Vasilevo and Novo Selo; and the creation of 
joint public enterprise by the municipalities of Ilinden and Gazi Baba. 
6.1 Cooperation among the Municipalities of Veles and Chashka 
 in Renting Services among Municipalities40
The municipality of Veles is a relatively large municipality with approximately 55,000 
inhabitants and a great traditional existence as a cultural, business, and administrative 
center. On the other hand, the municipality of Chashka (7,600 inhabitants) is a smaller 
and poorer local government that gravitates to the municipality of Veles with scarce 
human resources and overall poor administrative capacities.
According to the Law of Financing of Local Self-government (Article 45), in order 
to commence with ﬁscal decentralization (usage and management of block grants in-
stead of earmarked grants and greater ﬁscal autonomy), each municipality, regardless of 
its size, needed to have within its staﬀ at least three persons that would be responsible 
for municipal tax administration in order to competently and successfully operate the 
247
C o u n t r y  R e p o r t s :  M a c e d o n i a
ﬁnancial sources awarded by the decentralization. The municipality of Chashka did 
not posses such capacities; therefore, it could not further continue with the process of 
decentralization. The small municipalities were faced with the problem that they could 
not aﬀord the staﬀ necessary for progress and ultimately could not receive the beneﬁts 
of the ﬁscal decentralization.
Another impediment to the successful implementation of local competences was 
the lack of adequate staﬀ for conducting inspectoral oversight in areas such as educa-
tion, traﬃc, environment, and construction. The lack of inspectoral capacities always 
threatened the municipality of Chashka with the possibility that some of the awarded 
competencies might be revoked. On the other hand, Chashka could not aﬀord to es-
tablish a full-time inspectorate unit and such a position was economically ineﬃcient 
since Chashka’s territory contained only a small number of facilities, institutions, and 
businesses to be inspected.
After careful analysis of the situation and keeping in mind expenses and the quality 
and timeliness of executing the competences of the municipalities, the mayor of Veles 
made a proposal for cooperation to the mayor of Chashka, oﬀering to provide human 
resource services in the area of tax administration as well as inspection in education, 
environment, traﬃc, and construction. For this purpose, a special contract for rendering 
intellectual services was signed by the mayors on October 4th, 2006, which determined 
in detail the cooperative relationship. 
According to the agreement, the Municipality of Veles makes the capacities of its 
administration available in the enumerated areas according to the needs of the Munici-
pality of Chashka. Veles’s administration visits Chashka upon request and conducts 
the necessary activity for which a special record is produced regarding the activity 
undertaken. This record includes the time that was necessary to perform the activity 
(e.g., inspection of a school), which is important because depending on the number 
of hours of engagement of the inspector, Veles sends an invoice to Chashka as billing 
for the intellectual service. The amount of the hourly rate depends on the position of 
the inspector or the tax administration staﬀ that was engaged in providing the services; 
however, the amount per se is rather symbolic and does not really reﬂect a market value 
for the provided expertise since in practice invoices are only sent for inspectoral ﬁeld 
visits and rarely if ever for the assistance in the ﬁeld of tax administration. This is a sub-
stantial beneﬁt for the Municipality of Chashka because only one full-time staﬀ at the 
position of advisor may cost the municipal budget several thousands of euros per year. 
Under the current arrangement, however, Chashka pays only for the time the person 
is needed to conduct the competence. The municipality of Chashka’s overall savings 
for all the received services amounts to around EUR 12,000 annually, which would be 
spent if this intermunicipal cooperation had not been established.
Accountability is ensured through regularly reporting to the two municipal councils 
regarding implemented activities and ﬁnancial resources obtained. It is also ensured 
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through meetings with the neighborhood communities (mesna samouprava) to inform 
them of the results of IMC.
Monitoring and evaluation through continuous and regular communication are 
carried out between the respective units and sectors of the two municipalities’ administra-
tions. Additionally, the municipality of Chaska, in agreement with the signed contract, 
may at any time be informed of the quality and timing of the service provided by the 
municipality of Veles, and may thus have insight into the documentation and the overall 
administrative procedure.41 
Even though the contract equally approaches the inspectorate services and the tax 
administration services, the practical implementation of this IMC has shown develop-
ment in two streams. Since the municipality of Chashka does not have a need for a 
full-time inspectoral unit and is satisﬁed with services provided by the administration of 
Veles, it does not build its own capacities but is determined in the long term to continue 
to use the capacity of Veles. On the other hand, the situation with the tax administra-
tion is the complete opposite. The present employees of Chashka are developing their 
own capacities to administer taxes independently in the near future. For this purpose, 
they are trained and advised by the Unit for Tax Administration of Veles, to fulﬁll this 
competence and update their database of information regarding local taxes. At the 
same time, the municipality of Chashka was awarded support from the UNDP project 
(“Intermunicipal partnership for improved public service quality—II”), which provided 
IT equipment, a wireless connection between Veles and Chashka, as well as assistance 
in establishing and training Commissions for Evaluation of Real Property in order to 
be able adequately to set the property tax, which is a municipal income.
The cooperation produced numerous beneﬁts for the municipalities. Mainly these 
beneﬁts included the saving of ﬁnancial resources, greater work eﬀectiveness and eﬃ-
ciency, new experiences, skills, and knowledge for employees working on IMC-related 
issues, and timely submission of the decisions on various taxes. Meanwhile citizens 
beneﬁted by improved quality and reduced waiting time for services now available in 
their place of residence, as well as indirectly by increased standards of living (since saved 
resources are invested in improving services in education, healthcare, local infrastructure, 
and other areas).42
This cooperation represents a model for agreements between two neighboring munic-
ipalities in order to provide assistance to the one with lesser capacities, with the intention 
that it may develop itself and successfully execute awarded competencies. The lack of a 
detailed legal framework did not represent an impediment for successful development 
of this cooperation, which clearly achieved many beneﬁts for the municipalities. Among 
these beneﬁts are: fulﬁllment of conditions for commencing the decentralization process 
in the municipality of Chashka, ﬁnancial saving, optimal usage of both municipalities’ 
administrations, building of administrative capacities, and the creation and development 
of a tradition of cooperation among the municipalities (which broadens the possibility 
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of future collaboration). Even though the beneﬁts for Veles are not immediately visible 
nor can be converted into a substantial ﬁnancial amount, this cooperation constitutes 
a long-term partnership endeavor, whereby these two municipalities seek a higher level 
of local development by which they can achieve much more in the future. 
6.2 Cooperation among the Municipalities of Bosilovo, Novo Selo, 
 and Vasilevo in Establishing Joint Administrative Bodies
The cooperation among the municipalities of Bosilovo, Vasilevo, and Novo Selo is 
interesting for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that the current case was a pioneer formation of 
joint administration, while the second is the broad scope of their IMC, which includes 
several competences (urban planning, collection of incomes and inspectorate).
Among the three municipalities, the activities for creation of a joint administration 
commenced early in the second half of 2005 and was one of the initial attempts by 
the municipalities to jointly tackle the challenges of the decentralization process. The 
latest survey from the Ministry of Local Self-government showed increasing interest 
by the municipalities to form a joint administration. At the end of 2006, 26 percent 
of municipalities had formed joint administration, in the 2007 survey, 29 percent of 
municipalities claimed that they had some form of joint administration while the per-
centage has signiﬁcantly increased to 34.3 percent in 2008.
However optimistic these ﬁgures may be they are not accurate, since there is only 
one case of joint administration presented here. All others are a diﬀerent form of co-
operation, wherein one administration does services for another one. Therefore a great 
deal of these percentages include the buying or selling of services from a smaller to a 
bigger municipality or vice versa, without establishing a formal joint administration. 
For these reasons, it should be noted that only very few municipalities have a real joint 
administration that provides services for more than one unit of local self-government. 
The municipalities of Bosilovo, Vasilevo, and Novo Selo have a fully functional joint 
administration. Such is their achievement that they received the 2007 Best Practices 
Award from USAID. Their experience is presented below. 
The cooperation among the three municipalities diﬀers since instead of having one 
big municipality that is “dominant” and provides services for the other municipalities, all 
of these local self-governments are similar in size, population (barely exceeding 10,000 
inhabitants each), education facilities, and urban planning, for example. The catalyst 
of the formation of the joint administration was similar unfavorable conditions found 
in each of the municipalities; these included, for example, the quality of rural habitats, 
lack of institutional capacities within the municipalities, and a common weak ﬁnancial 
strength combined with growing competencies from the decentralization process. 
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With the joint administration the municipalities hoped primarily to enhance their 
capacities and to provide eﬀective and eﬃcient services for their citizens while employ-
ing an economy of scale and dividing the joint administration’s operational expenses. 
The joint administration establishment process was not an easy and fast process since 
all decisions needed to be made within each participating municipality simultaneously. 
Any lack of political will, even by one municipality, would mean blocking the complete 
cooperation endeavor.
Figure 4.2
The joint administration was organized in the sense that the Tax Administration 
Unit was located in the municipality of Vasilevo, the Urbanism Unit in the municipality 
of Novo Selo, and the Inspectorate Unit in the municipality of Bosilovo. Each unit is 
under direct management of the mayor of the host municipality but other mayors also 
manage regular control through monthly reports and ad hoc control upon the discre-
tion of any mayor. The civil servants working in each unit are direct employees of the 
host municipality and receive their salaries from the host municipality’s annual budget.
The joint administration provides services for 10,098 households living within 
the territories of the three municipalities through use of the “one stop shop system” of 
TIMELINE OF ACTIVITIES FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT ADMINISTRATION
Consultations with the Ministry of Local Self Government and 
Civil Servant Agency and deﬁning areas for joint administration
Initiative for establishment of joint administrative bodies by the 
Mayors of Bosilovo, Vasilevo and Novo Selo to the Municipal Councils 
Decision for establishment of joint administrative bodies adopted 
by the Municipal Councils of the three municipalities
Agreement for joint administration signed by the Mayors of the 
three municipalities
Agreement for number of staﬀ in each unit within the joint 
administration
Harmonization of decisions for systematization of municipal 
administration
Agreement for ﬁnancing the joint administration
July/August 
2005
September 
2005
October 
2005
October 
2005
December 
2005
January 
2006
January 
2007
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Citizen Service Centers. These centers are established in each of the municipalities and 
staﬀed by at least two civil servants. Regardless of where a citizen resides within these 
municipalities, she can approach the nearest center and request all necessary documents 
that are of the competence of the joint administration. For example a person from 
Vasilevo may request from the center in their own municipality urbanism and building 
issues that are processed in Novo Selo. The employee of the Vasilevo center based on 
the joint database that the three municipalities use, shall send the request on behalf of 
the citizen. Once the request is processed, the joint administration notiﬁes the center 
in Vasilevo who informs the citizen and issues him or her the requested document. This 
procedure provides for timely and correct provision of services for all citizens based on 
the principle that the documents move within the administration rather than the people 
that request the service.
The ﬁnancial expenses for the joint administration are equally distributed among the 
municipalities and they consist of a portion for the units’ physical functionality (such 
as electricity, equipment, working conditions) and the expenses for salaries of the civil 
servants within the joint administration. The actual physical functioning expenses are 
smaller than the expenses for salaries, which represent the greatest portion of function-
ing expenses. The amount of salary a civil servant receives is based on her education as 
well as the position that she holds. Since all of the employees in the Inspectorate Unit 
in Bosilovo hold a university education, the expenses for their salaries are the greatest. 
Because of this, the municipalities primarily pay the salaries of the administration located 
in their own premises from the municipal budget. In this way Bosilovo’s payroll yearly 
allocates MKD 2,000,00043 for the joint administration while Novo Selo allocates MKD 
1,900,000 and Vasilevo MKD 1,700,000. This apparent ﬁnancial discrepancy among 
the municipalities is leveled yearly by transfers from the budget of the municipality that 
pays less to the municipality that pays more. In this way the municipality that initially 
pays more for the salaries of the joint administration is compensated from the other 
two municipalities.
The established IMC enables cost distribution for a minimum 12 employees (accord-
ing to the requirements of the normative framework) between the three municipalities. 
The average cost is about EUR 800 monthly per employee, or EUR 115,200 for 12 
employees for one year. If the municipalities had established separate units, the additional 
costs for 24 new employees would have been EUR 230,400; this resulted in a savings 
of EUR 75,000–80,000 per municipality annually, which can be used towards other 
priorities in the municipalities.44
The successful operation of this system for providing services called for both human 
and technical capacities. The building of these capacities was aided by a great number of 
international development organizations such as USAID (in the form of USD 30,000 
), VNG International from Holland (for training), and the biggest assistance by the 
UNDP’s “Intermunicipal partnerships for improved public service quality,” which do-
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nated EUR 400,000 towards equipping the Citizen Service Centers with computers, 
internet, and other necessary equipment, and which also provided for extensive training 
of the municipal staﬀ. While the initial funding for the establishment of IMC is much 
higher than the actual annual savings produced, it must be noted that this investment 
will ﬁnancially “pay oﬀ” by the third year of the joint administration’s functioning, 
and the beneﬁts of the formed alliance will be visible for other projects although not 
transferable to a monetary value. 
The beneﬁts of the joint administration proved to be manifold, including provid-
ing better, more eﬃcient and eﬀective services to the citizens based on the updated 
database and the collecting of a higher percentage of taxes and fees into the budgets of 
the municipalities, which can then be used for municipal activities. The other also very 
important beneﬁts were identiﬁed as minimizing administrative operational expendi-
tures such as salaries and equipment, having an optimal number of employees in the 
municipality, maximum usage of human resources, raising the level of communication 
among citizens and municipalities, and improving municipalities’ images.
6.3 Cooperation Among the Municipalities of Ilinden and Gazi Baba 
 in Establishing a Joint Communal Enterprise
The Law on Public Enterprises in Macedonia provides for the option for formation 
of a joint public enterprise by several municipalities as an important tool for quality 
deliverance of services to their citizens. The dominant model of creating a joint public 
enterprise occurs in the communal sphere of collection, puriﬁcation and supply of 
drinking water and shall be presented through the example of the enterprise between 
the municipalities of Ilinden and Gazi Baba.
Their joint communal enterprise was formed shortly after the signing of the Agree-
ment for Intermunicipal Public Enterprise for the supply of clean drinking water among 
the mayors of both municipalities. The mayors were the initiators for this form of inter-
municipal cooperation although the legally binding decision was adopted a month later 
by the municipal councils of the two cooperating municipalities. The enterprise was not 
a completely new one since it was detached from the previous Public Enterprise Ilinden 
(both waste management and water supply) and transformed into Public Enterprise 
Vodovod Ilinden (only water supply for Ilinden and four villages of Gazi Baba).
The decision for establishment of the joint communal enterprise regulated the 
rights and obligations of the founding municipalities regarding the enterprise’s aim, 
the initial capital, the governing bodies and adoption of decisions, as well as oversight 
and control mechanisms.
The joint communal enterprise was designed to service 12 habitats45 within the 
municipality of Ilinden and four habitats within Gazi Baba, which territorially form 
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a spatial unit inclined for the joint provision of clean drinking water. The initial 
capital necessary for the establishment of the enterprise was determined to total EUR 
70,000 out of which 65 percent or EUR 45,000 were covered by the municipality of 
Ilinden while the remaining 35 percent and EUR 25,000 were transferred from the 
municipal budget of Gazi Baba in proportion to the number of households, counted 
by the Census of 2002, that were to be served by the new communal enterprise. The 
other technical means were provided from the current communal enterprise existing 
on the territory of Ilinden. 
The current maintenance of the water supply systems, managed by the PE Vodovod 
Ilinden, is ﬁnanced by the enterprise. The costs for the maintenance should be calcu-
lated and included in the water supply cost. The water supply cost is decided by the 
council of the municipality of Ilinden based on a bylaw (a methodology regulated by 
bylaw procedures), and is approved by the council of the municipality of Gazi Baba. 
The councils of the municipalities approve both the Regulation on the Use of Assets 
from the operations of the PE Vodovod Ilinden, and the coverage of losses, as well as the 
Regulation on the Liability of PE Vodovod. The founders of the PE Vodovod distribute 
proﬁts from its operations and cover potential losses according to the percentage of their 
contribution to the assets for its establishment. PE Vodovod Ilinden will distribute water 
supply bills to the citizens of the settlements of municipalities of Gazi Baba and Ilinden.
The governing bodies of the joint communal enterprise are the executive board, the 
supervisory board and the director/manager of the enterprise. The executive board is 
comprised of seven members out of whom four are appointed by the municipal council 
of Ilinden and three by the municipal council of Gazi Baba. However, the agreement 
contains a clause that if in the following four years the number of users of service from 
Gazi Baba becomes more than 30 percent of the overall users, then Gazi Baba will ap-
point four and Ilinden three members to the executive board.
The supervisory board is composed of ﬁve members where two are appointed by 
Ilinden and three by Gazi Baba. As with the executive board the reverse clause as is also 
applicable regarding the next four years in the composition of this supervisory body. 
The director/manager is directly appointed by the mayor of Ilinden but there is also a 
technical director who is appointed by the director upon proposal from the mayor of Gazi 
Baba. The director is responsible for implementing the decisions of the executive board. 
Even though there are a lot of checks and balances in the management of the joint 
communal enterprise, the agreement still provides for dual approval from both municipal 
councils for all of the most important actions and documents adopted by the enterprise. 
The IMC unit addresses accountability to citizens as follows: the municipal councils 
approve the annual account, the annual performance report, and the annual investment 
program of the PE Vodovod Ilinden. The annual account and the ﬁnancial report of PE 
Vodovod Ilinden are subject to audit by an independent audit company. In the case of 
a change in the service cost, the citizens of both municipalities are informed through 
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special announcements, municipal websites and the Oﬃcial Gazette, the local media, 
bill collectors of the enterprise, and citizens’ gatherings.
Joint monitoring and evaluation of the PE Vodovod Ilinden are carried out by the 
managing board and the supervisory board of property and ﬁnance audit. The director, 
the councils and the mayors of both municipalities are also involved in the monitoring 
and evaluation process. The PE Vodovod director prepares and submits regular reports 
(quarterly and semi-annually) to the managerial and supervisory boards, which following 
approval, are forwarded to the mayors and the councils. The annual account, annual 
performance report, and the annual investment program of the PE Vodovod Ilinden 
are forwarded to the councils of both municipalities.
The endeavor to establish and manage an intermunicipal joint communal enterprise 
provided numerous beneﬁts for the citizens of both municipalities and at the same time 
presented itself as a very useful model for implementation of the development plans of 
both Gazi Baba and Ilinden. The joint communal enterprise project reconstructed and 
modernized the regional system and supply of clean drinking water, eliminated health 
hazards, improved citizens’ standard of life, and presented the municipalities as reliable 
partners for investment to domestic and foreign business partners. 
The direct and visible beneﬁts from this unit of IMC are:
  improvement of citizens’ quality of life;
  fulﬁllment of the legal obligation as well as the municipal competence to provide 
water supply to all citizens and legal entities;
  saving of ﬁnances by employing joint resources;
  lower unit cost of service provision;
  contribution of the water supply system for promoting a positive climate for 
investment and the establishment of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
in the microregion (this was conﬁrmed when the municipality of Ilinden received 
the “Municipality Award” for implementation of the Local Development Plan).
The expenses for establishing the joint enterprise were minor in comparison to the 
beneﬁts that will be harvested in short time. The reported expenses were the consultant 
fees that amounted to EUR 5,000 for preparation of certain documents, assessments, 
and analyses as external contribution. The adequate capacity of the local administra-
tion was proven when the departments of both municipalities jointly prepared all legal 
regulations. Nevertheless, the hard data for the absolute amount of savings and other 
beneﬁts will require time to calculate once the PE has become operational.46 
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7. POLICY FOR ESTABLISHMENT AND IMPROVEMENT 
 OF INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN THE REPUBLIC 
 OF MACEDONIA
The proﬁling of municipal competences, the legal options for cooperation, the main 
obstacles, incentives as well as the presentation of successful IMC examples still consti-
tute only a list of data which needs to be processed within proactive policy to support 
IMC and replicate its beneﬁts. The policy is a complex issue since it does not envision 
one activity in a certain time by one subject, but represents the multiple eﬀorts of vari-
ous stakeholders over a longer period of time driven to accomplish one general goal. In 
our case this would be to establish and support formation of IMC in the Republic of 
Macedonia as a useful tool to harvest the beneﬁts of lowered expenditures and provide 
cheap and quality services to the citizens.
The policy needs to use all of the good practical examples and include them in its 
structure. Perhaps such an inclusive policy could resolve the issue of why good practices 
are not replicated and their results used by a greater number of municipalities. Actu-
ally that is the answer to why a policy is needed in the ﬁrst place. At present, there are 
successful anecdotal examples throughout the country’s territory, but rarely have the 
good solutions been copied. The policy should address all questions systematically and 
should initiate replication of the adequate practices as needed, as well as develop new 
preemptive solutions to avoid replicating the present. If a policy is not created, then 
long-term sustainability (even of good practices) shall be put at risk.
Keeping in mind that the policy is a complex system of activities by various stake-
holders during a longer period, it will be necessary to compare its results to the baseline 
data, which consists of deﬁning the present situation and determining how things will 
develop in the area of IMC if there are no policy activities. This baseline data should be 
compared to policies that are optimal for the development of IMC and that are feasible 
in terms of their implementation, since optimal solutions made by radical means are 
almost never politically and practically feasible. 
The policy recommendations presented here start with the presumption that the 
territorial re-organization of the municipalities is not possible and it is dangerous to 
incite any activities in this direction. As mentioned earlier this amalgamation can easily 
turn into a tool for political discourse, marginalizing IMC as the primary reason for 
its creation.
In order to create a policy it is important to determine its elements. The components 
of the policy are the issues that need to be addressed in a systematic way and they are 
the problems or the obstacles that need to be tackled. These problems and obstacles are 
already identiﬁed in the ﬁnancial, legal, administrative as well as in the political sphere 
of regulating and practicing IMC.
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7.1 Policy Recommendations 
Legal
After the adoption of the Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation, the most obvious policy 
recommendation is to follow the law and ensure its practical implementation. Hav-
ing the law provides a comparative advantage since there exist clear provisions on the 
thematic issue, which resolves the problem of the “legal vacuum” or at least compiles 
available options and classiﬁes them in a structural order. 
The policy approach should consist of expanding the stakeholders that are allowed 
to incite the cooperation, mainly the private sector, which will be interested in investing 
and sharing in the proﬁt of service provision to the citizens. The policy should also aim 
to attract the NGO sector of the country as a relevant stakeholder in inciting and pro-
moting the IMC concept as there are groups of organizations that have cultural, social 
and other interests that reach beyond the borders of one municipality. This option was 
envisioned in a draft version of the Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation where citizens 
and residents of the municipality, associations, and other legal entities could initiate 
IMC in all areas. However, this solution was not adopted in the ﬁnal text of the law. 
Regardless of the omission of the above provision, if the Law on IMC is interpreted in 
a narrow way, inclusion of these stakeholders may need an amendment to the law but 
another and far better solution would be a broader interpretation of the law and their 
insertion in a strategic paper of the government such as the “Program for implementa-
tion of the Decentralization Process,” which should allow them full capacity to promote 
and initiate IMC. 
The inclusion of these stakeholders shall shift the political discourse for the future 
of IMC beyond the political parties as such, to a dialogue between the local stakehold-
ers (local government, NGOs, citizens) and the central government (Ministry of Local 
Self-government and the government of the Republic of Macedonia). This will refresh 
the political decision-making process while giving more value to the bottom-up principle 
in designing such policies.
The Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation is not a perfect law (as there is no such 
thing) and its provisions should be implemented as a tool to mainstream the initia-
tion and frame the IMC into a deﬁned shape. The current provisions are not strict in 
deﬁning IMC and allow freedom for municipalities to tailor the cooperation that they 
want, the one that most adequately satisﬁes their identiﬁed needs, and in this sense 
amendments to the law are not immediately needed. The implementation of the entirety 
of the law’s provisions according to the spirit of promoting IMC will be satisfactory. 
The correct application of the formation, the broad options for initiation, the right to 
autonomously decide on every aspect of the IMC together with a real ﬁnancial support 
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and regular updating of the registry for IMC will be the route towards implementation 
of the legal provisions. 
The policy, in terms of intervention by the legal standards, will have to be ad-
dressed in the future when suﬃcient information can show whether this legal structure 
is adequate or stricter and more formalized provisions are needed. Having in mind 
that cooperation goes beyond regulation, future implementation and interpretation 
of the law may prove that its lax norms serve adequately; otherwise a revision shall 
be eminent. 
Financial
Present ﬁnancial support is very weak, both for ﬁnancial expenditures in starting the 
IMC, as well as for the continuation of IMC. The wording of the Law on Intermu-
nicipal Cooperation is that the government may (not must) support IMC in “areas of 
broader importance and interest,” and that the government may support IMC among 
municipalities based on criteria determined by the government. 
The policy recommendation would be in practice to turn the word “may” into “must” 
or at least a broad “should” through wider and more extensive determination of “areas 
of broader importance and interest,” hence giving the municipalities support in any of 
their competences upon willingness to cooperate and having a rational proposal. An-
other method is to set a scheme of criteria that will enable the government to assist and 
support pinpointed IMC, but this must be done in a transparent procedure minimizing 
the arbitrary discretion of the government and avoiding that only municipalities with 
mayors belonging to the ruling party or coalition prevail. 
Another more substantial assistance to the municipalities is the replication of the 
solution from the Law on Equal Regional Development that provides for one percent 
of the GDP to be forwarded to the regions for their own projects. The solution for 
IMC does not need to be as high as this (around EUR 60 million) but can represent 
a smaller percentage of the GDP, a percentage from the VAT, or any other central tax 
that should be awarded to cooperating municipalities. The intervention needs to be 
from the central funds only because an intervention in reallocation of the local funds 
will raise a lot of objection from the municipalities and create a negative feeling towards 
IMC. The policy will need to achieve this through legislative amendments both to the 
Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation and to the adequate taxation laws and this is why 
it will be the least likely to happen in practice.
Beyond the grant scheme or the tax or GDP allocation, another policy option is to 
establish a credit/loan line for interested municipalities that need the initial capital for 
investing into the IMC while they expect in due time to save on expenditure and repay 
the credit (with interest). The precondition that the municipalities have the capacity 
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to conceive and run a viable credited project must be secured through credit ratings.47 
The loan can be from either commercial banks, international loaning institutions that 
provide ﬁnancial support with lower interest rates, or even a special fund created for 
supporting loans that address the establishment of IMC.
Loaning is a very viable possibility that is provided in the Law on Financing of 
Units of Local Self-government and has already been used by the municipalities for 
projects that require larger ﬁnancial investments (such as the building and renovation 
of schools, public lighting, and other areas of change). The policy recommendation 
is that the government should assist the municipalities in assessment of their credit 
capacity and if they are solvent, to be the guarantor for the credit in front of domestic 
or international creditors. This will provide the initial capital for the municipalities 
and will cost absolutely nothing to the government while saving in local budgets and 
improving citizen services in the long run. 
One of the methods on municipal borrowing for the initiation and development 
of IMC is the USAID/Macedonia loan program, called Development Credit Authority 
(DCA). Under the program DCA guarantees up to 50 percent of loan amounts taken 
out by municipalities. USAID signed a USD 10 million loan portfolio guarantee so that 
local governments can borrow money for projects designed to improve energy eﬃciency 
and invest in local infrastructure, creating savings for the municipalities and improving 
their ability to access credit in the future.48
Another source of ﬁnance can be the loan that the government took from the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development for improving the services of the 
municipalities in the amount of EUR 18.9 million, with a ﬁve-year grace period and a 
13-year loan repayment program.49 
The last policy recommendation in the ﬁnancial sphere would be for the Minis-
try of Local Self-government to coordinate donor programs and use ﬁnancial grants 
or technical assistance in a systematic way. Currently in the country there are several 
organizations like UNDP and the OSCE, which have a generous grant scheme that, 
with central or local contribution, could raise its eﬀectiveness and sustainability. At 
this point it is important to stress that there can be no possibility for coordination by 
the ministry if no policy is adopted concerning directions of development for IMC. 
The determined strategy of the governmental stakeholders will be a key point in the 
successful coordination of any external assistance. 
The ﬁnancial policy recommendations apply even more so in the present times of 
economic instability and downturn when public expenditure should be reduced or at 
least directed toward systematic spending to alleviate the economy. The savings provided 
by employing IMC are already visible in the ﬁrst year of their implementation and may 
save municipal budgets threatened by lowered level of incomes from business subjects 
within the municipality. 
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Administration and Institutional Support
The legal and ﬁnancial policy interventions cannot be productive unless all of the stake-
holders (both local and central) have the corresponding capacity to absorb its potential. 
For of this reason every municipality should determine at least one of its civil servants 
as a focal point, a person educated in the speciﬁcs of intermunicipal cooperation and 
able to demonstrate these skills by recommending forms of IMC, as well as assessing 
the risks and the beneﬁts of an eventual cooperation, and among other tasks, indicating 
necessary expenses from the municipal budget. This person should remain in a profes-
sional capacity and not be changed after municipal elections change the municipal 
political leadership. 
The same policy should apply for the Ministry of Local Self-government, which 
according to its systematization has already established within its organizational struc-
ture a sector50 for equal regional development and IMC, and a unit for IMC. This unit 
should: perform the tasks regarding policy creation and legislative drafting, at all times 
serve as a reference to the municipal employees, and establish a communication chan-
nel with the municipalities to exchange information, data, results, indicate problems, 
etc. These civil servants should maintain the institutional memory of IMC projects and 
also be the recipients of the products after the ﬁnalization of the mentioned UNDP 
and any other program for IMC. However, even though ﬁve people are supposed to be 
employed in this unit, only one person has been appointed at present and it is uncertain 
when the other positions shall be ﬁlled. For development and further sustainability of 
present IMC practices it is of utmost importance to ﬁll all the positions in the unit 
with qualiﬁed staﬀ who will receive adequate training and will have the capacity to be 
the national institutional pillar for supporting IMC. 
In order for the municipalities not to feel divided in their individual approach to 
the ministry, it is important to have a plenary forum of all mayors that would enable 
them to initiate important questions regarding IMC to national institutions (line 
ministries, government, etc.). This approach is viable through the general assembly of 
ZELS wherein each mayor can address the issue and seek the support of fellow mayors 
to unite under an idea and present it as equal partners in front of the government. 
Another forum for expressing the concluded joint positions of municipalities can be 
the “Commission for initiating and following of the IMC,” established by the Law on 
Intermunicipal Cooperation. In this scenario ZELS has one representative as well as 
one mayor from each of the eight planning regions. This should present a formidable 
counterpart to the central government when deciding on policies and central funding 
towards decentralization issues. 
This administrational support from the municipalities as well as from the ministry 
(or ministries) needs to be adequately trained in order to be able to respond to the given 
tasks. These trainings need to be constantly organized and improved to keep pace with 
W O R K I N G  T O G E T H E R :  I N T E R M U N I C I PA L  C O O P E R A T I O N  I N  F I V E  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E A N  C O U N T R I E S
260
the demands of practical implementation and real-time problem solving. This kind 
of capacity building needs to be directed to all parties concerned, including political 
ﬁgures as well as professional staﬀ. The presentations and trainings need to be given to 
the mayors and members of the municipal councils as well as to the determined staﬀ 
from the administration. The former need to be introduced on how to develop poli-
cies for IMC in their municipalities and how to reach the adequate solution through 
needs assessment and negotiations, and lastly, to be trained in the proper drafting of 
documents of legal validity. 
Previous experiences should be used to train individuals on the forms of IMC 
available to municipalities. For example, a guidebook with template forms and useful 
examples has been designed by LDK consultants for CARDS project, “Technical As-
sistance for implementation and Coordination of Decentralization Process (Phase 1 and 
2),” in order to assist interested municipalities in IMC. Such valuable assets should be 
broadly promoted both on national and local levels. 
Promotion of IMC
The policy should include systematic promotion of the beneﬁts of the IMC, good ex-
amples, best practices, successful methods of problem solving and other themes for a 
more “aggressive” endorsement of intermunicipal cooperation. The promotion should 
be designed to ﬁt the target group towards which it is directed. The promotion directed 
to the citizens would include mass announcements, website information, direct meet-
ings in the neighborhoods, articles in bulletins of the municipality, local television and 
radio stations, etc. The promotion for political stakeholders would vary, so that they 
are informed about issues of their speciﬁc interest. The promotion should overcome the 
main barriers previously identiﬁed, which are the lack of local will and understanding 
of the value of IMC.
A special kind of promotion of best practices is through competition, namely a prize 
to be established for a formed and functional IMC practice. This however must not be 
understood as a prize for establishing IMC, but more urgently, as a reward for the best 
IMC practices. The example can be found in the Municipal Awards Program51 which 
is funded by the EU. For the 2008 awards, the government matched the prize money 
so the ﬁrst, second and third ranked municipality received double the prize amount. 
A condition of the competition can be that the prize money must be used for further 
improvement of IMC (in the same or other competencies).
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Monitoring and Assessment of Policy
The policy will need to be monitored and evaluated and at a due time altered to ﬁt 
the realistic needs of the municipalities. With this it will be the implementation of the 
policy that will be monitored and not the selected forms of IMC. Since the policy will 
include a lot of activities and a lot of stakeholders, it will show its weaknesses in due 
time and it will be of the utmost importance to establish remedial mechanisms on time. 
The assessment will also provide data on how to further develop new policies and to 
achieve greater results.
The most competent body to conduct this monitoring and assessment is the Ministry 
of Local Self-Government, most speciﬁcally the Unit for IMC, which at the same time 
is responsible for maintenance and use the IMC registry as envisioned in the Law on 
Intermunicipal Cooperation. It will be very important to manage the registry in such 
a way that it will provide relevant data that will enable periodical analysis (quarterly, 
semi-annual, annual, etc.) and thus answer the needs of municipalities in creating ad-
equate IMC development policy. 
Political Feasibility
Regardless of the policy recommendations provided above, it must be noted that the 
policy itself will be successful only if accepted by the political stakeholders and deter-
mined as a priority in their work. It is understandable that the milder solutions as well as 
the ones without signiﬁcant ﬁnancial requirements will be easier to implement. Political 
dialogue will be needed in deﬁning the national strategy between the ruling coalition, 
local political stakeholders, and ultimately with the citizens. However, the biggest asset 
of intermunicipal cooperation in this perspective is that it crosses beyond the country’s 
ethnic and party lines since it equally eﬀects all ethnic communities as well as all politi-
cal parties. The positive feature of the cooperation is that creates a much needed social 
capital that may lead only to further forms of cooperation.
7.2 Concluding Remarks
The overall presentation of the situation should serve as a good basis for establishment, 
development, and promotion of practices of intermunicipal cooperation in order for 
the municipalities to be able to harvest its beneﬁts. However, in order for the law and 
the other regulations to be implemented in their full capacity, a well-developed policy 
on IMC must be produced. It is recommended that the political stakeholders who will 
be ultimately responsible for creation of the policy take into consideration the policy 
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recommendations provided in this paper. They will serve as a comprehensive approach 
towards IMC and its potential in Macedonia. Even though some of the recommenda-
tions may seem diﬃcult to implement, in the longer trajectory of development and 
especially for the reason of fully functional sustainability of IMC endeavors, it is neces-
sary to indulge in the extra eﬀort and apply it to the satisfaction and beneﬁt of both 
municipalities and their citizens.
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NOTES
1 Oﬃcial Gazette of Republic of Macedonia 5/2002 (hereafter, Oﬃcial Gazette).
2 Oﬃcial Gazette 61/2004, 96/2004, 67/2007.
3 Oﬃcial Gazette 79/2009.
4 Abbreviation from Zaednica na Edinici na Lokalna Samouprava, www.zels.org.mk 
(Association of Units of Local Self-government).
5 For example a very high percentage of municipalities declared that they have joint 
administration although in fact only three of them have functional joint administration 
as explained in the examples below.
6 http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/kniga_13.pdf.
7 http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/default.aspx?VestID=21098. 
8 See below in chapter regarding languages.
9 http://www.sec.mk:90/2009/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=111&I
temid=109 .
10 http://www.a1.com.mk/vesti/default.aspx?VestID=27896.
11 The people’s vote on the referendum was 94 percent for and 4.89 percent against the 
continuation of the existence of the old territorial organization of 123 municipalities.
12 Lack of local capacities has been an inspiration for IMC and shall be presented by the 
example of cooperation between the municipalities of Veles and Chashka.
13 For e.g. Bosilovo, Vasilevo and Novo Selo; Lipkovo and Arachinovo, Zrnovci and 
Cheshinovo-Obleshevo.
14 These forms of neighborhood organizations do not posses the status of legal entity and must 
function within the organization of the municipality and therefore cannot be considered 
as a separate tier. A great deal of municipalities use this option but there is no obligation 
to do so.
15 The list is derived from Article 22 of the Law of Local Self-Government.
16 Law on primary education, Law on ﬁnancing units of local self-government, etc., as 
examples show if a small municipality does not have the adequate number of staﬀ for tax 
management it cannot enter into the second phase of ﬁscal decentralization, therefore 
the smaller municipality must request services through cooperation from the bigger one 
in order fulﬁll all of the competencies awarded to the local self-government. These cases 
shall be explained later in the example of the cooperation of the municipalities of Veles 
and Chashka.
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17 As presented below in the example of municipalities of Ilinden and Gazi Baba.
18 The central government rarely delegates competencies to the municipalities. It is rather an 
ad hoc exception rather than a regular delegation and for each special delegation a special 
transfer is made from central to local authorities. 
19 Renata Treneska-Deskoska Ph.D. 2007–2008. Accommodating multilingualism at local 
level in the Republic of Macedonia, Local government and Public Sector Reform Initiative, 
Budapest Fellowship Program.
20 Kicevo with surrounding municipalities, Tetovo and Jegunovce, Kumanovo and Lipkovo, 
Saraj and Gjorche Petrov, etc.
21 Robert Hetzog. Inter-municipal cooperation: a viable alternative to territorial amalgamation?
22 The project was referred in the chapter regarding employed methodology. It was ﬁnanced 
by the EU and implemented by the European Agency for Reconstruction.
23 The above mentioned option to create public enterprises for performing services of public 
interest is exercised in the establishment of one joint communal enterprise for the terri-
tory of two or more municipalities. Public enterprises can be founded by the government, 
municipalities or the city of Skopje, but also private and legal commercial entities. The public 
enterprise can be formed by a combination of these subjects in line with the regulations of 
the Law on Public enterprises (Oﬃcial Gazette of RM 38/96; 6/02; 40/03 and 49/06). 
  In areas that are competences of certain public institutions like education, science, 
child care, healthcare, social protection, protection of persons with special needs, the Law 
on Institutions (Oﬃcial Gazette of RM 32/05 and 120/05) awards the option of several 
municipalities to form one institution to serve their entire territory.
24 These are the rules regarding enterprises, urban design, local ﬁnances and taxation, 
education, etc. For example the municipality is free to join other ones in performing its 
competence for urban planning as long as it respects the rules for urban planning, urban 
zones, and other speciﬁc provisions. 
25 Justiﬁcation regarding the necessity of the Draft Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation.
26 Massimo Balducci. 2008. Inter-municipal Co-operation in Italy: a Brief Outline Inter-
municipal Co-operation Ad-hoc Projects or Permanent Institutional Structures? Second 
Regional Workshop. Bratislava, Slovak Republic.
27 One of the draft versions provided for citizens, interest groups and other local stakeholders 
to also be included as the potential subjects to initiate IMC in their respective ﬁeld of 
operation but the ﬁnal adopted text of the Law excluded them from such an opportunity.
28 As mentioned on page 8.
29 Article 9 of the Law on Intermunicipal Cooperation.
30 The lawmaker actually establishes the instruments for providing the services and not the 
services themselves.
31 On February 2, 2010 the government decided to establish this commission. The initial 
meeting of the commission was on March 5, 2010 where initial activities regarding the stra-
tegic approach for development of IMC were undertaken, especially creation of bylaws and 
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other “secondary legislation,” as well as plans for determining which would be the strategic 
areas for IMC development. Source www.imr.org.mk accessed on March 31, 2010.
32 In the earlier versions of the Law it was visible that ZELS was not represented in this 
commission although all of the municipalities are members of this association and ZELS 
has been an active participant in IMC projects implemented with support of the inter-
national donor community. Apparently, ZELS has ascertained its position as a relevant 
stakeholder in the IMC in the country and succeeded in stating its representation in this 
commission. The representative of this institution in the commission is selected from its 
administration and is acting upon directions from the management board of ZELS and 
its executive director to whom he it is also accountable.
33 The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), is a geocode standard 
for referencing the administrative divisions of countries for statistical purposes. http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomenclature_of_Territorial_Units_for_Statistics. 
34 A “Plan Region” is the terminology used in the law and is composed of several municipali-
ties that form a region for development which does not represent a second tier of local self 
government but rather a group of municipalities which determine what are the strategic 
priorities of the named region and try to implement it with resources from the provision 
in the Law on Equitable Regional Development, which allocates one percent of GDP for 
them. However, in practice this one percent is never given to the regions.
35 The project is ﬁnanced by the EU and implemented by the European Agency for 
Reconstruction.
36 Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats. 
37 In an interview, Mr. Georgi Manushev, the former mayor of Bosilovo, a municipality that 
has joint administration, stated “The most diﬃcult thing is to give up power,” meaning 
that mayors need to delegate some of their competencies over to the administration in 
order to establish a functional joint administration.
38 http://www.mls.gov.mk/MLS/FileStorage/File/Zakoni/PSDP%202008%20-2010%20
-%20so%20vgradeni%20zabeleski%20od%20MF%20doc%201.pdf. 
39 IMC for better service provision and EU accession, UNDP Project Concept Note.
40 The information for this part was graciously provided by the staﬀ of the Tax Administration 
Unit in the Municipality of Veles.
41 UNDP Intermunicipal cooperation database (Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia).
42 idem.
43 1 euro is approximately 61.5 MKD.
44 idem.
45 Habitat is the term used in Macedonia instead of village when the rural character does 
not need to be mentioned. 
46 UNDP Intermunicipal cooperation database (Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia). 
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47 For example the municipalities of Strumica and Veles have proven their high credit rating 
and have the capacities to run such projects. http://www.novamakedonija.com.mk/
NewsDetal.asp?vest=212101035252&id=10&prilog=0&setIzdanie=21908.
48 MLGA implementation of the DCA for Macedonia took a major step forward as the 
Municipality of Karpos received approval from the MOF for the very ﬁrst municipal 
borrowing in Macedonia since municipal borrowing has been enabled by the newly enacted 
legislation. The Municipality of Karpos signed the ﬁrst loan agreement with UNI Bank 
guaranteed by USAID DCA guarantee mechanism in the amount of $635,000USD. 
http://www.mlga.com.mk/Project_Components/Planning_Capital_Budgeting_and_
Municipal_Credit.php.
49 Republic Macedonia, Law for taking debt, with a loan from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development according to the Agreement for loan for the Project 
for improving municipal services. Oﬃcial Gazette 71/2009.
50 A Sector is composed of at least two units.
51 http://www.municipalawards2008.com.mk/eng/index.htm. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper aims to assess the current state of intermunicipal cooperation in Romania and 
provide recommendations aimed at increasing the effectiveness and diminishing the demo-
cratic deﬁcit of IMC. 
The methodology used here is mixed, quantitative and qualitative, and combines the 
macro and micro level perspectives on IMC. We discuss in a comparative perspective the 
legal framework for intermunicipal cooperation in Romania and we detail some quantita-
tive data showing current patterns of IMC in Romania. Then we analyze ﬁve case studies, 
representative of the different available legal forms and types of local governments involved 
in an attempt to assess organizational, functional, and accountability-related aspects of 
IMC in Romania.
IMC was introduced in Romania within a context marked by the political unacceptability 
of addressing the issue of local government size and severe tendencies towards centralism 
in the national administrative system, inherited from the Communist regime. At the same 
time, the limited ﬁnancial autonomy of Romanian local governments (resulting from a lack 
of parallelism between the process of decentralization and the re-alignment of intergov-
ernmental ﬁscal relations) makes them dependent on external funding for the initiation of 
signiﬁcant projects. Moreover, accessing external funding is closely linked with the ability 
to plan for local development while accounting for increased policy externalities. These 
aspects make intermunicipal cooperation highly attractive, as local governments perceive 
its potential for ﬁlling the gaps in strategic thinking and administrative capacity. Another 
highly important aspect is the fact that basic service delivery is underdeveloped in rural ar-
eas, which sheds light on the potential economies of scope associated with intermunicipal 
cooperation. This latter aspect is so compelling that any assessment of the effectiveness of 
intermunicipal cooperation in Romania should probably favor the economies of scope over 
the economies of scale.
The policy problem. Intermunicipal cooperation in Romania is vision-oriented and aimed 
at social, economic, cultural, sustainable development. We may even speak of a natural 
tendency towards functionally integrated multi-purpose IMC. But functional fragmentation 
appears in cases where local governments started directly with multi-purpose cooperation, a 
development that, apart from the technical character of some areas (which naturally fueled 
fragmentation), seems to be enhanced by legal provisions and the eligibility requirements 
of funding programs in the area of local public utilities. This fragmentation eventually un-
dermines the extent to which the regional logic gains the upper hand (with consequences 
over joint planning and policy coordination and collective action) and even leads to some 
multi-purpose IMC bodies’ regression from standing organizations to mere policy networks. 
This investigation pointed out that the effectiveness of IMC in Romania should ﬁrst and 
foremost be judged, at least at this point, through the lens of economies of scope. All the 
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cases studied here, and knowledge of other cases as well, suggest that IMC is extremely 
effective in setting up public services (especially local public utilities services) in areas where 
they did not exist before. By pooling their resources together, even some of the more 
disadvantaged local governments manage signiﬁcant steps in improving their services. At 
this point, economies of scale are visible only if we look at IMC bodies as fundraising and 
project management ofﬁces for the member municipalities (something to be found in all 
cases studied here). 
Another important feature of intermunicipal cooperation in Romania is the “frenzy 
of cooperation” resulting from the incentives used by the central government, as pointed 
out by the cases of territorial overlapping of multi-purpose IMC agreements with identical 
purposes. This reduces the level of involvement on behalf of the local governments and 
decreases the chances that the IMC body will be a success. 
A look at the inner workings of IMC bodies suggests that the highly complicated 
decision-making procedures prescribed by the law do affect the speed of decision-making. 
At the same time, however, they ensure a higher degree of control over IMC operations by 
the local councils, which is why they are accepted as such and dealt with. 
Human resources and start-up costs seem to be a problematic area for IMC operations—
a consequence of the size and the ﬁnancial resources of the local governments involved. 
Future policy in this area should deﬁnitely address this topic.
While political control of IMC operations by the local councils is generally achieved, 
the quantity and quality of information provided to the citizens still requires improvement, 
along with the implementation of several legal provisions deriving from legal status of dif-
ferent types of IMC bodies.
Based on these ﬁndings we believe that the goals of future policy in this area should be: 
 to further stimulate the set up of IMC bodies, especially of those involving only rural 
area local governments; 
 to stimulate the institutional development of existing IMC bodies along with higher 
organizational integration of IMC bodies and to diminish tendencies toward IMC 
fragmentation; 
 to increase compliance with transparency and citizens’ access to information, legal 
provisions, and thus, accountability to the citizen; 
 and to improve the informational environment and, through this, to facilitate hori-
zontal communication between local governments on IMC related issues. 
The policy recommendations we put forward involve a signiﬁcant but not radical change 
of policy in this area, without modiﬁcation to the legal framework. Recommendations build 
on the idea that a mix of information, support, and funding would best help solve this policy 
problem. Information involves a mix between capacity building for civil servants in charge of 
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setting up and working with IMC bodies, drafting and distributing a toolkit for intermunicipal 
cooperation in Romania and generally improving the informational environment around 
IMC in Romania. The support component would focus on building a national network of 
support for local governments involved in IMC bodies, preferably by networking experts 
currently working for different IMC bodies or local governments involved in such bodies. 
The funding component would involve the establishment of a program, limited to rural 
area local governments, which would fund the start up costs of multi-purpose IMC bodies.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ATU Administrative-territorial unit (in Romania it legally designates 1st 
tier local governments, corresponds to LAUs as designated by the 
Eurostat)
Banat-Ripensis Banat-Ripensis Microregional Development Association
CoE Council of Europe
CSOs Civil society organizations
CUA Arieş Urban Community (Comunitatea Urbană Arieş)
EC European Commission
EDEN European Destinations of Excellence project 
EU European Union
Horezu Horezu Depression Association (Asociaţia Depresiunea Horezu)
Huedin Inter-Community Development Association of the Vlădeasa-Huedin 
Microregion (Asociaţia de Dezvoltare Intercomunitară Microregiunea 
Vlădeasa-Huedin)
ICDA Inter-community development association
IMC Intermunicipal cooperation
ISPA Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
LAU Local administrative unit
NGO Non-governmental organization
NUTS Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics of the Eurostat
PHARE Programme of Community aid to the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe 
PODCA Administrative Capacity Development Operational Programme 
(Programul Operaţional Dezvoltarea Capacităţii Administrative) 
Regio Regional Operational Programme (Programul Operaţional Regional) 
UCRAP Central Unit for Public Administration Reform (Unitatea Centrală 
pentru Reforma Administraţiei Publice)
ZMO Oradea Metropolitan Area (Zona Metropolitană Oradea)
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1. INTRODUCTION
Intermunicipal cooperation (IMC) is widely seen as a way of coping with the rising 
costs of delivering public services to citizens whose demands are also rising, as well as a 
way of dealing with the issues of municipality size and administrative capacity. To some 
extent, this is also valid for intermunicipal cooperation in Romania. In addition to the 
aspects mentioned above, one more element needs to be emphasized in this respect—in 
Romania intermunicipal cooperation is strongly related to municipalities’ need to get 
external funding (especially EU Structural Instruments funding) for local projects as 
well as to the fact that cooperation is a vehicle for economies of scope. 
The issues to be investigated in relation to intermunicipal cooperation in Romania 
are similar to the issues investigated throughout Europe—legal autonomy issues, aspects 
related to democratic legitimacy and citizen participation, as well as a set of functional 
aspects (responsibilities, resources, and eﬀectiveness). A more recent addition to the list 
of aspects to be investigated is related to a debatable aspect of IMC in Europe—whether 
it is more advisable to encourage the integration or fragmentation of IMC, with each 
side providing its own arguments. To these we add some speciﬁc issues that need to be 
approached given the previously identiﬁed dynamics of IMC in Romania, such as the 
rationality of IMC (size and degree of interdependence between the cooperating local 
governments, especially in the special case of metropolitan areas) or the issue of territo-
rial overlapping of formal IMC with similar functions.
To various degrees, a set of actors has been involved in debating the issue of inter-
municipal cooperation in Romania. On one side, the central government has failed to 
live up to some of the promises it made related to IMC, such as the preparation of a 
toolkit for intermunicipal cooperation in Romania and a dedicated funding program. 
Instead of the toolkit, the Central Unit for Local Administration Reform (UCRAP) 
limited itself to publishing the presentation of two best practices on its website.1 These 
were later complemented by a short guide focusing strictly on some technical aspects 
of cooperation in the area of local public utilities prepared by a diﬀerent unit in the 
Ministry of the Interior and Public Administration Reform. The other promise was 
partially fulﬁlled, as no special funding program was created. Municipalities cooperat-
ing within the legal framework of inter-community development associations (a type of 
IMC body, presented in detail in the following sections) were eligible for funding under 
the Modernization Fund (part of the PHARE 2006 funds). This possibility was poorly 
reﬂected in the guidelines for applicants so, from over 1000 applications, only ﬁve came 
from inter-community development associations (the only legal form of IMC eligible), 
and only one of the ﬁve was selected for funding. On the other hand, NGOs working 
on local government issues, as well as representatives of the Public Services Employers’ 
Association (Patronatul Serviciilor Publice, PSP) pointed to the shortcomings of the 
existing legal framework—including contradictory aspects in diﬀerent laws, unclear 
277
C o u n t r y  R e p o r t s :  R o m a n i a
status (public or private) of the legal forms introduced by a 2006 law—and advocated 
a more pro-active policy on behalf of the central government. The associations of mu-
nicipalities played a limited part in the issue, mostly by promoting some best practices, 
while some municipalities actually involved in intermunicipal cooperation projects 
frequently complained about the diﬃculties of complying with the legal framework 
and covering some start up costs. 
This paper aims at assessing the current state of IMC in Romania and providing rec-
ommendations aimed at ﬁne-tuning current policy in this area in view of increasing the 
eﬀectiveness and diminishing the democratic deﬁcit of current IMC practices in Romania.
This assessment will focus on identifying possible changes in the patterns of inter-
municipal cooperation, since earlier assessments (made by several NGOs) were too close 
in time to the moment when the dedicated legal framework for IMC was introduced. 
So far, the central point in a series of studies and debates focused on one speciﬁc form 
of IMC introduced in 2006 (inter-community development associations, ICDAs) em-
phasized that, according to existing regulations, ICDAs lie somewhere between private 
and public law entities. Their status is subject to divergent interpretations of laws (Brie 
2007a; Brie 2007b; Pop and Horvath 2008; Pop, Stănuş, and Suciu 2007), with con-
sequences for their ability to operate in the area of service delivery. In a study of ICDAs 
in North-Western Romania, Pop, Stănuş, and Suciu (2007) pointed out, among other 
aspects, that existing regulations regarding ICDAs create favorable premises for using 
this type of organization in order to set up and develop local public utilities services. At 
the same time, existing associations have limited eﬀectiveness due to a series of structural 
problems related to expertise, human resources, inﬂexible budgets, and ﬁscal regulations. 
Also, there is a signiﬁcant legitimacy and accountability problem, as decisions made 
in ICDAs imply only indirect electoral legitimacy and little control through local civic 
society institutions (the process is less accessible for civil society, so oversight and control 
is much weaker). These studies are limited in scope and ﬁndings, mostly because much 
eﬀort has been concentrated on pointing out to the policy-maker the inconsistencies 
between some legal provisions. 
Since the legal framework for IMC is recent and municipalities are still becoming 
accustomed to it, it is not our intention to advocate for signiﬁcant changes from this 
perspective. Rather, we will focus on how to rationalize intermunicipal cooperation and 
to address the issue of IMC integration/fragmentation, as well as speciﬁc aspects that 
would help increase the impact of intermunicipal cooperation on local development. 
In the following sections of this paper we will detail some theoretical background 
aspects related to intermunicipal cooperation in Europe, some of the factors inﬂuenc-
ing intermunicipal cooperation in Romania and the methodology employed in order 
to assess the current state of IMC in Romania. We will then discuss, in a comparative 
perspective the legal framework for intermunicipal cooperation in Romania, and we 
will detail some quantitative data showing current patterns of IMC in Romania. Then 
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we will analyze ﬁve case studies, representative of the diﬀerent available legal forms and 
diﬀerent types of local governments involved, in an attempt to assess organizational, 
functional, and accountability related aspects of IMC in Romania. In the same section, 
we also touch upon the positive and less positive eﬀects of the incentives used by the 
central government to stimulate cooperation between local governments. In the last two 
sections of the paper we review alternative policy proposals and make a case for a pro-
posal focused on a mix of actions: the creation by the central government of a ﬁnancial 
support scheme for IMC, capacity building actions undertaken by a set of actors, as well 
as increasing the level of information about the workings of IMC in order encourage a 
more rational approach to cooperation on behalf of local governments. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: IMC IN EUROPE
Intermunicipal cooperation is considered instrumental for improving the scope and 
eﬃciency of local government activities, allowing them to combine resources in order 
to provide higher quality services and take advantage of economies of scale (Bahloul 
2008; Osterriender et al. 2006, v). IMC is one of the strategies used in Europe to cope 
with rising pressures on local governments in the past 20 years, along with amalgama-
tion, limitations on the operational scope and autonomy of local government, and the 
involvement of large privately and publicly owned companies and organizations in 
the fulﬁllment of public tasks (Hulst and Monfort 2007, 4–6). In a study of Spanish 
municipalities, Bel and Fageda ﬁnd that, in practice, intermunicipal cooperation is ac-
tually seen as an alternative to privatization of public services, with many Spanish local 
governments preferring to use intermunicipal cooperation rather than privatization to 
exploit economies of scale, regardless of their size (Bel and Fageda 2008). 
However, several authors underline the need for tailoring intermunicipal cooperation 
to country-speciﬁc circumstances, such as the institutional context and the policy-
making capacity of local governments (see Hulst and Monfort 2007, 2–3; Osterriender 
et al. 2006, v). This is the obvious explanation for the diversity marking intermunicipal 
cooperation, pointed out by Hertzog (2008): there are many possible forms of IMC, 
there are diﬀerent motivations for their creation, and they diﬀer in terms of objectives 
and membership. This is of course paralleled by a diversity of policy and institutional 
frameworks for IMC enacted by central governments around Europe, ranging from 
highly restrictive to highly permissive (detailed in the Council of Europe’s report, Good 
practices in intermunicipal cooperation in Europe).2
An increasing amount of literature on IMC focuses on the set of conditions neces-
sary for successful intermunicipal cooperation. Swianiewicz (2008) lists among these 
conditions: the existence of a legal framework, incentives for IMC (from the central 
government and/or the EU, ﬁnancial and/or functional incentives), and a culture of 
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cooperation and leadership. Data from Germany, where intermunicipal cooperation is 
either project-or vision-oriented, reveals that project-oriented intermunicipal coopera-
tion initiatives with a clear goal have been more successful than others (Osterriender 
et al. 2006, 45).
Some authors point to the existence of capacity development challenges to eﬀective 
intermunicipal cooperation and quality service delivery and mention several aspects 
of local government where intervention is needed: leadership capacities, facilitation 
skills, contract management, project development and management skills, cooperation 
and negotiation skills, analytical skills and the capacity to evaluate feasibility studies 
(Osterriender et al. 2006, 40–41). Focusing on Macedonia, Dauti (2008) also lists several 
challenges: the long-term sustainability of IMC, beyond the terms in oﬃce of present 
local elected oﬃcials; the need for permanent facilitation (disseminating experience, 
balancing interests, providing necessary technical assistance and ﬁnancial support for 
the initial set up), and the hesitation of local authorities to embark on IMC due to the 
lack of resources and experience. 
IMC presents a dilemma between eﬀectiveness and democracy (Houlberg 2008), 
given the fact that it reduces (or even annuls) citizens’ capacity to control the decisions 
in exchange for eﬀectiveness and economic viability. Swianiewicz (2008) includes weak 
democratic control and transparency in a list of problematic aspects of IMC along with 
the political costs of cooperation, the slow decision-making process, local particular-
ism, and costs due to the duplication of administrative structures. Assuming we accept 
as such this reduction of the citizen’s role, there are still some questions that need to 
be asked regarding the extent to which democratically elected local councils are able 
themselves to control IMC operations on behalf of the citizens. We must link the issue 
of democratic control over IMC operations with the response we give to the following 
question: Is intermunicipal cooperation more of a political or a technical problem? Re-
search on IMC in Western Europe, be it from an academic or practitioner’s perspective, 
appears to highlight the technical aspects of the issue. Political aspects are addressed 
only to mention that IMC is usually the norm in countries where central governments 
consider the political costs of resorting to other options—such as territorial reform or 
limitations to the operational scope of local governments—as being too high. 
At ﬁrst glance and in most countries IMC is primarily an issue of voluntary co-
operation between local governments. However, the list of conditions for successful 
intermunicipal cooperation, as well as the various challenges identiﬁed in various coun-
tries, and the need to solve the problem of the democratic deﬁcit of IMC, suggests that 
this is an important policy issue for central governments. The manner in which such a 
policy issue is handled depends though, to a large extent, on contextual factors such as 
formal state structure, but also on the norms, values, informal rules and traditions that 
inﬂuence intergovernmental relations and interaction (Hulst and Montfort 2007a, 13). 
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3. THE CONTEXT FOR IMC: SOME ASPECTS OF LOCAL
 GOVERNMENT IN ROMANIA
Any assessment of government policy in the area of intermunicipal cooperation is highly 
context based, as previous investigations have pointed to the link between speciﬁcs of 
local government in a given country and the patterns of intermunicipal cooperation 
(following Hulst and Montfort 2007). In the following paragraphs we brieﬂy look 
at the scale, position in the state administration, character and scope (functions and 
level of expenditure), and the degree of autonomy and discretion the Romanian local 
government enjoys in exercising its functions. The Romanian local government can be 
characterized as multifunctional territoriality-based or, using Wollman’s (1998) wording, 
the “classical” European model. If we compare the Romanian national administrative 
system with the ones in Western Europe, we will ﬁnd a similarity to the Southern Eu-
ropean model, mostly due to the unwillingness of elected oﬃcials to pay the political 
costs of forced amalgamation.
3.1 Types, Numbers, and Size
Romania has a two-tier local government. The ﬁrst level, administrative-territorial units 
(ATUs), corresponds to the LAU level 2, while the second level—the counties—cor-
responds to NUTS level 3. There are three types of ATUs: municipality (municipiu), 
town, and commune. Municipalities and towns correspond to urban areas, but in 
most cases these units include an urban area plus one or more villages. The distinction 
between municipalities and towns is traditionally based on criteria such as the size of 
the population, territorial size, or factors related to the historical, social, economic, and 
cultural importance. Communes are made up of two or more villages and hamlets. 
Counties are made up of territorial-administrative units and a county capital that is 
always a municipality. The capital city of Bucharest has a special status, to some extent 
similar to the counties.
Table 5.1 
Romanian Local Government at January 1, 2009—Synthetic Statistical Data
Number of 
1st tier local 
governments
Minimum 
population
Maximum 
population
Maximum 
population 
(without 
Bucharest)
Average number 
of inhabitants per 
local government
Average number 
of inhabitants per 
local government 
(without Bucharest)
3,180 142 2,067,545 350,581 7,172.96 6,524.84
Source: National Institute for Statistics, TEMPO Online database and Romania în cifre, www.insse.ro, 
retrieved March 7, 2009, June 27, 2009, respectively. 
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National level data as of January 1, 2009 show the existence of 41 counties, 103 
municipalities, 217 towns, and 2,860 communes. Also in 2008, the 2,860 communes 
included 12,487 villages, with an average of 4.37 villages per commune. This ﬁgure is 
highly relevant as it is an argument in favor of the idea that Romanian ﬁrst tier local 
government is not community-based but rather service delivery oriented. 
Table 5.2 
Size of Romanian Local Government, January 1, 2009
Urban
—Municipalities and towns (excluding Bucharest)
Rural
—Communes
Under 5,000 21 Under 1,000 75
5,000– 19,999 198 1,000– 1,999 587
20,000– 49,999 57 2,000– 4,999 1,743
50,000– 199,999 20 5,000– 9,999 432
200,000– 999,999 10 10,000 and over 23
Source: National Institute for Statistics, TEMPO Online database, www.insse.ro, retrieved March 7, 2009. 
Note: * By law entitled to a metropolitan area.
In terms of size, the Romanian local governments are rather small, 2,405 out of 
Romania’s 3,180 municipalities are communes (rural area local governments) with less 
than 5,000 inhabitants. This ﬁgure suggests that achieving economies of scale for most 
of the public services is rather impossible if local governments provide services on their 
own. After 1989 there has been some variation in terms of numbers (an increase from 
2,888 ATUs in 1990 to 3,180 in 2008) and the types of local governments (change of 
ranking), but this did not produce signiﬁcant shifts in terms of size. 
3.2 Position in State Structure and Degree of Autonomy
Any analysis of the formal position of local government only reveals part of its actual 
autonomy and policy discretion (Hulst and Monfort 2007, 3); and this applies to the 
Romanian case as well. The principles of local autonomy and decentralization are set 
forth in the Romanian Constitution. However, the autonomy of Romania’s local gov-
ernments is limited by a series of factors. 
First, the reform of the administrative system after 1989 involved the simultaneous 
application of both the principles of decentralization and de-concentration resulting 
in overlapping functions between the de-concentrated central government institu-
tions and the local governments, with consequences for sectoral policy-making and 
implementation (see Impactul serviciilor deconcentrate ale ministerelor asupra politicilor 
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publice locale, 2007). At the same time, de-concentration led to the transformation 
of the prefect’s oﬃce into a powerful local actor tending to exercise not only legality 
control (which is formally part of its duties) but also opportunity control over local 
governments (Coman et al. 2001; Impactul serviciilor deconcentrate ale ministerelor 
asupra politicilor publice locale, 2007). Secondly, no post-1989 sectoral decentraliza-
tion was paralleled by a realignment of intergovernmental ﬁscal relations (Bischoﬀ 
and Giosan 2007), leaving local governments with local autonomy but no ﬁnancial 
resources. Moreover, the same authors speak of ad hoc rather than actual decentral-
ization mostly motivated by the need to transfer deﬁcits to local budgets (Bischoﬀ 
and Giosan 2007). Thirdly, while a 2004 law ﬁnally introduced a clear division of 
functions between diﬀerent tiers of the national administrative system, this only sanc-
tioned the fragmenting of responsibilities among diﬀerent layers of the administrative 
system. This is very well exempliﬁed by the situation in the education system with 
perogatives divided among the central government, central government deconcen-
trated institutions, county councils and local councils. This is said to reﬂect a lack 
of administrative capacity, but it also reﬂects a choice towards bureaucratization and 
centralization (Bischoﬀ and Giosan 2007, 8). These aspects limit the capacity of local 
governments to formulate and implement local sectoral public policies, despite their 
status as entities with full authority and responsibility in all matters related to the 
local public interest within the limits of their territory. 
3.3 Character and Scope
The character and scope of any local government is deﬁned by the functions it performs; 
the level of expenditures corresponding to local governments can sometimes illustrate 
this. In this subsection, we look at the functions of local governments in Romania and 
at the extent to which discretion in exercising these functions is aﬀected by ﬁscal and 
ﬁnancial aspects.
According to 2004 changes to the legal framework, Romanian local governments 
have three categories of functions: own, shared and delegated. Own functions are the 
exclusive responsibility of local governments, including ﬁnancial aspects. Shared func-
tions are divided between local governments and other administrative tiers, each tier 
being partially responsible for the expenses. Delegated functions involve transfers of 
responsibilities from the central government to the local governments, accompanied 
by transfers of necessary funds from the central to the local level. The point of interest 
is, of course, the exclusive functions of the local governments, representing areas where 
full autonomy is exercised if enough ﬁnancial resources are available. The exclusive func-
tions of ﬁrst tier local governments in Romania include: the management of emergency 
situations at the local level; local public utilities provision (water supply and puriﬁca-
tion, sewage, district heating, local waste management, local public transport, public 
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lightning); maintenance of local roads and streets (municipalities only); administration 
of local public property; spatial planning; some areas of protection for the elderly and 
for victims of family violence; management of some public health institutions; and 
some culture related functions.
The ﬁscal autonomy of local governments in Romania grew signiﬁcantly after the 
1998 introduction of the Law on Local Public Finances, which gave local governments 
the right to set up local taxes and decentralized collecting mechanisms, as shown by a 
steady increase in local government spending illustrated in Table 5.3. This increase must 
be regarded with caution, because it is paralleled by variation in central government 
spending and a general increase in spending. 
Table 5.3 
Local and Central Government Spending, 1999–2008
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Local government 
spending as percent of GDP
4.0 4.4 6.4 6.5 6.7 7.0 7.1 8.4 9.6 9.8
Central government 
spending as percent of GDP
27.5 27.9 26.1 25.3 24.9 24.8 24.8 26.9 27.0 28.1
Source: Eurostat. Available online: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu, June 2009.
Sharing mechanisms were introduced simultaneously, and they involved the 
transfer of a portion of personal income taxes directly to local governments. Based 
on size in terms of population, local governments’ revenues from personal income 
taxes became a signiﬁcant portion of local budgets. However, local governments 
have no control over the tax rate and occasionally the tax base, so local control over 
budgetary revenues, tax rates, and tax bases is minimal (Copaciu 2007, 80). Other 
signiﬁcant portions of the local budgets come from earmarked transfers (part of 
the value added tax revenues) and the so-called equalization transfers. Equalization 
transfers come from upper levels in the administrative system and are based on a 
legal provision that conditions the decentralization of functions by the transfer of 
appropriate ﬁnancial resources from the upper to the lower level. While the most 
important source of revenues for most urban areas comes from the share of personal 
income tax and local taxes, local governments in rural areas actually depend on ear-
marked and equalization transfers for their budgets. Data from 2006 dealing with 
municipalities’ revenues, based on a survey, put the own revenues at 36 percent, with 
earmarked transfers at 53 percent and other transfers at 11 percent (Copaciu 2007). 
Rural local governments’ dependency on equalization and earmarked transfers have 
led to signiﬁcant consequences. In the area of education, for example, decentraliza-
tion made local governments responsible for school maintenance and led to uneven 
per student maintenance expenditures, as richer local governments had their own 
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funds to invest into their schools while poorer ones only had equalization funds to 
draw from (Bischoﬀ and Giosan 2007).
3.4 The Pressures: Administrative Capacity and the Development 
 of Public Service Delivery
While taking into account the systemic features of Romania’s local governments, we 
must also review some of the pressures confronting local governments, as these also in-
ﬂuence how intermunicipal cooperation is shaped and how successful it is. The previous 
subsections pointed to some of these pressures, such as size and the associated political 
taboo of territorial reform, the problematic autonomy of local governments, and ﬁscal 
autonomy issues. To these we can add the low level of administrative capacity and the 
under-development of public service delivery, especially in rural areas. 
A 2006 study by the Ministry of the Interior and Administrative Reform (Raport 
asupra rezultatelor cercetării administrative… 2006) pointed out some relevant aspects 
for the level of administrative capacity, linked to local governments’ ability to attract 
external funding for their projects. Among others, we mention the inability to draft 
local development strategies (in 2006, 48 percent of the municipalities in Romania did 
not have a local development strategy; 37 percent of the municipalities that have a local 
development strategy had to ask for outside help or had their strategies developed by 
third parties). Of course, when you expand out to the next ranks in the administrative 
system—towns and communes—the administrative capacity is even lower. The low 
level of administrative capacity of the rural municipalities is highlighted by the success 
rate in accessing funds dedicated to the modernization of their structures and services 
(PHARE funds for the modernization of public administration)—9 percent for com-
munes compared to 70 percent for county councils.
Table 5.4
Service Provision—Water Supply and Sewage Services, 
Coverage of Urban and Rural Areas, 2004–2006
Year Water supply Sewage and water puriﬁcation
Urban Rural Urban Rural
2004 309
98.41%
1,551
54.86%
302
96.18%
373
13.19%
2005 315
98.75%
1,620
56.82%
306
95.92%
386
13.54%
2006 317
99.06%
1,682
58.93%
308
96.25%
400
14.02%
Source: National Institute for Statistics, TEMPO online database, retrieved March 7, 2009. 
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This level of administrative capacity is combined with poor quality or entirely lacking 
public services, especially in the area of local public utilities. Taking water supply, water 
puriﬁcation, and sewage services, Table 4 shows that, mostly due to the change of rank-
ing for some ATUs, by 2006 even urban areas were not fully covered by such services. 
For rural areas, the situation is much worse with 58.93 percent of the area covered by 
water supply services and 14.02 percent by water puriﬁcation and sewage services.
4. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK, METHODS AND DATA
Any in-depth assessment of how intermunicipal cooperation has worked in Romania 
is, of course, highly contextual. In the following paragraphs, we list some of the basic 
premises of this assessment which resulted from the previous sections. Then we deﬁne 
some of the terminology used and clarify our view on what accountability and eﬀective-
ness mean in this context. We detail the methodology used and brieﬂy describe the data 
collected before detailing some problems with data collection. We end with some policy 
recommendations in the area of transparency, citizen information, and the collection 
of national statistical data.
Intermunicipal cooperation functions in a broader social, economic, demographic, 
cultural, and technological environment (Hulst and Montfort 2007a, 15). We must 
keep in mind that the introduction of intermunicipal cooperation in Romania is linked 
with the political unacceptability of addressing the issue of local government size and 
severe tendencies towards centralism in the national administrative system, inherited 
from the Communist regime. At the same time, the limited ﬁnancial autonomy of Ro-
manian local governments (resulting from a lack of parallelism between the process of 
decentralization and the realignment of intergovernmental ﬁscal relations) makes them 
dependent on external funding for the initiation of signiﬁcant projects. Moreover, ac-
cessing external funding is closely linked with the ability to plan for local development 
while accounting for increased policy externalities. These aspects make intermunicipal 
cooperation highly attractive, as local governments perceive its potential for ﬁlling the 
gaps in strategic thinking and administrative capacity. Another highly important aspect 
is the fact that basic service delivery is under-developed in rural areas, which sheds light 
on the potential economies of scope associated with intermunicipal cooperation. This 
latter aspect is so compelling that any assessment of the eﬀectiveness of intermunicipal co-
operation in Romania should probably favor economies of scope over economies of scale.
For analytical purposes we use here a somewhat broad deﬁnition of intermunicipal 
cooperation that also includes situations in which two or more local governments co-
operate between themselves and with other actors such as NGOs, private companies, 
and agencies at diﬀerent levels of the government (for example, the prefect’s oﬃces, 
deconcentrated institutions or county councils). The latter case is usually labeled as 
286
W O R K I N G  T O G E T H E R :  I N T E R M U N I C I PA L  C O O P E R A T I O N  I N  F I V E  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E A N  C O U N T R I E S
vertical cooperation and is excluded from the deﬁnition of intermunicipal coopera-
tion. We did not restrict this investigation to pure forms of intermunicipal cooperation 
(including only ﬁrst-tier local governments) due to the particular conditions in which 
the ﬁrst instances of IMC appeared in Romania—before a legal framework was enacted 
and, often enough, donor-driven and stimulated by an NGO. 
For the purposes of this analysis, we use a working deﬁnition of eﬀectiveness of 
intermunicipal cooperation that emphasizes, based on previous work reﬂected in 
Hulst and Montfort (2007) and the Council of Europe 2007 report on IMC, the 
following aspects: 
  the degree of organizational integration and its impact on planning and policy 
coordination; 
  actual joint projects and service delivery (if it is the case) and the extent to which 
economies of scale or economies of scope are achieved;
  ﬂux of decision-making (ability to make decisions in a timely and due manner, 
administrative-bureaucratic aspects of decision-making processes); 
  subjective eﬀectiveness (satisfaction of local governments involved, perceived 
cost-beneﬁt ratio of cooperation).
The investigation of accountability is twofold and accounts for both the political 
representation aspect of IMC and the similarity with the area of contract public service; 
that is a look at both the political and technical aspects of accountability. Ingram (2005) 
identiﬁes three dimensions of accountability in the contract public service, which are also 
applicable to the area of intermunicipal cooperation: the legal-contractual dimension, 
the performance dimension, and proﬁt (Ingram 2005, 18–20). Since intermunicipal 
cooperation is something rather new in Romania it is too early to look at the third 
dimension. According to previous analyses legal-procedural (statutes, contracts) and 
performance accountability mechanisms (monitoring bureaus and procedures) do exist. 
While assessing the functionality of these mechanisms we will also look at the political 
component of intermunicipal cooperation, with a focus on the organization of political 
representation and the extent to which IMC in Romania is accountable to elected local 
oﬃcials (mayors and councils). Another distinct aspect taken into account involves a 
participatory view on local democracy and looks at citizen information, consultation, 
and engagement in IMC operation and decision-making. 
This assessment of intermunicipal cooperation in Romania tries to balance the 
macro perspective, which is focused on identifying national level trends, with a micro 
perspective, focused on identifying the inner workings of such forms of cooperation. 
The ﬁrst stage of the assessment involves document analysis on primary legislation 
(referring directly to diﬀerent legal forms under which local governments can cooper-
ate), and secondary legislation (with indirect application, such as the law on public 
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property or the law regarding the contestation of administrative acts). We also look at 
policy documents by the Central Unit for Local Administration Reform and documents 
spelling out minimal requirements for accessing EU structural funding in the area of 
public services. This analysis aims to reveal the type of intermunicipal cooperation that 
the central government is trying to encourage and the extent to which current policy 
creates a ﬂexible enough framework for IMC that allows it to address the pressures 
confronting local government in Romania. Data for this stage of the analysis was col-
lected between June 2008 and October 2009.
The second stage of the assessment tries to identify some patterns of intermunicipal 
cooperation in Romania by looking at numbers. A secondary data analysis based upon 
the National Register of Associations and Foundations allows us to account for the 
number and evolution in time of formal associations of local governments in Romania 
(including ICDAs and NGOs). At this point, we also address issues such as their size, 
regional distribution, or the purpose of the association as stated in the establishment 
documents or in the sector. Raw data for this stage was collected in October 2008 and 
it consequently covers formal associations of local governments legally registered before 
September 30, 2008. Data does not allow us to talk about aspects such as the size of the 
local governments most likely to cooperate. In addition, it does not allow us to evalu-
ate the extent to which there is territorial overlapping of multi-purpose intermunicipal 
cooperation, one of the key issues pointed out by previous studies (Pop, Stănuş, and 
Suciu, 2007). This happens due to serious problems in data recording and transparency.
The last stage of the analysis involves an in-depth comparative analysis of ﬁve cases 
selected using the most dissimilar systems design strategy borrowed from comparativists 
in political science (Przeworski and Teune 1970), based on several criteria and avail-
ability of data issues. The cases analyzed cover the diﬀerent legal forms available for 
IMC, cooperation between municipalities of diﬀerent types, and diﬀerent purposes 
of cooperation. Given the lack of oﬃcial statistics and databases referring to diﬀerent 
IMC entities, this stage of the analysis provides the sole opportunity for the in-depth 
analysis of the eﬀectiveness and accountability surrounding IMC in Romania. The 
case study protocol designed for this stage of the research involves conducting one 
in-depth interview with personnel in charge of managing the organizations studied, 
two or three short interviews with project managers, mayors or other relevant actors, 
an analysis of the statutes and strategic documents from the organizations, an analysis 
of annual activity reports (if available), as well as an analysis of these organizations’ 
presence in local media or in available minutes of the local council’s meetings. Data 
for this stage of the analysis was collected between January and February 2008.
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5. THE LEGAL, POLICY, AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
This section primarily discusses the legal framework for intermunicipal cooperation 
in Romania, based on the analysis of both primary legislation3 (referring directly to 
diﬀerent legal forms under which local governments can cooperate) and secondary 
legislation (with indirect application, such as the law on public property or the law 
regarding the contestation of administrative acts). Because this paper aims at broadly 
assessing IMC in Romania, and keeping in mind its potential role in furthering local 
development, we will not focus on highly technical legal provisions associated with 
cooperation in the area of service delivery, such as those referring to speciﬁc steps for 
concession of service or procurement. Instead, we will focus on the extent to which 
the legal provisions approach issues such as the need for the integration of planning 
and policy-making, the degree of ﬂexibility allowed, the organization of political 
representation and the establishment of minimal accountability mechanisms, and 
central government obligations to support IMC. In addition, we expand this analysis 
beyond pure IMC, to include forms of cooperation involving non-local government 
actors. After a description of the legal forms for intermunicipal cooperation avail-
able, we will approach some of the key issues deriving from the critical analysis of 
this legal framework. We will also brieﬂy look at the minimal policy and institutional 
framework currently in place and assess its possible inﬂuence on the way IMC is 
shaped in Romania.
5.1 Available Legal Forms
The existing legal framework allows for the following types of intermunicipal cooperation:
  non-governmental organization, based on the provisions of the Law regarding 
associations and foundations, a form of private law that allows municipalities 
to cooperate both with other municipalities an actors such as NGOs, private 
companies, public authorities or individuals;
  inter-community development association (ICDA), based on the provisions 
of the Law No. 215/2001 of local public administration and its modiﬁcations 
through Law No. 286/2006, with a quasi-public status (to be explained below), 
which can be either multi-purpose IMC or single purpose;
  inter-community development association for local public utilities (local public 
utilities ICDA), based on the provisions of the Law No. 51/2006, single purpose 
bodies with public status, allowed to take over local public utility services whose 
management implies use of and making investments on public property. The 
local public utilities ICDA may operate the services itself, contract a private 
company, or set-up a private company. In each case, the legal entity taking over 
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the service needs to be authorized as a regional service provider by a central 
government agency. 
Technically, Romanian law allows for other forms of cooperation as well, such as the 
conclusion of identical service contracts with a private company by a number of mu-
nicipalities. Nevertheless, these forms of cooperation are rather rare for two reasons. The 
legalistic tradition in Romania leads to a strong preference on the part of municipalities 
for legally binding forms of cooperation. Secondly, clear preference is given to forms of 
cooperation that facilitate access to funds coming through the Structural Instruments in 
Romania 2007–2013. The eligibility requirements of these funding programs support 
the increase in numbers of ICDAs and local public utilities ICDAs. Consequently, we 
will focus our analysis on these three legal forms of intermunicipal cooperation. 
The basic principles are explicit in several pieces of legislation, most importantly 
in the Law on Local Public Administration (No. 215/2001) and the Framework Law 
for Decentralization (No. 195/2006), but also in the Law on Regional Development 
in Romania (No. 315/2004). These laws specify the right of local governments to vol-
untarily associate themselves in order to pursue their objectives; they are not limited to 
the county or the development region they belong to. 
Non-governmental organizations. Local governments in Romania may use this private 
legal form to make their cooperation oﬃcial. For a long time this was actually the only 
legal form for IMC available, so its use remains widespread. Three or more local govern-
ments can set up an association, based on legal provisions regarding associations and 
foundations. This legal form allows local governments, if they so wish, to include other 
actors—such as private companies, public institutions, NGOs, or individuals—in the 
structure of cooperation. Like any other NGO, associations comprising local govern-
ments can apply for and obtain the public utility status—which gives them preferential 
access to funds from state and local budgets and the use of public buildings. It also 
compels them to publish annual ﬁnancial and narrative reports in the oﬃcial bulletin 
(Monitorul Oﬁcial). These entities cannot take over public utilities and public services 
from the local governments and are more adequate for purposes such as tourism promo-
tion, cultural activities, or coordination and planning for local development activities. 
These bodies need to comply with a set of requirements regarding membership, decision-
making, funding, procedures to be followed in case of changes in the leadership, and 
procedures to be followed in case of dissolution. The sources of funding acceptable by 
law are membership fees, donations, grants, and direct economic activity. 
Inter-community development associations (ICDAs) are private law bodies based 
on the legal provisions of Law No 286/2006 introducing modiﬁcations to Law No. 
215/2001 on Local Public Administration. These entities receive by default the public 
utility status, with all associated rights and obligations mentioned above. This public 
utility status, along with other legal provisions such as allowing local governments to 
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transfer responsibilities to these bodies entitles us to mention that these entities have 
quasi-public status. As mentioned above, this was one of the most debated aspects of 
IMC policy in Romania so far, with mounting arguments coming from NGOs and 
representatives of the Public Services Employers’ Association to give these entities public 
status. As long as the law literally states that these entities have private status, legislation 
regarding transparency and citizen information does not apply. 
Based on explicit legal provisions they are able to take over functions from local gov-
ernments. ICDAs can be multi-purpose or single-purpose based on the decisions of their 
members. A debatable aspect related to ICDAs is their ability to take over and manage 
local public utility services that imply the use of and make investments on public property 
due to their unclear (public or private law) status. Only the local council can decide, by 
a two-thirds majority, whether public property or local public services can be given in 
administration or concession, or rented to somebody else. Similarly, only local councils, 
by simple majority of councilors in oﬃce, are allowed to make decisions regarding the 
local budget, contracting loans, participating in county, regional, or cross-border coop-
eration programs, and on the association or cooperation with other public authorities. 
A very important aspect diﬀerentiating ICDAs from NGOs are clear speciﬁcations 
referring to the representation of members. The legal framework clearly states that the 
representatives of the territorial-administrative units are named by a decision of the local 
council and must reﬂect the political conﬁguration resulting from the last local election. 
This is the single most important legal provision addressing the issue of accountability 
and legitimacy of the ICDAs. Similar to local governments, ICDAs are allowed to ap-
point a public manager (a position corresponding with that of the city manager) by a 
unanimous decision. 
Funding for ICDA comes from membership fees, grants, donations, companies 
owned by ICDAs or direct economic activities, much similar to the structure of fund-
ing for NGOs. Additionally, the Law on Local Public Administration states that the 
central government, through the Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform, will 
provide funding for ICDAs through a national funding program. This legal provision 
was never applied in full, with representatives of the ministry claiming that the PHARE 
2006 Modernization Fund was such a funding program, merely because ICDAs were 
marginally eligible for funding.
Metropolitan areas should be treated separately, even though they become functional by 
the use of one of the above-mentioned legal forms, due to some speciﬁc legal provisions. 
According to the law, only the capital city of Bucharest and the 10 municipalities over 
200,000 inhabitants (ﬁrst-tier municipalities) are allowed to form metropolitan areas. 
Metropolitan areas can be expanded to include local governments up to a distance of 30 
kilometers from the municipality. The only other criterion for inclusion in the metro-
politan area speciﬁed by law is “the existence of cooperation in multiple areas” between 
the municipality and the urban or rural neighboring municipalities (Law No. 351/2001 
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regarding national territorial planning). This criterion suggests that metropolitan areas 
should be constituted taking into account the degree of interdependence and policy 
externalities between the respective local governments. There are no provisions that 
would ensure the enforcement of this criterion. In the absence of other speciﬁc legal 
provisions, metropolitan areas can be organized using either the NGO or the ICDA as 
a legal framework. 
Local public utilities ICDAs are organized based on the provisions of Laws No. 
215/2001 and No. 51/2006 regarding local public utilities services, but some of the 
provisions of the Governmental Ordinance No. 26/2001 regarding associations and 
foundations are also applicable. Local public utilities ICDAs are limited to a speciﬁed 
set of services: water supply, water puriﬁcation and sewage, centralized heating systems; 
sanitation and waste management; public lighting; administration of public property; 
and local public transport. Cooperation in these areas has been approached separately 
by the legislator due to its technical nature and the need to harmonize general provisions 
with speciﬁc provisions related to service in these areas.
Local public utility ICDAs are assimilated with public institutions, meaning they are 
public law bodies. This explicitly entitles them to administer public services and public 
property. However, due to the speciﬁcs of the services in these areas—public property 
involved and investments necessary—decision-making with regard to key issues remains 
a prerogative of local governments (speciﬁcally, of local councils). 
Local public utility ICDAs can be either single or multi-purpose according to the 
legal provisions. Due to the complicated technical requirements and the almost com-
plete reliance of local governments on external funding for investments in these areas 
(with most funding programs requiring the existence of a single purpose association 
of municipalities), we expect that local governments prefer to organize single-purpose 
local public utility ICDAs. This is supported by the cases studied here, as well as by 
information referring to other cases, collected for the 2007 Public Policy Centre’s study 
of ICDAs in northwestern Romania. 
There are three options for actually managing the services after they are delegated 
to the local public utility ICDAs:
  direct management of service by the association, by creating a special internal 
department with this purpose;
  delegation to a private company whose shareholders must be, at least in part, 
the local councils or the ICDA;
  delegation to a third party, based on speciﬁc legal procedures for delegation, the 
available options being the concession of services or a public-private partnership.
No matter what the option for actual management of service is, by law, the ATUs 
remain responsible for policy-making in the respective ﬁeld and the development of 
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services. Therefore, they are compelled to establish special units in charge of monitoring, 
controlling, and supervising the implementation of delegation contracts, the contracts 
with beneﬁciaries/citizens, the quality of service, the price of service, the management, 
and the functionality of utility networks. 
5.2 Encouraging Integrated or Fragmented IMC?
The way IMC is being shaped in Romania also depends on the incentives used by the 
central government to stimulate cooperation as part of the policy and institutional frame-
work. However, this framework has remained minimal. The Central Unit for Public 
Administration Reform from the Ministry of the Interior manages, among a variety 
of tasks, aspects related to IMC. Policy in this area is focused on promoting IMC via 
public declarations encouraging IMC, usually made at the meetings of the national 
associations of local government, and embedding some incentives in the structure of 
funding programs managed by the ministry (PHARE Modernization Fund, PODCA—
Development of Administrative Capacity Operational Program). There was no explicit 
policy to promote cooperation yet the central government eﬀectively managed to signal 
local governments that this was desirable. The incentives used are deﬁnitely ﬁnancial 
in nature, but without involving special expenses made by the central government. 
Prior to the eﬀective launch of the Structural Instruments in Romania, during a series 
of public speeches and conferences, representatives of the Ministry of the Interior and 
Administrative Reform promoted IMC as the only chance most local governments had 
to access structural funds. This incentive proved to be successful, as pointed out by the 
increasing number of IMC bodies being legally registered. However, when ﬁnancial 
incentives are used to promote joint planning and programming of local policies, it 
is not uncommon to ﬁnd that cooperation is more symbolic than actual (Hulst and 
Montfort 2007b, 235). This also applies to Romania, as representatives of many local 
governments see IMC bodies only as a way of getting some funds, if possible without 
the joint planning process. 
At ﬁrst glance, the legal framework allows for a high degree of ﬂexibility, allowing local 
governments to decide with whom they should cooperate, in what areas and under what 
legal form, and by allowing the change of legal form (accomplished by a full-member 
decision and ratiﬁcation by a local court). This does respond to a particular state of 
mind within the Romanian national administrative system—the introduction of any 
type of obligation regarding intermunicipal cooperation would have been considered 
as an attack on the newly obtained local autonomy. At the same time, conditions for 
abuse were created because local governments were not prohibited from simultaneously 
joining several organizations with similar purposes. A look at Cluj county in western 
Romania is illuminating in this area—17 rural local governments are members of dif-
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ferent entities focused on local development (multi-purpose IMC registered as ICDA), 
and are also simultaneously members of the Cluj-Napoca Metropolitan Area Association 
(having the same purposes, registered as ICDA). Such tendencies undermine the role 
of IMC in the area of planning and policy coordination and pave the way for a low 
level of involvement in the respective organizations on behalf of the local governments. 
This problem is obviously linked to the extent to which legal, policy, and institutional 
frameworks are addressing the issue of interdependency between local governments as 
a key precondition for intermunicipal cooperation. Some very general legal provi-
sions, especially obvious in the case of metropolitan areas, do point to the need for 
interdependency between the local governments embarking IMC, but no enforcement 
mechanisms exist. Moreover, the minimal policy and institutional framework, in place 
at the central government level, does not involve the promotion of interdependency as 
a key prerequisite for successful cooperation.
The legal framework seems to encourage a high degree of integration, via the intro-
duction of the multipurpose ICDAs that could provide necessary planning and policy 
coordination at a microregional level and take over a series of responsibilities from the 
local governments involved. Integration is apparently encouraged, but the legal frame-
work does not give a public law status to the multi-purpose ICDAs, with consequences 
for their ability to take over service in the area of local public utilities. At the same time 
the delegation of responsibilities from the local governments to these entities is not 
complete, as the former still remain in charge of policymaking in the respective ﬁelds 
and responsible for the quality and the pricing of services provided to the citizens.
The broader policy framework does not address some of the organizational and 
functional aspects that are key for the desired integration of IMC. Given the local 
government’s position and degree of autonomy, and mostly looking at ﬁscal and ﬁnan-
cial aspects, this degree of integration is only achieved if the policy and institutional 
framework for IMC addresses issues such as start up costs, necessary human resources 
and long term ﬁnancial and organizational stability. A previous study (Pop, Stănuş, and 
Suciu 2007) pointed out that one of the key functional problems of IMC involving 
small local governments from rural areas is the fact that local authorities were not able 
to ﬁnancially support the activity of the organizations because they did not have enough 
revenues of their own (not earmarked or coming from equalization funds). In view of 
these aspects, the legal framework does state that a funding program dedicated to IMC 
should be created and managed by the Ministry of the Interior and Administrative 
Reform. As mentioned before, such a program was never created. 
At odds with what we described in the previous paragraphs, the legal and the 
policy framework for IMC in Romania also encourages the functional fragmentation of 
cooperation. The legal framework in the area of diﬀerent local public utilities services 
is so complex that it is diﬃcult to accommodate within one organization. From this a 
tendency towards setting up single purpose local public utilities ICDAs results. Fund-
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ing programs in the area of local infrastructure and local public utilities reinforce this 
tendency, as most local governments and IMC bodies depend on external funding for 
their projects. In the case of a group of local governments willing to cooperate in the 
area of local public utilities services, we will consequently ﬁnd several single-purpose 
organizations with separate structures but the same membership (as pointed out by 
previous studies; see Pop, Stănuş and Suciu 2007).
The fact that we are unable to assess whether the policy-maker was aiming at promot-
ing functionally integrated or fragmented IMC points out that policy-making in this 
area completely disregarded the existence of IMC attempts, which displayed a tendency 
toward more integrated forms of intermunicipal cooperation. 
In terms of transparency, accountability to citizens and political control over IMC 
operation, the legal framework seems to be ahead of the capabilities of local governments 
and, consequently, the organizations they set up. By their assimilation with public insti-
tutions, local public utilities ICDAs should apply in full the legal provisions regarding 
citizen access to information and the transparency of decision-making. By their public 
utility status, both ICDAs and local public utilities ICDAs are compelled to publish 
annual reports in the oﬃcial bulletin (similarly to local governments, but not even 
local governments apply this provision). Since, despite the formal act of delegation of 
responsibility, local governments remain in charge of policy-making and all major deci-
sions need to be approved by each local council, the operations of both ICDAs and local 
public utility ICDAs are controllable by the local councils and exposed to the public. 
The control exercised by local councils should also materialize in setting up monitor-
ing bodies in charge of controlling and supervising the implementation of delegation 
contracts, the contracts with beneﬁciaries/citizens, the quality of service, the price of 
service, and the management and functionality of utility networks. However, this is a 
legal provision that is extremely expensive to implement (involving among other things 
a change in the organizational diagram of the local government and hiring of staﬀ) for 
the majority of local governments in Romania. A very interesting provision refers to 
the representation of local governments taking into account the “political conﬁgura-
tion” of the local council—that is, political color—meant to ensure the representation 
of all interests. The extent to which such a provision is implemented would depend on 
the decisions made regarding the management of IMC, for example whether the local 
governments involved decide that each of them should have one or more seats on the 
organizational board. 
6. AN INVENTORY OF IMC 
The previous section pointed to the fact that the government policy in this area did not 
seem to take into account existing attempts by local governments to cooperate. It also 
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pointed out that it is unclear whether in Romania we should expect a tendency towards 
functionally integrated or fragmented IMC. This section tries to assess from a quantita-
tive perspective how local governments and existing IMCs coped with the introduction 
of the dedicated legal framework. After some methodological aspects are clariﬁed, we 
proceed with a discussion of the main trends in intermunicipal cooperation in Romania 
in terms of legal forms used, the dynamics of IMC establishment prior to and after 2006, 
regional patterns, the optimum size for IMC, and the areas of cooperation.
This section is based on the analysis of secondary data coming from the National 
Register of Associations and Foundations in Romania. Given the fact that legal provi-
sions regarding NGOs also apply to inter-community development associations, and 
given the lack of any other framework for their registration, all ICDAs, local public 
utility ICDAs and metropolitan area ICDAs should be listed in this register. The pub-
lic form of this register contains information related to the date of establishment and 
geographical placement, the number and the names of founding members, the purpose 
of the association, data referring to the board of the association, information related to 
changes in membership and the composition of the board. Based on this data we built 
an inventory of intermunicipal cooperation in Romania.4 
The data collected is incomplete as for some entries the register contains only the 
date of establishment, the county, and name of the organization.5 For 83 cases (41.9 
percent) we were not able to establish the type of IMC. To these shortcomings we add 
the problem of establishing the total number of associations between ATUs existing 
in Romania. After the data described in this section was collected, we had to conclude 
there is an unknown number of associations between ATUs in Romania. If we add the 
fact that every month new ICDAs or local public ICDAs are registered, the situation 
becomes even more complicated. In several documents, the Ministry of Interior and 
Administrative Reform mentioned a study of IMC in Romania (made at the beginning 
of 2008, based on questionnaires sent to the local authorities) that identiﬁed over 200 
associations exclusively made up of local governments. All these aspects suggest that 
there is a need to improve the informational environment with consequences for the 
quality of the policy-making process in this area. Some suggestions in this direction are 
presented in the last section of this paper. 
The section describing some of the characteristics of local government in Romania 
pointed to the fact that the only viable policy option in dealing with the issue of size and 
administrative capacity of local governments seemed to be intermunicipal cooperation. 
Surprisingly, the local governments were the ﬁrst to discover this fact as indicated by the 
number of associations between ATUs that were registered prior to the introduction of 
a dedicated legal framework in 2006. As Figure 5.1 shows, almost half (44.7 percent) 
of the associations between ATUs registered in Romania between 1999 and September 
30, 2008 are dated prior to 2006.
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Figure 5.1 
IMC Bodies in Romania by Year of Registration, 1999–2008 
 
Source: National Register of Associations and Foundations, September 30, 2008, available online on the 
website of the Ministry of Justice, www.just.ro.
Note: N=198.
Figure 5.2 
IMC Bodies in Romania by Year of Registration and Legal Form, 1999–2008
Source: National Register of Associations and Foundations, September 30, 2008, available online on the 
website of the Ministry of Justice, www.just.ro.
Note: N=198. 
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The impact of the dedicated legal framework for IMC established in 2006 is obvious 
if we look at the above taking into account the selected legal form. If data for 2006 and 
2007 shows that the legal form of NGO is still being used as a framework for cooperation, 
numbers for 2008 are very clear—all associations between ATUs registered between January 
and September 2008 have the legal status of inter-community development association. 
In terms of legal form used, the associations analyzed here are distributed as 
follows: 30.3 percent of the associations analyzed are ICDAs or local public utility 
ICDAs, 24.7 percent are NGOs and three percent are metropolitan areas. There are, 
of course, a number of associations, registered prior to the 2006 introduction of the 
legal framework, whose type cannot be assessed. An educated guess would lead us to 
the conclusion that these organizations have the legal status of NGO. But there are 
signiﬁcant chances that at least some of these organizations changed the legal form 
from NGO to ICDA after 2006, changes that would be unrecorded by the National 
Register of Associations and Foundations.
6.1 Regional Patterns of IMC
One interesting pattern of intermunicipal cooperation in Romania is revealed if we 
ﬁlter information through geographical placement. IMC is associated with geographi-
cal placement in Western Romania, in one of the historical provinces of Transylvania 
(Ardeal, Banat, or Crişana-Maramureş). Together, these historical provinces account 
for 64.14 percent of the associations we identiﬁed. This is explained mostly by cultural 
factors and slightly diﬀerent administrative traditions. The regional pattern is as strong 
if we use the eight development regions as a structuring factor, since three of them 
(west, northwest, and center) actually cover the historical provinces named above. One 
very important element becomes visible if we correlate this information with the Index 
of Community Development calculated for the communes in Romania (see Sandu, 
Voineagu, and Panduru 2009). A look at the median values at county level places all the 
counties in Western Romania in the upper half of the classiﬁcation, with signiﬁcantly 
better oﬀ rural areas in terms of local development.
6.2 Size of IMC Bodies
Another important aspect that needs to be discussed is related to the size of IMC bod-
ies. Intermunicipal cooperation is a way of coping with a set of problems connected to 
the size of a municipality. At the same time, the patterns identiﬁed here suggest there 
should be a discussion related to the size of IMC. The analysis showed that associations 
of local governments in Romania range in size from 2 to over 30 members (probably 
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more since the National Registry of NGO lists in such cases a part of the members 
and mentions “and others”). In fact, several associations actually comprise almost all 
local governments in a given county, such as the Agency for Sustainable Development 
of Tulcea County or the Braşov County Sustainable Development Agency, both acting 
as local development agencies and project management oﬃces for the entire county. 
The average size of IMC in Romania is 7.7 members, while the most frequent size is 
seven. Very large IMC seems to be an exception, but it is an exception related to a 
certain incentive for cooperation: the need to establish county level ecological landﬁlls 
by 2010 (required by the EU). The issue of IMC size can of course be discussed from 
several perspectives—size in terms of number of member local governments, size in 
terms of territory, or size in terms of population. We consider size in terms of num-
ber of members to be the relevant factor given the legal provisions that precondition 
decision-making within ICDAs by the approval of the Local Councils. 
 
6.3 Areas of Cooperation
In terms of the declared purpose of cooperation, there is at least one unexpected aspect 
of the issue. Our expectation in terms of single-purpose IMC was to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant 
number of ICDAs established for taking over water and sewage services, waste manage-
ment or public transport. But, at least one ﬁeld in need of a single-purpose legal entity 
for taking over a function of a local government was identiﬁed by the ATUs as early as 
2001–2002: forest management. After most property was returned to previous owners, 
local governments from forestry areas had to manage the forest that remained in their 
property while oﬀering the same service to their citizens. More than seven percent of 
the associations we identiﬁed were established by local governments (exclusively or in 
cooperation with groups of private owners) with the purpose of managing forests in 
their territorial area. 
Data show that multi-purpose intermunicipal cooperation, usually deﬁned as ori-
ented towards (sustainable) local development (social, economic, environmental), but 
sometimes also deﬁned as cooperation for improving local infrastructure (referring to 
local roads, water puriﬁcation and sewage, waste management), is dominant—43.43 
percent and 7.07 percent of the associations we identiﬁed. This also applies if we look 
at IMC set up before and after 2006; for example, 8 out of 17 organizations set up in 
2005 and 24 out of 42 organizations set up in 2008 are multipurpose. The tendency 
toward integrated IMC, with a planning and policy coordination component, existing 
before 2006, was also maintained after the dedicated legal framework was introduced.
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Figure 5.3 
IMC Bodies in Romania by Purpose of Cooperation, 1999–2008
Source: National Register of Associations and Foundations, September 30, 2008, available online on the 
website of the Ministry of Justice, www.just.ro.
In the area of single-purpose IMC, the ﬁeld of water supply and puriﬁcation and 
sewage (13.64 percent) is followed by forest management, tourism promotion, and waste 
management. All other categories, including purposes of cooperation such as obtaining 
EU funding, joint planning and project management, attracting investments, conserva-
tion of cultural heritage, local transport, cross-border cooperation and others, add up to 
14.65 percent of the total number of cases. The areas of cooperation identiﬁed here are 
in line with the type of responsibilities that the Romanian central government has so 
far transferred to local governments. We should mention that, in preparation for further 
decentralization, in the case of some multi-purpose local development IMC bodies, the 
stated purposes of cooperation also included areas where responsibilities had not yet 
been transferred to local governments. This is probably the result of the fact that any 
change to the statute of an IMC body does require written approval from all members 
and it is a rather complicated process requiring time and money. 
7. IMC AND THE ECONOMIES OF SCOPE
The previous sections of this paper pointed to the tendency of local governments to opt 
for integrated forms of IMC that would assume a signiﬁcant role in planning and policy 
coordination. This is all within a context marked by limited local government ﬁnancial 
autonomy, low administrative capacity and a dedicated legal and policy framework for 
Multi-purpose local development
Local infrastructure
Water supply and puriﬁcation and sewage
Waste management
Forest management
Tourism promotion 
Not available
Other
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IMC that seems to encourage the functional fragmentation of cooperation while not 
addressing issues such as the territorial overlapping of multi-purpose IMC or the need 
for interdependency between local governments engaging in cooperation. 
This section of the paper takes an in-depth look at intermunicipal cooperation in 
Romania, approaching a range of issues starting with organizational and functional 
aspects and ending with the speciﬁcs of metropolitan governance or the uses of IMC 
in enhancing cross-border cooperation. Given the lack of accurate quantitative data 
on intermunicipal cooperation in Romania, an in-depth assessment, using qualitative 
methodology, is necessary in order to fully assess the current policy regarding IMC in 
Romania. After a short presentation of each of the cases under investigation, we will 
proceed with a look at organizational aspects of IMC (choice of legal forms, evolution 
from one legal form to another, degree of organizational integration). Next, we will look 
at functional aspects (size of IMC, staﬃng, decision-making processes) and we will link 
them with the extent to which desired eﬀectiveness of IMC has been achieved. In the 
following subsection we approach the democratic aspects of intermunicipal cooperation 
in Romania. We then discuss the eﬀectiveness of the incentives used by the Romanian 
central government in this area and their side eﬀects. We also approach the issue of verti-
cal IMC, as well as intermunicipal cross-border cooperation. In the last subsection we 
sum up the results of the three stages of the empirical investigation and lay the grounds 
for possible solutions to this policy problem.
7.1 The Cases Studied
Any in-depth assessment of IMC in Romania needs to cover all available relevant legal 
forms (single or multi-purpose ICDA and NGO) while taking into account the special 
situation of metropolitan areas. Another aspect to be taken into account is the type of 
local governments involved in intermunicipal cooperation, since diﬀerences in local 
government administrative capacity and resources might account for diﬀerences in IMC 
performance. At the same time, we should cover both “hard” and “soft” cooperation, 
going from highly technical “hard” cooperation in the area of service delivery to “soft” 
cooperation in areas such as tourism promotion. 
Taking into account the above arguments, the cases approached by in-depth analy-
sis were selected, based on previous investigations of IMC in Romania, using the most 
dissimilar systems design strategy. The selection of cases takes into account the following 
criteria, as well as availability of data issues: purpose (multipurpose IMC vs. single pur-
pose IMC); legal form (ICDA for local public utilities, metropolitan area ICDA, ICDA 
or NGO); and type of local governments associated. The selected cases are the Inter-
Community Development Association of the Vlădeasa-Huedin Microregion (Asociaţia 
de Dezvoltare Intercomunitară a Microregiunii Vlădeasa-Huedin, from now on referred 
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to as Huedin), Arieş Urban Community (Comunitatea Urbană Arieş, CUA), Oradea 
Metropolitan Area (Zona Metropolitană Oradea, ZMO), Horezu Depression Associa-
tion (Asociaţia Depresiunea Horezu, Horezu) and the Banat Ripensis Microregional 
Development Association (Asociaţia Microregională Banat Ripensis de Dezvoltare a 
Localităţilor, Banat Ripensis). The strong tendency towards integrated IMC made it 
diﬃcult to identify cases of single-purpose cooperation that were functional for long 
enough to be suited for the purposes of this analysis. For this reason, only one of the 
cases selected involves single purpose cooperation. Later in this section, we will discuss 
the fact that even in this case, a strong tendency towards multi-purpose cooperation 
and integration is increasingly visible.
Table 5.5 
Criteria for the Selection of Cases
Huedin CUA ZMO Horezu Banat 
Ripensis
Sector
Multi-purpose IMC √ √ √ √
Single-purpose IMC √
Legal Form6
ICDA for local public utilities √ √
Metropolitan area ICDA √
ICDA √ √
NGO √ √ √
Membership
City √
Towns √ √ √ √
Communes (Rural) √ √ √ √ √
Cooperation between the municipalities of the Vlădeasa-Huedin area precedes the 
2006 introduction of a legal framework for IMC in Romania and is the result of a 
2001 initiative over several years by the Transylvania Ecological Club (Clubul Ecologic 
Transilvania), a Cluj-Napoca-based NGO that facilitated the initiative. Cooperation 
includes the small town (just below 10,000 inhabitants) of Huedin and 13 com-
munes from the mountain area of Cluj County in North-Western Romania. Initial 
cooperation, under the legal designation of NGO, was actually shaped in the form 
of a loose donor-driven policy network working towards a strategy for the sustainable 
development of the area. 
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Based on a sketch of a joint strategy for development, cooperation evolved and 
expanded to include areas such as waste management services, renewable energy, local 
infrastructure projects, or small-scale tourism promotion. This also resulted in the mul-
tiplication of the legal forms. Presently, the local governments involved in IMC use the 
following legal forms: an NGO, an ICDA focused on planning, coordination, informa-
tion and fundraising, some inter-community development associations grouping two 
or three local governments and focused strictly on service delivery, and contract-based 
cooperation in the area of waste management. To some extent, this multiplication of 
the legal structures used also led to fragmentation, for example cooperation in the ﬁeld 
of waste management is completely detached from all other legal forms of cooperation 
and is managed by separate staﬀ. 
Cooperation between these municipalities was marked by severe functional problems 
that were dealt with more or less successfully after donors and the NGO providing fa-
cilitation withdrew. Problems were related to the lack of ﬁnancial and human resources, 
dependency on external funding for day-to-day operations and the fatigue of cooperation 
associated with the rather immaterial outcomes in the ﬁrst years (e.g., strategies, plans, 
and lists of priorities). To some extent these problems explain why currently, even though 
more legally binding cooperation structures are used, the framework for cooperation is 
still more similar to a policy network than to a standing organization. 
Like many other successful examples of intermunicipal cooperation in Romania, 
this can also be characterized in terms of economies of scope, because rather than help-
ing to reduce costs of service delivery, it helped with the provision of services that never 
existed before its creation (e.g., waste management services in rural areas). 
The Arieş Urban Community7 was established in 2005 and comprises two towns 
and nine communes; all are situated south of the city of Cluj-Napoca in northwestern 
Romania, along two of Romania’s most high-traﬃc roads. The two towns—Turda 
and Câmpia Turzii—act as centers for employment, undergraduate education, some 
administrative services, healthcare, and public transportation for the surrounding rural 
municipalities. Except for the metropolitan area cases, this is one of the most obvi-
ous cases in which policy externalities triggered cooperation. Before intermunicipal 
cooperation was actually established, the two urban municipalities were providing 
services to one another—Câmpia Turzii was buying drinkable and industrial water 
from the Turda local water company and local transport was integrated in terms of 
routes and schedules. Cooperation was envisaged as multi-purposed and, so far, there 
is actual cooperation in the areas of planning, coordination, fundraising, and project 
management; joint water supply and puriﬁcation and sewage services, and urban 
planning and cadastral mapping. Like in other cases, here we also have a situation 
of economies of scope, as most of the member local governments were not able to 
provide water supply services on their own and are now in the process of introducing 
this service to their communities together.
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Being established before 2006, the Arieş Urban Community has the legal status of 
NGO, which it maintains at this moment. However, another legal form is also used 
as this organization has initiated and is currently implementing a large joint project 
in the area of water supply and puriﬁcation and sewage services. Given the fact that 
legal provisions only allow delegation of water supply services to local public utilities 
ICDAs, and that funding programs (ISPA, later the Cohesion Fund) mandate that re-
sponsibilities be delegated to a single-purpose entity, the Arieş Valley Water Association 
was created. This multiplication of the legal structures used led to fragmentation, as 
the newly formed local public utility ICDA now functions completely separately from 
the mother association. The latter was aﬀected in terms of human resources and, for a 
while, it functioned more like a policy network than a standing organization. For these 
reasons, representatives of the Arieş Urban Community consider that the main obstacle 
in the way of smooth and eﬀective cooperation is the legal framework.
The Arieş Urban Community exempliﬁes the diﬃculties with initiating cooperation 
when local governments of diﬀerent status and administrative capacity are involved. 
Until recently, the territory covered by this association was discontinued, as two rural 
municipalities from the area refused to join the others fearing that the two towns, with 
superior resources and administrative capacity, “would take over”, dominate the IMC, 
and impose only projects that would be advantageous for them. This fear was enhanced 
by the fact that the selected principle of representation took into account the size of the 
municipality in terms of population.
Another highly interesting aspect is the bipolar character of the organization. A look 
at most IMC bodies grouping both urban and rural local governments reveals a speciﬁc 
pattern. There is usually a larger local government, with superior resources and admin-
istrative capacity, acting as a center of gravity for the organization. Sometimes it may 
dominate the organization, sometimes it will take a leadership role and put its superior 
resources at work for common beneﬁt. In this case, we have two local governments 
who occasionally ﬁnd themselves competing with each other for leadership within the 
organization. An interesting example is a heated debate over whether the oﬃcial address 
of the local public utilities ICDA should be in the same town as the oﬃcial address of 
the NGO or in the other one. 
The Oradea Metropolitan Area (ZMO) encompasses the city of Oradea and the 
surrounding rural municipalities situated near the Romania-Hungary border. Oradea 
serves as the major center for employment, education, administrative services, health-
care, and public transportation for the surrounding municipalities. This case presents 
the highest degree of interdependence and policy externalities among the cases studied 
here. Cooperation was initiated in 2001 and materialized in 2005, prior to the intro-
duction of the dedicated legal framework for IMC in Romania. The interdependence 
and policy externalities are recognized by the involved local governments, who aim at 
increasing them based on joint development plans. Planning and coordination were 
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deemed so important in this case that the ﬁrst two years of cooperation were dedicated 
solely to drafting the macro-level development plans for the area (the ZMO Strategic 
Framework for Sustainable Development 2007–2006, the ZMO Portfolio of Priority Projects 
2007–2013, and the Territorial Planning Strategy of the ZMO 2007–2020). 
Given the legal framework, the Oradea Metropolitan Area is not able to work as 
a fully integrated standing organization, even though the local governments involved 
aim toward full delegation of (own) responsibilities and services provided to citizens 
towards this entity. In an attempt to achieve a high degree of organizational integration, a 
complicated structure appeared involving the simultaneous use of several legal structures 
for cooperation. Initiated as an NGO, and transformed into an ICDA in 2006, the 
organization named Oradea Metropolitan Area Association aims at creating several local 
public utility ICDAs that will take over service from the member local governments in 
speciﬁc sectors. In January 2009, two such organizations were functional—ApaRegio 
(water supply and puriﬁcation and sewage) and REOSAL (waste management in rural 
areas). A public company, whose shareholders are the local governments, with the status 
of regional operator of service, corresponds to each of these organizations. Several other 
local public utility ICDAs, which will deal with local public transport and forest manage-
ment, are being arranged. Although this case presents a complicated structure involving 
the existence of cooperation in several legal forms, so far there is no fragmentation of 
cooperation. The mother organization retains control over the planning, coordination, 
and fundraising and supervises the activities of the local public utility ICDAs. This is yet 
another example of the economies of scope associated with intermunicipal cooperation, 
as some of the services envisioned to be provided by this organization were inaccessible 
to citizens from the rural areas.
Another interesting aspect of this case is linked to cross-border cooperation. 
While commonly used deﬁnitions of IMC exclude cross-border cooperation, this case 
provides some interesting arguments in favor of a revision. The Oradea Metropolitan 
Area Association is currently exploring the possibility of including ﬁve municipalities 
from neighboring Hungary. They would prefer to be included in the ZMO rather 
than embark upon cooperation with the Hungarian city of Debrecen because Oradea 
is geographically closer than Debrecen (and assuming that because of this proximity 
interdependence is higher). Representatives of the ZMO also view their cooperation 
with the city of Debrecen, within a European Group for Territorial Cooperation, as an 
example of intermunicipal cooperation and mention in support of this the advanced stage 
of development of joint projects focused on improving transportation infrastructure.
Like in many other cases in Romania, the legal framework is considered problem-
atic. Representatives of the ZMO mention, among the success factors of their initiative, 
the capacity to “innovatively” use the legal framework in their favor, meaning bending 
the rules. As the lobbying capacity of this entity is quite high, it is no surprise that the 
representatives of the ZMO mention that they successfully managed to convince the 
central government to make some changes to the legal framework.
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The Horezu Depression Association presents the case of the oldest attempt at intermu-
nicipal cooperation in Romania identiﬁed by us. As early as 1994, there was an attempt 
by the local governments in the area to cooperate in order to develop a joint natural gas 
supply network, but the project was abandoned in 1996 due to some changes in the legal 
framework. This entity (established in 2005) currently comprises the town of Horezu 
and four neighboring communes, but the inclusion of other 5 neighboring communes, 
all situated in a mountain area in South Western Romania, is currently taking place. 
The town of Horezu acts as the economic and administrative center for this region.
This entity covers an area of tourist interest, including UNESCO protected monu-
ments and natural reservations. The need to upgrade tourism infrastructure and to 
stimulate tourism-led economic development of the area became the major domain and 
focus of cooperation. This case was selected as relevant to the analysis of single-purpose 
cooperation. During data collection we discovered that cooperation is in the process of 
expanding to other areas such as planning, coordination, and fundraising and to the joint 
management of emergency services, the latter resulting from the fact that the Horezu 
municipality was previously providing this service for all neighboring municipalities 
at its own expense. Cooperation in the area of tourism promotion was deﬁnitely the 
most fruitful so far, resulting in the inclusion of the area in the second phase of the EC 
EDEN project (European Destinations of Excellence). The major disappointment of 
these local governments is tied to this domain as well—the loss of a signiﬁcant tourism 
infrastructure grant (approx. 4.5 million Euros) because the central government (Min-
istry of Regional Development) failed to complete a procurement procedure in time. 
The legal form of cooperation was initially that of NGO, the only one available in 
2005. After the 2006 introduction of the dedicated legal framework for IMC the legal 
form was changed to inter-community development association. The tendency in this case 
is towards creating an integrated standing organization, the unusual aspect being the fact 
that the organization does not employ its own staﬀ but borrows some of the work-time 
of civil servants from the member municipalities. A complex institutional development 
project was implemented between 2008 and 2009, which included, among its results, 
the drafting and adoption of a joint development strategy as well as training of human 
resources and a revision of the statute of the organization. Until now, cooperation was 
concentrated on “soft issues” and participating local governments did not confront the 
highly technical and complicated legal framework for intermunicipal cooperation in the 
area of service delivery, which led to fragmentation in some other cases studied here. 
The Banat-Ripensis Microregional Development Association designates the cooperation 
between the small town of Jimbolia and nine neighboring communes from Timiş County, 
situated close to Romania’s borders with Hungary and Serbia. Cooperation was initiated 
as early as 2000, under the legal form of NGO, which has been maintained even after 
the introduction of the dedicated legal framework for IMC. Cooperation is focused on 
stimulating local economic development and supporting innovative agriculture (with a 
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cross-border component) and cultural, sports, and youth projects. Cooperation in the 
areas of joint waste collection and joint water supply and puriﬁcation is incipient, but 
it will be developed under the umbrella of a completely separate organization with the 
legal status of local public utilities ICDA and no links with the NGO. 
This organization operates more like a loose policy network and intends to keep this 
status and expand its activity in the domains it is currently working in. An interesting 
component of intermunicipal cooperation in this case is cross-border cooperation. Ef-
forts in the area of stimulating local economic development and supporting innovative 
agriculture involved cooperation with municipalities from Serbia and resulted in the 
drafting of the Agro-Innovative Development Strategy of the Banat-Ripensis Microregion, 
Romanian and the Northern Banat, Serbia and the creation of an exhibition center for 
innovative agriculture in Jimbolia. A cross-border loose policy network seems to be 
functional in this case and it resulted in eﬀorts for the identiﬁcation and materialization 
of cross-border business opportunities.
7.2 Organizational Aspects 
The cases presented in the previous subsection actually display a higher than expected 
degree of diversity, given the selection criteria we used. Intermunicipal cooperation in 
Romania is, as illustrated by the ﬁve cases, vision-oriented and aimed at social, economic, 
and cultural sustainable development. This is linked with the perceived inability of 
rural areas’ local governments to draft strategies for development, which usually leads 
them to cooperate with similar local governments and with larger and more resourceful 
urban governments. 
Despite this obvious use of IMC to compensate for local governments’ own low 
administrative capacity, one of the key factors that is taken into account when decid-
ing to embark on IMC is the interdependency and policy externalities between the local 
governments involved. In one of the cases studied here, the need to limit cooperation 
to “the area of inﬂuence of the town” is mentioned, while in another case no future 
expansion of membership is envisioned because it would ruin the “homogeneity” within 
the association. In the case of the metropolitan area, the decision to limit cooperation 
to an area of up to nine kilometers distance from the city (when the legally allowed 
maximum distance is 30 km) is related to the interconnectedness between the city and 
the neighboring villages. 
The search for a development vision and mutual support to compensate for low 
administrative capacity results in an obvious tendency towards more integrated forms of 
intermunicipal cooperation, namely standing organizations taking over several responsi-
bilities from local governments, with their own strategic documents, staﬀ and ﬁnancial 
resources, and with oversight over policy-making in the respective area. European 
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experience shows that multi-purpose IMC seems to come into existence when the need 
for IMC grows strongly over a relatively short time span (Hulst and Montfort 2007, 
217), and Romania is in such a situation. All IMC in Romania involves the use of some 
type of association, legally registered with a court and consequently legally binding. 
However, there does not seem to be a link between the legal form used and the degree 
of organizational integration. We have here the case of a multi-purpose ICDA working 
more like a policy network (Huedin), the case of an NGO working like a policy network 
(Banat-Ripensis), but also a case in which a very complicated structure involving an 
ICDA and several local public utilities ICDAs was built in order to create a framework 
for this integration (ZMO). These cases suggest that there are limitations to the legal 
framework, which does not seem to be adequate for the degree of integration desired by 
the local governments involved. As mentioned earlier, these legal provisions make local 
governments responsible for policy-making in an area even if they delegate responsibilities 
to an ICDA or to a local public utilities ICDA. At this point local governments seem 
to bend the rules and leave more discretion in policy-making up to the intermunicipal 
bodies, with local councils generally accepting without problems the proposals and 
decisions of the IMC council or board. 
Representatives of the IMC bodies explicitly mentioned the diﬃculties posed by the 
legal framework for advanced integration. In one case, there is even a mention of the 
need to “innovatively interpret legislation in our favor” while in another case the legal 
framework is blamed for the fragmentation of cooperation: “unfortunately we had to 
create a distinct association for this service, in time it became separate and now we no 
longer communicate with it.” This fragmentation is visible in all cases studied we stud-
ied that began as multi-purpose cooperation, with the notable exception of the ZMO. 
In this particular case, the resources available and the type of relationships established 
between the members (with the city of Oradea taking leadership but not dominating) 
helped to preserve the integrative character of IMC, even though in order to achieve joint 
delivery of services several legal entities exist or are about to be created. Of course, we 
may ﬁnd arguments in favor of both more integrated and more fragmented IMC. But 
research focused on metropolitan areas, by Lowery et al. (1992), ﬁnds that consolidated 
institutions promote the use of constructive problem-solving behaviors (something badly 
needed at the local government level in Romania) better than fragmented settings, and 
that consolidated institutions tend to foster and enhance democratic citizenship.
The fact that a group of local governments willing to embark on multi-purpose IMC 
ﬁnd themselves compelled to set up more than one legal body in order to achieve their 
goals does seem irrational. To this, we add the situation of multi-purpose IMC territo-
rial overlap. An obvious case is the above-mentioned case of multi-purpose IMC in Cluj 
county. Such overlapping is facilitated by a two-stage responsibility delegation process: 
ﬁrst, local governments set up an association and designate its goals, and then, in a separate 
decision, each local government delegates speciﬁc responsibilities to the association. The 
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ﬂexibility allowed by the legal framework (each local government being able to associ-
ate with whom it wants in the area it wants) results in abuse because local governments 
join more than one body and wait to see “what comes out of it.” This approach to IMC 
suggests that the local logic wins over the regional one and paves the way for a low level 
of involvement on behalf of the local governments and, ultimately, the failure of IMC. 
All the people we interviewed pointed to a very important challenge in cases in 
which cooperation is vision-oriented. Such cases involve a lengthy process of drafting a 
joint development strategy. In case of the Oradea Metropolitan Area, this process took 
two years. Since a development strategy or spatial planning documents are rather im-
material results, cooperation fatigue seems to result from such eﬀorts and may seriously 
undermine local governments’ commitment. This is surpassed with ease in two cases: if 
there is strong leadership within the IMC body that mobilizes the local governments or 
if, along with the planning process, small projects with material results are implemented. 
7.3 Functional Aspects 
Going beyond the extent to which intermunicipal cooperation actually delivers econo-
mies of scale or economies of scope in service delivery, the eﬀectiveness of IMC in 
Romania is a function of the how decision-making processes are shaped. Two factors 
seem to be essential in this respect: legal provisions requesting separate approval of each 
local council when key decisions are being made, and the way the relationships between 
the member local governments shape the decision-making process. 
While they do create a bureaucratic burden to IMC, the provisions requiring the 
approval of local councils for all key decisions are regarded by the representatives of the 
organizations studied here as normal. Consequently, they are not seen as a hindrance 
in the way of making decisions in a timely manner, but simply as imposing a certain 
degree of administrative planning. In one case, some of the local councils refused to 
approve some of the decisions made by the IMC body. However, they overturned 
their initial positions after they were presented with more data. While agreeing that 
getting all local councils to approve something is diﬃcult (especially if technical issues 
are involved and there is the need for the same wording in all local council decisions), 
all representatives of the IMC bodies we interviewed also point out that this compels 
them to be in permanent contact with the local governments and extremely transpar-
ent. Of course, speed of decision-making does depend on the size of the IMC body in 
terms of the local governments involved. All of the representatives of the organizations 
studied here acknowledged this and all of them mention this as a decisive factor in not 
accepting an expansion of membership. When expansions of membership are discussed, 
interdependence is another key factor in accepting or declining the application of other 
local governments. The IMC bodies studied here include between 10 and 15 local gov-
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ernments,8 and in all cases their representatives mentioned that they are “large enough” 
and that any expansion of membership would make them unmanageable.
The relationship existing between the local governments involved also shapes 
the decision-making process. This relationship is usually reﬂected by how the local 
governments organize their representation on the board of the IMC body. Legal provi-
sions specify the structure of the organization but leave the choice of representation 
criterion entirely to the discretion of the involved local governments. Two situations 
are found in practice: 
  The “one local government, one vote” situation in which the mayor is usually 
the representative of the local government. We ﬁnd such a representation struc-
ture in four out of the ﬁve cases, including, interestingly enough, the Oradea 
Metropolitan Area;
  Representation based on the size of the local governments in terms of popula-
tion, with or without a weighting factor in case of larger municipalities. It is the 
case of Arieş Urban Community and actually one the factors that, according to 
a representative of the IMC body, made smaller local governments reticent to 
become involved in cooperation, because they feared the activity of the IMC 
body would be dominated by the larger local governments to their detriment. 
It is also the case of the above-mentioned Cluj-Napoca metropolitan area, 
where conﬂicts appeared before the IMC body was legally registered since the 
representation structure proposed gave the city two thirds of the votes on the 
IMC board. Conﬂicts continued afterwards, leading to one local government 
announcing its withdrawal from the metropolitan area association two months 
after the legal registration was ﬁnally completed.
The ﬁrst situation eases the decision-making process, while the second is a serious 
challenge to an IMC project’s transition from project to functional IMC body. The case 
of Arieş Urban Community studied here illuminates a larger local government’s need 
to be extremely eﬀective in convincing smaller ones that it does not intend to impose 
projects that would not be beneﬁcial to all members. Going beyond the decision-making 
process, this is also a discussion about fairness, for which of the two situations mentioned 
above is more equitable for the local governments involved? In four of the ﬁve cases 
analyzed, the ﬁrst situation applies, with representatives of the IMC bodies seeing this as 
“normal” and mentioning that it would be unfair if larger local governments controlled 
decision-making in such a manner. In the other case, representation based on the size 
of a local government is the standard arrangement. We should mention, however, that 
the size imbalance between the two towns and the communes involved is not that high. 
Human resources seems to be one of the signiﬁcantly problematic areas for IMC 
in Romania. In the case of the metropolitan area, there are 10 employees in the main 
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oﬃce in charge of planning and coordinating IMC operations, plus minimal staﬀ in the 
oﬃces of the local public utility ICDAs. At the other end of a continuum, we have the 
situation from Horezu, where local governments lend some of their staﬀ to the ICDA. 
The general situation seems to be the one in which the IMC body has a minimal staﬀ 
(1–2, maybe 3 people) and borrows staﬀ from member local governments. This is also 
aided by the fact that a signiﬁcant amount of paperwork on IMC operations needs to 
pass through the local councils. We exclude from this assessment the staﬀ employed by 
the companies providing local public utilities services, as this is staﬀ usually taken over 
from other companies or from local governments. A key problem confronting IMC 
involving small and relatively poor local governments is their dependency on external 
funding for the hiring of staﬀ to work for the IMC body, as mentioned by the people 
interviewed. The case of IMC in the Huedin area is relevant—in order to pay its sole 
employee the IMC body sells consultancy services to local governments interested in 
IMC. Some local governments’ decision that some of their own staﬀ will work on behalf 
of the association is natural. However, these small and relatively poor local governments 
usually start with a human resources problem, meaning an inability to attract and retain 
minimally qualiﬁed staﬀ. If the IMC bodies do ﬁnd some ﬁnancial resources and hire 
their own staﬀ, there is the problem of retaining highly qualiﬁed staﬀ, even if the IMC 
body is one with a relatively good ﬁnancial status as is the case of the metropolitan zone 
studied here. We should also mention that IMC staﬀ members do not have the status of 
civil servant and the legal protection that derives from it (for example legal protection 
in the case of whistle blowing). 
Another problematic area is related to ensuring ﬁnancial resources for the start-up of 
the IMC body. In all the cases examined there is an obvious reliance on external fund-
ing for the starting up of the joint delivery of services in diﬀerent areas. The ﬁnancial 
resources all Romanian local governments are willing to invest into IMC bodies (except 
maybe for cities such as Oradea or Cluj-Napoca), are relatively small and directly related 
to the share of own revenues in local budgets. If we look at the membership fees local 
governments pay to IMC bodies, we see that they are insigniﬁcant (amounts such as 
EUR 0.25 or 1.25 per year per inhabitant) if the local governments involved are rather 
small. When IMC is nascent, these fees, along with in-kind contributions (oﬃces, 
communication costs) are the sole source of funding for the IMC body. Transfers from 
the local governments to the IMC body are possible only by a local council decision 
and this usually happens if there is a need to co-fund a speciﬁc project. These transfers 
mostly come from the county councils, with some county councils only joining IMC 
bodies because this would ease fund transferring—instead of passing funds down to 
local governments that will transfer to the IMC body, the transfer happens directly. 
The challenge for all IMC bodies seems to be that of surviving until the ﬁrst external 
project-based grant is obtained, which can be a rather long time, and raises the question 
of what would be the possible alternative solution to paying the start up cost. 
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When asked about the main diﬃculties the IMC body was confronted with and 
how they were surpassed, along with the obvious reluctance to cooperate, representa-
tives of these entities mention: the complicated legal framework or the fact that legal 
framework was nonexistent when the IMC body was set up; conditioning introduced 
by funding programs, and the lack of information on how to do it. The latter was, in 
time, compensated by horizontal communication between local governments—in all 
the cases studied here, assistance was provided by the IMC body to other local govern-
ments trying to replicate the example.
7.4 Transparency and Political Control of IMC Operations
Both academics and practitioners focused intensely on the discussion of equity, eﬀective-
ness and eﬃciency in intermunicipal cooperation and less on the democratic quality 
of intermunicipal cooperation (see Kübler and Heinelt 2005). In a previous section 
we pointed to the existence of several legal provisions, addressing both aspects of IMC 
accountability approached here, political representation and technical aspects. 
Political control of IMC operations by democratically elected leaders (mayors and 
councils) is highly facilitated by the legal provisions that require a speciﬁc decision by 
each local council if public funds or public properties are involved. Since IMC bodies 
are generally at the stage in which they are preparing to implement projects focused 
on joint service delivery, they frequently need to turn to local councils for decisions 
on speciﬁc topics. This leads to a relatively high degree of control of IMC operations 
by mayors and councils. Mayors usually represent the local governments on the IMC 
boards, while in some cases each local government is represented in the general assembly 
of the IMC body by several local councilors. The direct involvement of mayors and 
councilors (and sometimes of civil servants on their behalf ) in IMC operations depends 
on the degree to which cooperation is institutionalized. If the IMC body works more 
like a policy network, mayors are highly involved (in one of the cases studied here this 
involvement goes as far as having the mayors themselves producing paperwork and 
solving logistical problems). This level of involvement is to some extent decreased if the 
IMC body works more like a standing organization and has its own staﬀ. Generally, 
representatives of the IMC bodies interviewed by us acknowledged this as a sensitive 
issue that receives a great deal of attention.
Legal provisions do mention the need to ensure that local governments are repre-
sented in IMC bodies (ICDAs and local public utility ICDAs) taking into account the 
“political conﬁguration.” While the law is not speciﬁc, in Romania political conﬁgura-
tion usually means representation of all political parties that hold seats in the council 
as a function of their relative weight. In the cases studied here, this is enforced only if 
the statute of the IMC body stipulates that the general assembly of the association will 
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include several representatives of each local government (as is the case in the Oradea 
Metropolitan Area). Usually though, the general assembly only includes a representative 
per local government and this representative is usually the mayor. From this point of 
view, Romania is much more similar to other European countries that provide for the 
representation of diﬀerent political forces in that it lacks detailed procedures (see Hulst 
and Montfort 2007b, 223). 
The fact that all key decisions need to be ﬁltered by the local councils places all 
information related to these decisions under the statutory legal provisions regarding 
freedom of information. The fact that information is available for interested citizens, 
local CSOs or journalists is evident in the local media coverage of IMC operations in 
all the cases studied here. In some speciﬁc cases there is even national media coverage of 
IMC operations. If citizens or local CSOs have complaints about IMC operation, they 
cannot address these complaints directly but they can approach the local councils. The 
degree of direct citizen involvement in IMC operation also seems to be connected to the 
degree of integration. In the case of standing organizations that went through the process 
of drafting a joint development strategy, diﬀerent citizen participation mechanisms (but 
mostly public debates) were used to consult citizens on the vision for development (in 
all four cases studied in which we found a strategy for development or at least a sketch 
of such a document). In the case of the Banat Ripensis Microregional Development 
Association we ﬁnd the highest degree of citizen involvement, as the IMC body runs 
actions to stimulate youth participation, citizen information and counseling through 
Citizen Advice Bureaus, and edits a newsletter providing citizens with information on 
its activities and the activities of the member local governments.
From a technical perspective, at least minimal accountability mechanisms are in 
place in all the cases studied here. All IMC bodies have speciﬁc provisions requiring 
periodical (usually annual) narrative and ﬁnancial reports to be presented ﬁrst to the 
general assembly of the IMC body and then to the local councils. This is a very impor-
tant aspect, since there is no speciﬁc legal provision in the dedicated legal framework 
that even mentions the notions of narrative and ﬁnancial reports. There are of course 
diﬀerences in terms of the degree of complexity of these reports from one case to the 
other. Deriving from their public utility status (and from a special law on this topic), 
ICDAs and local public utilities ICDAs are compelled to publish an annual report in 
the oﬃcial bulletin, similar to an obligation instituted for local governments. Not even 
local governments comply with this.
In terms of performance accountability mechanisms, we have the situation of a legal 
provision aimed at ensuring such accountability but is not applicable in practice. Even 
though they have the legal obligations to do so, local governments have not established 
bureaus in charge of monitoring the quality and cost of the services provided by the 
IMC, mainly because this involves supplementary staﬀ being hired or staﬀ re-allocated 
from a diﬀerent bureau. Only one local government from the ones involved in the IMC 
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bodies studied here has taken the legal steps to change the diagram and create this bureau 
and, unsurprisingly, it is the largest and the richest. 
7.5 Vertical and Cross-Border Cooperation
The cases approached here, as well as other background information on IMC opera-
tion in Romania, point to some interesting aspects usually left outside the scope of the 
concept, but which are highly relevant if placed in the local context. 
Usually, intermunicipal cooperation refers to cooperation between ﬁrst tier local 
governments. In Romania the legal framework allows second tier local governments
—counties—to be members of IMC bodies. Therefore, as reﬂected by the inventory of 
IMC in Romania, we have a signiﬁcant number of cases in which in the same IMC body 
we have ﬁrst and second tier local governments. As quantitative data show, three situa-
tions are more frequent when it comes to the involvement of counties in IMC. The ﬁrst 
situation is the one in which a county council is a member of all the IMCs established 
by municipalities from the respective county. It is the case of Mureş, where the county 
council sees IMC bodies as a vehicle toward implementing its own development plans 
and applies this logic in its interactions with them (as reﬂected by strategic documents 
of the county council and Pop and Horvath 2008). County councils become involved 
for two possible reasons: the desire to supervise what the municipalities do (not as a 
result of legal provisions but a stated fact in many counties) or simply because of the 
need to facilitate the transfer of funds whenever necessary. 
Another situation in which county councils are also directly involved with IMC 
results from the structure of EU funding. Funding for regional emergency services for all 
eight development regions in Romania is available via the REGIO program (European 
Regional Fund) but only for one regional project per development region that must 
be implemented in association by all counties in the region. Therefore, ICDAs made 
up strictly of county councils were created in order to ensure access to such funding. 
A third situation related to county involvement in IMC goes back to the year 2002 
when, again in view of EU funding, associations of local governments, county councils 
and private companies delivering services were created in each county to prepare for 
county level, service delivery integrated projects in areas such as waste management and 
water supply and sewage. 
Among these situations the ﬁrst one deserves special attention since with these forms 
of vertical cooperation there is a risk of losing policy discretion in exchange for access 
to upper government level resources (Hulst and Montfort 2007b, 231). This tendency 
is reinforced by the 2008 changes to law no. 51/2006 regarding local public utilities 
services (introducing the local public utility ICDA). These changes stipulated that, 
in the case where the infrastructure resulting from IMC is not limited to the territory 
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of one local government and the county council is a member of the association, the 
county council automatically becomes the owner of the infrastructure, which gives 
it leverage. 
Vertical cooperation also produced some positive results in terms of stimulating IMC 
and providing support to ﬁrst tier local governments experimenting with IMC. Often, 
county councils built upon the positive experience of one IMC body and disseminated 
information about this practice to other local governments—such as the Vâlcea County 
Council, which shared information about one of the IMC bodies studied here with other 
ﬁrst tier local governments from the county, or, to a lesser extent, the Cluj County Council. 
In Braşov and Tulcea, we have county level IMC bodies focused on development, com-
prising almost all ﬁrst tier local governments in the county, created and eﬀectively led by 
the county councils. This county council driven process resulted in remarkable success in 
terms of accessing external funding for county level and community level projects, however 
local governments did seem to lose some of their policy discretion. 
Another aspect worth mentioning is the obvious link that two of the IMC bodies 
studied here have managed to establish between IMC and cross-border cooperation. In 
the case of the Oradea Metropolitan Area, there is an obvious tendency towards closer 
cross-border cooperation based on “hard” issues, due to the interdependency between the 
ZMO member local governments and some of the nearby Hungarian local governments. 
Based on an EU incentive, the other form of cross-border intermunicipal cooperation 
that seems to gain ground is the European Group for Territorial Cooperation. The case 
of the Banat-Ripensis Microregional Development Association and its cross-border 
activities focused on issues such as local economic development also brings evidence in 
support of the idea that sometimes the term intermunicipal cooperation also expands 
to include cross-border activity.
7.6 Reframing the Policy Problem
This investigation emphasized that the eﬀectiveness of IMC in Romania should ﬁrst and 
foremost be judged, at least at this point, through the lens of the economies of scope. 
All the cases studied here, and knowledge of other cases as well, suggest that IMC is 
extremely eﬀective in setting up public services (especially local public utilities services) 
in areas where they did not exist before. By pooling their resources together, even some 
of the more disadvantaged local governments manage signiﬁcant steps in improving 
their services. This leads to positive evaluations when it comes to the cost-beneﬁt ratio 
of cooperation. We might even say that because of this, IMC in Romania is still in its 
“honeymoon period.”
Economies of scale are not yet visible in the area of local public utilities services, 
where they are expected, because most IMC bodies are still working on feasibility 
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studies, writing funding applications or are just beginning project implementation. At 
this point, economies of scale are visible if we look at IMC bodies as fundraising and 
project management oﬃces for the member municipalities (something to be found in 
all cases studied here).
Data does show a tendency towards functional fragmentation in cases where local 
governments started directly with multi-purpose cooperation, a tendency that, apart 
from the technical character of some areas (which naturally fueled fragmentation), 
seems to be enhanced by legal provisions and the eligibility requirements of funding 
programs in the area of local public utilities. This fragmentation eventually undermines 
the extent to which the regional logic gains the upper hand (with consequences for 
policy coordination and collective action) and even leads to some multi-purpose IMC 
bodies regressing from standing organizations to mere policy networks. 
When discussing the degree of functional integration, the cases of the metropoli-
tan areas should be mentioned. The Oradea Metropolitan Area is probably the most 
successful example of IMC in Romania, but the complicated institutional structure 
that was built in order to support this success does point to the need for better regu-
lation in this area. 
Another important feature of intermunicipal cooperation in Romania is the “frenzy 
of cooperation” that resulted from the incentives used by the central government, as 
pointed out by the cases of territorial overlapping of multi-purpose IMC with identical 
purposes. This reduces the level of involvement on behalf of the local governments and 
the chances that the IMC body will be a success. This problem has been singled out 
before, Pop, Stănuş, and Suciu (2007) suggesting as a possible solution that the central 
government prohibit by law local governments from entering two IMC bodies with 
identical purposes simultaneously. 
A look at the inner workings of IMC bodies suggests that the highly complicated 
decision-making procedures prescribed by the law do aﬀect the speed of decision-making, 
but they also ensure that local councils exert a higher degree of control over IMC opera-
tions, which is why they are accepted as such and coped with. 
Human resources and start-up costs seem to be a problematic area for IMC oper-
ations—a consequence of the size and the ﬁnancial resources of the local governments 
involved. Future policy in this area should deﬁnitely address this topic.
While political control of IMC operations by the local councils is generally 
achieved, the quantity and quality of information provided to the citizens still requires 
improvement, along with the implementation of several legal provisions deriving from 
the public utility status of ICDAs and the public institution status of the local public 
utility ICDAs.
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8. POLICY OPTIONS
The image depicted here of the eﬀectiveness and accountably of intermunicipal coop-
eration in Romania, suggests the need for the ﬁne-tuning of policy in this area. Any 
policy proposal should however take into account a key aspect. Local governments 
experimented with IMC in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, but a dedicated legal framework 
for IMC was only introduced in 2006. The legal framework was introduced without 
some of the promised minimal support measures. Moreover, it had to be changed in 
January 2008, since local governments pointed that some of the provisions regarding 
local public utilities ICDAs were problematic and hindering their eﬀorts to achieve 
something. Legal framework is usually mentioned as the main cause of problems 
during the establishment of the IMC body, after the reluctance to cooperate. Local 
governments have barely made it through the adjustment to the legal framework pe-
riod. Consequently, we believe that in the short and medium term policy in this area 
should include no or minimal corrections to the legal provisions and be focused on 
the policy and institutional elements in order to stimulate IMC.
The goals that should be at the center of future policy in this area are:
  to further stimulate the set up of IMC bodies, especially of those involving only 
rural areas local governments;
  to stimulate the institutional development of existing IMC along with higher 
organizational integration of IMC bodies and diminish tendencies toward 
fragmentation of IMC;
  to increase compliance with transparency and citizen access to information-
related legal provisions and thus accountability to the citizen;
  to improve the informational environment and, by doing so, to facilitate hori-
zontal communication between local governments on IMC related issues. 
Three possible approaches to this policy problem can be envisioned within this 
context. 
Option 1
Status Quo. This option assumes that, given the current state of IMC in Romania, all 
the problems identiﬁed will be solved over time without changes to policy or to the legal 
and institutional environment. This assessment of current IMC practices in Romania 
demonstrated that very successful cases exist. Of course, certain conditions seem to have 
facilitated this success, such as the leadership and human resources provided by a larger, 
richer, usually urban local government. Small, poor, rural local governments do not, at 
this moment, have the resources that would facilitate the success of IMC initiatives. If 
the general economic conditions improve in Romania, we can expect some improvement 
in the ﬁnances, human resources and, consequently, the administrative capacity of these 
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local governments. These could reﬂect in the success of possible IMC initiatives. Such 
evolution can only be expected in the long term, with the issue of fairness to small local 
governments still outstanding. 
Option 2
Adjustments to the Legal Framework. The second option advocates for incremental change 
and supports minor changes to the legal framework for intermunicipal cooperation in 
Romania. These changes would involve a limitation that would take into account the 
purposes of the associations. Local governments would be forbidden to adhere to two IMC 
bodies with identical purposes. Other changes should approach the issue of metropolitan 
areas, namely by introducing minimal requirements regarding the equitable representa-
tion of small local governments (protecting them in their relationships with cities). Other 
small changes would involve an adjustment of the eligibility criteria of funding programs 
for local governments to the natural tendency towards integrated IMC. This would allow 
services beneﬁting from those grants to be managed by multi-purpose IMC bodies. 
Option 3
Fine-Tuning—Information, Support and Funding. This option involves a signiﬁcant 
but not radical change of policy in the area of intermunicipal cooperation, without 
interfering with the legal framework. The main components of this option are in-
formation, support, and ﬁnancing. Information involves a mix of capacity building 
for civil servants in charge of setting up and working with IMC bodies, drafting 
and distributing a toolkit for intermunicipal cooperation in Romania, and gener-
ally improving the informational environment for IMC in Romania. The support 
component would focus on building a national network of support for local govern-
ments involved in IMC bodies, preferably by networking experts currently working 
for diﬀerent IMC bodies or local governments involved in such bodies. The funding 
component would involve the establishment of a program, limited to rural area local 
governments, for funding the start-up costs of multi-purpose IMC bodies, with the 
grants ideally covering administrative and staﬀ-related costs (salaries and training) 
for the ﬁrst operational year of the respective body.
Each of these policy options needs to be weighed, taking into account the policy 
goals formulated above. Along with these goals, we should also take into account a 
series of constraints, most of them discussed at diﬀerent points in this paper, such as 
the acceptability of certain measures to both central and local governments, ﬁnancial 
aspects, and the risks associated with an unwanted change in legal provisions that could 
arise out of parliamentary debates. Another element to consider in this discussion is the 
imbalances in size and human and ﬁnancial resources between diﬀerent kinds of local 
governments. These kinds of imbalances give (mostly rural) small local governments a 
handicap from the get go. The following table comparatively analyzes the three policy 
options, taking into account speciﬁc goals and constraints.
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The third policy option presented above addresses best the goals and values we be-
lieve should inform policy in this area. In terms of constraints it is of course the most 
expensive option, and this the main argument against it. The main argument in its favor 
is time, as it would take less time to produce the desired eﬀects in terms of consequences 
for development. However, while being costless in terms of public funds, the constraints 
aﬀecting the second policy option are equally important without addressing the goals 
and values in the same manner. The ﬁrst policy option is the most simple, but its main 
disadvantage is addressing only some of the concerns resulting from this investigation 
and only over a very long time. 
9. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper has approached intermunicipal cooperation in Romania with a focus on 
how to improve the accountability and eﬀectiveness of existing IMC. We placed this 
study into a comparative context, with ﬁndings on IMC in Western and Eastern Europe 
informing the investigation and the policy options. Intermunicipal cooperation in Ro-
mania was approached with the intention of balancing the conclusions of a quantitative 
investigation focused on identifying patterns (reﬂected in section VI), an in-depth look 
at relevant case studies (reﬂected in section VII), and a critical look at the legal, policy 
and institutional framework existing in Romania. This analysis is highly context-based, 
as it takes into account the pressures local governments in Romania face.
As previously mentioned, it is not our intention to advocate for radical changes to 
policy regarding intermunicipal cooperation in Romania. We do propose some measures 
that will help rationalize IMC in Romania, increase eﬀectiveness and fairness to small 
local governments, and increase the accountability of IMC bodies to citizens. The main 
recommendations resulting from this study are:
  Capacity building for local governments and IMC bodies. This would be most 
easily done by including training modules on IMC related topics (facilitation 
skills, contract management, project development and management skills, 
cooperation and negotiation skills) in the curriculum of the governmental 
structure in charge of civil servants’ training (as local governments are compelled 
periodically to send civil servants to receive training from this agency). 
  Development and dissemination of an IMC Toolkit. The respective toolkit 
should address possible types of IMC, emphasize the degree of interdependency 
and policy externalities as a key factor in any decision made to cooperate, address 
all legal status and technical issues, provide speciﬁc information to discourage 
territorial overlapping IMC, detail transparency and citizen information aspects, 
and showcase best practices in each of these respects.
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  Creation of a special register of IMC bodies as a subsection of the Ministry 
of Justice’s National Register of Associations and Foundations. This would 
facilitate impact assessments as well as horizontal communication between 
local governments (transmission of expertise, information, problem solving). 
Such communication already exists and was essential to increasing the eﬀective-
ness of IMC in Romania, but was hindered by the fact that the only way local 
governments were able to identify an IMC body with a similar situation and 
more experience, was word of mouth. This would not require legal changes but 
simply a decision by the Ministry of Justice.
  Set up a national network linking practitioners from existing IMC bodies and 
use it to disseminate good practices. This will work as a consultation resource for 
all policy regarding IMC and public services; and as an informational resource for 
local governments and IMC bodies. Such a network can be set up and facilitated 
by the federation of the IMC bodies (if plans to create it materialize) or by one of 
the three associations of municipalities. Alternatively, the Central Unit for Local 
Public Administration Reform could establish and maintain this network.
  Establish a national funding program for IMC. This will be limited to IMC 
bodies covering strictly rural areas and will provide start-up grants that will 
pay for the administrative and staﬀ costs for one year and for the drafting of a 
development strategy. 
  Collect statistical data regarding IMC. Currently the National Institute for 
Statistics does not collect any information on existing IMC bodies, while the 
information provided by the Ministry of Finance is incomplete and almost 
impossible to use. As IMC bodies are taking over critical public services such as 
water supply or waste management, they will account for an increasing share of 
local government spending. This would again involve decisions by the respective 
components of the central government, without changes to the legal framework.
  Establish a review mechanism for policy regarding IMC. This and other inves-
tigations can only account for the suitability of policy in a context in which the 
emphasis in IMC is on achieving economies of scope and attracting external 
funding for joint projects. We do not know at this point how this policy will 
aﬀect the functioning of IMC bodies when they pass this stage and become 
simply service providers. We suggest that in approximately ﬁve years the central 
government (through the Ministry of the Interior) conduct an in-depth impact 
assessment and see whether a revision of policy is necessary. 
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NOTES 
1 Currently, due to website reorganization by the UCRAP, these presentations are no longer 
available. 
2 Interestingly enough, this report mentions as “novel” the approach of the Bulgarian govern-
ment that, similar to Romania, chose to create a legal framework and leave the decision 
regarding IMC entirely at the discretion of the local governments. 
3 The primary legal framework for intermunicipal cooperation in Romania is made up of 
the following pieces of legislation: Law No. 246 from 2005 regarding associations and 
foundations; Law No. 351 from 2001 regarding the approval of the National Territorial 
Plan—Section IV on the network of municipalities; Law No. 195 from 2006—framework-
law on decentralization; Law No. 213 from 1998—law of public property; Law No. 215 
from 2001—law of local public administration including ulterior modiﬁcations made in 
2006; Law No. 315 from 2004 regarding regional development in Romania; Law No. 51 
from 2006 regarding community public utilities services including ulterior modiﬁcations 
made in 2008; Law No. 554 from 2004 regarding the contestation of administrative acts; 
Law No. 554 from 2004 including ulterior modiﬁcation made in 2007; Law No. 96 from 
2003 regarding the outline-statute of administrative-territorial units. I was asked to clean 
it up a bit, hopefully it is more manageable like this.
4 Following these guidelines: (a) out of the National Register of Associations and Foundations 
(September 30, 2008 data) we selected all associations with two or more ATUs as founding 
members. We included associations in which two or more ATUs cooperate with non-LG 
actors such as NGOs, private companies, individuals; (b) out of this list we selected only 
associations with a listed purpose connected to municipal activities (198 associations); (c) 
for each of these associations we collected the following information: reference number, 
name, county, year of establishment, number of members, types of members (counties, 
large urban ATUs—Bucharest and county capitals, small urban ATUs, communes), purpose 
of the associations; (d) based on this information we tried to distinguish between NGOs, 
ICDAs, and metropolitan area ICDAs. However, we were unable to distinguish between 
ICDAs established based on the provisions of the Law on Local Public Administration and 
local public utilities ICDAs established on the basis of the provisions of Law No. 51/2006 
on Local Public Utility Services.
5 Although, according to law the administrative-territorial units (ATUs) are the founding 
members of the organization, the register records the names of the mayors as founding 
members. Even though ICDAs receive public utility status by default at their establishment, 
the National Register of Associations and Foundations does not account for this status, which 
would actually facilitate the distinction between NGOs and ICDAs. For some cases, the 
type of IMC was established based on prior knowledge of the respective cases. Separating 
associations set up by ATUs into NGOs and ICDAs was possible based on the following 
criteria: name (whether it contained the term “inter-community”) and type of members (if 
an NGO, a private company or another non-local government actor is listed as founding 
member then the organization can only be an NGO).
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6 Since the legal framework and eligibility criteria for funding sometimes force the same 
municipalities to create diﬀerent IMC bodies for diﬀerent services, more than one category 
might describe the same case.
7 No resemblance to the French model of communautés urbaines should be inferred from 
this name, since the legal framework in Romania does not allow for such a similarity. This 
name was chosen because the initiatiors hoped that in the future their cooperation would 
result in something similar to the ComAGA (communauté urbaine from the Angoulême 
region in France) with whom contacts were established.
8 The Horezu Depression Association had, at the moment when data was collected, ﬁve 
members, but was in the process of formally expanding membership to 10 members.



